{"id":16795,"date":"2026-02-17T16:13:55","date_gmt":"2026-02-17T14:13:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=16795"},"modified":"2026-10-07T02:50:39","modified_gmt":"2026-10-07T00:50:39","slug":"khaled-ali","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/khaled-ali\/","title":{"rendered":"Khaled Ali: Political and Economic Conditions Are Worse Than Before January (Interview)"},"content":{"rendered":"

Fifteen years after the January revolution, its events remain vivid despite the passage of time. Much has still not been made public, and the generation that participated has yet to tell all its stories or offer its own full assessments of what happened behind closed doors.<\/p>\n

In this interview with Zawia3, human rights lawyer Khaled Ali discusses the civilian political camp\u2019s presidential election negotiations from the aftermath of the revolution to 2018. Why did civilian forces fail to unite? How were alliances formed? Why did he announce his candidacy in 2018 and then withdraw? He also addresses political freedoms, violence, the recent Cabinet reshuffle and constitutional amendments.<\/p>\n

On January\u2019s fifteenth anniversary, you called for people to write about the revolution. Why now?<\/h2>\n

Fifteen years have passed, during which Egypt, the region and the world have undergone profound changes. We need to reread the experience in light of what followed, not to issue definitive judgments about success or failure but to understand its context, consider how to act in the future and learn from what we all experienced. Fifteen years is enough time for reflection and review, which makes continued writing important.<\/p>\n

Many participants still remember the revolution as though it happened yesterday. New generations did not witness it, or experienced it as children and remember a social and human event more than a political one.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, inaccurate accounts have appeared alongside an official narrative portraying what Egyptians did as the worst act of their lives, deserving punishment, and blaming 2011 for everything negative in society. That is inaccurate.<\/p>\n

If that narrative is repeated constantly, January\u2019s participants must also write about their feelings and perspectives: why they went out, how they understood the revolution, how it developed, what diverted it, and who tried to destroy it, contain it or prevent it from achieving its aims.<\/p>\n

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Both accounts must remain available to new generations so they can reach a balanced judgment. The revolution\u2019s testimony must not disappear while the opposing account dominates official media and presidential discourse.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

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Were there mistakes during January that require reassessment?<\/h2>\n

I would not describe what happened primarily as mistakes. It arose from a broader context in which civilian forces had no real opportunity to organise, despite providing much of the momentum in the streets between 2000 and 2011.<\/p>\n

The Muslim Brotherhood, by contrast, was a large organisation that concentrated more on its internal affairs and presented itself to Mubarak\u2019s government as a potential partner in power.<\/p>\n

Its relationship with the government resembled a push-and-pull arrangement. Arrests of members prompted protests, but it also had significant room to operate: it published material, its cadres moved around and its offices continued their work. It seemed more like an actual political party than a prohibited organisation, within an accommodation involving dialogue, containment and mutual pressure.<\/p>\n

From 2000, political forces participated in successive waves of mobilisation: support for the Palestinian intifada; protests against the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, when they first entered Tahrir Square; the Freedom Now and Kefaya movements against extending Mubarak\u2019s rule and hereditary succession; the Mahalla strikes of 2006 and 2008; and growing labour mobilisation around privatisation, minimum wages and pensions.<\/p>\n

Civilian forces, particularly the left, including Nasserists, generated much of this momentum and connected directly with people\u2019s daily concerns. But broad mobilisation did not become a large party or organisation able to match the Brotherhood or state networks. A broad, organised civilian movement could have made a decisive difference; it did not emerge at the time.<\/p>\n

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