{"id":16667,"date":"2026-08-13T14:30:15","date_gmt":"2026-08-13T12:30:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=16667"},"modified":"2026-10-24T14:55:52","modified_gmt":"2026-10-24T12:55:52","slug":"nile-water-crisis-egypt-gerd","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/nile-water-crisis-egypt-gerd\/","title":{"rendered":"The Nile\u2019s Toughest Test Since the High Dam: Drought, Withheld Water and a Structural Deficit"},"content":{"rendered":"

The issue of water security in Egypt returned forcefully to the forefront in recent weeks, after the first practical indicators of the effects of the unilateral operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam emerged in the<\/span> receding<\/span><\/a> of the Nile’s waters in several areas of Sudan, in parallel with<\/span> warnings<\/span><\/a> of a below-average Ethiopian rainy season that could take the country into one of the most dangerous “lean years” in decades.<\/span><\/p>\n

The forecasts<\/a> of the IGAD organisation for climate prediction in East Africa indicate that the Ethiopian rainy season (July\u2013October 2026) will be below average, which directly affects the Blue Nile, which supplies the River Nile with between 81% and 85% of its annual inflow, while the hot “El Ni\u00f1o” phenomenon<\/a> plays a role in drying the air over the Horn of Africa, which reduces rainfall on the Ethiopian plateau. In addition, the River Nile goes through recurring natural cycles<\/a> roughly every 20 years (7 fat, 7 lean, 6 average), and there are strong indications that 2026 falls within the “lean years”.<\/p>\n

For its part, the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation confirmed<\/a> that sudden changes in the Renaissance Dam’s discharges without prior coordination with Sudan caused water levels to fall in some areas. Eng. Sameh Abdel Rahman, deputy head of the Nile Water Sector at the ministry, said in press statements<\/a> that the Ethiopian side suddenly changed the dam’s operating pattern and reduced the quantities of water released without prior coordination with Sudan or Egypt, after the discharges at the start of the flood season had been proceeding at the expected rates, which disrupted the operation of the Sudanese reservoirs and lowered the water in some areas lying between the Sennar Reservoir and the Khartoum water station.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In the second half of last July, the Ethiopian side changed the operating<\/span> pattern<\/span><\/a> and sharply reduced the quantities of water released from the dam without notification, which led to a decline in the water inflow to the Sudanese reservoirs. Before that, the dam<\/span> was operating<\/span><\/a> with only six turbines out of 13, at a capacity not exceeding 50% of its maximum capacity, which affected the regularity of the flow.<\/span><\/p>\n

There is still no legally binding agreement between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan regulating the way the dam is operated in drought years, which leaves the downstream countries exposed to sudden shocks in discharges, as<\/span> happened<\/span><\/a> in late August 2025, when discharges fell to 111 million cubic metres per day and then suddenly jumped to 750 million cubic metres in September, causing sudden floods in Sudan.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading:<\/b> From \u201cStupid Funding\u201d to Promises of a Solution\u2026 Why Is Trump Talking About the Renaissance Dam Now?<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n


\nHave the Lean Years Begun?<\/b><\/h1>\n

Dr Nader Noureddine, professor of water and land resources at the Faculty of Agriculture, Cairo University, and an expert at the General Assembly of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), on the other hand, believes that the drop in the water level in Sudan was linked to a temporary incident, explaining that the water later returned to its normal levels, but that this does not negate, as he puts it, that the current year carries worrying indicators regarding the flood season.<\/span><\/p>\n

Noureddine points out, speaking to Zawia3, that 2026 is considered, according to climate indicators, one of the “lean years”, as a result of lower rainfall rates on the Ethiopian plateau, which will be reflected in the size of the coming flood via the Blue Nile, explaining that the usual flows of about 50 billion cubic metres could fall this year to between 25 and 30 billion cubic metres only.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

He adds that the crisis is linked not only to weak rainfall, but also to the way Ethiopia manages the Renaissance Dam, explaining that Addis Ababa is seeking to finish making up for the shortfall suffered by the reserves of the dam’s lake during the past year before allowing the water to pass to Sudan and Egypt. He stresses that the rules governing the management of international rivers require data to be exchanged between countries, and that in years of scarce flood, priority must be given to passing the water to the two downstream countries before using it to generate electricity, considering that this point represents the core of the current crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Egypt<\/figure>\n

On the repercussions of the decline in the Blue Nile’s inflow for the water situation in Egypt, Noureddine explains that citizens will not feel a direct drop in the level of the River Nile or a shortage of drinking or irrigation water, because the water arriving from the Nile does not enter the river channel inside Egypt directly, but is first stored in Lake Nasser behind the High Dam and then released from it daily according to the needs of the agriculture, industry, domestic consumption and environmental sectors, under the management of the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, with releases increasing during the summer and decreasing in winter according to the nature of the uses.<\/span><\/p>\n

He points out that the real impact of the weak flood will not appear in the river channel inside Egypt, but in the size of the strategic reserve in Lake Nasser, stressing that the state has a water reserve sufficient, by his estimate, for at least about five years, which provides a margin for dealing with drought years. He cites a previous experience during the era of former President Hosni Mubarak, saying that the strategic reserve at that time was sufficient to cope with seven lean years, which means that the impact of the current season, if it continues, would be limited to depleting part of the reserve, and would not affect the arrival of water to citizens.<\/span><\/p>\n

He adds that the “lean years” do not necessarily come in succession, as the current season may be followed by a rainy season that makes up for part of the deficit, explaining that the natural cycles of the Nile’s inflow include, on average, seven years of high inflow, seven low years and six average years, which makes the recurrence of successive drought years not inevitable.<\/span><\/p>\n

For his part, Dr Alaa El-Nahry, vice-president of the United Nations Regional Centre for Space Sciences, tells Zawia3 that the decline in the water inflow coming from the Ethiopian plateau cannot be separated from the cyclical nature of the region’s climate, explaining that the sources of the Nile go through cycles of drought, or what are known as the “lean years”, which recur, by his estimate, about every twenty years, which makes the decline in rainfall rates something to be expected from a climatic point of view.<\/p>\n

El-Nahry points out that the existence of the Renaissance Dam has changed the nature of dealing with these natural cycles, explaining that the dam makes Ethiopia more able to control the quantities of water released to the two downstream countries, and adding that Addis Ababa seeks to keep the water inside the reservoir in order to keep it permanently full, which is reflected in the quantities of water reaching Sudan and Egypt.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

He adds that the danger of the dam is not limited to Egypt and Sudan, but also extends to Ethiopia itself in drought years, citing previous droughts that the country has witnessed and that caused, according to him, the death of large numbers of livestock.<\/span><\/p>\n

El-Nahry considers that the current decline in discharges is inconsistent with the climate indicators linked to the “El Ni\u00f1o” phenomenon, explaining that the phenomenon’s effects during the current year pointed to an increase in rainfall in the Horn of Africa region, not a decrease, which leads him to consider it likely that Ethiopia’s management of the dam’s discharges is a main factor in the decline in the quantities of water reaching Sudan and Egypt during the current period.<\/span><\/p>\n

On the repercussions of this for the water situation in Egypt, El-Nahry stresses that the country already suffers from an existing water deficit, but that Lake Nasser is able, at present, to make up for part of any shortfall in water inflows. However, he insists that the real solution does not lie in relying on the strategic reserve alone, but in reaching an agreement that guarantees Ethiopia’s commitment to passing sufficient quantities of water, even during drought years, given that this represents a right of the two downstream countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

The Current Water Deficit: 54 Billion Cubic Metres<\/b><\/h1>\n

Egypt is currently facing a huge structural water<\/span> deficit<\/span><\/a>, as statistics from the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS) and the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation indicate that Egypt’s water deficit amounts to about 54 billion cubic metres annually. Egypt’s actual<\/span> need<\/span><\/a> amounts to 114 billion cubic metres, while what is available does not exceed about 60 billion cubic metres, which<\/span> include<\/span><\/a> 55.5 billion cubic metres from the historical Nile share under the 1959<\/span> Agreement<\/span><\/a>, 2.4 billion cubic metres of groundwater, 0.4 billion cubic metres from desalination and 1.3 billion cubic metres from rainfall.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Water<\/figure>\n

Egypt covers this enormous gap through two main sources:<\/span> the reuse<\/span><\/a> of water (21.6 billion cubic metres annually from treated agricultural drainage water) and the import of agricultural crops in the form of “virtual water” (34 billion cubic metres annually), in addition to the excessive<\/span> withdrawal<\/span><\/a> of deep groundwater (3\u20134 billion cubic metres annually), which is an environmentally unsustainable solution.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Annual<\/figure>\n

The Egyptian individual’s<\/span> share<\/span><\/a> of water has fallen from about 2,053 cubic metres annually in 1960 to less than 570 cubic metres in 2018, and it is expected to fall to about 500 cubic metres, a figure below the international water poverty line (1,000 cubic metres per person annually) and far below the water scarcity threshold (500 cubic metres).<\/span><\/p>\n

In June 2025, Cairo University issued a study, published in the “Egyptian Journal of Agricultural Economics”, that presented<\/span> four<\/span><\/a> scenarios for Egypt’s water balance up to 2050. In the worst of these scenarios (the catastrophic scenario), which combines population growth, climate change, the full operation of the Renaissance Dam and the non-use of treated drainage water, the water deficit could reach between 110 and 120 billion cubic metres annually by 2050.<\/span><\/p>\n

As for the World Bank<\/span> report<\/span><\/a> issued in 2025, it warned that Egypt will reach the threshold of “severe scarcity” of water by 2033, that is, within 9 years from now, and by 2037 the per capita share could fall to only 242 litres per day for drinking, equivalent to 88 cubic metres annually for drinking only. By 2050, an Egyptian government report expects the per capita share to fall to only 390 cubic metres annually.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Different<\/figure>\n

A<\/span> study<\/span><\/a> conducted by the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) in 2022 expects that climate change could reduce the Nile’s inflow by between 5% and 20% by 2030, while another<\/span> study<\/span><\/a> by the University of Southern California expects a decline of 6% on average by 2060. In the worst scenarios (years of severe drought), the Nile’s inflow could fall by 31% by 2100, and some studies even arrive at forecasts of a decline of up to 70% in extreme scenarios.<\/span><\/p>\n

Even if Ethiopia does not use a single drop of water for irrigation purposes, the Renaissance Dam causes major water losses for Egypt because of the nature of the giant artificial lake that has formed behind it, as studies<\/a> indicate that evaporation losses from the lake amount to about 3.8 billion cubic metres annually (6.5% to 8.7% of the inflow), while losses from seepage into the ground beneath the dam reach between 10 and 15 billion cubic metres annually (17% to 24%). With total annual losses ranging between 12 and 18 billion cubic metres, the Renaissance Dam will have reduced Egypt’s share of the Nile by between 15% and 22% annually.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

<\/b><\/p>\n

A Direct Impact on Electricity<\/b><\/h1>\n

The High Dam in Aswan is<\/span> the largest<\/span><\/a> hydroelectric station in Africa, with a capacity of 2,100 megawatts, according to data from the Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy. However, scientific studies warn that climate change and rising temperatures will lead to<\/span> an increase<\/span><\/a> in the evaporation rates of Nile water, which reduces the river’s flows by a proportion that could exceed 0.5%. Estimates indicate that current evaporation rates in the Aswan reservoir already reach about 10%.<\/span><\/p>\n

With temperatures rising, and this coinciding with the implementation of government<\/span> plans<\/span><\/a> to rationalise energy consumption and carry out load-shedding, citizens’ need for clean water is increasing, which makes it necessary to reconsider Egypt’s water share, especially given the growing pressure on resources.<\/span><\/p>\n

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) expects<\/span> temperatures to rise<\/span><\/a> in some regions of Egypt by between 1.8 and 3.6 degrees Celsius during the current century. This rise will multiply the need for water consumption in agriculture, together with increased evaporation rates in the River Nile and the irrigation networks, while supply is expected not to keep pace with demand, which threatens water insecurity and a suffocating economic crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n

Since Ethiopia began building the Renaissance Dam in 2011, Egypt<\/span> has considered<\/span><\/a> the project a real threat to its water security. In recent years, Cairo has been keen to highlight the catastrophic economic cost of filling and operating the dam unilaterally. According to official estimates, a reduction of just one billion cubic metres in Egypt’s share of Nile water could<\/span> lead<\/span><\/a> to the loss of 290,000 jobs, a deterioration in the productivity of 130,000 hectares and an increase in food imports of about $150 million, in addition to the loss of $430 million in agricultural production revenues, according to what was presented before the UN Security Council.<\/span><\/p>\n

The third national<\/span> report<\/span><\/a> submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change affirms that freshwater resources and agriculture are the sectors most vulnerable to the repercussions of climate change in Egypt, whether as a result of rising temperatures or decreasing amounts of rainfall. To reduce water consumption, the Egyptian government has already<\/span> reduced<\/span><\/a> the area planted with rice from 1.76 million feddans to 750,000 feddans, in a step aimed at saving about 3 billion cubic metres of water annually.<\/span><\/p>\n

But the challenges remain present, as<\/span> studies<\/span><\/a> expect the agricultural area in Upper Egypt to decrease by up to 29.47%, and in the Nile Delta, Egypt’s food basket, by 23.03%. This decline, along with the deterioration in the production of rice and other basic crops such as fruit and vegetables, will threaten food security and raise food prices, which portends major economic and social risks, especially since agriculture accounts for about 23% of the labour market in Egypt.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is<\/span> expected<\/span><\/a> that between 1.8 and 6.75 million feddans of agricultural land will be lost (18% to 67% of a total of 10 million feddans), with a loss in agricultural GDP ranging between $10 billion and $51 billion, depending on the dam-filling scenario. Food production is expected to decline by 5.7% by 2050, a rate higher than the global average of 4.4%.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Projected<\/figure>\n

In the labour market, the agricultural<\/span> sector<\/span><\/a> employs 5.5 million workers out of a total of 28.8 million workers in Egypt, and the loss of agricultural land could lead to the loss of 4.75 million jobs in the worst scenarios, raising the unemployment rate from 11% at present to between 25% and 34%.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading:<\/b> The Water Crisis Worsens in Egypt: Repeated Cuts and Rising Prices<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n


\nCan We Count on Negotiations Again?<\/b><\/h1>\n

Amid the renewed controversy over the decline in water discharges, Ethiopia<\/span> reaffirmed<\/span><\/a> its adherence to its traditional position on the Renaissance Dam and called on Egypt to resume negotiations. The Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy, Eng. Habtamu Itefa, said that his country invites Cairo to engage in negotiations “within joint frameworks” that serve the interests of all parties, instead of levelling what he described as “accusations not based on facts” about the dam.<\/span><\/p>\n

In statements carried by the official Ethiopian news agency (FANA), Itefa described the Renaissance Dam as a development project and a symbol of African cooperation, stressing that it was built to meet Ethiopia’s growing electricity needs and not to harm the two downstream countries, denying that the dam is a source of threat to Egypt or Sudan, and considering that it has contributed to reducing the risk of floods, as well as supporting regional integration through the export of electricity to a number of neighbouring countries, including Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Ethiopian minister rejected the Egyptian accusations linking the decline in discharges or the fall in water levels to the operation of the Renaissance Dam, describing those accusations as “unacceptable”.<\/span><\/p>\n

Last June, US President Donald Trump<\/span> expressed<\/span><\/a> his country’s readiness to return to playing the role of mediator between Egypt and Ethiopia to resolve the Renaissance Dam crisis, amid official Egyptian assurances that there were no new developments regarding any actual mediation, and the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation stressed that any negotiating track must be based on guaranteeing Egypt’s water rights.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ambassador Rakha Ahmed Hassan, former assistant foreign minister, believes that any talk of resuming negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia cannot be assessed in isolation from the real aim of those negotiations, explaining that the essence of the disagreement that stalled all the previous rounds of negotiation related not so much to the mechanisms of negotiation as to the nature of the results sought from them.<\/p>\n

Hassan points out that Egypt insisted, throughout the previous rounds of negotiation, on reaching a legally binding agreement regulating the rules for operating the Renaissance Dam, especially with regard to the quantities of water released during periods of prolonged drought and short drought and seasons of high floods, while Ethiopia, according to him, preferred to settle for issuing a political declaration or statement, without committing to a legally binding agreement regulating the management of the dam.<\/p>\n

He adds that this divergence in aims is what drove the negotiations into a “vicious circle”, which led Cairo to regard them as “negotiations for the sake of negotiations”, noting that nothing has yet emerged to indicate that the Ethiopian position has changed in any fundamental way.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Commenting on the latest Ethiopian call to resume negotiations, Hassan says that the motives behind this call remain unclear, asking whether it came in response to pressure or a request from the United States, given that US President Donald Trump has announced more than once his readiness to contribute to relaunching negotiations between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, or whether it is merely a new call that does not differ in substance from the previous rounds.<\/span><\/p>\n

He stresses that entering a new round of negotiations will be of no use unless it is preceded by a clear agreement that the final aim is to reach a legally binding agreement, presented in the form of a draft agreement to be discussed by the three parties. As for returning to discuss the same issues while postponing their resolution to later stages, he believes this will not achieve any real progress, especially since the issue for Egypt is linked, as he puts it, to water security and represents “a matter of life or death”, while Ethiopia views it as a project for development and economic renaissance.<\/span><\/p>\n

On the tools Egypt has if water discharges continue to decline, Hassan points out that the assessment of the situation will remain linked to the scale of the actual damage that may result from the decline in water inflow, noting that the Declaration of Principles signed in Khartoum in 2015 included provisions relating to dealing with cases in which significant harm is caused to the two downstream countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

He adds that the picture will only become clear by following the developments of the current flood season, explaining that the basic question is whether the current decline will remain within limits that can be made up for through the reserves of Lake Nasser and other water reservoirs, or whether it will turn into a sharp decline affecting agricultural and industrial uses and daily water consumption.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hassan notes that water resources experts are already talking about initial indicators pointing to a clear decline in flood rates this year, but that judging the size of the crisis and how long it will last requires monitoring the season’s developments over the following weeks, stressing that the picture will become clearer by the middle of the month, when flood levels become apparent more precisely.<\/span><\/p>\n

Regarding the possibility of resorting to the United Nations or the Security Council, Hassan considers it unlikely that the United Nations represents the most effective path, explaining that the international organisation has customarily left such disputes relating to international rivers to regional frameworks, given that there are major countries that have similar water files and do not favour expanding the role of the United Nations in this type of issue.<\/span><\/p>\n

He believes that the most realistic move remains within the framework of African regional institutions, alongside making use of the American role, given that the United States has a degree of influence over the Ethiopian leadership, expressing his hope that the current phase, after the completion of the dam’s construction, will help create more suitable conditions for reaching understandings that guarantee the rights of all parties.<\/span><\/p>\n

Commenting on the Ethiopian call, Dr Nader Noureddine points out that Cairo has not yet announced its position on this call, noting statements by US President Donald Trump in which he spoke of studying the possibility of relaunching talks between the three countries, but he stresses that no official decision has yet been issued on resuming the negotiating track.<\/span><\/p>\n

Regarding the role of international institutions, Noureddine explains that they do not play the role of mediator in political disputes, but that their role is limited to issuing data, forecasts and scientific analyses. He points out that international organisations concerned with climate and water have previously issued estimates of lower rainfall rates on the Ethiopian plateau during the current season, but that mediation between states remains the responsibility of states or international powers, such as the United States, China or Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

He notes that regional developments, foremost among them the war raging in the region, are currently absorbing international attention, which could postpone any actual move to revive the Renaissance Dam negotiations until those crises subside.<\/span><\/p>\n

For his part, Dr Alaa El-Nahry expresses his pessimism about the chances of reaching an agreement given Ethiopia’s continued refusal to commit to a legally binding agreement on the operation of the dam, considering that dealing with this file requires a firmer stance at the political and diplomatic level. He says the issue needs “strength” in the management of the negotiations, and calls for a broader internationalisation of the crisis within the United Nations, considering that the rules of international law governing international rivers grant downstream countries rights that must be respected, and that the construction of dams on shared rivers should not be carried out in a way that harms the rights of other countries. He also believes that the Declaration of Principles agreement signed by the three countries came in a spirit of good faith, but that Ethiopia, by his estimate, exploited it in a way different from what Cairo had expected.<\/span><\/p>\n

El-Nahry stresses that Egypt has, in his view, a legal basis that allows it to demand that Ethiopia be obliged, through the United Nations, to establish fair rules for the distribution of water among the three countries, in a way that guarantees the continued flow of water even during drought years and prevents any party from controlling water discharges unilaterally.<\/span><\/p>\n

Speaking about the worst-case scenario, El-Nahry points out that Lake Nasser will remain able to mitigate the effects of any decline in water inflows to a large extent, but he goes back to stress that relying on the reserve alone does not represent a permanent solution, renewing his call for the internationalisation of the issue and considering that resorting to the United Nations has become, in light of what he described as “Ethiopian intransigence”, a necessary step that cannot be postponed.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading:<\/b> Towards Cutting Subsidies: The Government Raises Electricity Prices for the Fifth Time in Five Years<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n

<\/b>The Failure of Previous Negotiations<\/b><\/h1>\n

Over<\/span> four<\/span><\/a> consecutive rounds of negotiations, Egypt and Ethiopia failed to reach any agreement on the Renaissance Dam crisis. In December 2023, Cairo<\/span> officially announced<\/span><\/a> the failure of the last round of negotiations, which had lasted four months, stressing that Addis Ababa had used the negotiating track as a cover to impose a policy of fait accompli, without regard for the interests of the two downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan. Egypt stressed, in an official statement, that it would continue to monitor closely everything related to the filling and operation processes, while fully reserving its right to defend its water security.<\/span><\/p>\n

The<\/span> origin<\/span><\/a> of the crisis goes back to March 2015, when President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi signed in Khartoum a \u201cDeclaration of Principles\u201d with Ethiopia and Sudan, an agreement that stipulated Ethiopia’s commitment to taking into account the water needs of Egypt and Sudan and to avoiding causing them any significant harm during the construction and filling of the Renaissance Dam on the course of the Blue Nile, the main tributary of the River Nile. However, subsequent Ethiopian practices, according to Cairo, violated this commitment.<\/span><\/p>\n

In June 2021, Egypt<\/span> turned<\/span><\/a> to the UN Security Council in an attempt to mobilise an international position that would pressure Ethiopia to freeze its unilateral moves regarding the construction and filling of the dam. However, the Security Council at the time merely urged the three countries to continue negotiating under the auspices of the African Union, which Egypt and Sudan saw as a position that did not rise to the seriousness of the threat.<\/span><\/p>\n

Cairo considers that Ethiopia’s<\/span> decision<\/span><\/a> to begin building the dam in 2011 was a blatant disregard for the rights of 110 million Egyptians and 46 million Sudanese who depend on the Nile’s waters as an almost sole source of fresh water. Since then, Egypt has been trying to push Addis Ababa towards a fair and balanced agreement, especially with regard to the most sensitive items of the dispute: the schedule for filling the dam’s reservoir and its direct impact on the water flows of the two downstream countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

Egypt demanded a filling schedule extending over at least seven years,<\/span> to avoid<\/span><\/a> any acute water deficit that would threaten the food and economic security of its citizens. Ethiopia, on the other hand, insisted on filling the reservoir within only three years, which it actually carried out during the first, second, third and fourth fillings, the completion of which was announced in September 2023, without an agreement with Egypt or Sudan.<\/span><\/p>\n

The disagreement is not limited to the results of the negotiations, but extends to the way the negotiations themselves are managed. While Egypt and Sudan demand the internationalisation of the issue and recourse to multilateral international mediation including the United Nations, the United States and the European Union, Ethiopia insists that the African Union remain the sole body sponsoring the negotiations, even though the previous rounds under African sponsorship did not produce any tangible progress.<\/span><\/p>\n

In conclusion, the crisis facing Egypt does not appear to be merely a crisis of a weak rainy season or an exceptional year of the “lean years”, but rather a test of the state’s ability to manage its water resource under three simultaneous pressures: climate change that is shrinking the Nile’s inflow, a structural water deficit exceeding 54 billion cubic metres annually, and the continued absence of a legally binding agreement regulating the operation of the Renaissance Dam during periods of drought.<\/span><\/p>\n

Editorial correction: The first version of the report stated that the water resources available to Egypt amounted to 80 billion cubic metres; the correct figure is about 60 billion cubic metres, which is consistent with their components mentioned in the report and with the deficit of 54 billion cubic metres.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In 2026 Egypt faces three simultaneous pressures: a structural water deficit of 54 billion cubic metres annually; the Renaissance Dam reducing its discharges without notification in a season in which flows are expected to fall from 50 billion to 25 billion; and the absence of a binding agreement after four failed negotiating rounds, alongside the World Bank’s warning that severe scarcity will be reached by 2033.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":16056,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[410],"tags":[],"kateb":[6247],"class_list":["post-16667","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-investigations-en","kateb-rasha-ammar"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/\u0627\u0644\u0646\u064a\u0644-.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16667","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16667"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16667\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23912,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16667\/revisions\/23912"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/16056"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16667"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16667"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16667"},{"taxonomy":"kateb","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kateb?post=16667"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}