{"id":16782,"date":"2026-01-18T15:44:06","date_gmt":"2026-01-18T13:44:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=16782"},"modified":"2026-10-23T22:29:05","modified_gmt":"2026-10-23T20:29:05","slug":"ammar-ali-hasan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/ammar-ali-hasan\/","title":{"rendered":"Ammar Ali Hassan: The Press Is Shackled, Parliament Engineered and the National Dialogue a Wasted Opportunity"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In a country where the public sphere shrinks year after year, and where politics turns into an activity fraught with risk, the question of the role of the intellectual, the limits of speech and the meaning of dialogue becomes an existential question. Here, talk about the press, parliament or the opposition is no mere elitist discussion, but a matter that touches on the right to knowledge and the possibility of imagining a different future.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In this context comes this extended interview with the writer and political thinker Ammar Ali Hassan, as a critical testimony on a moment of crisis, in which he speaks from the position of witness and critic at once. Hassan draws on his long experience of following the transformations of the Egyptian public sphere, and approaches the political and cultural scene from its most sensitive angles: press freedom, the structure of parliament, the crisis of the opposition, and the outcomes of what was called the &#8220;National Dialogue&#8221;. He offers no flattering answers, nor does he settle for superficial description; rather, he goes to the roots of the imbalance, linking political repression, the erosion of the public sphere, the rise of social violence and the blocked horizon of culture and writing.<\/span><\/p>\n<div style=\"position: relative; padding-bottom: 56.25%; height: 0; overflow: hidden; max-width: 100%;\"><iframe style=\"position: absolute; top: 0; left: 0; width: 100%; height: 100%;\" title=\"YouTube video player\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/nVlxAF5f_AI?si=_YVSyxuB_rDIgvOx\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><br \/>\n<\/iframe><\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>What do you make of the growing accusations of spreading false news, and the Egyptian government&#8217;s move towards toughening the penalties associated with this charge?<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In many cases, describing news as &#8220;false&#8221; is not accurate. There is a fundamental difference between false news and erroneous news. And even lying itself comes in degrees; there is total lying and partial lying, and there is also a difference between deliberate lying and unintentional lying.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> And even when an error is proven, a basic question must be asked: what are its causes? Is it due to the journalist&#8217;s failure to verify accuracy or to make the effort to reach the information? Or did the authorities themselves withhold the information and begrudge people it? In that case, if the journalist makes an effort and publishes, the authorities rush to brand what was published as lies, then resort to the courts and to imprisoning journalists in publishing cases, which is historically unusual in Egyptian political and media life.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The current penalties are sufficient, indeed numerous and harsh, and the journalistic community has made strenuous efforts over decades to ease them, but unfortunately things are moving in the opposite direction. Penalties are being toughened at a time when the press has almost died and been suffocated.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> The Egyptian press today cannot say anything, not about senior officials, nor even about junior bureaucratic employees. The press has become shackled, and people have turned away from it and from the media, because it is no longer able to convey the truth, or finds nothing to convey in the first place.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Whether it is government institutions, the bureaucratic apparatus, the business and finance community or some of the influential institutions in Egyptian life, everyone works under a thick fog through which no information leaks. As a result, the press has been lost: news journalism barely exists, and there is no possibility of conducting in-depth investigations into any phenomenon.  As for opinion writers, they are hounded and cannot express themselves freely, from the self-censorship they acquire as a result of continuous repression to the direct instructions passed on to editors-in-chief.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>There have been more than 180 statements in just six months, ranging from misleading to inaccurate, issued by ministers and officials, according to statistics compiled by organisations specialising in fact-checking. How do you comment on that?<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">If the &#8220;false news&#8221; rule were applied to the statements issued by many officials, we would find ourselves facing cases wholesale, and we would wake up the next day to a complete ministerial and political vacuum.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The truth is that many statements are made on the basis of rough estimates and arbitrarily, and the figures are contradictory and change from one official to another, while the truth is either absent or deliberately concealed. The press tries to feel its way towards this truth, but it is not enabled to do so.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">As I mentioned, there is a clear difference between lying and error. Professional custom has held for decades that if a newspaper or platform publishes an incorrect news item, the party concerned has the right to respond or to correct it in the same space and in the same font size, as we learned from the masters of this profession. But what is happening now is completely different; they do not wait for a correction, nor do they offer an alternative narrative, and at the same time, if journalists try to understand or to ask, they are accused of lying and deviance, and sometimes of treason.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>Do you think the freedom of information law will be issued soon?<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">I think the freedom of information law may indeed be issued soon, but the more important question that must be asked here is: where is the Transparency Commission stipulated by the constitution? Because the constitution did not merely stipulate the right of access to information, but also provided for punishing those who withhold information from the people.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> If this constitutional rule were applied, and the Transparency Commission it stipulates were established, a very large part of the crisis would be solved, and the press would become able to access regular government reports, statistics and data that could be relied on and referred to, particularly with regard to economic projects.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">But treating the freedom of information law as a pressure tool, a means of repression or a framework for besieging freedoms is a deficient and misleading approach. This law should be viewed as a direct response to an inherent right of the Egyptian people, the owner of the money, the land, the sovereignty and the legitimacy, to knowledge, and to being informed of what is happening to their money, their rights and their future.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>Recommended reading: <\/b><a href=\"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/from-travel-bans-to-barriers-to-work-how-legal-restrictions-choke-egypts-civil-society\/\"><b>From Travel Bans to &#8220;Work Bans&#8221;: How Is Civil Society Being Strangled by Law?<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>What is your assessment of the recent parliamentary elections?<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">They are not only the longest, but also the strangest in the whole history of Egypt, from the time it came to know parliamentary life a century and a half ago until this moment. They were elections marred by a great deal of chaos, breaches and violations, to the extent that they required the intervention of the President of the Republic himself, an intervention that would not have happened had he not been told that the scale of the breach had widened to a degree at which the scandal had become comprehensive and general, and that an intervention was needed to temper the excesses of the hideous practices we witnessed during the electoral process.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The parliament that resulted from elections conducted in this way will remain wounded in the conscience of the Egyptian people and in the way people view it, even if its procedural form is completed and it fulfils the formal procedures that enable it to convene, exercise its functions and issue whatever legislation, laws or even constitutional amendments it wishes. Consequently, this parliament will remain wounded in public consciousness, and everything it issues will in turn remain wounded. Hence, returning to what is right is a virtue, and reconsideration is a duty, because a parliament formed in this way will be difficult for people to digest or to grant moral legitimacy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>Do you see a difference ahead between the coming parliament and previous parliaments?<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">I think the 2015 parliament and the 2020 parliament went through in the same way. An absolute closed list and individual-seat elections, many of which were decided in advance, although the use of political money, the breaches and the arbitrary measures were relatively less in previous sessions. This time, however, it went beyond the usual limits, reaching the point of engineering the entire electoral process and determining the results before laying down the premises, in a way that leads to a path prepared in advance. This pattern was partially present in the 2015 and 2020 parliaments, but it did not reach this degree of crudeness or clarity at the time.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">And I believe we will see the same parliament, in the same way and with the same performances. There will be opposition voices; some of them have a specific path drawn for them, and others are outside this framework, but their ability to have an impact is in the end almost non-existent, because the sweeping mechanical majority remains in the hands of the authorities. Thus parliament turns into merely a bridge across which the executive authority passes to achieve what it wants.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>How do you assess the experience of the National Dialogue? And did it actually open a window, however limited, in the public sphere?<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> The National Dialogue was, in fact, a squandered opportunity to open channels of communication between an opposition and independent figures, between experts, scholars and thinkers, and between experienced politicians with a history on the one hand, and the current authorities on the other. Some participants seemed like intermediaries conveying the pulse of the people to the authorities, and some were sincerely keen on the national interest.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">At the very least, the National Dialogue should have ended with a clear action plan, to be implemented in whole or in part in the following phase. It was not hoped that the matter would be limited to the release of prisoners of opinion or political prisoners, or only to amending electoral laws; rather, we hoped that this plan would include genuine and comprehensive political reform.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">But, unfortunately, the National Dialogue was treated as a public relations campaign, or as a means of testing the waters or easing pressure. Then things carried on in this way. Then came the &#8220;Al-Aqsa Flood&#8221; war, the authorities no longer needed to listen to the dialogue participants, and the matter ended in this way.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This is a familiar affliction in Egyptian political life, one we have grown accustomed to over long decades. I personally am one of those who opened their eyes to politics in the Mubarak era, and I found that whenever the authorities were in crisis or came under intense pressure, they resorted to such dialogues; they are broadcast on television screens, and the participants speak with logic and competence. But as soon as the crisis ends, the door to dialogue is closed and we return to square one. This is exactly what also happened in the experience of the National Dialogue in this era.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b> Does that mean the same scenario could be repeated in the Media Development Committee?<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Media Development Committee, in my estimation, will not lead to anything worth mentioning, as long as the entrenched political doctrine currently prevailing views the media as a threat to stability if the door is left open to it and if it is free media. This is a notion that can be refuted; the flexibility and media freedom that existed in earlier periods are what preserved Egypt to a large extent. If media freedom were a factor of collapse, other countries would have collapsed, especially as we have witnessed conflicts, civil wars and broad popular uprisings in our surroundings.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Indeed, the media was one of the reasons that helped prolong the life of the Mubarak regime; although this regime had exhausted its purposes by 1995, it continued for sixteen years after that, thanks to the margin of flexibility created by media freedom.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> Therefore, if the political authorities do not recognise that public freedoms, including media freedom, are inherent rights of citizens, they should at least treat them as a means of injecting a degree of flexibility into the veins of political life, in a way that makes these authorities more familiar, more stable and more acceptable to a broad segment of people.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>From the political system we move to the opposition. Do you think the Egyptian opposition is capable of playing its role? Is there still a pulse in it, or are we facing a real crisis in the structure of the opposition?<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> The opposition has been suffering for a long time. We are facing either an opposition that the authorities created with their money and influence, and whose path and limits of movement they set, or an opposition that tried to rebel against this equation, and so was besieged, excluded, derided and smeared, with its legitimate sources of funding, coming from the pockets of the Egyptian people, dried up, while it was subjected to intense surveillance, or elements were pushed in to blow it up from within and weaken it to the point of collapse.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">We have seen these practices repeatedly, since the Mubarak era, with parties such as Al-Wafd, Al-Amal, Al-Tagammu and Al-Ahrar, and then the Al-Ghad Party. This is the mechanism the authorities have consistently used to play on the margins of the serious opposition.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"><br \/>\n<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> As for the other opposition, the one that has a specific path drawn for it, or that settles for what is available, or that shares some of the spoils with the political authorities, I do not count on it, nor do I consider it an opposition in the true sense.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Nevertheless, this does not mean that Egypt is devoid of opposition. There is an unorganised opposition, a fluid opposition, comprising scholars, thinkers, experts, politicians and notables, and extending also to ordinary citizens and the general public. These people exist, and they can by no means be denied or excluded; indeed, I see their circle widening over time.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>Does that mean you do not recognise the so-called &#8220;available space&#8221; opposition, which distinguishes between electoral alliances and political alliances?<\/b><b><br \/>\n<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> I do not recognise an opposition whose path is drawn by the authorities. It is natural, and indeed customary in all democracies around the world, for the opposition, as part of the political system, to hold a dialogue with the authorities, to reach understandings with them, to sit at the same table, present programmes, put forward alternatives, engage in dialogue, convey the pulse of the street to these authorities, and even take part in decision-making. All of this is understandable and acceptable.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">But what I cannot understand is for the political authorities to designate particular &#8220;spoils&#8221; for the opposition, and for the relationship to be limited to these spoils alone, or to attempts to soften the repression the authorities may exercise against opponents. Here the relationship turns into something resembling begging or pleading, not a relationship of equals, nor a dialogue between equals. In this case, the opposition does not see itself as entitled to put forward alternatives, nor as entitled to think about reaching power. All of that is absent.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The authorities view the opposition as &#8220;ornamental necklaces&#8221;, and many parts of the opposition unfortunately accept these roles. But on the other hand, there are those who rebel against this situation and seek to build a real opposition, whether an organised opposition within political parties, pressure and interest groups, or a fluid opposition extending among the general public and within civil institutions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>Recommended reading: <\/b><a href=\"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/2025-egypt-elections-6\/\"><b>Elections No One Believed: When the Appeals Outnumber the Individual Seats<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n<p><b>Do you expect the coming parliament to work on amending the constitution?<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> I think all scenarios are open in the future. We may see this parliament complete its coming legislative term in full. We may witness a ruling by the Constitutional Court dissolving parliament and calling for new elections. And parliament may complete its term and pass a package of pending legislation and laws, which on the whole fall within the political and economic orientations of the current executive authority.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This parliament may also proceed to amend the constitution, whether with regard to presidential terms or other articles, and this is a real possibility. Parliament&#8217;s life may also end after a year, or after months, perhaps before it proceeds with such amendments. And the amendment may take place if it completes its legislative term.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">And if another parliament comes through new elections, it too may look into these files.  More precisely, all possibilities are on the table. There is talk circulating, unconfirmed information, apprehensions, speculation and expectations that are hard to classify: are they actual information? Or guesses? Or apprehensions? Or prophecies?<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">But judging by what has happened before, and by the desires, ambitions, capabilities and appetites present in the political scene, a very large part of these files remains in the hands of parliament and its role in the coming phase.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>We are living through a tangible state of violence in Egyptian society over the past two years, violence directed mostly at the weakest groups, such as women, children and others. In your view, what are the causes of this violence?  And where exactly does the crisis lie?<\/b><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> The social violence that is spreading and becoming widespread in Egyptian society does not have single causes; rather, it is the product of a set of complex factors that are intertwined to a great degree.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">There are, first, political causes, related to the closure of frameworks for public dialogue and the absence of spaces to let off steam, in addition to the impact of decisions issued by the highest authority on overall living conditions. Added to this are the laws that are legislated and that besiege people, whether in the markets through the continuous rise in prices driven by inflation, or with regard to the relationship between owner and tenant on land, or the new housing rent laws, and others. All of this leads to patterns of violence within what may be called &#8220;societies of scarcity&#8221;.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">There are causes related to the decline of religious restraint, because religious institutions and some of those who produce religious discourse no longer offer people a role model or a good example. Indeed, some of them fell spectacularly during the last decade, in a real test that Egypt has gone through from the January revolution until today.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">There are also clear economic causes, represented by the expansion of societies of scarcity, rising poverty rates and the shrinking of giving. It is natural for hardship to lead to patterns of violence; a person who cannot find food, clothing or medicine will not be a calm or gentle person, and may direct their anger at society if unable to direct it at the authorities.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">There are also factors related to the recycling of violence, or what may be described as &#8220;the waste of violence&#8221;, which is reproduced and circulated via social media. The space has become open to instinct, to excessive consumption, to extravagance and to the circulation of scenes of violence and crime, things that used to reach people in limited proportions in the past, but are today present on a wide scale.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Added to this are causes linked to drugs, especially the emergence of new, highly potent types that take away the mind and push addicts to commit violence against themselves, against their families and relatives, and against society in general.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">And finally, there are causes related to the spread of certain psychological disorders and illnesses, some of whose sufferers may be inclined to violence. More precisely, the causes of violence in Egyptian society are multiple and complex; each factor has its weight and share, but they all combine to push society from a state of tranquillity and harmony into the circle of violence.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">We have a writing crisis in Egypt. This is very clear in drama and film works in recent times; rarely do we find works that satisfy the audience or leave an impact. Even the books issued by publishing houses no longer receive any notable attention. So where is the crisis? <\/span><b><br \/>\n<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> The crisis is complex. The writing crisis is not superficial but multidimensional, and part of it relates to the writers themselves.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">A book, when it is published and given the description &#8220;book&#8221;, needs a complete journey inside a reputable publishing house, starting with the choice of subject, through revision, correction, proofreading and editing, and up to printing worthy of the word &#8220;book&#8221;. This system has clearly been tampered with. There are many publishing houses that publish poor texts in exchange for payment, many of them unrevised and not meeting basic standards; some are literary plagiarism and some rely on artificial intelligence, and this practice has spread as long as the publisher receives the money.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The causes of the crisis go beyond that, to include society&#8217;s view of culture as a luxury in the last decade, along with anxiety about intellectuals as bearers of awareness, so what was wanted was to curtail their roles.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In the past, there was a connection between the book and drama, the latter being the medium most widespread among the public compared with books. This link has almost been severed. Drama writers have come to favour the easy route, and rarely do we find works adapted from a novel or a short story, as was customary in the history of Egyptian drama and cinema.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Drama and cinema used to contribute to &#8220;making stars&#8221; of some writers; people would watch works adapted from their novels, learn their names and then look for their books, and this was a legitimate means of promotion for literature. This role has almost ended today.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">As for cultural spaces in the Egyptian press, they are almost non-existent, except for very few publications, such as &#8220;Akhbar al-Adab&#8221;, and its readership is limited too. Cultural magazines and periodicals are printed in hundreds of copies, and sometimes only dozens are distributed, and even if they were distributed in thousands, the number would remain meagre compared with the number of intellectuals or of those wishing to engage with culture.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Accordingly, I do not see the problem as lying in a shortage of producers of literary or artistic texts; that assessment is entirely incorrect. Rather, the crisis is broader, encompassing publishing houses, the media, the spaces in which texts are able to reach their audience, as well as the general view of culture and writing in society.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">We now have a far greater number of writers than was the case in earlier times. Look at short story competitions and you will find a large number of good works. Those who organise these competitions and prizes answer this question in practice; even the prizes dedicated to young people receive hundreds of novels, at least forty of which are considered good.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Was there ever a period when Egypt had forty good writers? No, but the state used to sponsor culture and open up its arteries, and Egypt enjoyed a regional role in this field, and all of that reflected positively on the people of the pen.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Today, all of this has almost disappeared, and the true intellectual, the one who seeks the truth, criticises the performance of the authorities, sides with the people and objects to corruption and tyranny, is subjected to a severe siege. This situation has also brought down the symbolism and value of the intellectual in people&#8217;s eyes, and so the public turned away from him.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The causes are multiple, some relating to the general context and some to the intellectuals themselves, who have mostly accepted moving away from concern with people&#8217;s problems and becoming preoccupied with their own writings. Some of them were excluded or dropped out of the race, some stopped producing after questioning the point of writing, and some produce good texts but find no means of publication, or, if they find publication, their work does not achieve circulation or distribution. We do indeed have complex problems in this respect.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Hassan believes the opposition has been suffering for a long time. We are facing either an opposition that the authorities created with their money and influence, and whose path and limits of movement they set, or an opposition that tried to rebel against this equation, and so was besieged, excluded, derided and smeared<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":14903,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[412],"tags":[],"kateb":[728],"class_list":["post-16782","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics-en","kateb-shimaa-hamdy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/\u0639\u0645\u0627\u0631-\u0639\u0644\u064a-\u062d\u0633\u0646.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16782","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16782"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16782\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23460,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16782\/revisions\/23460"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14903"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16782"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16782"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16782"},{"taxonomy":"kateb","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kateb?post=16782"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}