Fifteen years after the January Revolution, its events remain present in people’s minds as though they happened yesterday, despite the passing of the years. Nevertheless, many of the facts that were not allowed to come out into the open have yet to be revealed. To date, the January generation has not fully told its stories, nor has it presented its own reviews of what happened during that period. Perhaps the right moment to reveal them has not yet come, but it is certain that much of what went on behind closed doors has yet to come to light.<\/p>\n
Human rights lawyer Khaled Ali, speaking to Zawia3, lifts the curtain for the first time on what went on behind the scenes of the presidential elections within the civil current, from the aftermath of the January Revolution until 2018, and answers questions that have been asked repeatedly without answers: Why did the civil forces not unite? How were alliances formed within the current? Why did he announce his candidacy in 2018 and then withdraw? And how was the decision to withdraw taken?<\/p>\n
He also talks about the political situation and the freedoms file before January and at present, as well as the rise in incidents of violence, the latest cabinet formation, and the constitutional amendments.
\n<\/b><\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
On the fifteenth and most recent anniversary, you called for writing about January and its events. Why now?<\/strong><\/p>\n Fifteen years have passed since the January Revolution, and during these years Egypt, like the region and the entire world, has witnessed deep and major transformations, which requires us to reread what happened in light of subsequent developments, not for the sake of issuing definitive judgments about success or failure, but out of an attempt to understand the general context, to grasp what happened, to think about how to move forward in the future, and to benefit from the experiences we have all been through. Hence the importance of writing continuously about this experience, especially after fifteen years, a period of time sufficient for reflection and review.<\/p>\n A broad segment of those who took part in the revolution still hold it in their memory as though it happened yesterday, recalling its details and events they lived through themselves. On the other hand, there are new generations who did not witness the revolution, and who perhaps heard about it or lived through it in their childhood, as a social and human event more than a political one.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n At the same time, erroneous writings about the revolution have appeared, alongside an official discourse that portrays what Egyptians did as if it were the worst thing they have ever done in their lives and something for which they deserve punishment, and that holds 2011 responsible for everything negative in society, which lacks accuracy.<\/p>\n If this narrative is constantly repeated, then the children of the January Revolution are also called upon to write about their feelings and their vision: Why did they take to the streets? How did they see the revolution? What developments did it go through? What derailed it? And who tried to assassinate it, besieged it or prevented it from achieving its goals?<\/p>\n The aim is for both narratives to remain present before the new generations, enabling them to reach a balanced judgment, so that the testimony of the revolution is not absent at a time when the counter-narrative dominates through the official media or the discourse of the President of the Republic.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Do you think mistakes were made during January that call for review?<\/strong><\/p>\n I cannot describe what happened as mistakes so much as the product of a general context in which the civil forces were not given a real opportunity to organise, even though they formed the main momentum on the Egyptian street during the period from 2000 to 2011.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood was a large organisation that focused to a greater degree on its internal affairs, and sought to present itself to the Mubarak regime as a potential partner in power.<\/p>\n The relationship between the two sides at the time could be described as closer to a push-and-pull equation: whenever one of the group’s members was arrested, it would organise protests in response, while at the same time it enjoyed clear margins of movement: it issued its publications, its cadres moved about, and its activity continued inside its headquarters. At that stage the group appeared closer to an actual political party than to a banned organisation, under a formula of accommodation with the Mubarak regime that ranged between dialogue, containment and mutual pressure.<\/p>\n Since 2000, the political forces engaged in successive waves of mobilisation: starting with support for the Palestinian intifada, through the protests against the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, when they took to Tahrir Square for the first time, then the “Freedom Now” and “Kefaya” movements in rejection of term extension and hereditary succession, up to the Mahalla strikes of 2006 and 2008, the rising wave of labour protests, and the issues of privatisation, the minimum wage and pensions.<\/p>\n This momentum was created mainly by the civil forces, particularly those with a leftist background, including the Nasserist current, and it helped to create direct interaction with the issues of the street and the concerns of society.<\/p>\n However, this mobilisation, despite its breadth, did not turn into a large party entity or a broad organisation capable of matching the organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood or the networks of the state. In my view, the existence of a broad and organised civil organisation was a pivotal point that would have made a big difference had it materialised, but that did not happen at the time.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n What about the behind-the-scenes story of your candidacy in the 2012, 2014 and 2018 presidential elections? And do you think there was a mistake for which you bear a share of the responsibility?<\/strong><\/p>\n