{"id":15776,"date":"2026-06-30T13:42:51","date_gmt":"2026-06-30T11:42:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=15776"},"modified":"2026-06-30T13:42:51","modified_gmt":"2026-06-30T11:42:51","slug":"deleted-lines-20","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/deleted-lines-20\/","title":{"rendered":"Land for the Army, Prison Cells for Dissidents: 1,700 Challenges to the Old Rent Law"},"content":{"rendered":"

Detentions over opinion, 1,700 constitutional challenges to the rent law, deaths in the detention of Sudanese refugees<\/em><\/p>\n

June witnessed a presidential decree granting the Armed Forces Engineering Authority exceptional privileges on the North Coast, and in the same month Ahmed Douma was sentenced to prison for an article, and Omneya Suwaydan was detained for her testimony about a cesarean section. 1,700 families filed constitutional challenges against the old rent law, and fifteen thousand dismissed employees awaited another challenge to the drug-testing dismissal law, while Egyptian authorities punished six Shia citizens and deported Sudanese refugees fleeing war to a country unprepared to receive them.<\/p>\n

In the twentieth edition of the Deleted Lines newsletter, we monitor all of this and more. Here are the details.<\/p>\n

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Political Parties and the Opposition<\/h1>\n

Politically, Zawia3 conducted two extended interviews in June with two of the most prominent faces of the Egyptian opposition, converging on a single question: why is the opposition unable to present a genuine alternative to authority, and where does the closed political space stand in relation to this failure.<\/p>\n

On 1 June, Zawia3 published its interview with politician and lawyer Ziad Elelaimy<\/a>, his first extended public appearance in years. Elelaimy offered a reading in which he sees Egypt’s crisis as structural, stretching across three hundred years of attempts to build a modern state, and argued that the January Revolution succeeded in bringing about change but failed to manage it, and that the only way out is transitional justice with its three stages: disclosure, then accountability, then building a new social contract, which the constitution mandated legislating eleven years ago without it ever being enacted. Elelaimy linked the political crisis to an economic one, as the external debt rose from approximately $46 billion in 2014 to approximately $165 billion, meaning approximately $119 billion in borrowing over twelve years without the citizen feeling its impact. He concluded that there is no genuine opposition without a clear system of governance and no political space, and that the political vacuum is always filled by extremism or explosion.<\/p>\n

On 23 June Zawia3 published its interview with former MP Ahmed Tantawi<\/a>, who responded directly to what was raised in the Elelaimy interview. He clarified that what some understood from Elelaimy’s reference to a meeting with “the second man” was constitutionally the Speaker of the House of Representatives who fills in for the President of the Republic in his absence, and who was the one he met with to warn him against the Hope Alliance, not any security or sovereign center of power as might be understood given the prevailing political structure. Tantawi recounted for the first time the behind-the-scenes details of founding the 2019 Hope Alliance and its four pillars, and how one of the party chairmen obstructed the issuance of the founding statement with successive objections, before the security strike came at dawn the following day with the arrest of five of his colleagues. He also revealed that he had requested the lifting of his parliamentary immunity to appear before investigators and was not responded to, and that the court refused to hear his testimony despite lawyer Khaled Ali’s confirmation that the leader of the alliance was present in the courtroom and ready to testify.<\/p>\n

The two interviews converge at a shared critique of the Civil Democratic Movement, as Tantawi sees its crisis as structural, lying in the evasion of two questions: who its members are, and how decisions are made within it, given the consensus mechanism that allows a single party to obstruct everyone. Elelaimy agreed that the opposition remained “acted upon” rather than an actor, and that it must put forward a vision for the future instead of settling for reaction. Tantawi warned that authority does not fear the opposition but fears the alternative, and revealed that the “Hope Current” party remains prevented from signing the powers of attorney necessary for its establishment and from renting premises, calling for the formation of a “Front for the Protection of the Constitution” that rejects any new constitutional amendment touching presidential term limits and closing the horizon for the peaceful transfer of power. He affirmed that what led to his year-long imprisonment was not forging powers of attorney but what was described as an electoral violation related to asking his supporters to retain powers of attorney they were prevented from notarizing, and that he spent that year with his campaign manager Mohamed Abu El-Diyar and a number of campaign members.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The two interviews also converged at the file of political enmity and re-detention. Elelaimy saw that Sayed Mashageb’s return to detention hours after his release following eleven years in prison, and Ahmed Douma’s re-detention because of something he said or an article he wrote, reveal a systemic malfunction, as a person is not tried for their opinion, and that the bigger problem is not Douma or Al-Iskandarani or Mashageb but the absence of any improvement that people can sense in their lives. Tantawi recounted that the authority’s harassment of the Hope Current went beyond preventing its establishment to restricting even the most basic activities, to the point that four members of its founding committee found no place in Dakahlia during Ramadan to break their fast after venues closed their doors to them one by one, and they sat on the ground, with Tantawi refusing to turn the incident into a media battle.<\/p>\n

In response, the Elelaimy interview drew a media reaction, as pro-government presenter Nashat Al-Dihy attacked the interview on his program on Ten TV, questioning whether “Zawia3” had a license, and saying that all its guests were “deeply wrong” and “adopt a single orientation” based on attacking the state, considering that what Elelaimy said goes beyond freedom of opinion and expression and touches the armed forces, the judiciary, and the political system. This is an attack that ignores that Zawia3 also hosts official sources and commits to offering the right to respond in its reports, making it incoherent to reduce a platform that publishes both a narrative and its opposite to “a single orientation.” The linking of coverage legitimacy to the licensing question also shifts the discussion from the content of what was said to an attempt to silence its speaker.<\/p>\n

Zawia3 also monitored what it described as the deepest crisis in the history of the Civil Democratic Movement<\/a> since its founding in December 2017. Its trigger was a statement the movement issued in solidarity with Conservatives Party chairman Akmal Qortem following the demolition of a palace he owns on the banks of the Nile, which the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation asserted was built in violation of the law and encroaching on the river’s protected corridor. The statement triggered a broad wave of anger because it conflated a legal dispute over private property with public and national causes such as Warraq Island and historic cemeteries, forcing the movement to withdraw it, apologize for it, and delete it from its page, while a number of parties disavowed it, foremost among them the Conservatives Party itself, which announced a reassessment of its alliances in preparation for a potential withdrawal. The Trustees Council meeting was postponed from 5 June to 12 June to calm the atmosphere and discuss the two options of comprehensive restructuring or dissolution. According to leaderships and researchers who spoke to Zawia3, the statement was merely a symptom of a structural crisis that had accumulated over years, rooted in organizational ossification, the consensus decision-making mechanism, and declining engagement with popular concerns, following a series of withdrawals that reduced its active parties to nine and the failure of the “Youth Secretariat” initiative launched in 2024 to inject new blood.<\/p>\n

Zawia3’s report traces the roots of the crisis back to a long trajectory of fragmentation. The movement, founded as an umbrella comprising twelve parties bringing together liberal, leftist, and nationalist currents, entered a phase of dormancy and restriction with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s second term in 2018, before returning to the forefront in April 2022 with the national dialogue invitation, then seeing its components diverge over participation in the 2023 presidential elections, with the membership of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and the Justice Party frozen, followed by the Reform and Development Party which left its seat as the 2025 elections approached, until its active parties shrank to nine and it became more reliant on public figures within the Trustees Council than on organized parties. The most recent parliamentary elections added a new layer with allegations targeting Islam Qortem, son of Akmal Qortem, over indirect coordination with candidates of the loyalist Mostaqbal Watan party and the use of political money, which the Conservatives Party denied. Political and human rights researcher Mostafa Shawky sees the crisis as an extension of the “comprehensive nationalization of the public sphere” that isolated civil forces from society, combined with an “ossified leadership” that squandered the opportunity for renewal after the national dialogue, while Akram Ismail, a leader within the movement and the Bread and Freedom Party, acknowledges that the security siege does not exempt it from responsibility for a statement that linked a personal matter to national causes at a moment of organizational flabbiness and weakened effectiveness.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

This is the same impasse pointed to by both Elelaimy and Tantawi in their interviews, between an old generation unwilling to cede the space and a new generation unable to take it over, in a public sphere that is narrowing for both simultaneously.<\/p>\n

The Civil Democratic Movement at Its Deepest Crisis: One Statement Exposed What Has Been Building Since 2017<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

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Economic Rights: June’s Decisions Touch the Lives of Millions<\/h1>\n

The End of In-Kind Subsidies: 70 Million Citizens Face a New System<\/h3>\n

June 2026 marked the month of the quiet revolution against the food subsidy system Egypt had lived with for decades. After intensive deliberations between the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Supply and Finance and the IMF mission in Cairo, the government officially announced its direction toward converting in-kind subsidies to cash support as of 1 July 2026, in a decision affecting approximately seventy million Egyptians currently registered on ration cards.<\/p>\n

Under the new system, the value of the support allocated per person will range between 300 and 350 Egyptian pounds ($5.77 and $6.73) per month, disbursed via a “smart card” rather than directly in cash, allowing the purchase of approximately 30 basic commodities from approved outlets. This value means a family of four will receive between 1,200 and 1,400 Egyptian pounds ($23.08 and $26.92) monthly. To put this figure in concrete terms: a kilogram of poultry has exceeded 90 Egyptian pounds ($1.73), a kilogram of sugar is 28 Egyptian pounds ($0.54) within the subsidized system and 50 Egyptian pounds ($0.96) on the open market, oil is around 100 Egyptian pounds ($1.92) per kilogram, and the subsidized bread loaf will be calculated at 1.5 Egyptian pounds ($0.03) instead of 20 piasters amid the continuation of partial government support. Pasta will be sold at market price with no direct subsidy.<\/p>\n

Supply Minister Sherif Farouk said that food subsidy allocations had risen to approximately 180 billion Egyptian pounds ($3.46 billion) annually, affirming that the state does not aim to reduce allocations but to direct them more efficiently. In parallel, the ministry removed approximately 850,000 citizens from the subsidy system during June under “social justice” criteria, while opening a window for complaints. Estimates suggest that between ten and twelve million additional people will exit the system after the new eligibility criteria are applied, which include income level, car ownership, agricultural holdings, and electricity consumption level. These criteria drew criticism from social experts who asked: how can economic capacity be accurately measured in a country with no organized wealth register, and what becomes of those who fall in the gray area between eligible and non-eligible and are not reached by the notification of exclusion?<\/p>\n

It is worth noting that management of the new subsidy system will not be limited to the Ministry of Supply, but it is anticipated that the “Future of Egypt Authority,” the economic arm of the military establishment, will play a pivotal role in agricultural production, storage, and distribution, prompting researchers to question the limits of civilian oversight over a system affecting the food security of more than half of Egypt’s population.<\/p>\n

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The Minimum Wage: A Number on Paper and a Gap in Reality<\/h3>\n

In June, raising the minimum wage to 8,000 Egyptian pounds ($153.85) was approved effective 1 July 2026 for civil service employees, with exceptional increases for teachers and health sector workers whose figures had not been officially determined by the end of the month. The government moved early to pay June salaries ahead of Eid Al-Adha. However, these figures sit in a zone of stark contradiction: labor reports indicate that thousands of employees in government and semi-government sectors still receive salaries below 3,500 Egyptian pounds ($67.31) due to pay grade and job classification problems, and that the scheduled salary increase amounts to 1,000 Egyptian pounds ($19.23) for those without a special pay grade, a nominal increase preceded by cumulative inflation that has eroded the pound by approximately 70% of its value over four years. By a simple calculation: the value of 8,000 Egyptian pounds today is equivalent to approximately $154, whereas it was worth more than $400 before the first waves of currency flotation.<\/p>\n

The situation in the private sector is not much different, as the Global Rights Index of the International Trade Union Confederation published in June found that at least 14 independent unions are unable to operate, depriving workers of any real bargaining tool to extract better wages. The irony is that the minimum wage increase was issued at the very same time in June that saw a strike by Cairo water workers over allowances delayed for ten years, and a sit-in by Ministry of Agriculture employees demanding salaries withheld for five years despite final judicial rulings ordering their disbursement.<\/p>\n

The New Labor Law: 42 Protests in 100 Days, and the Minimum Wage Is “Ink on Paper”<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

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Pensions: An Increase That Beats Inflation for the First Time, But Real Poverty Defies Numbers<\/h3>\n

The annual increase on pensions for approximately 11.5 million beneficiaries takes effect from the beginning of July, and for the first time in years it exceeds the projected inflation rate according to Central Bank data. This is a relative achievement that does not conceal the fact that the minimum pension remains below subsistence level in many cases. Someone receiving a pension of 1,800 Egyptian pounds ($34.62) a month pays from it alone a gas, electricity, and water bill averaging more than 400 Egyptian pounds ($7.69) monthly after the recent series of increases, plus rent if they are not a property owner, before any spending on food or medicine. Rights organizations expressed concern that the principle of “statistical improvement” conceals a deeper structural gap: small pension recipients live below subsistence even with the increase. It is also worth noting that the government announced in June its commitment to paying an annual installment to the National Social Insurance Authority starting at approximately 238 billion Egyptian pounds ($4.58 billion), though critics considered these adjustments to reorganize the financial dimension without addressing the actual deterioration in pension values.<\/p>\n

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Education Costs: Poverty Is Criminalized in Schools and Universities<\/h3>\n

In June, official language schools in several governorates issued warnings based on Ministerial Decree No. 224 of 2025, threatening students with unpaid tuition fees with the withholding of their results and compulsory transfer to government schools. Critics described this decision as converting poverty into a crime paid for by the child rather than the parent, treating education as a conditional bill rather than a constitutional right. The Ministry of Education announced fees for government schools for the new academic year 2026\/2027, including 100 Egyptian pounds ($1.92) for digital services and educational platforms, 12 Egyptian pounds ($0.23) for health insurance, alongside multiple subscriptions totaling between 250 and 350 Egyptian pounds ($4.81 and $6.73) at the preparatory and secondary levels, amounts that appear modest but burden many families amid inflation.<\/p>\n

On the private university front, Cairo Private University announced a 10% fee increase for new students in the 2026\/2027 academic year, while human medicine faculty fees at private universities reached between 150,000 and 165,000 Egyptian pounds ($2,884.62 and $3,173.08) annually, and British-partnership universities reached 330,000 Egyptian pounds ($6,346.15) for engineering. This means that a student at a private medical faculty needs the equivalent of 22 times the monthly minimum wage to pay for a single academic year. The Ministry of Higher Education does not intervene in setting these fees, leaving the matter to market mechanisms at a time when public university education is deteriorating under the weight of the teacher shortage and crumbling infrastructure, with the average student caught between a deteriorating public university and a private university beyond their reach.<\/p>\n

Egypt’s 400,000 Teacher Shortage: A New School Year With a Crisis Still Unresolved<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

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Social Protection<\/h3>\n

The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights published its analysis of the 2026-2027 fiscal year budget, concluding that tax revenues no longer cover half of public expenditures, and that approximately 48% of the state’s resources have become loans, after a decade of IMF programs. The analysis found declining allocations for subsidies, education, wages, and health in favor of debt servicing and interest payments, meaning that the burdens of public spending are concentrated in meeting financial obligations at the expense of direct social items that directly affect citizens’ daily lives.<\/p>\n

This reading aligns with a previous Zawia3 analysis of Egypt’s external debt trajectory<\/a>, which tracked its rise from approximately $48 billion in June 2015 to levels exceeding $161 billion by the end of fiscal year 2024-2025, with high repayment maturities during 2026 exceeding 2 billion Special Drawing Rights equivalent to approximately $2.6 billion. This figure is noted as an analytical context on which the budget reading relied, not as a separate June event. This file intersects with what the organizations signing the Cairo Institute statement noted: that the continuation of repression occurs amid severe economic pressures that increase the fragility of marginalized communities, linking the deterioration of economic and social rights to the contraction of the public sphere.<\/p>\n

When half of the budget’s resources become loans and spending concentrates in debt servicing and interest payments, the available space for subsidies, wages, pensions, and social protection contracts. These are the items that form the first line of defense for lower-income families against inflation and the rising cost of basic goods and services. The decline in wages’ and subsidies’ share of public spending means that the purchasing power of low-income earners erodes at the very time that energy and food prices are rising, making the budget reading a rights document as much as a financial one, as it reveals the state’s priority ordering between external financial obligations and the social rights of its citizens.<\/p>\n

Egypt Pays Its Debts With Debt: An Economy Living on the Next Bill<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

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The Military’s Expansion Into State Lands<\/h1>\n

On 4 June, the Official Gazette published the Cabinet’s decision to classify the yacht marina project at Kilometer 92 on the Northwest Coast, assigned for implementation to the Armed Forces Engineering Authority, as a “national project” under Building Law No. 119 of 2008, with work beginning the same day. This classification grants the project exceptional facilitations exempting it from standard licensing requirements and competitive tendering. The Official Gazette had published the original decision on 23 May 2026.<\/p>\n

The project, implemented by the Engineering Authority through the El-Alamein Company for Port and Yacht Management, of which the Authority is one of the owners, is drawing sharp environmental criticism, as foreign companies conducted studies confirming that the marina’s negative effects on coastal shores are “difficult to remedy,” recalling what the neighboring Marina Marassi project 33 kilometers away left behind in terms of beach erosion, though the Engineering Authority has insisted on proceeding with implementation.<\/p>\n

Context That a Single Month Cannot Contain<\/strong><\/p>\n

This cannot be read as an isolated event. Since 2013, President Sisi has issued successive decisions allocating state-owned land to various Armed Forces agencies, from the Future of Egypt Authority for Sustainable Development to the National Service Projects Organization to the Engineering Authority itself. A report by the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies in Riwaq Arabi journal published in 2025 documented that the expansion of the military economy in Egypt since 2014 includes acquiring land with legislative and regulatory support, which has negatively affected investment dynamics and investor rights. Researcher Yezid Sayigh of the Carnegie Center, in his study “The Egyptian Military Establishment as the Vanguard of State Capitalism,” found that the expansion of the military economy encompassed real estate development, the construction of industrial and transport complexes, and natural resource extraction, in ways that compete with the private sector without equal conditions.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The more telling irony is that the IMF explicitly criticized in its fourth review statement issued in July 2025 “the failure to curb the role of state-owned and military companies that enjoy preferential treatment in the form of tax exemptions, access to prime land, and cheap labor,” while the Egyptian government has not implemented what it announced of deals to offer army-affiliated companies such as “Safi,” “Wataniya,” and “Silo Foods” since mid-2022. Zawia3 addressed this file from the angle of “commercial barracks,” documenting the exceptional privileges, conscript labor, and their reflection on the collapse of the private sector, a file that embodies what civil-military relations studies describe as the “militarization of the state”: the transformation of the military institution from a professional actor subject to civilian authority into a dominant economic actor that shapes state priorities outside accountability mechanisms.<\/p>\n

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The Right to Housing and Urban Affairs: Suspended Laws and Families Facing the Courts<\/h1>\n

The Old Rent Law: 1,700 Challenges and Families Awaiting Judgment<\/h2>\n

The Old Rent Law No. 164 of 2025 represents the most pressing file in the lives of millions of Egyptians who have lived in rented units for decades. In June 2026 specifically, the legal battle around it reached its peak. On 14 June, the Commissioners Authority of the Supreme Constitutional Court heard a number of constitutional lawsuits, including a suit demanding a ruling on the unconstitutionality of the law in its entirety, with a focus on a challenge to Article Seven, in addition to nine disputes demanding suspension of its implementation. The Authority decided to adjourn one suit for preparation of the commissioners’ report and postpone another.<\/p>\n

In parallel, the lawyer representing tenants had filed 1,700 challenges before the Administrative Court, some of which succeeded in obtaining suspensory rulings from the State Council on decisions related to rental value assessment that reached multipliers of twenty times. These challenges affirmed that the law affects established legal positions and original constitutional rights, foremost among them the right to housing, the principle of equality, and the prohibition of affecting acquired rights without constitutional justification.<\/p>\n

MP Atef Meghawry revealed on 22 June that he was gathering the necessary signatures from parliament members to submit a legislative amendment protecting the social stability of tenants, noting that the current law contains indications of unconstitutionality because it grants the landlord the right to resort to an urgent affairs judge to vacate the premises by a provisional enforceable order that cannot be stayed by the tenant’s challenge, which squanders substantive degrees of litigation.<\/p>\n

The law meanwhile remains in force, as the Constitutional Court does not have the authority to temporarily suspend legislation. Under it, residential rental contracts end after 7 years from the date it comes into force, and 5 years for non-residential units, with immediate increases in rental value according to area classification starting from a minimum of 250 Egyptian pounds ($4.81) in economic areas up to 1,000 Egyptian pounds ($19.23) in premium areas. The Ministry of Housing opened the application window for alternative units for old-rent tenants until 12 July 2026.<\/p>\n

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2.9 Million Building Violations: Reconciliation or Darkness<\/h2>\n

At the beginning of June, the reconciliation deadline for building violations extended for six additional months beginning 5 May 2026 had entered its second month. This concerns approximately 2.9 million documented building violations affecting properties inhabited by millions of citizens across the country. Reconciliation prices were set between 50 and 2,500 Egyptian pounds ($0.96 and $48.08) per square meter depending on the nature of the area, with the possibility of installments up to five years and a 25% discount for immediate payment.<\/p>\n

On 27 June, a report revealed that the government is studying new facilitations including expanding the conversion of coded meters to regular electricity meters for those who have completed reconciliation procedures, a matter that affects the lives of millions of families currently paying 2.74 Egyptian pounds ($0.05) per kilowatt-hour at a unified price instead of the progressive tier system, representing an actual increase reaching 28% above what they used to pay. This equation illustrates what a building violation has come to mean for the citizen: not only the risk of demolition or a fine, but disconnection from electricity, water, and gas and deprivation of government support networks.<\/p>\n

The amendments to the reconciliation law issued at the beginning of 2026 included notable facilitations: allowing the change of use of basements from parking to residential in completed occupied cases, and facilitations in procedures for additions and modifications. Yet the complete picture reveals a structural contradiction: millions of Egyptians built their homes over decades in the absence of urban planning and the collapse of social housing, then came reconciliation laws to require them to pay for the legalization of what they built away from a state that failed to provide them with the alternative.<\/p>\n

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Electricity Meters: The Housing Bill Rises<\/h2>\n

Owners of coded meters have been facing since April 2026 a unified price of 2.74 Egyptian pounds ($0.05) per kilowatt-hour after the tier system was abolished for them, while owners of legal meters benefit from the progressive tiers that start at a much lower price. Reconciliation for building violations has thus become an additional economic pressure instrument: the citizen who cannot afford reconciliation fees remains trapped with a meter that costs them more. The fundamental observation here is that this interlinked equation, building violation plus coded meter plus reconciliation fees plus higher bills, describes the lives of a large proportion of Egypt’s residents who live in informal neighborhoods that have expanded to encompass today approximately three-quarters of Greater Cairo’s population according to academic estimates.<\/p>\n

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Expropriation and Land Allocation<\/h2>\n

On 7 June, human rights organizations issued a statement demanding the halt of the removal and dismantling of Alexandria’s historic tram and all executive procedures related to it, and ensuring a development process that preserves the rights of the city and its residents. The co-signing organizations considered that removing the historic tram from the city affects its residents’ right to a low-cost public transport means and threatens its urban and historical fabric, describing what is happening as harm to the rights of the city and its residents warranting review.<\/p>\n

Connected to this file, from the angle of land allocation, is what Zawia3 followed regarding the allocation of approximately 69.55 feddans of Agricultural Research Center land in Giza to a government agency, and the resulting distress calls from thousands of researchers and administrators warning of the dismantling of a scientific institution more than a century old and a direct impact on food security.<\/p>\n

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Three Reform Proposals<\/h2>\n

On 22 June, the Urban Observatory issued a policy paper titled “Three Proposals for Reforming the Law on Expropriation for Public Benefit,” analyzing Law No. 10 of 1990 that grants the government the power to seize private property for public benefit purposes in exchange for compensation, in the context of the significant expansion in infrastructure projects that Egypt has witnessed in recent years and the forced expropriation of thousands of homes annually that has resulted.<\/p>\n

The paper identifies a number of problems: the prescribed compensations are calculated at reduced prices that do not reflect real market value; judicial appeal procedures take many years; and the concept of “public benefit” is interpreted expansively by government bodies. The paper proposes three reform axes: a more precise and narrower definition of public benefit; a neutral, market-based compensation assessment mechanism; and effective procedural guarantees enabling those affected to challenge quickly and effectively. The paper builds on the principle of the “social function of private property” established by Al-Sanhuri in the Civil Code, which permits prioritizing the public interest over the owner’s right provided fair compensation is given.<\/p>\n

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Public Health: Counterfeit Medicines, Contaminated Food, and Markets Without Adequate Oversight<\/h1>\n

Five Drug Authority Warnings: Counterfeit Medicines in Egypt’s Markets<\/h2>\n

The Egyptian Drug Authority issued five official warnings about counterfeit and unidentified pharmaceutical preparations being circulated in local markets. The warnings revealed a single recurring pattern: companies discover that packages bearing their names and batch numbers were never produced by them, meaning the counterfeiters copied even the internal batch numbers. Among the targeted medicines: eye drops used to treat glaucoma and reduce intraocular pressure (Alphanova), capsules dispensed to prostate patients (Flopadex), and tablets for treating irritable bowel syndrome (Coloverin-D). In the Flopadex case specifically, the counterfeiters provided a glaring spelling error exposing the forgery: the word “madical” was printed instead of “medical,” and the name of the active ingredient was absent. The Authority confirmed that the warnings are limited to specific batches and do not constitute a total suspension of these medicines.<\/p>\n

These warnings come in a context where the Drug Authority had documented the issuance of 41 official recalls in 2026 up to near the end of June, varying between commercial adulteration and batches not meeting quality standards, revealing the scale of a structural problem in the Egyptian pharmaceutical market that cannot be solved by individual warnings alone.<\/p>\n

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29 Tons of Contaminated Food in Alexandria Alone<\/h2>\n

On 27 June, intensive inspection campaigns in Alexandria revealed the seizure of more than 29 tons of food unfit for human consumption, including 937 kg of meat of unknown origin, 633 kg of poultry parts of unknown origin, 87 kg of spoiled meat, 175 kg of poultry parts bearing signs of spoilage, 120 kg of unfit rice, and 20 liters of expired cooking oil, some seized in kitchens belonging to well-known restaurant chains. In Cairo, the Veterinary Medicine Directorate seized 12 tons of spoiled meat before it reached markets. In Aswan, half a ton of unfit meat and poultry was seized. In Qalyubiya, a quarter ton. In Assiut, 425 kilograms of spoiled fish were seized before being put up for sale. These figures distributed across distant governorates in June alone reveal that the phenomenon of contaminated and unidentified food spares no particular area.<\/p>\n

On 15 June, the National Food Safety Authority launched inspection campaigns on restaurants and floating vessels in Giza, seizing expired foods and products of unknown origin.<\/p>\n

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Unlicensed Nutrition Centers: An Illusion at Health’s Expense<\/h2>\n

On 11 June, reports monitored a government move to counter the spread of unlicensed therapeutic nutrition centers operating in a near-public manner, exploiting the obsession of broad segments of Egyptians with rapid weight loss and body improvement amid increasing economic and social pressures. The risks of these centers range from random prescription of diets that may lead to malnutrition, to unauthorized fat-burning injections, to recommending dietary supplements at exaggerated doses. This phenomenon is fed by “TikTok doctors” who promote fantastical solutions through digital platforms with advertisements reaching millions of viewers without any oversight.<\/p>\n

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Mental Health: Silent Burdens<\/h2>\n

The mental health file continues to be absent from political and media attention, despite cumulative indicators of concern. While Egyptians face accumulated economic pressures from inflation, rising costs, the loss of subsidies, and employment precarity, experts note that the numbers of those visiting mental health clinics have risen notably in recent years, while spending on mental health care remained within overall health spending that did not exceed 1.1% of GDP in 2025\/2026. The stigma of mental illness remains a social barrier preventing early seeking of care, amid the absence of a community mental health support system commensurate with the burdens that the Egyptian citizen is living under.<\/p>\n

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Omneya Suwaydan<\/h2>\n

The health file in June intersects with freedom of expression at the case of Dr. Omneya Suwaydan, detained on 17 June following her publication of testimony about violent practices to which women are subjected inside maternity departments at Al-Shatby Hospital. The case raises a dual question about the right of female patients to safe care on one hand, and the right of health sector workers to report violations inside medical facilities on the other, as the reporting of the incident became the cause of detention, opening a broader discussion about the ability of doctors and nurses to expose what happens inside government hospitals without subjecting themselves to prosecution.<\/p>\n

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Pre-Trial Detention and Political Trials<\/h1>\n

The month opened with a notable judicial ruling. On 3 June, the New Cairo Misdemeanor Court sentenced writer and poet Ahmed Douma to one year in prison with hard labor and immediate execution in Case No. 4894 of 2026 Fifth Settlement Misdemeanors, after convicting him of “publishing and broadcasting false news domestically and internationally that would disturb public security and spread fear among people.” According to what the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights reported, the origin of the case goes back to Douma’s public defense of detainees’ rights and his account of the use of permanent lighting as a means of torturing inmates at the Badr Prison Complex, which the Initiative summarized by describing the case as one where “the charge is broadcasting dazzling light.” We did not monitor during the month any official investigation being opened into the incident he recounted.<\/p>\n

The ruling against Douma acquires doubled significance when read in the broader context monitored by human rights organizations during the same month. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies and fifteen co-signing organizations, in a statement issued on 8 June ahead of the Egypt-EU Partnership Council meeting, mentioned Douma among examples of a practiced policy of re-arresting those who had been released or pursuing them in new cases, alongside researcher and journalist Ismail Al-Iskandarani and detainee Sayed Mashageb. The organizations noted that approximately six thousand people were referred to trial before terrorism courts during an eight-month period extending from late 2024 to May 2025, placing the Douma ruling within the framework of a pattern of using the judiciary as a tool against expression and opinion.<\/p>\n

On 7 June, the Supreme State Security Prosecution renewed the detention of lawyer Mohamed Abu El-Diyar for an additional fifteen days on Case No. 4502 of 2026, on the basis of accusations of joining an organization founded contrary to law, “spreading false news,” and using a social media account to promote it. The Egyptian Initiative clarified that the prosecution came against the backdrop of Abu El-Diyar joining a committee defending political prisoners, within a security sweep that targeted a number of committee members.<\/p>\n

On 8 June, the Egyptian Initiative called for the release of twenty-one-year-old Mohamed Walid Abdel Moneim, whose first trial session was held on 9 June in Case No. 2806 of 2024. The case includes nine defendants, among them three middle-school children charged with joining a “terrorist organization.” The Initiative noted that Mohamed Walid, who has a severe disability, spent two years in a detention facility not equipped to receive him, in violation of Article 38 of Law No. 10 of 2018 on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.<\/p>\n

On 11 June, co-signing human rights organizations demanded that lawyer Mohamed Al-Baqer’s challenge be accepted and his name removed from the “terrorist” lists, condemning his continued inclusion despite the expiration of his sentence.<\/p>\n

On 17 June, a broad solidarity statement called for the release of Dr. Omneya Suwaydan following her detention after publishing testimony about practices to which women are subjected inside maternity departments at Al-Shatby Hospital. Dozens of feminist and human rights organizations signed the statement.<\/p>\n

\n

“Arbitrary Detention Is Rampant, Egypt Responds With More Arrests”<\/h2>\n

Human Rights Watch published a commentary opening with a scene from the photo exhibition organized by the Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners at the headquarters of a political party in Cairo on 12 May, when relatives of detainees gathered to share grievances, only for security forces to launch an arrest sweep the same night targeting Mohamed Abu El-Diyar, Wafaa Al-Masry, and Hanan Al-Tantawi from the defense team. The organization concluded that the Egyptian authorities’ response to arbitrary detention is more arrests, affirming that this pattern reveals a systematic approach that employs repression as a response to any demand for justice.<\/p>\n

\n

Prisons, Enforced Disappearance, Torture, and Deaths in Detention<\/h1>\n

The Justice Committee submitted an intervention to the Human Rights Council calling for an investigation into the death penalty from the perspective of the prohibition of torture and deaths inside detention facilities, reporting that it documented in 2026 alone twenty-one deaths inside detention facilities during the period from 1 January to 24 May, following its documentation of fifty-six deaths in 2025. The total deaths inside detention facilities in Egypt it documented amounted to 1,361 cases during the period from 2013 to 2026, with many linked to deliberate medical neglect, torture, and unsafe detention conditions.<\/p>\n

According to figures documented by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights for 2025, the Prison Authority carried out death sentences against at least fifteen people in ten cases; the Court of Cassation upheld death sentences against thirty-one people in twenty-three cases; first instance and appellate courts issued death sentences against 461 people in 320 cases; and the papers of 405 defendants were referred to the Grand Mufti.<\/p>\n

The Cairo Institute statement of 8 June described the continued systematic and widespread resort to enforced disappearance and torture, with near-total impunity for security agencies, alongside continuing collective arbitrary detention in conditions described as harsh, and pointed to the absence of any movement to investigate mass graves in Sinai highlighted by civil society reports during 2025.<\/p>\n

\n

Press Freedom, Media, and Freedom of Expression<\/h1>\n

Freedom of expression topped the month’s scene, as three events converged: the ruling against Ahmed Douma on 3 June fell on a writer and poet because of his words, the detention of Dr. Omneya Suwaydan on 17 June was punishment for publishing a professional testimony, and the Mohamed Al-Baqer file concerns one of the most prominent defenders of freedom of expression.<\/p>\n

According to the Cairo Institute statement of 8 June, citing the Committee to Protect Journalists, Egypt kept eighteen journalists behind bars during 2025, maintaining its position among the world’s worst jailers of journalists, with continued retaliatory arrests of journalists and their family members.<\/p>\n

The Freedom of Thought and Expression Foundation issued a research paper titled “Generation Z and Restrictions on Freedom of Expression in Egyptian Universities,” monitoring shifts in student participation under escalating restrictions since 2013. The paper relied on a survey covering 49 participants from students and graduates of public and private universities, and nine interviews with students who participated in the pro-Palestine movement. The results showed a striking convergence in negative assessments regardless of university.<\/p>\n

On 18 June, the Foundation issued a paper titled “New Pathways to Suppressing the Truth: Egyptian Family Values as a Justification for Publication Bans,” monitoring the Public Prosecutor’s use of “protecting family values” as a justification for publication ban orders in a new expansion beyond the traditional reasons linked to investigation confidentiality.<\/p>\n

Connected to this file is what concerns Zawia3 itself, as the platform’s website had been blocked inside Egypt for the second time within less than a month, with thirty-three international and regional human rights and journalism institutions condemning the blocking as an assault on the right to knowledge and press freedom.<\/p>\n

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Digital Rights and Internet Surveillance<\/h1>\n

On 11 June, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights announced the return of its website to full operation after a cyberattack aimed at blocking it and disrupting access to it for a day and a half. The blocking of independent platforms represents one of the forms of restriction on online freedom of expression, a pattern that recurs with websites producing investigative or rights-related content.<\/p>\n

The digital restriction tools in this scene integrate between blocking, technical attack, and surveillance. The blocking of independent websites cuts the reader’s access to content from its source, while technical attacks aim to disable websites from within, and surveillance works to track users and what they publish. These three tools share the same result: narrowing the available space for expression and information exchange.<\/p>\n

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Refugees, Migrants, and Sudanese in Egypt<\/h1>\n

The Asylum Law’s Executive Regulations: A Security Philosophy<\/h2>\n

On 1 June, Zawia3 published a report monitoring the executive regulations of the Foreigners’ Asylum Law, published in the Official Gazette a full year behind the deadline set by the law, beginning the gradual transfer of management of a file affecting more than 1.1 million registered refugees and asylum seekers from the UNHCR to a permanent committee under the Ministry of Interior.<\/p>\n

The report revealed that the draft regulations were completed in December 2025 and presented to competent agencies in January 2026 coinciding with the escalation of hate speech against refugees and security campaigns targeting them, without being opened for discussion with specialists at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or with the UNHCR. In an exclusive statement to Zawia3, Nour Khalil, director of the Refugees Platform in Egypt, described the law as “legislatively flawed” and in violation of the constitution and international obligations, affirming that both the law and regulations were driven by a “security philosophy” rather than a protective framework.<\/p>\n

Two official developments also occurred in June: on 1 June, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly issued the executive regulations and granted holders of expired documents a six-month deadline to regularize their legal status. On 25 June, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi received a UNHCR delegation, affirming that Egypt hosts more than 10.5 million foreigners including approximately 1.1 million registered refugees, and called on the international community to support Egypt in bearing this burden.<\/p>\n

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Sudanese Refugees: Deaths in Detention and Escalating Deportations<\/h2>\n

Reuters published an investigation documenting the suffering of Sudanese refugees inside Egyptian prisons and the escalation of deportation operations, relying on accounts from forty-five refugees, seven lawyers, and eight refugee rights defenders. The investigation made Al-Nadhir Al-Sadiq, an eighteen-year-old Sudanese secondary student, its entry point. He fled the civil war in Sudan in search of safety before dying from pneumonia after more than three weeks in an overcrowded Cairo prison, where he was beaten and extorted by other prisoners.<\/p>\n

Reuters documented three deaths of Sudanese refugees in overcrowded prisons this year. Two security officials said nine Sudanese had died while in detention. The investigation cited ten former detainees saying refugees sleep in shifts due to cramped space and are subjected to beatings and appalling sanitary conditions.<\/p>\n

In Al-Nadhir’s case, he was held with more than 140 prisoners in a cell of 36 square meters, eating bread and cheese and drinking from a hose in the bathroom building. When he complained to his mother of chest inflammation and requested medicine said to be unavailable, an officer called the next day to inform the family of his death. The same day, those detained with him were deported to Wadi Halfa in a journey described as eighteen hours chained without food or water.<\/p>\n

Three security officials said authorities had deported more than 5,500 people since November, compared to approximately 100 official deportations annually in 2023 and 2024. Karim Anara of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights described the scale as unprecedented and in violation of Egypt’s international obligations.<\/p>\n

On 25 June, the Refugees Platform issued an urgent statement documenting 12 deaths inside pre-deportation detention centers and the continued deportation of thousands across the southern border without being given the opportunity to access the UNHCR for registration. The Platform affirmed that forcing Sudanese back to an active armed conflict zone constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of non-refoulement.<\/p>\n

While President Sisi affirms Egypt hosts more than 10.5 million arrivals calling for international support, this discourse intersects with a documented wave of deportations targeting individuals holding valid protection documents, revealing the gap between what the state declares and what it practices on the ground.<\/p>\n

\n

Workers, Trade Unions, and Wages<\/h1>\n

On 17 June, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights called on the Egyptian government to accelerate the ratification and implementation of the Convention on Decent Work in the Platform Economy, after the International Labour Conference at its 114th Session approved this convention with Egypt among the consenting member states. The call acquires its importance from the breadth of the gig economy sector in Egypt and the precarious conditions of drivers and delivery workers.<\/p>\n

This development comes against the backdrop of a wave of labor protests that escalated since the beginning of 2026, covering sectors including textiles, ceramics, metallic industries, and food industries, with demands concentrated on the actual implementation of the minimum wage, stopping deductions, and paying delayed salaries. The International Labour Organization’s 2026 Committee of Experts Report warned of the undermining of the right to union organization, rising child labor rates, and the continuation of forced labor concerns.<\/p>\n

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Farmers, Agricultural Land, and Fishermen<\/h1>\n

At the heart of this file lies what Zawia3 followed regarding the allocation of approximately 69.55 feddans of Agricultural Research Center land in Giza to a government agency, and the subsequent distress calls from thousands of researchers and administrators warning of the dismantling of a scientific institution more than a century old and a direct impact on food security. This file intersects with the water resources crisis, as the largest portion of Egypt’s water resources goes to the agricultural sector representing a direct or indirect source of livelihood for millions of residents.<\/p>\n

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Environment, Water, and Climate<\/h1>\n

The environment and water file in June concentrated around concerns connected to the rainy season that reaches its peak in the Blue Nile Basin between June and September. Warnings intensified at the beginning of the month about a potential flood scenario if three conditions converge: the GERD reservoir filling to a high level, the turbines not operating at full capacity, and rainfall exceeding the average, which could push the release of large quantities of water in short periods and raise the risk of floods in Sudan and then Egypt. These concerns intersect with a structural water situation in which Egypt ranks among the most arid countries, with more than 97% of its renewable water resources dependent on sources outside its borders, and an annual water deficit estimated at approximately 21 billion cubic meters, part of which is bridged by importing more than 60% of food needs.<\/p>\n

This file carries a dual rights dimension: it connects to the right to water, and to anticipated increases in drinking water prices based on rising maintenance costs, placing the cost of obtaining safe water in direct confrontation with the purchasing power of low-income earners.<\/p>\n

\n

Minorities and Freedom of Belief<\/h1>\n

On 22 June, the family of journalist Haider Qandil announced his abduction from in front of his workplace in the Al-Doqqi neighborhood of Giza at 7 pm by a force from the National Security Sector. The same day, his brother Youssef pointed to the dawn arrest of six other individuals: Islam Abdel Khaleq Abu El-Magd, Ammar Abdel Khaleq Abu El-Magd, Hussein Ammar Abdel Khaleq Abu El-Magd, Amin Ahmed, Amr Abdallah, and Fathy Mukhtar, while another security force raided the home of Mustafa Al-Mubarak, a New Zealand citizen married to the sister of Qandil’s wife, and took him to an unknown location.<\/p>\n

Qandil’s wife Asmaa Al-Nashar said she believes her husband’s arrest came as part of a security campaign targeting a number of Egyptian Shia citizens. Ishaq Ibrahim of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights noted that Qandil himself had informed him shortly before his disappearance that a detention campaign had begun targeting a limited number of Shia. Qandil had in late 2020 been subjected to eight months of detention, three of them in enforced disappearance, on charges including “contempt of religion” and “forming an organization contrary to law” because of his Shia affiliation, before being released on bail and dismissed from his job on security instructions. In 2021, he was banned from travel and had his passport confiscated at the airport.<\/p>\n

It is worth noting that Haider Qandil is the photographer who conducted the photographic coverage of Zawia3’s extended interview with politician Ahmed Tantawi published on 23 June. We wish him his freedom urgently.<\/p>\n

This case embodies a chronic situation of security treatment of Egyptian Shia that treats sectarian affiliation as a charge in itself, in the absence of any legal framework guaranteeing freedom of religious belief outside the four officially recognized Sunni schools of jurisprudence.<\/p>\n

\n

Women, Personal Status, and Violence Against Women<\/h1>\n

This file was led in June by the case of Dr. Omneya Suwaydan, whose detention on 17 June came as punishment for publishing testimony about the violence to which women are subjected inside maternity departments at Al-Shatby Hospital. The solidarity statement mobilized dozens of feminist organizations and initiatives, among them the New Woman Foundation and initiatives concerned with combating violence against women and others working on the file of unnecessary cesarean sections.<\/p>\n

At the legislative level, the organizations signing the Cairo Institute statement of 8 June noted that parliament is discussing personal status laws with far-reaching effects on women. Zawia3 also followed the file of preparing the personal status law for Christians in Egypt, over which dozens of meetings have been held without the full draft being published.<\/p>\n

\n

Children<\/h1>\n

In Case No. 2806 of 2024, the Egyptian Initiative noted that among the nine defendants are three middle-school children charged with joining a “terrorist organization.” At the level of digital surveillance, the organizations signing the Cairo Institute statement noted that targeting extended to minors because of their online gaming activity. Connected to this file is what the ILO had previously documented of rising child labor rates in Egypt.<\/p>\n

\n

Persons with Disabilities<\/h1>\n

The disability file was led in June by the case of young Mohamed Walid Abdel Moneim, who spent two years in a detention facility not equipped to receive him in disregard of Article 38 of Law No. 10 of 2018. Connected to this section is what Zawia3 monitored regarding the requirement for more than 554,000 citizens to undergo additional examinations to determine their “degree of disability,” with some compelled to spend thousands of pounds to prove chronic conditions.<\/p>\n

\n

Education and Students<\/h1>\n

The education file was present at the heart of the Egyptian Initiative’s reading of the 2026-2027 budget, which found declining education allocations among the social items that contracted in favor of debt servicing. This connects to a broader discussion about the extent of the state’s adherence to the constitutional minimum for education spending. The contraction of allocations places educational rights in direct competition with debt burdens, reflecting on the quality of educational services and on families most dependent on public education.<\/p>\n

\n

Political Parties, Elections, the Civil Movement, and the Opposition<\/h1>\n

The file of independent political work remained present in June through the Ahmed Tantawi campaign case, with the inclusion of Tantawi, his lawyer Mohamed Abu El-Diyar, and a number of his campaign members on prosecution lists. The organizations signing the Cairo Institute statement of 8 June noted that the 2025 legislative elections were held in a closed public space, and pointed to widespread expectations that this parliament will move toward a constitutional amendment ending the limitation of presidential terms.<\/p>\n

\n

Legislation, Laws, and Government Decisions<\/h1>\n

Two legislative milestones were monitored in June. The first on 1 June with the issuance of the executive regulations of the Foreigners’ Asylum Law, detailed in the refugees section. The second on 14 June, when the Commissioners Authority of the Supreme Constitutional Court decided to adjourn the constitutional challenge to Law No. 73 of 2021, known as the “dismissal from employment due to drug testing law,” raising the question of its compatibility with the constitution.<\/p>\n

The organizations signing the Cairo Institute statement also addressed the new Criminal Procedures Law, described as an exceptional law undermining justice guarantees, returned by the President to parliament before issuing it after the parliament had postponed its implementation by one year without addressing its most problematic provisions.<\/p>\n

\n

Egyptian-European Relations and the Human Rights File<\/h1>\n

On 15 June, the eleventh session of the Egypt-EU Partnership Council was held in Luxembourg, chaired by Kaja Kallas and Dr. Badr Abdelatty, with the participation of Mediterranean Commissioner Dubravka \u0160uica and eight EU Foreign Ministers. The Council reviewed progress within the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership framework adopted in March 2024. On Palestine, both sides welcomed Security Council Resolution 2803 of 2025 and renewed their commitment to the two-state solution. On migration, both sides agreed to continue addressing irregular migration in a coordinated manner and to support the transition toward a national asylum system respecting international standards.<\/p>\n

This session had been preceded on 8 June by a statement signed by fifteen organizations warning EU institutions against “whitewashing” the Egyptian authorities’ record, noting that after two years of the Strategic Partnership, no meaningful progress had been achieved in human rights, democracy, or the rule of law, despite this progress having been presented as a fundamental condition for the five billion euro European financial assistance package, whose first installment of one billion euros was disbursed in mid-January 2026.<\/p>\n

The statement noted approximately six thousand people were referred to trial before terrorism courts during eight months, documented increasing transnational repression against Egyptians abroad including within EU member states, and called on the European Commission and the External Action Service to reflect this situation in their first annual report on financial assistance to Egypt.<\/p>\n

\n

June’s Public Debate Topics<\/h1>\n

A number of the month’s files extended into public debate. The Alexandria tram removal sparked widespread debate among the city’s residents about the feasibility of the project and its impact on a mode of transport tied to the city’s identity. The ruling against Ahmed Douma on 3 June sparked a discussion about the criminalization of speaking about detainees’ conditions. The detention of Dr. Omneya Suwaydan occupied space in debate about women’s safety inside government hospitals. The Sudanese refugees file intersected with public opinion through the debate about deportation operations, accompanied by hate speech against Sudanese and Syrians that rights bodies monitored on social media. The Egypt-EU relationship file remained present between those who see European funding as support for economic stability and those who see it as cover for a rights record that has not improved.<\/p>\n

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