{"id":17334,"date":"2025-09-08T16:25:47","date_gmt":"2025-09-08T14:25:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=17334"},"modified":"2026-10-24T15:04:19","modified_gmt":"2026-10-24T13:04:19","slug":"egypt-israel-4","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/egypt-israel-4\/","title":{"rendered":"Gas as Leverage: How Will Cairo Respond to Netanyahu\u2019s Threats?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In a step that observers considered a new phase of pressure on Cairo to accept the plan to displace Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to the Sinai Peninsula, newspapers affiliated with the Israeli occupation government promoted reports<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.middleeastmonitor.com\/20250903-netanyahu-links-gas-deal-with-egypt-to-sinai-military-reinforcements-review\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">stating<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had issued instructions not to proceed with implementing the huge gas deal<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/egypt-israel-3\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">signed<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> with Egypt about a month earlier, worth about $35 billion for the supply of 130 billion cubic metres until 2040, without his personal approval, with the aim of linking implementation of the agreement to new conditions and guarantees from Egypt, based on claims that Cairo had violated the Camp David Treaty through military reinforcements in Sinai.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">For its part, Cairo considered Netanyahu&#8217;s statements to lack &#8220;realism&#8221;, and the response came sharply from the head of the State Information Service, Diaa Rashwan, who<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.net\/ebusiness\/2025\/9\/4\/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">affirmed<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that what Netanyahu announced lacks political and economic realism, stressing that Cairo does not see these threats as a danger to its security or to its stability in the energy sector. Rashwan said in televised statements: &#8220;I advise him to cancel the deal if he is able to bear its economic consequences&#8221;, in a clear indication that the political and financial cost would fall mainly on the Israeli side.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Egypt also<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.maspero.eg\/tv\/2025\/09\/07\/888202\/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A4%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">reiterated<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> that it will not submit to any Israeli pressure, whether on the energy file or on the issues of Gaza and the border, and described these threats as cards of political pressure aimed at undermining the steadfast Egyptian position on the Palestinian cause and its rejection of the displacement of Palestinians. Official statements indicated that Egypt possesses the capacity to protect its national security and its economy, and that the loss from the deal would fall mainly on Israel.<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>In this context, two sources, one diplomatic and the other security, revealed to Zawia3 that Cairo pays little attention to Netanyahu&#8217;s statements about freezing the gas agreement, and considers them a show aimed at public opinion inside the occupation state and an attempt to cover up Tel Aviv&#8217;s failure to achieve its goals in the Gaza Strip, foremost among them the project of displacing the Palestinians. The two sources affirmed that Egypt has drawn a clear red line, namely its categorical rejection of any scenario leading to displacement; apart from that, it is ready to deal with various developments by virtue of the alternatives and strategic options it has in the energy sector and in its wider regional files.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The diplomatic source stressed that Cairo will activate its response options in reaction to actions, not to statements, explaining that his country is capable of protecting its resources and securing safe alternatives, as it is proceeding with implementing broader agreements for liquefying and exporting gas in a way that preserves its interests. As for bilateral relations, the two sources described them as &#8220;the most tense in years&#8221;, affirming that Cairo currently has no intention of returning to the level of exchanging ambassadors. At the same time, they stressed that Egypt still prefers the diplomatic option in dealing with all foreign files, but remains ready to use whatever tools are necessary to preserve its national security and safeguard its strategic assets.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Earlier, reports indicated that the Egyptian army had<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/DefenseArabic\/posts\/%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%8F%D8%AB%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%82%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%80%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%89%D9%84\/1071625874993187\/\"><b> reinforced<\/b><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> its military presence in north-eastern Sinai and raised the level of field readiness by deploying additional tanks and armoured vehicles around the Rafah crossing and the areas adjacent to it, which worries Tel Aviv. Observers believe that this military move, although defensive in nature, carries within it a clear message that Cairo will not allow any security breach or direct threat coming from the Palestinian south, especially with growing talk in the Israeli media about &#8220;safe corridors&#8221; or buffer zones on the edges of Gaza that could be exploited to force Palestinians to flee into Sinai.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">According<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/m.facebook.com\/AJA.Egypt\/photos\/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF-88-%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-\/1044154631232767\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">to official sources<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> and military experts, the Egyptian army has deployed about 88 military battalions in Sinai, comprising nearly 42,000 soldiers, in addition to 3 complete military divisions and more than 1,500 tanks and armoured vehicles, as well as projects to develop military airports and expand their runways, and to strengthen air defence networks and naval piers on the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Observers compare these figures with what the peace treaty stipulates, which sets the maximum for Egyptian forces in the area at about 50 battalions and only 22,000 soldiers, which shows the size of the gap between the current reality and the original security arrangements that were put in place to ensure a delicate balance in the strategically important peninsula.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> <\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>Recommended reading:<\/b><a href=\"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/egypt-israel-3\/\"> <b>Israel&#8217;s Gas in Egypt: The Biggest Deal in Decades<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n<h1><b>What Is the Nature of the Disputed Deal?<\/b><\/h1>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">On 7 August last, Tel Aviv announced the conclusion of &#8220;the largest gas deal in its history&#8221; with Cairo, worth $35 billion, to export about 130 billion cubic metres of natural gas until 2040, or until the quantities stipulated in the contract are fulfilled,<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/AJArabic\/status\/1953493840821973333?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1953493840821973333%7Ctwgr%5E2328533f829b6e32095752dc2307f12c6df09313%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.aljazeera.net%2Fnews%2F2025%2F8%2F7%2Fd8a5d8b3d8b1d8a7d8a6d98ad984-d985d8b5d8b1-d8b5d981d982d8a9-d8bad8a7d8b2\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">according to<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> what the Israeli Energy Minister, Eli Cohen, revealed.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/assafirarabi.com\/ar\/66037\/2025\/08\/08\/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The deal<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, which was signed between Israeli companies, most notably &#8220;NewMed&#8221;, the partner in the giant Leviathan field, and the Egyptian side, does not represent merely an economic agreement; rather, it redraws the map of mutual dependence between two states bound by complex political relations and a tense popular memory. It multiplies<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.alarabiya.net\/aswaq\/oil-and-gas\/2025\/08\/07\/%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%B9-%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%8035-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">threefold<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> the volume of exports that began in 2019 (60 billion cubic metres at the time), making Egypt the largest destination for Israeli gas in the region.<\/span><\/p>\n<figure class=\"z3c z3c--column\" dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\" data-z3c=\"{&quot;type&quot;:&quot;column&quot;,&quot;lang&quot;:&quot;en&quot;,&quot;series&quot;:[&quot;Value (USD billion)&quot;],&quot;x&quot;:[&quot;2018 (\\u0627\\u0644\\u0639\\u0642\\u062f \\u0627\\u0644\\u0623\\u0635\\u0644\\u064a) | 2018 (original contract) | 2018 (contrat initial)&quot;,&quot;2020 (\\u0628\\u0639\\u062f \\u062a\\u0639\\u062f\\u064a\\u0644 2019) | 2020 (after 2019 amendment) | 2020 (apr\\u00e8s l\\u2019avenant de 2019)&quot;,&quot;2025 (\\u0627\\u0644\\u0627\\u062a\\u0641\\u0627\\u0642 \\u0627\\u0644\\u0645\\u0648\\u0633\\u0639) | 2025 (expanded deal) | 2025 (accord \\u00e9largi)&quot;],&quot;cats&quot;:[&quot;2018 (original contract)&quot;,&quot;2020 (after 2019 amendment)&quot;,&quot;2025 (expanded deal)&quot;],&quot;vals&quot;:[[15],[19.5],[35]],&quot;unit&quot;:&quot;USD billion&quot;,&quot;step&quot;:false,&quot;suffix&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;min&quot;:null,&quot;max&quot;:null,&quot;dec&quot;:1,&quot;colors&quot;:[],&quot;xlabel&quot;:&quot;Year&quot;}\"><figcaption class=\"z3c__t\">2025 saw the largest gas deal in the two countries&#039; history, worth $35 billion<\/figcaption><p class=\"z3c__st\">Value of Egypt&#039;s gas import contracts with Israel<\/p><div class=\"z3c__legend\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><\/div><div class=\"z3c__plot\" role=\"img\" aria-label=\"2025 saw the largest gas deal in the two countries&#039; history, worth $35 billion\"><\/div><div class=\"z3c__table\"><table><thead><tr><th>Year<\/th><th>Value (USD billion)<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>2018 (original contract)<\/td><td class=\"n\"><bdi dir=\"ltr\">15.0<\/bdi><\/td><\/tr><tr><td>2020 (after 2019 amendment)<\/td><td class=\"n\"><bdi dir=\"ltr\">19.5<\/bdi><\/td><\/tr><tr><td>2025 (expanded deal)<\/td><td class=\"n\"><bdi dir=\"ltr\">35.0<\/bdi><\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/div><div class=\"z3c__foot\"><span>Daily News Egypt (2019), JPT (2020), Al Arabiya (2025) \u00b7 Volumes: 64 bcm over 10 years in the 2018 contract, raised to 85.3 bcm over 15 years by the October 2019 amendment; about 130 bcm to 2040 in the 2025 deal<\/span><button type=\"button\" class=\"z3c__tbtn\" data-show=\"Show table\" data-hide=\"Hide table\" hidden>Show table<\/button><\/div><\/figure>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><em>The evolution of gas deals between Egypt and Israel<\/em><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The Israeli Energy Minister did not hide the significance of the deal at the time, describing it as &#8220;important news from a security and political standpoint, just as it is from an economic standpoint&#8221;, and affirming that it consolidates his country&#8217;s position as a &#8220;leading regional energy power on which its neighbours rely and which they need&#8221;. According<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/ar\/%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84\/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%A7\/3653533\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">to him<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, the deal will bring billions of dollars into Israel&#8217;s treasury, provide jobs and strengthen its economy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><b>For his part, <\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Karim El-Omda, professor of political economy, affirms that if the deal is cancelled, the biggest loser will be the Israeli side, pointing out that the agreement, which amounts to about 130 billion cubic metres of gas and $35 billion until 2040, is an expanded amendment to the original agreement signed in 2019, and not a new agreement.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">El-Omda explains that the main reason for concluding the agreement is the existence of a direct pipeline between Egypt and Israel that carries gas from the Israeli &#8220;Leviathan&#8221; field in the Mediterranean directly to Egyptian territory, which makes Egypt the only available buyer for Israeli gas. He adds that Egypt, in turn, needs the gas to cover the deficit between production and consumption, which may continue for two years, pointing out that the alternative would be importing liquefied gas at very high prices ranging between $10 and $15 per million British thermal units.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">El-Omda points out that the deal achieves two main benefits for Egypt, as it covers the larger part of domestic consumption for homes, factories and lagging industry, while the surplus can be directed to the two liquefaction plants in Idku and Damietta to be exported at higher prices, generating additional revenue. He adds that the situation is gradually improving with the increase in Egyptian production and new Cypriot fields coming on stream and being linked to the &#8220;Zohr&#8221; field, which will make the liquefaction plants operate at full capacity by 2026.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">El-Omda affirms that Israel is the party that would be most harmed by any possible halt to the agreement, since the American company &#8220;Chevron&#8221;, which owns 39.66% of the field, has spent huge sums on exploration and extraction operations and is pressing the Israeli side to market and sell the gas, pointing out that Egypt has several alternatives, including four giant vessels for regasifying natural gas and a possible surplus next winter, which gives it greater flexibility in managing the agreement, while Israel remains compelled to implement it.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><b>Recommended reading:<\/b><a href=\"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/egypt-israel-2\/\"> <b>Economy Overtakes Politics: Unprecedented Growth in Trade Between Cairo and Tel Aviv<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n<h1><b><br \/>\nHow Has the Gas Map in the Eastern Mediterranean Changed?<\/b><\/h1>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Less than a decade ago, Egypt was being heralded as about to become a rising regional power in the energy field, after the<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.marefa.org\/%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84_%D8%B8%D9%87%D8%B1_%D9%84%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">discovery<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> of the giant &#8220;Zohr&#8221; field in 2015, which was described at the time as a &#8220;strategic shift&#8221; in the country&#8217;s economic future. With the start of production in late 2017, Cairo turned to<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/arabic.news.cn\/20250420\/b1fc20f66d65400480cb2b12ae1521e4\/c.html\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">exporting<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> its surpluses, and concluded a series of agreements to liquefy gas on behalf of neighbouring countries, including Israel, which saw in the Egyptian infrastructure a precious opportunity to overcome obstacles to export.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">But this picture began to<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/attaqa.net\/2025\/07\/23\/%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%B8%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AB-%D8%A8%D9%8A\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">change<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> gradually with domestic complications and the changing energy equation in the region. By 2023, &#8220;Zohr&#8221; production began to decline, as a result of what technical reports described as a shortfall in pumping and lower rates of new discoveries, against a rise in domestic demand due to population growth and the expansion of energy-intensive industries. Meanwhile, Israel was accelerating the development of its offshore fields, especially &#8220;Leviathan&#8221; and &#8220;Tamar&#8221;, which together became the centre of gravity of the Israeli gas map.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">With the 2018 agreement between the Israeli company &#8220;Delek&#8221; and the private Egyptian company &#8220;Dolphinus&#8221;, Egypt<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/attaqa.net\/2025\/04\/17\/%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%B8%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-2025-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AC%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B7\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">began<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> importing gas from Israel with the aim of re-liquefying it and exporting it to Europe. At the time, the deal was promoted as part of a strategy to turn Egypt into a regional energy hub, but in reality some quantities were used to cover the domestic deficit, at a time when official discourse focused only on export and profitability.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Today, as the energy crisis inside Egypt intensifies and signs of shrinking export revenues appear, the latest agreement has once again highlighted a striking paradox: Egypt, which was among the first countries in the region to discover gas, finds itself forced to rely on Israeli gas to secure its basic needs. Israel, meanwhile, has turned from a buyer of Egyptian gas in the past decade into its main source now, at the heart of a complex economic relationship that goes beyond economics to enter deep into the balances of power and politics in the Eastern Mediterranean.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/egypt-israel-2\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">figures<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> indicate that Israeli natural gas represents the backbone of Israel&#8217;s exports to Egypt; exports of petroleum gas alone reached $2.13 billion in 2023, equivalent to 95% of total Israeli exports to Egypt. This proportion reflects Egypt&#8217;s growing dependence on Israeli gas, especially in light of the marked decline in domestic production. Egypt&#8217;s gas production fell by 15% between January and July 2024, which pushed Cairo to step up its imports, which reached 4.84 billion cubic metres during the first half of the current year, compared with 4.24 billion cubic metres in the same period of the previous year.<\/span><\/p>\n<figure class=\"z3c z3c--column\" dir=\"ltr\" lang=\"en\" data-z3c=\"{&quot;type&quot;:&quot;column&quot;,&quot;lang&quot;:&quot;en&quot;,&quot;series&quot;:[&quot;Production&quot;],&quot;x&quot;:[&quot;2022&quot;,&quot;2023&quot;,&quot;2024&quot;],&quot;cats&quot;:[&quot;2022&quot;,&quot;2023&quot;,&quot;2024&quot;],&quot;vals&quot;:[[66.96],[59.29],[49.37]],&quot;unit&quot;:&quot;bcm&quot;,&quot;step&quot;:false,&quot;suffix&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;min&quot;:null,&quot;max&quot;:null,&quot;dec&quot;:2,&quot;colors&quot;:[],&quot;xlabel&quot;:&quot;Year&quot;}\"><figcaption class=\"z3c__t\">Egypt&#039;s natural gas output slumped over three years<\/figcaption><p class=\"z3c__st\">Annual production, 2022 to 2024<\/p><div class=\"z3c__legend\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><\/div><div class=\"z3c__plot\" role=\"img\" aria-label=\"Egypt&#039;s natural gas output slumped over three years\"><\/div><div class=\"z3c__table\"><table><thead><tr><th>Year<\/th><th>Production<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>2022<\/td><td class=\"n\"><bdi dir=\"ltr\">66.96<\/bdi><\/td><\/tr><tr><td>2023<\/td><td class=\"n\"><bdi dir=\"ltr\">59.29<\/bdi><\/td><\/tr><tr><td>2024<\/td><td class=\"n\"><bdi dir=\"ltr\">49.37<\/bdi><\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/div><div class=\"z3c__foot\"><span>Joint Organisations Data Initiative (JODI), via Attaqa \u00b7 Output fell 11.5% in 2023 and 17% in 2024. From January to July 2024 it fell 15% to 30.19 bcm, against 35.5 bcm in the same period of 2023<\/span><button type=\"button\" class=\"z3c__tbtn\" data-show=\"Show table\" data-hide=\"Hide table\" hidden>Show table<\/button><\/div><\/figure>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Egypt&#8217;s gas production currently stands at about 5 billion cubic feet, and it imports about 1 billion cubic feet a day from Israel, while consumption ranges between 6.7 and 6.8 billion cubic feet a day. This dependence, according to observers, goes beyond the economic aspect to reach the strategic and security aspects, as the gas deal signed in 2018, worth $15 billion, with companies such as &#8220;Delek Drilling&#8221; and &#8220;Chevron&#8221; was not merely an energy deal but part of a wider regional track to strengthen cooperation between Tel Aviv and several Arab capitals.<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Here it is worth noting that Cairo saw a marked decline in its domestic natural gas production during the first seven months of 2024, as production fell to about 30.19 billion cubic metres compared with 35.5 billion cubic metres during the same period of 2023, a decline of nearly 15%. This decrease is mainly due to the depletion of major offshore fields such as the &#8220;Zohr&#8221; field, in addition to the slowdown in exploration for new fields and delays in planned development projects, such as the &#8220;Raven&#8221; field, which are expected to enter service after 2025.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">More detailed<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.alarabiya.net\/aswaq\/special-stories\/2024\/07\/06\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">data<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> showed an annual decline in gas production of 17%, as it fell from 59.29 billion cubic metres in 2023 to 49.37 billion cubic metres in 2024. The decline in the Mediterranean basin alone, which accounts for 72.8% of Egyptian production, amounted to about 18%, which directly affected Egypt&#8217;s ability to meet domestic demand, as the domestic market needs 6.2 billion cubic feet a day while production does not exceed 4.6 billion. This led Egypt to become a net importer of liquefied gas for the first time since 2018, as it imported 2.8 million tonnes during 2024, while its liquefied gas exports fell by 84% to 0.54 million tonnes.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">This decline contributed to worsening the crisis of repeated power cuts, given that 60% of Egypt&#8217;s electricity mix relies on natural gas. To make up for the shortfall, Egypt<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/arabic\/articles\/c134r34606ko\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">increased<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> its reliance on Israeli imports, as the quantities imported from Israel reached about 1 billion cubic feet a day, with expectations that they would rise to 1.07 billion cubic feet a day by January 2025. This trend is expected to continue until 2027, according to current plans to close the gap between supply and demand.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<h1><b>What Does Netanyahu&#8217;s Talk Signify?<\/b><\/h1>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Sara Kira, <\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">director of the European North African Center for Research,<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">tells Zawia3 that cooperation between Egypt and Israel in the gas sector began at the level of companies through commercial contracts, without any direct political commitment, explaining that all the contracts were purely commercial, and that any notion of political interference or direct control was inaccurate.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">She adds: &#8220;After 2011, and with the start of border demarcation for gas exploration, Egypt was aware that the region would witness fierce conflicts over gas, especially with international parties seeking to build multiple pipelines to export gas to Europe. Hence came the establishment of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum as a mechanism to control the file tightly and to ensure that things did not get out of control.&#8221; She points out that the forum was not merely a political meeting, but a tool for managing the discovered resources, whereby each party can work on the fields it discovered. Egypt discovered three fields, the most important of which was the &#8220;Zohr&#8221; field, while Israel discovered five fields, so everything was placed under the forum&#8217;s management to ensure balance and prevent any direct exploitation of one party by another.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The researcher focusing on regional and international affairs explains that the commercial contracts signed within the forum give the sovereign state the right to amend or cancel clauses when necessary, taking into account the conditions of both parties, which allows the file to be managed flexibly without harming the interests of any party.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">She notes that the current situation consists of selling gas to Israel at relatively low prices to facilitate export to Europe, which guarantees Egypt dollar income without harming its contracts with the European market, and also allows it to support domestic consumption when needed, stressing that any long halt of gas would harm Israel more than Egypt, because Israel does not have a flexible infrastructure to facilitate export without the planned storage, while Egypt has worked to secure its supplies from alternative sources, including Qatar and Iran, under special arrangements that have not been officially declared, to ensure the stability of domestic supplies and provide foreign currency.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Sara also points out that the long-term contracts extend until 2040 and allow Israel to export only from surpluses after meeting the needs of the domestic market, which means that Egypt is sometimes not an export priority. She explains that in June 2025 the Israeli Energy Ministry shut down the &#8220;Leviathan&#8221; and &#8220;Karish&#8221; fields on the pretext of security tension with Iran, which immediately cut off exports to Egypt and Jordan, and then later announced that gas would be exported only from surpluses after meeting the needs of the domestic market, which put Egypt at the bottom of the priorities.<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>At the same time, Sara affirms that any possible gas cut-off carries direct repercussions for Egypt, including its impact on electricity and social stability, as the state relies heavily on gas to generate electricity, and a halt leads to power cuts and forces the state to buy emergency fuel. It also leads to a drain of hard currency to cover the deficit, as Egypt was forced to import about 60 cargoes of liquefied gas in 2025 at a cost of nearly $3 billion, in addition to purchases of fuel oil, as well as its negative impact on gas-intensive industries such as fertilisers and petrochemicals, and the decline of Egypt&#8217;s reputation as a regional energy hub because the liquefaction plants in Idku and Damietta have turned from exporters into importers.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The director of the European North African Center for Research also points out that any long halt or termination of the long-term contracts would be costly for Israel economically and diplomatically, because it relies on exporting gas through limited infrastructure, and anything short of that raises the cost of insurance and financing for its gas projects. Therefore, the most likely threat, according to Sara, is repeated short-term halts rather than a permanent cut-off, as the file remains a tool of pressure and a political strategy; however, Egypt&#8217;s smart management of the contracts and coordination through the forum have set clear limits to protect its domestic and regional interests, while maintaining the stability of exports to Europe and generating dollar income without harming internal stability.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Recommended reading:<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/egypt-israel\/\"> <b>Rising Tension: What Are the Limits of a Possible Escalation Between Egypt and the Israeli Occupation?<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n<h1><b><br \/>\nWhy Does Our Government Tie Its Own Hands?<\/b><\/h1>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In a previous interview with Zawia3, the economist and chairman of the board of trustees of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, Zohdy El-Shamy, described the deal as &#8220;a new strategic catastrophe&#8221; and &#8220;a long-term shackling of Egypt&#8217;s decision-making in the energy field&#8221;, considering that it represents a continuation of wrong policies that have put the country at the mercy of Israeli gas.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">El-Shamy said that the ruling authority should have learned from its previous mistakes, when years ago it signed a deal to import gas from Israel worth $15 billion, which was later raised to $20 billion, instead of investing in developing Egyptian gas fields and achieving self-sufficiency. He explained: &#8220;The paradox is that these Israeli fields, from which we export today, are geographically closer to Egyptian waters, and there are legitimate suspicions that they contain Egyptian gas that was seized because of the lack of decisiveness in demarcating the maritime borders early on.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">El-Shamy criticised what he described as a &#8220;glaring contradiction&#8221; in policies, explaining that Egypt&#8217;s dependence on Israeli gas restricts its ability to take firm positions towards what he called &#8220;Israeli aggression and thuggery&#8221;, as Israel can use this dependence as a card of political and economic pressure in times of crisis. He added: &#8220;Instead of the government planning to end this humiliating situation and reform its energy policies, we find it today expanding the scope of dependence on the same source, with a much bigger deal, reaching $35 billion and extending until 2040&#8221;, considering that this &#8220;mortgages part of Egyptian national security to the considerations of the Israeli market&#8221;.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">The economist considered that the step is not merely a commercial agreement, but &#8220;a reshaping of the power relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv on foundations that make the latter a compulsory partner in Egypt&#8217;s energy equation&#8221;. He raised sharp questions: &#8220;What does it mean to tie our energy needs to a single source in a state that occupies Arab land and is waging a continuing war on our borders? And what logic makes us double our dependence instead of looking for alternatives?&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">He said: &#8220;What is happening is not merely an error of judgement, but a major crime against Egypt and its national security, because it puts us in the position of a follower, not a partner, and binds us to policies that may one day conflict with our national interests. It is political and economic folly for which Egyptians will pay the price for decades to come.&#8221;<\/span><\/p>\n<h1><b>The History of Gas Agreements Between Egypt and Israel<\/b><\/h1>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Gas<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/manar.com\/page-47025-ar-ar-ar-ar.html\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">relations<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> between Egypt and Israel witnessed major developments and qualitative shifts between 2005 and 2025, during which Egypt turned from an exporter of gas to Israel into a major importer of it, with the signing of several strategic agreements that sparked domestic and regional controversy.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">It began in 2005, when Egypt<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.independentarabia.com\/node\/629990\/%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2\/%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B6%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%9F\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">signed<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, through the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company, a 20-year agreement to export 1.7 billion cubic metres of natural gas a year to Israel at a price ranging between $0.70 and $1.5 per million British thermal units (below cost price). Actual export began in February 2008 through the Arish\u2013Ashkelon pipeline. This agreement sparked widespread popular and judicial protests in Egypt because of the pricing terms and the lack of transparency, and it continued until the Egyptian revolution of 2011.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">After the revolution, the pipeline<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.asianewslb.com\/?page=article&amp;id=185032\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">was subjected<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> to repeated attacks, which aggravated the crisis between the two countries, and the agreement officially ended in 2012 by a decision of the Egyptian side against the background of the security conditions and disputes over prices, and Egyptian gas exports to Israel stopped completely.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In 2018, the picture changed radically when Cairo signed an<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/arabicpost.net\/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AD%D8%A9\/2025\/08\/08\/%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84\/\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">agreement<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\"> with Israeli companies (Delek\/Noble Energy) to import gas from the &#8220;Tamar&#8221; and &#8220;Leviathan&#8221; fields, worth $15 billion and for a period of 10 years. In January 2020 the agreement entered into force and the pumping of Israeli gas into the Egyptian market began, with the aim of liquefying it in Egypt and re-exporting it to European and Asian markets and making use of the Egyptian infrastructure.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">In August 2025, the largest deal in the history of the relations<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.alaraby.co.uk\/economy\/%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%AD-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9\"> <span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">was signed<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">, providing for the supply of 130 billion cubic metres of Israeli gas until 2040, worth $35 billion, with arrangements to increase quantities through new pipelines and to support Egypt&#8217;s ambitions as a regional energy hub. Egypt also signed tripartite agreements with Israel and the European Union in 2022 to export Israeli gas to the Europeans after liquefying it in Egypt.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">With this, the volume of relations in the gas sector between Egypt and Israel reaches its peak in 2025 in terms of quantity and value, with Egypt turning into an importer and a vital regional partner in the Israeli gas trade.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Finally, despite Israel&#8217;s attempts to use the deal as a card of pressure to impose its political agenda, the Egyptian position remains firm in rejecting any scenario for displacing the Palestinians, while holding on to alternative options in the energy sector that allow it to manage the file with greater flexibility. Between economic interests and strategic calculations, it is clear that the gas battle in the region will not be merely numbers or contracts, but an extension of a long struggle over influence, identity and sovereignty.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align:center;\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/gas-map-2025-en.png\" alt=\"Gas, political leverage and competing assessments in September 2025\" style=\"display:block;margin:24px auto;max-width:100%;height:auto;\" width=\"1600\" height=\"2300\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-17320\" srcset=\"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/gas-map-2025-en.png 1600w, https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/gas-map-2025-en-209x300.png 209w, https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/gas-map-2025-en-712x1024.png 712w, https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/gas-map-2025-en-768x1104.png 768w, https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/gas-map-2025-en-1069x1536.png 1069w, https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/gas-map-2025-en-1425x2048.png 1425w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1600px) 100vw, 1600px\" \/><\/p>\n<p><em>Editorial correction: The first version of the report stated that the expanded agreement to export Israeli gas to Egypt covers about 150 billion cubic metres of gas; the correct figure is that it covers about 130 billion cubic metres, worth about $35 billion, until 2040, as stated at the beginning of the report.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>Editorial correction: The first version of the report stated that Chevron owns 55% of the Leviathan field; the correct figure is that its share is 39.66%, according to the company&#8217;s data.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>Editorial correction: The first version of the report stated that the $15 billion gas deal was signed in 2020; the correct information is that it was signed in 2018, and gas began flowing to Egypt under it in January 2020.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The background to the largest deal in the history of Egyptian-Israeli relations, and the reasons for the escalating tension from Sinai to Leviathan.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":13860,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[412],"tags":[],"kateb":[6247],"class_list":["post-17334","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics-en","kateb-rasha-ammar"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/\u0645\u0635\u0631-\u0648\u0627\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0644-\u063a\u0627\u0632-1.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17334","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17334"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17334\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":24073,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17334\/revisions\/24073"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13860"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17334"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17334"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17334"},{"taxonomy":"kateb","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kateb?post=17334"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}