{"id":16984,"date":"2025-02-13T18:48:18","date_gmt":"2025-02-13T16:48:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=16984"},"modified":"2026-10-07T09:58:14","modified_gmt":"2026-10-07T07:58:14","slug":"propaganda","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/propaganda\/","title":{"rendered":"How Coordinated Online Accounts Used Gaza and January 25 in a Propaganda Campaign"},"content":{"rendered":"

As soon as a ceasefire agreement between Palestinian resistance factions and the Israeli government was announced, a coordinated campaign began on X under the hashtag #\u0645\u0635\u0631_\u0639\u0637\u0627\u0621_\u0644\u0627_\u064a\u0646\u0642\u0637\u0639, meaning \u201cEgypt\u2019s Giving Never Stops.\u201d It promoted Egypt\u2019s role in humanitarian mediation and aid, then shifted towards attacking the opposition through a hashtag presenting January 25 as Egyptian Police Day.<\/p>\n

This investigation examines the campaign through social network analysis of participating accounts. The analysis identified patterns consistent with systematic amplification, including activity attributed to inauthentic accounts.<\/p>\n

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A coordinated hashtag<\/h2>\n

Following the Gaza ceasefire, official media emphasised Egypt\u2019s role in pressuring the Israeli government to accept a truce, leading international efforts to end the military escalation and securing humanitarian assistance.<\/p>\n

The online campaign followed the same approach, focusing on Egypt\u2019s positive role in reaching the agreement. A closer examination of engagement, however, revealed patterns suggesting that some of the activity was not organic.<\/p>\n

Researchers first collected posts using the target hashtag and reviewed participating accounts\u2019 creation dates, follower counts and previous activity. This helped identify unusual engagement and possible collective amplification.<\/p>\n

They then used social network analysis to map links between the campaign\u2019s most active accounts. Measures of centrality identified influential accounts and clusters repeatedly interacting with one another, which may indicate organised coordination.<\/p>\n

Content analysis also revealed similarities in posts and hashtags. Researchers examined how several accounts reposted the same material within short periods, tracing changes in the political messaging and its direction.<\/p>\n

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A sudden surge<\/h2>\n

The report identifies a sharp increase in posts between January 19 and 23, 2025. More than 17,000 posts were recorded, with reported reach exceeding 97 million. Reach is a platform-monitoring metric and should not be read as a verified count of unique people.<\/p>\n

\"The
The supplied reach chart reports 97.2 million total reach and a daily average of 6.94 million. Its plotted peak falls on January 22; the original Arabic caption gives January 21.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Saudi Arabia ranked second after Egypt among locations associated with posts on the hashtag, accounting for 788 posts.<\/p>\n

Mostaqbal Watan News accounts led the engagement among accounts belonging to news websites. The outlet is the media platform of the Mostaqbal Watan party, known for supporting Egypt\u2019s governing authorities.<\/p>\n

The text describes reposts as about 45% of activity and original posts as about 12%. The accompanying chart provides the more precise breakdown below.<\/p>\n

\"Distribution
Distribution of post types in the supplied chart: reposts 45.3%, replies 35.8%, original posts 12.8% and quote posts 6.1%.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The reposting figures suggest that the hashtag\u2019s visibility was not simply the result of spontaneous engagement. A network of accounts played a significant role in amplifying it. Many displayed unusual activity, such as frequent posting around the clock or a narrow focus on particular content without personal interaction. Some had participated in similar campaigns.<\/p>\n

Several participating accounts lacked personal photographs or biographical details identifying their operators, apart from listing Egypt as their location.<\/p>\n

Accounts including Aa56547979, Ward7890 and rushyt1 stood out for intensive, repetitive activity and frequent reposting. The report later lists the Ward account as @Ward789000; these spellings are reproduced as given in the source.<\/p>\n

The rushyt1 account\u2019s biography used #\u0639\u0635\u0627\u0628\u0629_\u0627\u0644\u0631\u064a\u062a\u0648\u064a\u062a_\u0644\u0644\u0641\u0648\u0644\u0648\u0631\u0632, roughly \u201cthe retweet gang for followers,\u201d a hashtag associated with accounts displaying similar activity.<\/p>\n

\n

The campaign\u2019s messaging developed in two stages: first highlighting Egypt\u2019s role in Gaza and humanitarian aid, then attacking the Egyptian opposition as January 25 approached.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

\n

Recurring language in the campaign<\/h3>\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Theme<\/th>\nEnglish meaning of terms in the original word cloud<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
Campaign slogan<\/td>\nEgypt\u2019s Giving Never Stops<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
January 25<\/td>\nJanuary 25 Is Egyptian Police Day<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Gaza and border crossing<\/td>\nGaza; Palestine; Rafah; Rafah crossing<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
National praise<\/td>\nEgypt Is a Very Great Country; Egypt, Mother of the World; Egypt Will Win in the End<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Other recurring language<\/td>\nOur Awareness Is Our Weapon; Trump; expressions praising Egypt and insulting opponents<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>
English rendering of themes in the original Arabic word cloud; no frequency values were supplied.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
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Accounts driving the campaign<\/h2>\n

The accounts @BAHAA0003823628 and @BASSEMELMASSRY emerged as major drivers. According to the report\u2019s timeline, the campaign began on January 20, 2025, with the first hashtag posts appearing at 08:35 UTC. @BASSEMELMASSRY was among the early users, posting at 09:21 UTC.<\/p>\n

\n

Reported sequence<\/h3>\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Time or date<\/th>\nActivity<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
January 20, 2025, 08:35 UTC<\/td>\nFirst hashtag posts identified in the report\u2019s timeline<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
January 20, 2025, 09:21 UTC<\/td>\nAn early post by @BASSEMELMASSRY<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
January 21, 2025<\/td>\nThe account\u2019s activity shifted towards the Police Day hashtag<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>
The source\u2019s separate cumulative-adoption chart places account markers earlier in January, which conflicts with these dates. This timeline follows the dates stated in the report rather than inferring exact timings from that chart.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Combining the temporal and network analyses showed that the hashtag initially spread gradually. Engagement rose after several hours as central accounts became involved and carried the campaign into wider circles.<\/p>\n

\n

Of 7,062 reposts recorded in the campaign, the report attributes 44.5% to @BAHAA0003823628 and @BASSEMELMASSRY together.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The network\u2019s influence was not confined to those two accounts. Other central accounts acted as intermediaries, distributing posts between groups and extending circulation.<\/p>\n

@Aa56547979, @Ward789000 and @rushyt1 appeared among the network\u2019s most influential accounts. They helped recirculate and amplify material, linking different groups of users and sustaining the hashtag\u2019s visibility.<\/p>\n

\n

Prominent network accounts<\/h3>\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Account<\/th>\nRole identified by the analysis<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n
@Aa56547979<\/td>\nA central amplifier connected to the campaign hashtag<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
@Ward789000<\/td>\nAn intermediary recirculating campaign content<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
@rushyt1<\/td>\nAn amplifier and link between groups of accounts<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>
Account roles described in the source analysis; this does not identify the people operating them.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
\"The
The supplied network map shows links formed through mentions and reposts between participating accounts.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
\"Two
Two posts identified as widely reposted in the source. Both combine praise for Egypt with insults directed at opponents and link the giving campaign to the January 25 Police Day hashtag.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
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Propaganda that keeps shifting<\/h2>\n

The analysis links #\u0645\u0635\u0631_\u0639\u0637\u0627\u0621_\u0644\u0627_\u064a\u0646\u0642\u0637\u0639 with the later hashtag #25_\u064a\u0646\u0627\u064a\u0631_\u0639\u064a\u062f_\u0627\u0644\u0634\u0631\u0637\u0629_\u0627\u0644\u0645\u0635\u0631\u064a\u0629, meaning \u201cJanuary 25 Is Egyptian Police Day.\u201d Meltwater monitoring data cited in the report recorded 48 posts on January 21, compared with no daily posts in the preceding period displayed.<\/p>\n

The tool also reported a 959-fold increase over its usual baseline. The exact underlying baseline was not supplied; the displayed zero for earlier days should not be treated as a mathematical denominator for that ratio.<\/p>\n

\"A
A January 21 post by @amlkhalil11 combines hashtags praising Egypt and its army with the Police Day and Egypt\u2019s Giving Never Stops slogans. Its closing phrase calls Egypt \u201cthe mother of the world.\u201d<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Sentiment analysis classified 92% of posts as positive. The report interprets this as a campaign promoting the anniversary of the revolution as Egyptian Police Day.<\/p>\n

Geographical data associated 23 posts with Egypt, a figure described as 505 times the daily baseline. These are monitoring estimates, not independently verified locations for every account operator.<\/p>\n

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The \u201cMaestro\u201d again<\/h2>\n

As the analysis above shows, @BASSEMELMASSRY, known as the \u201cMaestro,\u201d helped launch and drive engagement around the giving hashtag. On January 21, 2025, the account gradually moved towards #\u0662\u0665_\u064a\u0646\u0627\u064a\u0631_\u0639\u064a\u062f_\u0627\u0644\u0634\u0631\u0637\u0647_\u0627\u0644\u0645\u0635\u0631\u064a\u0629, another spelling of the Police Day hashtag.<\/p>\n

At the time of the analysis, the account had 98,502 followers. The report argues that engagement did not reflect ordinary interaction with real followers, but was amplified through repeated reposting by connected accounts.<\/p>\n

Mentions of the account rose to 48 on January 21, compared with zero in the preceding days displayed. Of those, 23 were associated with Egypt, described as a 505-fold rise over the usual baseline.<\/p>\n

\n

The posting pattern, together with connections to accounts supporting the same messaging, places the \u201cMaestro\u201d among the central elements of the directed propaganda network identified by the analysis.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

\"A
A January 21 post by @BASSEMELMASSRY praises action against opponents, uses derogatory language comparing them to sheep, and combines hashtags labelling the Muslim Brotherhood traitors with the giving campaign and Police Day slogans.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The account\u2019s posts exaggerate state achievements while demonising opponents through language suggesting threats and instability, the report concludes.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Social network analysis traces coordinated amplification around pro-government hashtags praising Egypt\u2019s role in Gaza, followed by attacks on opposition voices ahead of January 25.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":11791,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[410],"tags":[],"kateb":[9326],"class_list":["post-16984","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-investigations-en","kateb-arabi-facts-hub-afh"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/\u0644\u062c\u0627\u0646-\u0627\u0644\u0643\u062a\u0631\u0648\u0646\u064a\u0629.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16984","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16984"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16984\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":16985,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16984\/revisions\/16985"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/11791"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16984"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16984"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16984"},{"taxonomy":"kateb","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kateb?post=16984"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}