{"id":16788,"date":"2026-06-09T20:41:14","date_gmt":"2026-06-09T18:41:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=16788"},"modified":"2026-10-24T14:57:57","modified_gmt":"2026-10-24T12:57:57","slug":"civil-movement-8","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/civil-movement-8\/","title":{"rendered":"The Civil Movement\u2019s Deepest Crisis: One Statement Exposed Years of Accumulated Fault Lines"},"content":{"rendered":"

Over recent weeks, the Civil Democratic Movement has gone through one of the biggest <\/span>crises<\/span><\/a> since its founding, after a statement it issued in solidarity with the head of the Conservative Party, engineer Akmal Kortam, provoked a wide wave of controversy and anger in political circles and on social media, before the movement <\/span>apologised<\/span><\/a> for it, withdrew it and deleted it from its official page.<\/span><\/p>\n

The statement came against the backdrop of the crisis over the demolition of a palace owned by Kortam on the banks of the Nile, which he <\/span>described<\/span><\/a> as an infringement of his rights, while the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation <\/span>affirmed<\/span><\/a> that the building had been erected in violation of the law and encroached on the Nile’s protected zone. <\/span><\/p>\n

<\/span>Critics<\/span><\/a> considered that the statement conflated a legal dispute concerning private property with public and national issues such as Warraq Island and the historic cemeteries, giving the case political dimensions wider than its immediate scope. Others considered that the movement had given priority to defending one of its leaders at the expense of issues affecting wider segments of citizens, in addition to objections to the mechanism by which the statement was issued and the fact that it was not put up for sufficient discussion inside the movement before it was published.<\/span><\/p>\n

Some critics went as far as saying that the statement <\/span>adopted<\/span><\/a> a biased position in a dispute that is still the subject of legal proceedings, which later prompted the movement to withdraw the statement and apologise for it, affirming that its wording had been unfortunate and had led to interpretations that did not reflect what it intended<\/span><\/p>\n

The large wave of criticism prompted a number of parties and politicians to announce their objection or to <\/span>disclaim<\/span><\/a> responsibility for it, foremost among them the Conservative Party headed by Akmal Kortam, which revealed a major malfunction and deep disagreements over the decision-making mechanisms inside the movement and the nature of its political priorities.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to informed sources inside the Civil Movement who spoke to Zawia3, the anger the statement left behind has prompted internal reviews of the future of the alliance and the mechanisms for running it. The parties taking part in the alliance are holding meetings and consultations to evaluate the experience and discuss the future of continuing in it, between a comprehensive restructuring or dissolving it and forming new alliances of an ideological character, while the movement’s Youth Secretariat has decided to prepare a restructuring proposal in the hope of saving the alliance.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

It was decided to postpone the meeting of the Board of Trustees, which had been scheduled to be held on 5 June last, to 12 June, to give all members the chance to attend and to calm the atmosphere. In the same context, the Conservative Party<\/span> announced<\/span><\/a> a reassessment of its political alliances, including the Civil Movement, which some interpreted as paving the way for withdrawal, while sources in the party affirmed that the final decision would be determined after the upcoming meeting.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although the crisis appeared on the surface to be a disagreement over a solidarity statement, leaders and members of the movement, researchers and politicians who spoke to Zawia3 see that it has revealed a deeper crisis that has accumulated over years, relating to organisational ossification, weak decision-making mechanisms, a declining connection with popular issues and the failure of attempts to inject new blood into the country’s largest civil opposition alliance. <\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading: <\/b>After land, wheat and fish… the Mostakbal Misr agency takes over 40,000 ration outlets<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n


\nA revealing crisis<\/b><\/h1>\n

The Civil Democratic Movement was founded <\/span><\/a>in December 2017 as a political alliance comprising 12 political parties and a number of public figures at the time, with the aim of unifying the efforts of the civil opposition forces and defending the principles of the civil state, democracy and the rule of law, and offering a political alternative based on pluralism and the peaceful transfer of power.<\/span><\/p>\n

Since its creation, the movement has brought together liberal, leftist and nationalist currents under its umbrella, a diversity that gave it the ability to build consensus on a number of public issues, but which at the same time carried the seeds of disagreements that kept accumulating over the years.<\/span><\/p>\n

From 2018, the year of the second term of the current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the movement faced political and security challenges that limited its ability to play its role in the public sphere. The movement remained in a state of dormancy and restriction until it <\/span>returned <\/span><\/a>to the forefront of the political scene again in April 2022, following the Egyptian President’s call, during the Egyptian Family Iftar, for the launch of the National Dialogue with the participation of pro-government and opposition forces, a call that represented an opportunity to regain part of the movement’s political presence and reactivate its role in the public sphere.<\/span><\/p>\n

The National Dialogue phase saw a degree of<\/span> cohesion<\/span><\/a> inside the Civil Movement, as its activity stood out clearly in demanding the release of those detained in cases related to opinion. However, this cohesion did not last long, and disagreements soon began to escalate as the 2023 presidential election approached. At first the movement adopted a unified position calling for guarantees for holding a competitive election, before the positions of its components later diverged on the question of taking part in the presidential race, which led to a split within its ranks. <\/span><\/p>\n

In a<\/span> previous report<\/span><\/a> by Zawia3 entitled \u201cWe agreed to disagree\u2026 behind the scenes of the Egyptian opposition’s splits\u201d, the report traced the most prominent milestones of the split inside the Civil Democratic Movement during this phase, and expected that the movement would see a transformation in the nature of its role after the last presidential election, and that it would not return to its previous situation before the electoral contest. This later materialised with the <\/span>freezing<\/span><\/a> by the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and the Al-Adl Party of their membership, before the Reform and Development Party <\/span>decided<\/span><\/a> on a freeze as well after that.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In this context, Akram Ismail, a leading figure in the Civil Democratic Movement and the Bread and Freedom Party, considers that the latest crisis has revealed the reality of the movement and its structural crises, explaining that the alliance is living under a political and security siege as a result of its attempt to express a current that rejects the engineering of political life and seeks to preserve a degree of independence.<\/span><\/p>\n

He adds, speaking to Zawia3, that the siege does not absolve the movement of its responsibility for the deleted statement, as it contains internal contradictions and unequal weights among its components, as well as differences in ideological backgrounds and traditions of political work, factors that make it more fragile whenever political activity declines and initiative is absent, so that latent disagreements rise to the surface more clearly.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ismail stresses that the movement is trying to express an independent opposition outside the bounds of the “Available Space” (an electoral alliance comprising the Al-Adl, Egyptian Social Democratic and Reform and Development parties and a number of pro-government parties), which makes it pay the price of this choice through siege and isolation, but he considers at the same time that the mistake the movement made in the statement of solidarity with Akmal Kortam cannot be ignored and is not justified by this siege, especially since it linked an issue of a personal nature to general national issues, which made it easier to direct criticism at it at a moment when it was already suffering from sluggishness and weak effectiveness.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

For his part, political and human rights researcher Mostafa Shawky considers that the current crisis cannot be separated from the movement’s historical trajectory, regarding it as an extension of a series of accumulated crises and not a product of the latest statement.<\/span><\/p>\n

Speaking to Zawia3, Shawky divides the roots of the crisis into two main parts: the first is objective, represented by what he describes as “the comprehensive nationalisation of the public sphere”, which led to the closure of the political sphere, the isolation of civil forces from society and the weakening of their ability to build popular bases or communicate with citizens.<\/span><\/p>\n

The second part relates to subjective factors within the movement itself, foremost among them the failure of attempts at restructuring, especially after the National Dialogue, which represented an opportunity to inject new blood and renew working mechanisms; however, what he describes as “the ossified leadership” was unable to make use of this limited opportunity, before stagnation returned with the shrinking of the margin for political movement.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading: <\/b>Ziad El-Elaimy: No real opposition without a clearly defined system of government… and Egypt has neither<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n


\nA long path of disintegration<\/b><\/h1>\n

The presidential election ended in December 2023 with the announcement of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s victory for a third term, but this did not end the disagreements inside the Civil Democratic Movement: the freezing of the membership of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and the Al-Adl Party continued, amid an escalating debate over electoral alliances and preparations for the 2025 parliamentary elections, especially as the movement <\/span>held fast<\/span><\/a> to its rejection of any coordination with pro-government parties, which deepened the divergences among its components.<\/span><\/p>\n

In February 2024, a new<\/span> crisis <\/span><\/a>erupted following a statement issued by the movement that called for allowing demonstrations against the genocide in Gaza and criticised the Egyptian position on the war and the continuation of the Camp David Accords, but the statement did not enjoy internal consensus despite being officially published, which sparked a new disagreement over decision-making mechanisms. According to a <\/span>previous report <\/span><\/a>by Zawia3, several parties objected to its being issued without consensus, most prominently the Reform and Development Party, followed by the Conservatives and Al-Dostour, which revealed more political disagreements and organisational sluggishness inside the movement.<\/span><\/p>\n

Later, the Reform and Development Party <\/span>left<\/span><\/a> its seat inside the Civil Movement, its seat inside the movement, as the parliamentary elections approached, adding to a series of setbacks that reduced the number of active parties inside the Civil Movement to only nine parties, and the movement came to rely to a greater degree on public figures within the decision-making framework, “the movement’s Board of Trustees”, compared with organised political parties, in the absence of a unified vision or a clear popular presence.<\/span><\/p>\n

In July 2024, in an attempt to heal the rift and create an opportunity for popular outreach and to renew the blood inside the Civil Movement, the movement began to move forward with what it had approved regarding <\/span>restructuring<\/span><\/a>, which later resulted in the formation of what became known as the \u201c<\/span>Youth Secretariat<\/span><\/a>\u201d. However, this secretariat lasted only a short period, and appeared through limited activities and events before its role gradually declined without leaving a tangible organisational or political impact on the structure of the alliance.<\/span><\/p>\n

With the last parliamentary elections, the movement appeared in a state of electoral dispersal and without a unified programme or a cohesive electoral alliance bringing its components together under one umbrella, which Zawia3 documented in its report<\/a>” Divisions or complementary roles… why did the Civil Movement fail to form a single electoral alliance?”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The repercussions of this phase did not stop at the limits of organisational dispersal, but extended to a new crisis in the form of <\/span>accusations<\/span><\/a> directed at Islam Kortam, son of Akmal Kortam, head of the Conservative Party, during his candidacy in the House of Representatives elections for the Al-Basateen and Dar El-Salam constituency, which the Conservative Party later <\/span>denied, <\/span><\/a>and which centred on claims of indirect coordination with candidates of the pro-government party ‘Mostaqbal Watan’ for the individual seats, in addition to accusations relating to the use of political money in the electoral process. This was in a context that contradicts the previously declared positions of the Civil Movement and the Conservative Party.<\/span><\/p>\n

Regarding what was raised about Islam Kortam during the last parliamentary elections,<\/b> Akram Ismail says the matter saw major disagreements inside the movement that did not come out into the open, affirming that the way Islam Kortam won did not pass normally, and that it was the subject of discussions and of escalating disagreements among the movement’s components.<\/span><\/p>\n

He points out that the information that reached the movement spoke of electoral practices similar to what happens in elections, such as the use of political money and others, but the assessment of these practices differs among the movement’s parties: there are those who consider them an electoral crime, while others saw them as part of the usual way elections are run, as a result of differences in the traditions of work and political practice among the different parties and currents inside the movement.<\/span><\/p>\n

In his assessment of the movement’s political performance, Mostafa Shawky says that the Civil Movement has not developed its view of the political reality in Egypt since the Tiran and Sanafir crisis, and has since relied on a set of ready-made or “canned” positions that do not engage with the issues of greatest importance in citizens’ lives, explaining that although the movement presented visions for political and economic reform at earlier stages, it failed to produce any real development of its political vision amid the continued closure of the public sphere.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading: <\/span>Ziad El-Elaimy: No real opposition without a clearly defined system of government… and Egypt has neither<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n


\nControversy over the role and influence of the Conservatives, and the party announces its anger<\/b><\/h1>\n

Although the statement at the centre of the disagreement inside the Civil Movement came in the framework of solidarity with Kortam in his crisis, the paradox was that the Conservative Party <\/span>objected<\/span><\/a> to the statement and disowned its content after criticism escalated. The party later announced the freezing of its previous alliances and the start of building new social liberal alliances in preparation for the electoral contests up to 2030.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although <\/span>the statement<\/span><\/a> did not explicitly provide for withdrawal from the Civil Democratic Movement, its content was interpreted in political circles as paving the way for disengagement from the alliance, especially after engineer Akmal Kortam left the group of the Civil Movement’s Board of Trustees, a step that an informed source inside the movement described to Zawia3 as a clear message expressing the Conservative Party’s position on the future of its relationship with the movement.<\/span><\/p>\n

Coinciding with the anger provoked by the statement, a wider debate arose about the extent of the Conservative Party’s <\/span>influence<\/span><\/a> inside the movement and the limits of its impact on shaping its positions, especially as the movement’s meetings relied for long periods on the party’s headquarters, with the financial and logistical resources it provides. <\/span><\/p>\n

Political and human rights researcher Mostafa Shawky describes the presence of engineer Akmal Kortam, who came from a political background<\/a> as one of the members of the National Democratic Party, ‘the ruling party under former President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, within the leadership body of the Civil Movement as “the historic mistake” the movement made since its founding, explaining that overlooking his political practices and historical biases came as a result of the financial influence he possesses.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

At the same time, Shawky considers that talk of the amount of power this financial influence confers inside the movement is exaggerated, and explains that the relative weight of the left-wing parties, whether nationalist or socialist, has always been the highest and most influential in the movement’s decision-making; but the real problem was that these forces did not express a unified position, as some of them would adopt the positions of other currents inside the movement and give them the weight needed to settle decisions, which made the decision-making mechanism more dynamic and complex than merely being subject to the influence of a single person.<\/span><\/p>\n

For his part, Magdy Hamdan, a member of the Presidential Council of the Conservative Party, says the party’s latest statement does not necessarily mean withdrawal from the Civil Movement or from any of the existing alliances, explaining that the party is going through a phase of \u201crearranging and reviewing its positions\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hamdan adds, speaking to Zawia3, that Talaat Khalil, a member of the Presidential Council and general coordinator of the Civil Democratic Movement, has been mandated by the party to take a decision on remaining in the movement or freezing its membership, with this to be settled at an upcoming meeting.<\/span><\/p>\n

He stresses that the Conservative Party’s remaining in the Civil Movement depends on the movement having a real desire to develop and bring about change in its structure, and he considered that the continued presence of some faces and leaders, whom he described as “the idols that are there”, is obstructing the renewal process, and that the movement needs to attract figures who are more effective and more capable of influencing the political sphere. He noted that the movement’s composition is ideologically unbalanced, as it is dominated by a leftist character against a single liberal party, the Conservatives, which has been reflected in weak consensus on positions, especially electoral ones.<\/span><\/p>\n

Hamdan considers that the Civil Movement alliance has not achieved its goals as an electoral framework, and that the Conservatives have remained the most influential party inside it, and he even went as far as saying that had it not been for the party, the movement would not have been founded.<\/span><\/p>\n

Regarding the future of the alliance between the Conservative Party and Al-Dostour, Hamdan described Al-Dostour’s organisational situation as turbulent and legally unresolved regarding its presidency, with the Political Parties Affairs Committee not recognising any of the disputing parties as the party’s official head, explaining that the party deals only with officially recognised entities.<\/span><\/p>\n

He also affirms that this approach is consistent with its respect for the law and state institutions, rejecting involvement in the internal disputes of other parties, and revealing the Conservatives’ intention to found a broader liberal alliance bringing together different forces, as part of a plan to rebuild a political alignment capable of competing on the public scene.<\/span><\/p>\n

Commenting on the Akmal Kortam crisis, he criticised what he described as \u201cgloating\u201d on the part of some parties in the movement and the disavowal by others of their responsibilities, pointing out that Kortam later presented what he considers evidence refuting the Irrigation Ministry’s accusations regarding the disputed incident.<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/b><\/p>\n

An unacceptable apology <\/b><\/h1>\n

Despite the Civil Democratic Movement’s <\/span>apology<\/span><\/a> on its official page and the withdrawal of the controversial statement, this did not succeed in containing the wave of anger and criticism that escalated and reached the point of demands to dissolve the movement and end its experience, on the grounds that it is no longer able to play its role as a unifying framework for the civil opposition forces.<\/span><\/p>\n

During the latest crisis, controversy arose over the <\/span>future<\/span><\/a> of the movement, as critics considered that it had lost its ability to represent the civil opposition or express its priorities, regarding the latest crisis as having revealed the scale of the long-standing organisational and political crises, which prompted some voices to demand its dissolution and the search for an alternative framework that is more cohesive and effective.<\/span><\/p>\n

In this context, Ola Shahba, a leading figure in the Bread and Freedom Party, considers that the crisis of the Civil Democratic Movement is deeper than the incident of the latest statement, regarding its roots as linked to the nature of the alliance, its working mechanisms and its political choices. <\/span><\/p>\n

She explains, speaking to Zawia3, that the withdrawal of any party will not resolve the crisis, because the movement was by its nature founded on an alliance of politically and intellectually different forces, which is natural in alliances, but she considers that the real problem lies in two basic issues: the weak connection with direct social issues and the absence of a real popular base, which has left the movement lacking social backing that would monitor its performance and give it wider legitimacy.<\/span><\/p>\n

She adds that the second crisis relates to the internal structure and decision-making mechanisms, pointing out that the crisis of the latest statement revealed a clear malfunction in the way decisions are made inside the movement, as the statement was issued without sufficient discussion among all parties, some objections were treated as minority opinions, while others did not present an explicit objection despite bearing political responsibility for it.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Bread and Freedom Party leader also points out that what happened after the statement was issued revealed that some parties inside the movement<\/span> rushed<\/span><\/a> to defend themselves individually and to declare that they were not responsible for the statement, considering that this moment represented a practical declaration that the movement no longer works as a coordinated political coalition, because a number of its components were preoccupied with protecting their party entities instead of defending the collective decision. The matter also revealed clear ossification in the internal working mechanisms and indifference on the part of some parties to the fate of the alliance itself, as well as the absence of political imagination and of the ability to assess the consequences of the decisions issued in the movement’s name.<\/span><\/p>\n

She considers that the problem with the statement was not only its content, but its detachment from the social context, as the case it addressed concerned a businessman who does not represent a general social threat, which made the comparison the statement contained with issues such as Warraq or the historic cemeteries politically unfortunate, and revealed a weakness in anticipating reactions.<\/span><\/p>\n

On the other hand, Walid El-Ammari, official spokesperson of the Civil Movement and a member of Al-Dostour Party, says the meeting of the Board of Trustees was postponed to ensure wider attendance, with the next meeting to be held at the headquarters of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party or of Bread and Freedom (under formation), affirming that what is circulating about dissolving the movement is not based on any official discussion so far.<\/p>\n

He adds that discussions inside the movement centre on two options: either a comprehensive restructuring and new blood, or dissolution if agreement on reform proves impossible, noting that the idea of dissolution has not been put forward as a final decision inside the Board.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

He points out that a large part of the current criticism comes from parties that have been part of the Democratic Current since its creation, considering that some of the discourse rejecting the movement and calling for its dissolution offers no clear alternative for the future of civil action.<\/span><\/p>\n

El-Ammari stresses that the movement admitted the mistake of the statement and apologised for it, as part of entrenching a culture of political accountability, emphasising that political life in Egypt generally lacks the admission of mistakes. He adds that the real fear lies in the attacks continuing even after any reforms or restructuring are carried out, warning that their continuation may be aimed at weakening the civil opposition, especially as some official media outlets have adopted this discourse.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading: <\/b>69 death sentences in two months… and the pursuit of defenders of prisoners of opinion<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n


\nThe Civil Movement’s youth: a restructuring attempt that ended in failure<\/b><\/h1>\n

In the context of the talk about the internal restructuring that the Civil Movement’s Board of Trustees is preparing to discuss at its upcoming meeting on 12 June, a previous experience the movement went through in 2024 returns to the fore, when it sought to inject new blood into its organisational structure by launching the “<\/span>Youth Secretariat<\/span><\/a>” initiative. The initiative aimed to integrate young people into decision-making mechanisms and to renew the organisational structure, but it remained limited in impact despite organising some events and being represented on the Board of Trustees.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to sources who spoke to Zawia3, the Youth Secretariat faced internal challenges from its creation that prevented its development, as it did not gain full acceptance from all of the movement’s components. Some parties, whether representatives of political parties or public figures, viewed the initiative as an attempt to reshape the balance of power inside the movement or to impose new influence on the decision-making process, which was reflected in the level of cooperation with it.<\/span><\/p>\n

The sources added that the secretariat also faced successive organisational crises, relating to the absence of clear bylaws defining its powers and its relationship with the Board of Trustees, as well as disagreements over the criteria for membership and representation and weak coordination between it and the parties making up the movement, which gradually led to a decline in its activity and a shrinking of its role.<\/span><\/p>\n

For his part, Akram Ismail explains that the young members of the secretariat remained somewhat reserved about fully engaging inside the movement, because of the continuing tension over the practices of the Board of Trustees and the disagreements relating to its priorities and preferences. He points out that the Civil Movement has not yet settled whether it wants to expand the youth component inside it, that the traditional leaderships still dominate the movement, and that there is caution in dealing with the new generation, opening the field to it and bearing the consequences of that, even though giving young people the chance to gain experience requires accepting the possibility that they will make mistakes or take unbalanced positions at times.<\/span><\/p>\n

Shawky, meanwhile, considers that the failure of the Youth Secretariat to renew the Civil Movement is due to two main reasons: the dominance of a traditional leadership that treated young people as an organisational appendage rather than a force for change, and, on the other side, the inability of the group itself to impose an influential presence inside the movement or to wrest space for its project. He adds that political closure leads to diminishing young people’s capacity to act, and that new projects can only have an impact in periods of political opening and the widening of the public sphere. <\/span><\/p>\n

In this context, Ola Shahba considers that the Youth Secretariat did not succeed in playing the role expected of it as a space for renewing ideas or developing activities that reconnect the movement with society. She adds that the problem is not linked to young people alone, but to the nature of their political formation and the extent of their actual involvement in public work, in addition to the weak interest of some parties in social issues and internal democracy, pointing out that belonging to the youth category is not enough to bring about change if they continue to move within the same traditional intellectual and organisational frameworks.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

She also considers that including independents and public figures on the Board of Trustees, with voting rights equal to those of the representatives of party entities, reduced the space for young people’s influence, especially since these independents, or those known as public figures, are not subject to accountability from organisational or party bases and do not rely on political groups that support their positions.<\/span><\/p>\n

She stresses that this structural flaw was reflected in the performance of both the movement and the Youth Secretariat, which calls for a review of the founding mechanism and the way of working. She points out that the secretariat emerged in the context of youth momentum linked to the Palestinian cause, but relying on this momentum alone was not enough to produce real political renewal or a stable organisational experience, despite her awareness of the cost of this mobilisation for some young people and the continued detention of some of them.<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/b><\/p>\n

The future of the Civil Movement: either development or dissolution<\/b><\/h1>\n

On the future of the Civil Movement, political researcher Mostafa Shawky considers that calls to dissolve the movement by an organisational decision will not change the nature of the existing political crisis, suggesting that it will not be dissolved of its own will, but will move towards a gradual \u201cdecomposition\u201d as a political alternative emerges that is more capable of attracting the active elements within it. He adds that the current leadership is not qualified to absorb serious reform projects, and that what is being put forward does not go beyond, in his estimation, attempts to improve the image, nothing more.<\/span><\/p>\n

On the other hand, Walid El-Ammari affirms that the Youth Secretariat will submit at the next meeting a proposal to restructure the Civil Movement in the hope of preserving this civil alliance. El-Ammari points out that the reform proposals include broadening the membership base and integrating public figures, young people and leaders from the middle generation, while redefining the concept of a public figure, setting controls on membership and linking it to actual participation, and dropping the membership of those who are inactive, in addition to establishing an executive office with real executive powers and setting controls on the movement’s political discourse as a civil, not ideological, alliance.<\/span><\/p>\n

El-Ammari adds that the Youth Secretariat played roles in public and human rights files, among them the cases of Alaa Abdel Fattah, Laila Soueif’s hunger strike and the file of the Criminal Procedure Law, affirming that it remained cohesive despite the disagreements over the movement’s latest statement.<\/span><\/p>\n

He attributes the decline in its activity to internal disagreements and the lack of consensus on mechanisms of transparency and candour, while stressing that this does not absolve it of responsibility. He also explains that the youth were represented on the Board of Trustees by two members, one independent and the other from a party, and that they took a decisive position in rejecting the use of the movement’s name to support any electoral candidate, which the Board of Trustees abided by.<\/span><\/p>\n

As for Ola Shahba, she considers that dissolving the Civil Movement or replacing it with new ideological alliances will not be a way out of the crisis, because that would reproduce smaller entities facing the same problems but with weaker capacity for influence. She explains that the movement was originally established as an alliance of opposition forces in a closed political context, with the aim of coordinating efforts around common rules, not unifying intellectual frames of reference, considering that its existence does not at the same time prevent the establishment of parallel alliances around specific issues or orientations if any of the parties wish to do so. <\/span><\/p>\n

She points out that the real crisis is not so much about the form of the alliance as about how it is run and the decision-making mechanisms inside it, considering that the Civil Movement today needs real external pressure if it wants a serious restructuring based on different foundations.<\/span><\/p>\n

She also stresses that the parties making up the movement themselves need a deep review of their internal decision-making mechanisms, the issues they adopt, their internal bylaws and the extent of their respect for internal democracy and the rights of women and of their members, considering that these files are not marginal issues, but reflect the nature of the political culture prevailing inside these parties and the extent of their ability to produce new leaderships and enable marginalised members to influence political decisions.<\/span><\/p>\n

The crisis of the Civil Democratic Movement reveals that the problem is no longer linked to a particular incident or a controversial statement, but reflects a long accumulation of political and organisational divergences within an alliance founded on diversity more than on harmony; and between the paths of reform and restructuring on the one hand, and calls for dissolution on the other, the movement appears to face a decisive moment of testing, concerning its ability to renew its tools and carry out a comprehensive organisational review, or to face the possibility of gradual erosion in the absence, so far, of a clear political alternative.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Civil Democratic Movement apologised for and deleted a statement in which it defended Akmal Kortam’s palace, setting off an internal crisis that reveals disagreements accumulated since the founding of the alliance of 12 parties in 2017, amid demands for restructuring or dissolution ahead of the Board of Trustees meeting on 12 June.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":19368,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[412],"tags":[],"kateb":[728],"class_list":["post-16788","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics-en","kateb-shimaa-hamdy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/civil-coalition-crisis-2026.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16788","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16788"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16788\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23950,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16788\/revisions\/23950"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/19368"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16788"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16788"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16788"},{"taxonomy":"kateb","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kateb?post=16788"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}