{"id":17645,"date":"2025-03-09T16:08:12","date_gmt":"2025-03-09T14:08:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=17645"},"modified":"2026-10-24T15:07:05","modified_gmt":"2026-10-24T13:07:05","slug":"egyptian-state-council","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/egyptian-state-council\/","title":{"rendered":"Egypt\u2019s State Council Promotions Expose a Divide in Judicial Careers"},"content":{"rendered":"

The latest promotions round issued by the Special Council for Administrative Affairs of the State Council, at its session held on 17 February last under the chairmanship of Counsellor Ahmed Abboud, sparked wide debate within judicial circles, because of what some described as a disparity between the State Council and the other judicial bodies and authorities. This round is the largest in the history of the State Council, as it covered a large number of counsellors, amid demands to guarantee equal opportunities among the various judicial bodies.<\/span><\/p>\n

This debate coincided with demands for the intervention of the President of the Republic, in his capacity as<\/span> head of the Supreme Council for Judicial Bodies and Authorities<\/span><\/a>, to examine the extent to which the promotions round is consistent with the law establishing the Supreme Council, Article 8 of which stipulates the need to achieve balance among the judicial bodies and to reduce the time gaps in promotions within a period not exceeding ten years.<\/span><\/p>\n

In this context, voices emerged calling for the structure of the Egyptian judiciary to be reconsidered through the application of a “unified judiciary” system, under which the various judicial bodies would be merged under a single umbrella, a system in force in some Arab and foreign countries, with the aim of reducing the differences between judges and guaranteeing unified standards for promotions and appointments.<\/span><\/p>\n

While the round was ratified at the General Assembly of State Council counsellors on 26 February, debate continues over the extent to which it achieves the balance sought by the law on the Supreme Council for Judicial Bodies, and over its impact on the judicial landscape in the coming years.<\/span><\/p>\n

The latest State Council promotions round raised questions about its consistency with the law establishing the Supreme Council for Judicial Bodies and Authorities, which stipulates reducing the time gap in promotions between members of the different judicial bodies. According to opponents of the round, it did not contribute to achieving this goal; rather, it is likely to have widened the gap between members of the different bodies from the same graduation and appointment cohorts and the same job grade.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

According to the official statement issued by the State Council, the promotions round included the promotion of 341 members to the grade of Vice-President of the State Council and 329 to the grade of Undersecretary of the State Council. It also saw the approval of the largest promotions round in the Council’s history, with 1,754 members promoted, among them 480 to the grade of Counsellor, 93 to the grade of Assistant Counsellor (A), 274 to the grade of Assistant Counsellor (B), 375 to the grade of Deputy and 532 to the grade of Delegate.<\/span><\/p>\n

In light of these figures, the debate continues between those who believe the round came to strengthen efficiency within the Council and those who demand that promotion policies be amended to guarantee balance among the various judicial bodies, in accordance with the legal parameters.<\/span><\/p>\n


\n<\/span>Recommended reading: <\/b>With Documents: Financial Irregularities and Conflicts of Interest in the Secondment of Judges, and Parliament Moves<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n

Disparity in promotions between judicial bodies<\/b><\/h1>\n

An <\/span>exclusive analysis for Zawia3<\/b>, prepared by a group of counsellors and judges in various judicial bodies, revealed a large disparity in promotions and job grades between the State Council on the one hand and the other judicial bodies on the other, which has caused anger within judicial circles. This analysis, which <\/span>the counsellors and judges gave exclusively to Zawia3<\/b>, shows that members of the State Council move up through promotions faster and more regularly than their counterparts in the Public Prosecution and the Administrative Prosecution and State Lawsuits authorities, leading to a time gap that may reach <\/span>20 years<\/b> between judges belonging to the same graduating class, which exacerbates the disparity in financial and career privileges within the judicial bodies.<\/span><\/p>\n

A member of the State Council obtains the grade of Vice-President of the State Council, the highest job grade in the promotions structure, at the age of 37 or 38, while their counterparts in the other judicial bodies only reach similar grades after a full decade: a judge in the ordinary judiciary is promoted to President of a Court of Appeal or Vice-President of the Court of Cassation, and a member of the Administrative Prosecution and State Lawsuits authorities reaches Vice-President of the Authority, at the age of 47 or 48. This large disparity in promotions is reflected directly in vast differences in pay and financial benefits, deepening the sense of discrimination within the judicial system and intensifying objections to the latest promotions round.<\/span><\/p>\n

The analytical review reveals a clear disparity in the structure of career progression between the State Council and the other judicial bodies, which entrenches the gap between their members in terms of promotions and financial benefits.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"February<\/a><\/figure>\n

\n

Opponents argue that the promotions have widened, rather than narrowed, the gap between judges who graduated or entered service in the same year.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The council\u2019s announcement covered 341 promotions to vice-president and 329 to deputy of the State Council. A further 1,754 members were promoted to five other grades: 480 counsellors, 93 assistant counsellors A, 274 assistant counsellors B, 375 deputies and 532 delegates. Together, the seven categories total 2,424 promotions.<\/p>\n

Supporters see the move as strengthening the council\u2019s capacity. Critics want promotion policies adjusted to achieve a better balance across the judiciary.<\/p>\n

<\/svg><\/div>\n

Different routes to the same seniority<\/h2>\n

An analysis supplied exclusively to Zawia3 by judges and counsellors from several judicial institutions identifies substantial differences in promotion speed and grade progression. Its authors say State Council members advance faster and more regularly than colleagues in the ordinary judiciary, Public Prosecution, Administrative Prosecution Authority and State Lawsuits Authority.<\/p>\n

The estimates suggest gaps exceeding a decade at senior grades, with consequences for pay and professional benefits. They are an approximate comparison supplied by sources, not statutory ages for promotion or a census of every judge\u2019s career.<\/p>\n

The sources describe State Council members reaching vice-president in their late thirties, while counterparts elsewhere may reach comparable senior grades, such as appeal court president, Court of Cassation vice-president or deputy head of a judicial authority, at around 47 or 48.<\/p>\n

The State Council\u2019s career sequence runs from assistant delegate to delegate, deputy, assistant counsellor B, assistant counsellor A, counsellor, deputy of the council and vice-president. The ordinary judiciary and prosecution service follow a different sequence, beginning with junior prosecutor, assistant prosecutor, prosecutor and senior prosecutor, then court president B, court president A, counsellor, appeal court vice-president and appeal court president.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Members of the State Council follow a career ladder consisting of: Assistant Delegate, Delegate, Deputy, Assistant Counsellor (B), Assistant Counsellor (A), Counsellor, Undersecretary of the State Council and Vice-President of the State Council. By contrast, a judge in the ordinary judiciary follows a different path, starting from Prosecution Aide, then Assistant Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor, Senior Deputy Prosecutor, Court President (B), Court President (A), Counsellor, Deputy President of Appeal, and finally President of Appeal.<\/span><\/p>\n

What is striking about this progression, however, is that judges at the State Council are promoted at a faster pace than their counterparts in the ordinary judiciary, as the State Council’s grades allow smooth and regular movement between positions, while the ordinary judicial path includes additional grades, such as Prosecution Aide, which have no equivalent at the State Council, delaying promotion to later stages.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

There is also a notable difference at the senior grades, as the grade of President of Appeal in the ordinary judiciary is equivalent to the grade of Vice-President of the Court of Cassation, which is the same grade a member of the State Council reaches under the title of Vice-President of the State Council, but at a much younger age, which widens the time gap between the two bodies.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Two<\/a><\/figure>\n

According to the sources, the additional stages and slower progression in the ordinary judiciary contribute to the delay. They also point to differences at senior levels, where State Council members can reach a grade they consider comparable at a much younger age.<\/p>\n

Their age comparison starts with an assistant delegate at the State Council and an assistant prosecutor at about 25. At 26, it pairs a council delegate with a prosecutor; at 28, a council deputy with a senior prosecutor.<\/p>\n

The gap begins to open at assistant counsellor B, reached at about 30 in the council, compared with roughly 33 for court president B. Assistant counsellor A is reached at about 32, while court president A is reached at around 35.<\/p>\n

At counsellor level, the comparison puts a State Council member at about 33 and an appeal court counsellor or advocate general at about 43. It places a deputy of the council at 34\u201335, against about 45 for an appeal court vice-president. At the top of the illustrated sequence, it gives 36\u201337 for a State Council vice-president, compared with 47\u201348 for an appeal court president or Court of Cassation vice-president.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

The approximate review revealed a divergence in promotion paths between members of the State Council and their peers in the other judicial bodies, as the time disparity in promotion begins from the earliest stages of judicial work and gradually widens to more than a decade at the senior job grades.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the State Council, an Assistant Delegate is appointed at the age of 25, the same age at which an Assistant Prosecutor is appointed. The State Council Delegate is then promoted to the grade of Delegate at the age of 26, at the same time as the Assistant Prosecutor is promoted to Deputy Prosecutor. At the age of 28, a member of the State Council reaches the grade of Deputy, while the Deputy Prosecutor is promoted to the grade of Senior Deputy Prosecutor.<\/span><\/p>\n

The gap begins to widen at the grade of Assistant Counsellor (B), which a member of the State Council obtains at the age of 30, while a judge in the ordinary judiciary only reaches the grade of Court President (B) at the age of 33. A member of the State Council is then promoted to Assistant Counsellor (A) at the age of 32, while a judge reaches the grade of Court President (A) at the age of 35.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the age of 33, a member of the State Council holds the grade of Counsellor, while their counterpart in the ordinary judiciary only reaches a similar position (Appeal Counsellor or Advocate General) at the age of 43, a time gap of up to ten years. This disparity keeps widening, as a member of the State Council is promoted to Undersecretary of the State Council between the ages of 34 and 35, while a judge only reaches the grade of Deputy President of a Court of Appeal at the age of 45.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the top of the career ladder, a member of the State Council obtains the grade of Vice-President of the State Council between the ages of 36 and 37, while a judge in the other judicial bodies only attains the grade of President of Appeal or Vice-President of the Court of Cassation between the ages of 47 and 48, reflecting a time gap of more than a full decade, which in turn affects the differences in financial and career privileges between the two sides.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading: <\/b>Ahead of the Club Elections: Judges Angry After Their Children Fail Military Courses<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n

\n“<\/b>I felt wronged and thought about resigning”<\/b><\/h1>\n

“I never imagined the difference would be such a large gap” \u2013 this is how a Court President (A), who asked not to be named, begins his conversation with Zawia3, speaking about his personal experience of the disparity between the judicial bodies. The judge, one of the top graduates of his class at the Faculty of Law in 2011, obtained a grade of excellent and was among those accepted into the State Council in 2012, but he complied with his father’s wish that he join the Public Prosecution, moving to it in 2013, expecting the differences in career progression between the judicial bodies to be limited, but what he faced later was shocking.<\/span><\/p>\n

After 12 years of service, he finds himself a Court President (A), working at a court two hours from his home under unrelenting work pressure, while his colleagues who stayed at the State Council have risen to the grade of Undersecretary of the State Council, a grade equivalent to a Counsellor at the Court of Cassation or a Deputy President of a Court of Appeal, a difference of more than ten years in promotions and privileges. “The matter is not only about the job title,” the judge explains, “but goes beyond that to salaries, job burdens and working hours. We work non-stop, while our colleagues at the State Council enjoy less pressured work schedules and offices close to their homes”.<\/span><\/p>\n

The judge speaks of the moment he first realised the size of the gap: “I always had a feeling that promotions at the State Council moved at a faster pace, but when I met one of my former colleagues and discovered that he had become Undersecretary of the State Council while I am still at my current grade, I felt as though I had lost years of my professional life”. It was not just a difference in promotions; it extended to income, financial privileges and even standing within the judicial system.<\/span><\/p>\n

The judge cites Article 186 of the 2014 Constitution, which stipulates equality among judges, but describes it as “suspended provisions”, as the State Council has become “a separate entity within the judicial authority”, enjoying privileges exceeding those granted to judges of the ordinary courts, even though the latter are the holders of “general jurisdiction” to rule on cases.<\/span><\/p>\n

The judge did not stop at the question of promotions alone, but revealed additional financial privileges granted to his peers at the State Council, saying: “My colleagues there are seconded to outside bodies that give them the equivalent of 100% of their total salaries, that is, double what we receive in the ordinary judiciary”. The judge, who preferred not to be named, questions the extent to which this secondment conflicts with the principle of judicial impartiality: “How can an administrative judge rule on a case concerning an administrative body to which he himself is seconded? Is that not a breach of the independence of the judiciary? Is it conceivable for the judge to be the adversary and the arbiter at the same time?”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Nor is the matter limited to financial privileges; it extends to the State Council’s disregard of the provisions of the law on the Supreme Council for Judicial Bodies and Authorities, according to his testimony. The judge explains that the law clearly stipulates in Article 8 the need to eliminate the gap in promotions between the judicial bodies within ten years of its passage in 2021, so that parity is achieved by 2031. Yet reality is moving in the opposite direction, as “the State Council has thrown this rule out of the window and continued to grant its members accelerated promotions without any regard for the principle of career balance within the judicial authority”.<\/span><\/p>\n

The judge notes that the continuation of this situation constitutes “a fundamental breach of the principle of justice within the judicial authority”, adding: “The State Council no longer cares about achieving justice as a system; it now runs things according to the interests of its members alone, ignoring the effect of that on the other judicial bodies”. In light of this reality, the judge no longer sees a clear future within the institution that is supposed to be a source of justice, stressing that he is seriously considering submitting his resignation, having come to feel that the injustice he faces inside the judiciary exceeds the injustice he is supposed to stand against outside it.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although he is still doing his job, the thought of resigning now visits him more than ever before, like many of his colleagues who believe that the career disparity has come to constitute “systematic discrimination” that is incompatible with the idea of justice that is supposed to be the foundation of the judicial institution.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading: <\/b>Egypt’s Public Prosecution Turns a Blind Eye to Investigating Detainees’ Torture Complaints<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n

\nA unified judiciary?<\/b><\/h1>\n

Counsellor Mohamed Nagi Derbala, former Vice-President of the Court of Cassation, believes, in his statements to Zawia3, that the crisis of disparity in promotions and financial privileges between the judicial bodies is not new, but the result of accumulations that have continued for years and should have been addressed long ago. He explains that one of the solutions proposed previously was to grant the Supreme Judicial Council, the Special Council of the State Council and the General Assembly of the Supreme Constitutional Court independent budgets with specified resources, to be approved in the House of Representatives as a single figure, just as is the case for the House of Representatives, the Shura Council and the Presidency of the Republic, with no interference in their details. He adds that this has already been achieved for the Supreme Constitutional Court, but has not yet been applied to the judges of the judicial authority or the State Council, which has led to the continuation of financial and career disparity within the judicial system.<\/span><\/p>\n

Derbala explains that the immediate solution to the crisis lies in the state playing its role in supporting promotions and providing the financial grades needed to achieve balance between the judicial bodies, so that promotions are linked to the number of cohorts and the numbers of judges in all judicial bodies, noting that this role falls to the state as the body responsible for providing financial resources and including job grades in the general budget.<\/span><\/p>\n

As for the solution, the former Vice-President of the Court of Cassation believes that applying a “unified judiciary” system is the most important way to eliminate all forms of disparity, as it guarantees the unification of the judicial bodies under a single umbrella, ending differences in promotions and financial privileges and creating a fairer and more stable system, noting that this proposal was one of the projects he championed during his participation in the Constituent Assembly that drafted the 2012 Constitution, but it met strong resistance from representatives of the State Council and the Supreme Constitutional Court, who felt that unifying the judicial bodies would lead to the loss of some special privileges and benefits.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Derbala stresses that the continuation of the current situation will worsen the disparities over time, as the gaps between judges in the different bodies will grow year after year. He believes that a unified judiciary is the model adopted in most countries of the world, whether they follow the Anglo-Saxon system or the Latin system, while an unjustified multiplicity of judicial bodies leads to the creation of power centres within the judiciary, which serves neither the independence of the judicial authority nor the achievement of justice.<\/span><\/p>\n

Former State Council judge Essam Mohamed Refaat stresses, in a statement to Zawia3, that the latest promotions round has caused anger because of the clear discrimination and disparity between the judicial bodies and authorities, noting that the roots of the crisis lie in the flexibility of laws and standards in the hands of decision-makers, which allows promotion standards to vary within the different judicial institutions. He stresses that the principle in legislation regulating sovereign posts, including the judiciary, is that it should set unified standards guaranteeing justice and equality among judges, away from any personal considerations or pressures that fuel divisions within the multiple judicial bodies.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Refaat adds that there are growing demands to apply a <\/span>“unified judiciary”<\/b> system, so that there would be a single judicial umbrella under the name <\/span>“Egyptian Judiciary Institution”<\/b>, encompassing all judicial branches, such as the public prosecution, the criminal judiciary, the administrative judiciary, the sharia judiciary, the economic judiciary, the civil judiciary, the Supreme Court of Cassation and Appeals, legal advisory opinions and legal legislation. He explains that this model has become an urgent necessity to regulate the performance of the judicial system and to unify the standards for promotion and privileges, so as to achieve equal opportunities among judges in the various bodies.<\/span><\/p>\n

The former State Council judge notes that many countries, such as <\/span>England, the United States, Morocco and Algeria<\/b>, have adopted the unified judiciary model, in which judges are subject to a single legal system known as <\/span>“common law”<\/b>. This system is applied in countries that do not rely on legal duality, where the judicial authority has jurisdiction over all types of disputes, regardless of their nature, within a unified legal framework and unified procedures, and it is the prevailing model in Anglo-Saxon countries.<\/span><\/p>\n

Refaat explains that a unified judiciary rests on the <\/span>principle of the separation of powers<\/b>, which guarantees the independence of the judicial authority from the legislative and executive authorities and reinforces its impartiality, especially when ruling on administrative disputes. He adds that this system affirms the <\/span>principle of equality before the law<\/b>, so that the law is a general and abstract instrument that applies to everyone without discrimination, which prevents disparity in privileges and judicial decisions between the different bodies.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading: <\/b>Overlapping Interests: Egyptian Sports Clubs as an Arena for Political Conflicts<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n

\nConstitutional questions<\/b><\/h1>\n

Dr Mohamed Mahmoud Mehran, a specialist in international law and a member of the American and European Societies of International Law, stresses in exclusive statements to Zawia3 that the large disparity in promotions and salaries between the various judicial bodies raises questions about its consistency with constitutional principles and the standards of international law.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Commenting on the controversy sparked by the latest State Council promotions round, Mehran explains that international law does not consider every disparity in privileges and job grades to be a form of prohibited discrimination, but when this disparity leads to fundamental differences in the career paths of judges from the same cohort, <\/span>the matter may become inconsistent with the principle of equality before the law<\/b>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The professor of international law notes that the Egyptian Constitution stipulates in Article 94 that the independence of the judiciary and the immunity of judges are two fundamental guarantees for the protection of rights and freedoms, while Article 11 affirms the principle of equality, which calls for the current promotions system to be reconsidered to ensure that it does not conflict with constitutional principles. He adds that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, stress the need to provide fair financial guarantees for judges, which requires a review of the current disparity in privileges among the various judicial bodies.<\/p>\n

On the proposed solutions, Mehran notes that many developed countries adopt a unified judiciary system while maintaining different specialisations within it, which makes it possible to reduce disparities in privileges without undermining the independence of each body. He points out that Morocco is the most advanced Arab country in this direction, following its recent judicial reforms that led to the creation of the Supreme Council of the Judicial Authority to oversee all judges, followed by Tunisia and Jordan, which have taken similar steps through the creation of unified judicial councils. Nevertheless, Mehran explains that Arab countries in general do not apply the unified judiciary system in its complete form, as they retain multiple judicial systems with differing grades and career paths.<\/span><\/p>\n

The legal expert stresses that a unified judiciary does not mean abolishing specialisations, but unifying the organisational structure and the general rules for promotions and pay, ensuring justice among judges in the various bodies without undermining the particularity and jurisdiction of each judicial body. He adds that the optimal solution lies in creating a fair promotions system that takes into account the nature of each body’s work and ensures that living standards are close among judges in the various judicial bodies, through fair salaries that preserve the dignity of the judge and befit his standing and independence.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Recommended reading: <\/b>Judicial Immunity: A Protective Shield or a Weapon for Corruption in Egypt?<\/b><\/a><\/p>\n

Speed of promotions<\/b><\/h1>\n

A senior judicial source at the State Council tells Zawia3 that the notable speed of promotions for State Council members compared with their counterparts in the other judicial bodies is due to the small number of people appointed annually to the Council compared with the Public Prosecution and the State Lawsuits and Administrative Prosecution authorities.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The source, who asked not to be named, explains that State Council appointments are usually limited in number: for example, if the Public Prosecution takes in about 1000 new members annually, the State Council appoints only 100 to 150 members, which makes it possible to provide the financial grades needed to promote all members without delay. As a result of these small numbers, promotions are granted at a faster pace than in the other judicial bodies, which face delays because of the large number of those eligible for promotion set against the limited financial grades available.<\/span><\/p>\n

The source adds that in the ordinary judiciary, when the time comes to promote a cohort of 1000 members to the grade of Vice-President of the Court of Cassation or President of a Court of Appeal, the financial resources allow only 100 to 200 members to be promoted, which leads to the rest of the members being carried over to subsequent promotion rounds. At the State Council, however, the number of those eligible for promotion is close to the number of financial grades available, which prevents any delay in promotions.<\/span><\/p>\n

The source notes that this difference in mechanism between the various judicial bodies has caused the numbers of judges whose promotion has been deferred to accumulate in the ordinary judiciary, which over the years has widened the career gap between State Council judges and their counterparts in the Public Prosecution and the State Lawsuits and Administrative Prosecution authorities, turning it into a clear crisis in promotions and privileges.<\/span><\/p>\n

Amid this escalating crisis and the anger within judicial circles, the State Council on Thursday 27 February last sent the promotions round file to the Presidency of the Republic, according to a senior judicial source at the Council, in preparation for the issuance of a presidential decree approving it and bringing it into force in the coming days. This comes at a time of growing questions about the possibility of the Presidency intervening, in its capacity as head of the Supreme Council for Judicial Bodies and Authorities, to stop this disparity and discrimination in promotions, and to apply the legal provisions that require work to reduce the career and financial differences between members of the various judicial bodies and authorities.<\/span><\/p>\n

Editorial correction: The first version of the report stated that Article 176 of the 2014 Constitution stipulates equality among judges; the correct article is Article 186, which stipulates that judges are \u00abequal in rights and duties\u00bb.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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