{"id":17593,"date":"2025-04-08T18:28:34","date_gmt":"2025-04-08T16:28:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=17593"},"modified":"2026-10-08T02:27:57","modified_gmt":"2026-10-08T00:27:57","slug":"egypt-israel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/egypt-israel\/","title":{"rendered":"Egypt and Israel: How Far Could Escalating Tensions Go?"},"content":{"rendered":"

As Israel\u2019s devastating campaign in Gaza enters its nineteenth month, relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv are under growing strain. Israeli officials have accused Egypt of breaching the peace treaty and called for the removal of what they describe as military infrastructure in Sinai. On 4 March, Defence Minister Israel Katz said Israel would not allow Egypt to violate the treaty.<\/p>\n

The two countries signed their peace treaty in Washington in March 1979<\/a>, following the 1978 Camp David accords. It ended the state of war, provided for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and established diplomatic relations and security arrangements limiting forces in specified zones.<\/p>\n

Diplomatic signals have added to the tension. Israel\u2019s incoming ambassador had not completed the presentation of credentials in Cairo at the time of this report. On 24 March<\/a>, President Abdel Fattah El Sisi received credentials from 23 new ambassadors, without an Israeli representative among them.<\/p>\n

Reports also said Egypt\u2019s ambassador to Israel, Khaled Azmi, had returned to Cairo months earlier and had not resumed his post, although Egypt had not formally announced his withdrawal. The absence of a formal announcement is important: an ambassador\u2019s absence does not itself establish that diplomatic relations have been severed.<\/p>\n

How far could the tension go? Will it remain political and diplomatic, or could military confrontation follow? Analysts interviewed by Zawia3 describe a relationship under intense pressure from the war, the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and Egypt\u2019s rejection of any forced displacement of Palestinians into Sinai.<\/p>\n

Reports of Egyptian reinforcements near Rafah have been interpreted as defensive preparations and a warning against a direct threat to the border. Concerns about buffer zones or arrangements that could push Gaza\u2019s population towards Sinai give those movements wider political significance.<\/p>\n

Media accounts have circulated estimates of 88 battalions, around 42,000 personnel and more than 1,500 tanks and armoured vehicles in Sinai, alongside development of military facilities. This report could not independently verify those totals or their geographical distribution. They cannot, by themselves, establish a treaty violation.<\/p>\n

The treaty\u2019s original security annex permits up to 22,000 Egyptian personnel in Zone A and four border battalions totalling up to 4,000 personnel in Zone B, with different arrangements for Zone C. It also allows security arrangements to be reviewed and changed by mutual agreement. Treating 22,000 as a single limit for all Sinai, without accounting for zones or subsequent agreements, is therefore misleading.<\/p>\n

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A sharper diplomatic tone<\/h2>\n

Since October 2023, Egyptian statements have become increasingly forceful in condemning Israeli military actions and warning about their regional consequences. Cairo has repeatedly called for civilian protection, humanitarian access and an end to displacement.<\/p>\n

After the explosion at Al Ahli hospital in Gaza in October 2023, Egypt condemned what its statement described as an Israeli bombardment. That attribution was Egypt\u2019s stated position; responsibility for the explosion was disputed, and this report does not independently resolve it.<\/p>\n

Cairo also called on influential states to act, demanded that attacks around the Rafah crossing stop so aid could reach Gaza, and warned that orders directing large numbers of Palestinians south created a humanitarian emergency and violated international humanitarian law.<\/p>\n

As the war continued, Egypt reiterated its rejection of attempts to expel Palestinians or alter the territory\u2019s demographic character. It pursued efforts to restore the Gaza ceasefire while condemning Israeli actions in Syria and attacks affecting UNRWA facilities in Gaza.<\/p>\n

For the analysts interviewed, the sharper language reflects both the scale of Palestinian suffering and Egypt\u2019s concern that developments across its northeastern border could become a direct national-security crisis. But they disagree about whether Cairo\u2019s response is sufficiently forceful.<\/p>\n

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Critics call for stronger action<\/h2>\n

Akram Ismail, a central committee member of the Bread and Freedom Party, which is under establishment, and a figure in the Civil Democratic Movement, says Egypt\u2019s official response falls far short of the catastrophe.<\/p>\n

He argues that Cairo should seriously raise the possibility of suspending the peace framework associated with Camp David as a political signal against war crimes and the deliberate starvation of civilians. He also advocates practical steps to challenge Gaza\u2019s siege, including official delegations from several countries attempting to enter with humanitarian assistance.<\/p>\n

Ismail tells Zawia3 that Egypt should help build an Arab, or broader regional, coalition capable of exerting pressure on Western governments and the United States. Such a coalition need not be exclusively Arab, he says, but should represent popular interests and create meaningful leverage.<\/p>\n

He attributes Egyptian hesitation partly to pressure from Gulf states and warns that the cost of inaction could be severe. In his assessment, an overwhelming Israeli victory backed by the Trump administration would reshape the regional balance in Israel\u2019s favour and further diminish Egypt\u2019s role.<\/p>\n

He also argues that closer ties between Israel and some Gulf governments could contribute to a regional alignment that marginalises Cairo. These are his political assessments of the possible consequences, rather than settled predictions.<\/p>\n

Political-science professor Mostafa Kamel El Sayed says Egypt\u2019s government regards direct military action against Israel as outside its options. But, he argues, it has not exhausted the diplomatic and economic measures still available.<\/p>\n

He calls for action through the UN General Assembly and international legal mechanisms, including pressure for sanctions. He also points to the significance of the International Court of Justice proceedings under the Genocide Convention.<\/p>\n

The legal position needs precision. In its January 2024 order<\/a>, the ICJ indicated provisional measures to protect rights at issue in the case. As of this report\u2019s publication, it had not issued a final judgment that genocide had been committed. The provisional proceedings should not be presented as a final determination of the merits.<\/p>\n

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El Sayed\u2019s argument is that rejecting military confrontation does not require limiting Egypt\u2019s response to statements: diplomatic, economic and legal pressure remain available.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

He advocates suspending economic agreements with Israel and criticises continuing commercial and gas ties amid the destruction in Gaza. He referred in the interview to what he described as a new gas agreement in January; this report has not independently established that specific claim and does not treat it as a verified deal.<\/p>\n

El Sayed also calls for pressure on other Arab governments over trade links with Israel, and for Egyptians to be allowed to demonstrate peacefully, including outside the US embassy and in public spaces. He argues that peaceful expression should be part of the response rather than a matter handled solely through restricted official diplomacy.<\/p>\n

For him, the stakes extend beyond Palestine. He warns that regional silence would enable Israel and its allies to impose facts on the ground by force, with consequences for the wider region.<\/p>\n

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Is the \u201ccold peace\u201d reaching its limits?<\/h2>\n

Although the treaty has kept official relations in place for decades, widespread Egyptian opposition to normalisation has long made it a \u201ccold peace\u201d. Security cooperation has coexisted with public anger over Israeli actions against Palestinians.<\/p>\n

Arrangements allowing additional Egyptian deployments in Sinai, particularly during the campaign against armed groups after 2013, show that the security framework has not remained entirely static. Analysts now ask whether the Gaza war is placing those understandings under a different kind of pressure. This report does not independently establish that Egypt\u2019s current deployments exceed mutually agreed arrangements.<\/p>\n

Egyptian commentary, including in Al Ahram, has warned against violating the border or forcing demographic change in Gaza by expelling its population. The fear is that a new reality imposed on Gaza could leave Cairo facing either a mass-displacement emergency or an unintended security confrontation.<\/p>\n

Israel also treats the Egyptian border as strategically sensitive. The policies of the Israeli government\u2019s far right and the widening military campaign have complicated a relationship that Egyptian decision-makers have traditionally managed pragmatically.<\/p>\n

The relationship has survived earlier crises: the 1985 Ras Burqa shooting, tensions during the Palestinian uprisings beginning in 1987 and 2000, waves of anger over attacks on Gaza, and the killing of Egyptian soldiers near the border in 2011. Those episodes illustrate both the depth of recurring tensions and the durability of the formal framework.<\/p>\n

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The immediate danger may be less a deliberate decision to go to war than an accidental clash or a miscalculation that neither side can quickly contain.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Fady Eid, a researcher on the Middle East and North Africa, tells Zawia3 that all scenarios remain possible. He argues that both sides have prepared militarily for contingencies, while stressing that neither wants a direct war because its cost would be enormous.<\/p>\n

Eid interprets Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu\u2019s actions as an attempt to exploit what he sees as a historic opportunity to advance an expansionist project. In his analysis, Netanyahu\u2019s political and personal interests encourage renewed fighting and make it harder to end the war.<\/p>\n

He also argues that Hamas faces internal pressures and has maintained what he considers unrealistic demands in prisoner-exchange negotiations despite the destruction in Gaza. These are the researcher\u2019s characterisations of the parties\u2019 calculations.<\/p>\n

Eid describes the displacement question as particularly difficult for Egypt. He believes Israeli operations are fragmenting Gaza and concentrating pressure on the south, close to the Egyptian border. His concern is that civilians could be driven towards the border wall, leaving Cairo to choose between admitting them into Sinai or being accused of abandoning them.<\/p>\n

In the first case, he argues, Egypt risks facilitating the permanent dispossession of Palestinians; in the second, it faces an acute moral and humanitarian dilemma. He describes the resulting position as a political trap.<\/p>\n

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How might escalation unfold?<\/h2>\n

Mohamed Hamed, director of the East Mediterranean Forum for Political and Strategic Studies, sees more than a temporary disagreement. He describes a deeper crisis of trust, intensified by Israeli operations around Rafah and attempts to impose new security arrangements unilaterally.<\/p>\n

Hamed says dialogue involving Cairo, Tel Aviv and Washington aims to prevent direct confrontation. Yet he argues that developments along the Philadelphi, or Salah Al Din, corridor and inside Gaza are creating conditions that could increase pressure for displacement into Sinai\u2014something Egypt regards as a strategic threat.<\/p>\n

He also reads the delay in the incoming Israeli ambassador\u2019s presentation of credentials as a political signal. Hamed says Cairo had already approved the proposed ambassador\u2019s name, but had not invited him to present credentials alongside other envoys.<\/p>\n

Approval of a nominee, often called agr\u00e9ment, and the later presentation of credentials are distinct stages. Foreign ambassadors present credentials to the receiving head of state; they do not take an oath before Egypt\u2019s president. Hamed\u2019s interpretation of the delay should be distinguished from an official Egyptian explanation.<\/p>\n

In his assessment, Egypt\u2019s reinforcements in Sinai are a defensive response to the growing threat near Rafah. He rejects Israeli claims that these movements should automatically be treated as a breach of the peace framework. Establishing compliance, however, requires the actual deployment details and relevant agreements, not inference from public rhetoric alone.<\/p>\n

Hamed strongly rejects any scenario in which Palestinians are forced from Gaza into Sinai, describing it as a threat both to Palestinian rights and Egyptian security. Like Eid, he points to the dilemma such pressure would impose on Cairo.<\/p>\n

Despite that assessment, he does not expect a direct clash or a full diplomatic rupture in the near or medium term. He anticipates continued military signalling and indirect diplomatic pressure, alongside Egypt\u2019s consistent opposition to forced displacement.<\/p>\n

The danger, he concludes, is that an unforeseen event on the ground could trigger a wider crisis. The treaty and the high cost of war remain restraints, but they do not remove the need to manage an increasingly tense border and a catastrophic war next door.<\/p>\n

Editorial correction: The Arabic and English versions clarify the war\u2019s month count, the treaty\u2019s signing location, the presentation of ambassadorial credentials, the security annex\u2019s different geographical limits and the distinction between ICJ provisional measures and a final judgment. The report retains its 8 April 2025 context.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Gaza war, fears of forced displacement and military signalling in Sinai strain Egypt\u2019s peace with Israel. Analysts weigh the risks of escalation and Cairo\u2019s remaining options.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":12284,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[412],"tags":[],"kateb":[6247,728],"class_list":["post-17593","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics-en","kateb-rasha-ammar","kateb-shimaa-hamdy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/\u0645\u0635\u0631-\u0648\u0627\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0644.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17593","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17593"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17593\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17594,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17593\/revisions\/17594"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/12284"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17593"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17593"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17593"},{"taxonomy":"kateb","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kateb?post=17593"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}