{"id":12816,"date":"2025-05-19T14:42:14","date_gmt":"2025-05-19T12:42:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=12816"},"modified":"2025-05-21T14:43:28","modified_gmt":"2025-05-21T12:43:28","slug":"money-laundering","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/money-laundering\/","title":{"rendered":"Egypt\u2019s Money Laundering Crisis: Billions Unchecked, Accountability Absent"},"content":{"rendered":"

On April 27, Egypt\u2019s Public Prosecutor<\/a> announced the referral of 273 money laundering cases to economic criminal courts within a single year\u2014a stark indicator of the widespread nature of this crime in the country. Behind this large figure lie deeper questions about the effectiveness of the state\u2019s oversight bodies and their capacity to detect or prosecute such crimes. The announcement also reflects accumulated institutional failures that have allowed money laundering networks to embed themselves within the Egyptian economy. Although Egypt is a signatory to international conventions against money laundering and terrorism financing, and has a specialized unit within the Central Bank dedicated to this purpose, the persistent rise in the number of cases raises pressing concerns.<\/p>\n

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The statement noted that the total sums involved in these cases over one year amounted to: 7,748,472,866 pounds<\/a> ($154,969,457) (seven billion, seven hundred forty-eight million, four hundred seventy-two thousand, eight hundred sixty-six pounds), $319,313,495 (three hundred nineteen million, three hundred thirteen thousand, four hundred ninety-five U.S. dollars), \u20ac4,059,455 (four million, fifty-nine thousand, four hundred fifty-five euros), and \u00a3552,930 (five hundred fifty-two thousand, nine hundred thirty British pounds).<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Although the announcement was published as evidence of the state\u2019s effectiveness in combating such crimes, it sparked controversy\u2014not only due to the size of the figures but also because it lacked any details about the nature of the cases or their outcomes. Analytical readings of the figures point to an unprecedented expansion of the phenomenon and reveal deep institutional and structural gaps that have enabled illicit funds to penetrate the financial system, according to observers who spoke to Zawia3.<\/p>\n

Most troubling, according to experts, is the absence of answers to fundamental questions regarding the percentage of these cases relative to total reports received, the number of reports dismissed, the nature of the verdicts issued, and, most importantly, the unknown volume of undisclosed cases\u2014which raises many questions. This lack of transparency undermines the credibility of the official numbers and turns what could have been a marker of progress into a warning signal revealing the depth of the crisis.<\/p>\n

Despite more than two decades since the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit<\/a> within the Central Bank of Egypt in 2002, the unit does not publish detailed annual reports disclosing the number of reports, investigation outcomes, or the effectiveness of cooperation with the Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office\u2014as is evident on its official website. This reflects a weak institutional foundation for transparency at a time when Egypt\u2019s economic climate demands clear reassurance for both local and foreign investors.<\/p>\n

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International and local reports<\/a> estimate Egypt\u2019s informal economy at between 30% to 40% of the GDP, making it a fertile ground for money laundering activities, especially amid weak oversight and the difficulty of financial tracking. Data from the Anti-Money Laundering Unit shows a significant rise in suspicious financial activity reports in recent years. Yet official entities have not disclosed the total volume of laundered money or the number of judicial rulings issued, reflecting broader challenges in transparency and oversight. Regional reports\u2014such as those from the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)\u2014indicate that Egypt faces medium to high risks in the area of money laundering, particularly due to the existence of financial channels that lack sufficient regulation, including informal money transfer activities and undocumented business relationships.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

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ho Launders Money in Egypt?<\/h3>\n

The details of ongoing investigations<\/a> reveal a striking diversity in the sources of illicit funds, underscoring the widespread and deeply embedded nature of money laundering in Egypt. This crime is primarily linked to specific sectors, including informal currency trading, real estate investment, gold trading, and the creation of shell companies or NGOs used as fronts to funnel funds into the formal financial system.<\/p>\n

In addition, the expansion of the informal economy, estimated to represent around 40% of Egypt\u2019s GDP, creates fertile ground for money laundering activities. These sectors lack sufficient oversight and allow funds to circulate with minimal traceability. Observers note that some laundering networks exploit loopholes in the banking system, including weak enforcement of Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations in some financial institutions.<\/p>\n

In numerous cases, individuals with economic or political influence are suspected of involvement in laundering operations\u2014whether through construction firms or large commercial ventures used to clean money from illicit sources. Yet due to a lack of transparency in investigations and limited public information about those involved, the true scope of these networks remains unclear. Some cases suggest possible involvement of foreign entities or cross-border smuggling operations, but such cases often remain stuck in court or end in undisclosed settlements, amid media silence and a lack of parliamentary or public accountability.<\/p>\n

Despite the absence of detailed annual statistics, available data reveals a clear increase in money laundering cases over the past five years. Several cases publicized by security authorities point to the emergence of complex networks involving government employees and commercial entities, reflecting the severity of the issue and its penetration into multiple sectors.<\/p>\n

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In 2020<\/a>, Egypt\u2019s Ministry of Interior reported the seizure of 1.3 billion pounds ($26,000,000) in connection with eight cases involving money laundering, bribery, and illicit enrichment. That same year, security efforts also led to the detection of over 1,600 cases of tax evasion and public funds theft. In February 2020, one of the largest laundering cases occurred when 17 people, including postal authority employees, were arrested for creating fake accounts used to transfer around 1.69 billion pounds ($33,800,000). Investigations revealed that the money was used to finance illegal migration, currency trading, and drug trafficking.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Tasneem Ammar, a master\u2019s researcher in governance and anti-corruption and Deputy Director of Projects at the World Organization for Al-Azhar Graduates, told Zawia3 that money laundering is one of the most critical threats facing the Egyptian economy over the past decade. According to her, these crimes have risen significantly since 2020.<\/p>\n

One of the key reasons behind this increase, Tasneem explained, is the technological advancement that facilitates cross-border money transfers, alongside intense competition among illicit actors to exploit gaps in financial systems.<\/p>\n

Reports from the Central Bank of Egypt indicate that weak regulatory systems and poor law enforcement have fostered a fertile environment for such illegal activities. Moreover, lack of coordination among oversight agencies and low awareness of money laundering risks have worsened the situation.<\/p>\n

Tasneem explained, \u201cIn some cases, temporary banking channels and advanced encryption technologies were used to conceal identities and suspicious transactions. The Anti-Money Laundering Unit has documented real-world cases involving sophisticated international networks aiming to move criminally obtained funds.\u201d<\/p>\n

She added, \u201cMoney laundering crimes have had a major impact on the national economy, causing massive financial losses estimated in the billions of pounds between 2020 and the present. Statistical studies show that these losses have reached around 3% of GDP in some years, negatively affecting foreign and local investment and resulting in capital flight. These activities also undermine trust in the financial system and obstruct oversight and transparency efforts.\u201d<\/p>\n

Furthermore, according to Tasneem, money laundering contributes to the spread of corruption and the erosion of the legal system, as some money launderers exploit lax oversight to expand their illicit operations. While oversight authorities have taken some steps, poor inter-agency coordination continues to hinder access to accurate data, preventing an immediate and effective response to this phenomenon.<\/p>\n

Tasneem continued: \u201cTo overcome the problem of money laundering, practical solutions are needed\u2014particularly those that strengthen legal and regulatory frameworks. Reports by the Central Bank and the Anti-Money Laundering Unit stress the importance of enhancing cooperation between relevant bodies both domestically and internationally to exchange information and track suspicious financial activities.\u201d<\/p>\n

She added, \u201cEffective solutions include upgrading the digital infrastructure of financial systems, developing modern encryption protocols, and imposing strict penalties on violators. Raising awareness among users and financial institutions is also essential\u2014awareness programs and training are key components of any effort to combat this threat.\u201d<\/p>\n

She concluded: \u201cSome government and private sector initiatives have achieved notable success. Statistics show a 15% drop in laundering-related crimes since the implementation of new measures. As part of its oversight role, the Financial Regulatory Authority, alongside the Anti-Money Laundering Unit, continues to activate permanent monitoring mechanisms and update laws to align with global developments\u2014facilitating the early identification and reporting of suspicious transactions.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Lack of Transparency and Ineffective Deterrence<\/h3>\n

Zohdy El-Shamy, an economist and leading member of the Popular Socialist Alliance Party, told Zawia3 that the rapid and unexpected developments in Egypt\u2019s economic landscape reflect a lack of transparency and a lack of clarity and stability in public administration. He said, \u201cWe are constantly surprised by news of major companies suddenly shutting down branches\u2014most recently a well-known food chain that closed over 130 branches at once, amid conflicting reports of food safety violations and leaked suspicions of money laundering. Yet the state has not clearly announced the facts or the outcome of any investigations.\u201d<\/p>\n

El-Shamy added that the swift resolution of the matter, despite the gravity of the circulating accusations, raises suspicion: \u201cIf these were merely health violations, does it make sense to shut down all those branches so abruptly? And if there was suspicion of money laundering, how was it settled within two weeks without trial? This reflects a broader state of opacity that now dominates Egypt\u2019s economic climate.\u201d He continued, \u201cWe are living in an environment of extreme ambiguity, where the absence of regulatory oversight intersects with the interference of powerful entities in various economic sectors\u2014creating fertile ground for conflicts of interest and unchecked corruption.\u201d<\/p>\n

The economist emphasized that the government bears much of the responsibility, stating: \u201cFor years, government policy has relied on hot money, whether through the stock market or debt instruments, to cover the foreign currency deficit. Despite promises not to repeat this strategy after the 2021 crisis, the approach continues\u2014deepening the fragility of the national economy.\u201d<\/p>\n

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On the weakness of oversight bodies, El-Shamy said: \u201cIt is unfortunate that security agencies show strong performance in expression and opinion cases, while appearing completely ineffective in fraud and money laundering crimes. I personally fell victim to an online fraud attempt, and I know dozens of similar cases. Despite submitting all relevant data\u2014account numbers, names, and phone numbers\u2014no one was held accountable.\u201d He emphasized the regulatory and legal fragility that encourages manipulation: \u201cIt\u2019s inexplicable that all this fraud happens without the state being able to track down those responsible, despite clear evidence. The real solution lies in changing the state\u2019s mode of governance entirely, because the current system has clearly failed to protect citizens and the economy alike.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Regarding sectors that show suspicious inflation, El-Shamy said: \u201cReal estate remains one of the most commonly used fronts for money laundering. But there are also companies and projects launched across different regions that do not align with actual market demand or economic activity, and some are owned by foreign entities.\u201d He stressed that what is happening \u201crequires explanation and scrutiny by the responsible authorities,\u201d warning that continued ambiguity and official indifference will only deepen disruption in the market and society.<\/p>\n

From his side, Karim El-Omda, professor of political economy, told Zawia3 that money laundering is not exclusive to Egypt but a global phenomenon. He explained that \u201cthe issue is not just about having deterrent laws\u2014the real challenge lies in the detection mechanisms, which are highly complex even in major countries.\u201d<\/p>\n

El-Omda added that several well-known countries are deeply involved in money laundering: \u201cAfrica, particularly the Congo, is notorious for laundering operations, as are Iran, Turkey, Dubai, Algeria, and even Switzerland, where illicit funds are estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.\u201d He noted that money laundering harms the economy because it is not driven by profitability or feasibility studies, but rather by the need to justify large cash flows from suspicious sources.<\/p>\n

The political economy professor pointed out that the sectors most commonly used in money laundering include:
real estate, cinemas, bars, caf\u00e9s, and massage and beauty centers\u2014all of which offer services with variable pricing and lack precise oversight of customer volume or actual revenue. \u201cDeclared profits are used as a front, with money deposited into banks to make it appear as legal business income, giving it a legal cover and allowing criminals to expand their operations,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n

El-Omda affirmed that money laundering will persist as long as illegal activities such as drug trafficking, antiquities smuggling, prostitution, organ trade, and arms dealing continue to exist. \u201cThose who operate in these fields always seek legal facades to conceal the sources of their funds,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n

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The United Nations defines<\/a> money laundering as \u201cthe process of managing proceeds from crimes to disguise their illegal origin.\u201d This process is critical because it allows the offender to enjoy the proceeds without exposing the source to legal risk. The UN Convention in Vienna (1988) addressed money laundering in Article 3.1, describing it as: \u201cThe conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from any criminal offense, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person involved in the offense to evade the legal consequences of their actions.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Additionally, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) includes provisions on combating money laundering in Articles 6 and 7, while Articles 12, 13, and 14 address the confiscation of criminal proceeds. The UN Convention against Corruption (2003) also contains measures to combat money laundering in Articles 14, 23, and 24.<\/p>\n

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What Does Newspaper Content Analysis Reveal?<\/strong><\/h3>\n

As part of this investigation, Zawia3 conducted a systematic review of a sample of press coverage published in a number of Egyptian newspapers\u2014both state-owned and independent\u2014over the past few months to examine how money laundering issues are reported. The sample included major outlets such as Al-Ahram<\/em>, Al-Akhbar<\/em>, Al-Masry Al-Youm<\/em>, and Al-Shorouk<\/em>, in addition to online platforms like Youm7<\/em> and Masrawy<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Through an analysis of the content published in Egyptian newspapers, we found that most of the coverage focuses heavily on the official narrative when addressing money laundering cases. Reports primarily rely on statements from the Public Prosecutor, the Central Bank, or the Anti-Money Laundering Unit, without delving into the background of the phenomenon or initiating independent investigative work that could expose its broader dimensions. Coverage is largely brief and news-oriented, with a notable absence of analysis or interpretation, leaving readers with figures and statistics devoid of the context needed to grasp the scale and complexity of the issue.<\/p>\n

While some independent outlets\u2014such as Al-Masry Al-Youm<\/em> and Al-Shorouk<\/em>\u2014have covered specific money laundering cases, their reports tend to be cautious, especially when referencing powerful figures or state-affiliated entities.<\/p>\n

Additionally, money laundering cases are often presented within a narrative of official achievements by the Public Prosecution or security agencies, rather than being addressed as a serious economic phenomenon requiring systematic intervention. In some instances, money laundering is linked to other issues such as corruption, terrorism, or drug trafficking, but without examining how these are intertwined with the economic structure. The crucial link between the informal economy and money laundering operations\u2014vital to understanding the roots of the problem\u2014is rarely discussed, despite its significance according to experts.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the journalistic coverage lacks in-depth or investigative reporting that traces illicit money flows or exposes the networks that facilitate them. There is also a general absence of focus on the responsibility of financial institutions\u2014such as banks or NGOs\u2014that may serve as conduits for laundering funds. Furthermore, the social and economic impacts of money laundering\u2014such as distortion of market fairness, price manipulation, or the illegitimate redistribution of wealth\u2014are seldom addressed in a meaningful way.<\/p>\n

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Legal and Oversight Gaps: How Illicit Funds Escape Detection<\/h3>\n

Despite Egypt\u2019s engagement with the international anti-money laundering (AML) framework and its recent legislative updates, glaring loopholes persist that allow illicit funds to flow through formal financial channels undetected at early stages. These gaps are both legislative and operational, beginning with unclear definitions of certain predicate offenses tied to money laundering and extending to poor coordination among oversight and enforcement bodies.<\/p>\n

One of the most critical weaknesses lies in the absence of a unified, up-to-date database shared across judicial, financial, and security agencies. This fragmentation delays the tracing of financial flows and the ability to link related cases. Additionally, some financial institutions\u2014especially non-bank entities\u2014fail to strictly enforce Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations or report suspicious transactions, either due to limited technical capacity or fear of losing high-net-worth clients.<\/p>\n

In this context, Mohamed Fetouh, a high court appeals lawyer, told Zawia3 that while significant legislative advancements have taken place\u2014particularly the 2020 amendment to the AML law\u2014practical implementation remains deeply challenged. He cited key deficiencies, including the lack of an integrated database connecting state agencies, weak monitoring of cash-based transactions in certain sectors, the widespread use of shell companies whose real owners are hard to trace, and insufficient specialized training for frontline personnel responsible for detecting and analyzing suspicious financial activity.<\/p>\n

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Fetouh also highlighted the lack of strong legal protections for whistleblowers and witnesses, which discourages voluntary reporting of suspicious activity within institutions. Moreover, some oversight bodies are unable to access accounts or transfers conducted under the names of religious or charitable organizations due to social and political sensitivities.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

He emphasized that combating money laundering in Egypt requires more than just legislative reform; it demands actual enforcement and enhanced inter-agency coordination. He called for strict controls on large cash transactions and the creation of a central registry to disclose the ultimate beneficial owners of companies\u2014not just their legal representatives. He also advocated for awareness campaigns targeting the private sector and business owners to educate them about the risks of becoming unwitting participants in money laundering schemes.<\/p>\n

\u201cEgypt has made real legislative progress,\u201d Fetouh noted, especially since exiting the FATF grey list, but he added that countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are advancing faster\u2014through the establishment of independent financial intelligence units, and rigorous monitoring of money flows, particularly in real estate and investment sectors. According to him, certain activities are commonly used as money laundering fronts due to the difficulty of income verification. These include the real estate market (especially cash transactions outside the banking system), import-export firms, as well as caf\u00e9s, restaurants, and the used car trade. He also flagged football player transfers in Egypt as a growing laundering avenue, with money often sourced from drug trafficking, arms dealing, and antiquities smuggling.<\/p>\n

Fetouh also expressed concern over the lack of transparency in tracking political funds, particularly those tied to businesspeople or politicians with connections to power. He described this as a form of institutional complicity that helps perpetuate the problem. \u201cLaws alone will never be enough without a genuine political will grounded in transparency, economic justice, and equal accountability,\u201d he said. \u201cThere are individuals shielded from scrutiny because of their proximity to influential circles. This remains a major barrier to any meaningful reform of Egypt\u2019s AML system.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Egyptian law<\/a> outlines several AML procedures, most notably requiring financial institutions to implement KYC protocols to verify customer identities and scrutinize suspicious transactions. The Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit, housed within the Central Bank of Egypt, is tasked with monitoring suspicious activity and analyzing reports submitted by banks and financial firms.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

In terms of penalties, Egyptian law imposes severe consequences on individuals and entities involved in money laundering, including prison terms ranging from three to seven years, and heavy fines that may reach millions of pounds. Courts may also impose additional financial sanctions on companies that facilitate laundering, such as license revocation or fines levied on responsible executives. In some cases, life imprisonment is possible, especially if the offender is a high-ranking official or if the laundering involves complex or international networks.<\/p>\n

The law also punishes anyone who provides assistance or support for money laundering, including those who engage in suspicious transactions via informal financial channels or through fictitious companies. Nonetheless, despite these provisions, challenges in enforcement remain. Egypt continues to struggle with inconsistent oversight, weak transparency mechanisms, and the lack of regular public reporting\u2014all of which hinder effective AML implementation.<\/p>\n

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The Evolution of Money Laundering in Egypt (2015\u20132025)<\/h3>\n

In 2019, Egypt adopted its first National Risk Assessment (NRA) report for money laundering and terrorism financing, covering the period from 2014 to 2017. The report was prepared by the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit, in coordination with relevant authorities. It highlighted challenges in understanding and assessing money laundering risks, particularly in informal sectors and the unregulated economy.<\/p>\n

In 2021, Egypt approved the first update to its NRA, which covered the years 2018 and 2019. This updated assessment demonstrated improved risk identification and understanding, with a growing focus on enhancing inter-agency coordination and improving regulatory procedures.<\/p>\n

Additionally, in 2020, Egypt underwent an international evaluation conducted by the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). The process concluded in June 2021, and the final report indicated that Egypt had made notable progress in implementing international AML\/CFT standards, demonstrating a good understanding of risks and effective cooperation among involved entities.<\/p>\n

In July 2022, Egypt amended its Anti-Money Laundering Law under Law No. 154 of 2022, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit and expanding its powers. Furthermore, the country launched a National Strategy for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing covering the period from October 2023 to September 2025.<\/p>\n

However, the publicly disclosed figures related to money laundering cases reveal a worsening crisis\u2014one that cannot be addressed through slogans or superficial statements. Behind the billions in suspicious financial flows, lie legal, regulatory, and structural gaps that weaken the state\u2019s ability to detect money laundering in its early stages or even hold perpetrators accountable afterward.<\/p>\n

In a country where the informal economy accounts for nearly half of the GDP, and where regulatory agencies suffer from limited transparency and poor coordination, public trust is eroded, and ambiguity prevails. The crisis is not merely about financial crimes\u2014it reflects a broader governance failure and institutional inertia that enables corruption and impunity.<\/p>\n

Unless serious reforms are implemented\u2014focusing on transparency, oversight, and institutional accountability\u2014money laundering will not remain a distant threat. It will become a ticking time bomb that threatens the very fabric of Egypt\u2019s national economy.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Despite updated laws and global evaluations, Egypt faces a growing money laundering crisis fueled by legal loopholes, weak oversight, and institutional failure<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":12779,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[410],"tags":[11183,11184,11190,11187,11182,11186,11191,11185,11188,11189],"kateb":[6247],"class_list":["post-12816","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-investigations-en","tag-aml-egypt","tag-corruption-egypt","tag-economic-governance-egypt","tag-egypt-anti-money-laundering-law","tag-egypt-money-laundering","tag-fatf-egypt","tag-illicit-finance-networks","tag-informal-economy-egypt","tag-real-estate-laundering-egypt","tag-shell-companies-egypt","kateb-rasha-ammar"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/\u063a\u0633\u064a\u0644-\u0627\u0645\u0648\u0627\u0644-2.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12816","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12816"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12816\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12821,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12816\/revisions\/12821"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12779"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12816"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12816"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12816"},{"taxonomy":"kateb","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kateb?post=12816"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}