{"id":17675,"date":"2025-02-19T17:20:05","date_gmt":"2025-02-19T15:20:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=17675"},"modified":"2026-10-08T06:27:49","modified_gmt":"2026-10-08T04:27:49","slug":"tiran-and-sanafir","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/tiran-and-sanafir\/","title":{"rendered":"Tiran and Sanafir: Sovereignty, Security and an Unsettled Political Dispute"},"content":{"rendered":"

The islands of Tiran and Sanafir have become a recurring source of controversy in Egyptian\u2013Saudi relations since Cairo and Riyadh signed a maritime boundary agreement in April 2016 placing them on the Saudi side of the boundary. The two governments presented the agreement as a way to define their respective exclusive economic zones and make use of maritime resources.<\/p>\n

In Egypt, however, it provoked political opposition and a protracted court battle. The Administrative Court invalidated the agreement in June 2016, and the Supreme Administrative Court upheld that ruling on 16 January 2017. Conflicting rulings followed from the Court of Urgent Matters, which is not an appellate court over the administrative judiciary. Parliament approved the agreement on 14 June 2017, and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ratified it on 24 June. On 3 March 2018, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the conflicting judgments should be disregarded<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The UN Treaty Collection<\/a> records the agreement as entering into force on 2 July 2017 and being registered by Saudi Arabia on 25 July that year. Its legal entry into force must therefore be distinguished from subsequent correspondence and security arrangements. A later letter to the UN cannot accurately be described as a condition for the agreement first taking effect.<\/p>\n

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Press reports in October 2024<\/a> linked talks during the Saudi crown prince\u2019s 15 October visit to Cairo to outstanding arrangements concerning the islands. Such implementation issues do not mean the boundary agreement itself remained out of force.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The dispute remains sensitive in Egyptian public debate. Opponents maintain that the islands historically belonged to Egypt. The Egyptian government relies on documents it considers evidence of Saudi sovereignty and says Egyptian administration began in 1950 at Saudi Arabia\u2019s request.<\/p>\n

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A strategic gateway to the Red Sea<\/h2>\n
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Tiran and Sanafir lie at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, serving the Jordanian port of Aqaba and the Israeli port of Eilat. Their location makes them strategically important to maritime movement between the gulf and the Red Sea.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

\"Tiran
Tiran and Sanafir at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Map: Google Earth.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

David Schenker<\/a>, a Washington Institute researcher and former US assistant secretary of state, argues that Israel\u2019s principal concern is preserving navigation to Eilat. His analysis places that interest within the broader international framework governing maritime passage, rather than treating it solely as a bilateral issue with Egypt or Saudi Arabia.<\/p>\n

Former Egyptian Journalists Syndicate head Makram Mohamed Ahmed<\/a> previously argued that changing the islands\u2019 status required security coordination with Israel because of the Egyptian\u2013Israeli peace arrangements. He described a shift in security responsibilities from Egypt to Saudi Arabia that would require coordination with Israel.<\/p>\n

Human rights lawyer Malek Adly tells Zawia3 that the agreement could reshape the region\u2019s strategic landscape. He sees Saudi involvement in arrangements associated with the Camp David framework as potentially significant for navigation, international monitoring forces and regional security balances. Legally, however, participation in arrangements concerning the islands does not make Saudi Arabia a party to the 1979 Egyptian\u2013Israeli peace treaty.<\/p>\n

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Economic stakes beyond the shoreline<\/h2>\n

An economist who requested anonymity tells Zawia3 that the islands are important to Egyptian influence in the Red Sea. In his assessment, relinquishing them diminishes Egypt\u2019s position along a major regional maritime route. He also points to reports of natural gas potential in the Red Sea as a possible consideration in competition for regional influence, without providing a documented reserve estimate for the islands themselves.<\/p>\n

Tiran overlooks the strait alongside Sharm el-Sheikh on Sinai\u2019s coast and Ras Hamid on the Saudi coast. The navigable passage between Sharm el-Sheikh and Tiran is vital to ships travelling to and from the Gulf of Aqaba; the shallower waters around the islands constrain alternative routes.<\/p>\n

The strait is Eilat\u2019s maritime outlet to the Red Sea and beyond. Its geographic importance should not be confused with a legal right to close it: the peace treaty guarantees freedom of navigation and passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.<\/p>\n

The economist also highlights the area\u2019s tourism appeal, particularly its clear waters, coral reefs and diving sites. Tiran covers approximately 80 square kilometres and Sanafir about 33. The surrounding marine environment includes colourful fish, sea turtles, including green turtles, molluscs, echinoderms and marine algae.<\/p>\n

The islands have been associated with the security arrangements for Zone C under the peace treaty and the work of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)<\/a>. Established through a 1981 protocol outside the UN framework, the MFO is not a United Nations peacekeeping force.<\/p>\n

\"A
A historical map of Egypt reproduced among the documents cited by opponents of the transfer. Their interpretation draws attention to contour markings on Tiran and Sanafir; the map alone does not settle the legal dispute.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
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Aid, investment and security arrangements<\/h2>\n

Reporting in December 2022<\/a> described delays in security arrangements concerning the islands. These should not be confused with the boundary treaty\u2019s entry into force, nor should a reduction in US assistance be treated, by itself, as proof that aid was conditional on this issue.<\/p>\n

At Davos in January 2023, Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed al-Jadaan described a change in the kingdom\u2019s approach to foreign assistance<\/a>, with greater emphasis on reforms in recipient countries. His remarks concerned a general policy, rather than announcing that aid to Egypt was conditional on Tiran and Sanafir.<\/p>\n

Reports also circulated a figure of $15 billion for potential Saudi investment at Ras Banas. That was a reported proposal, not evidence here of a formally announced final contract or completed payment. Ras Banas is a peninsula in Egypt\u2019s Red Sea governorate extending roughly 50 kilometres into the sea.<\/p>\n

Adly, a Court of Cassation lawyer and director of the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, says areas offered for foreign investment remain under Egyptian sovereignty. He nevertheless believes investment can serve as political leverage over the islands. This is his assessment of the relationship, rather than proof of a publicly declared condition in an investment contract.<\/p>\n

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Opponents preserve their legal case<\/h2>\n

Adly says opponents exhausted the domestic legal avenues available to challenge the agreement. Their case rested on documents they argue establish Egyptian sovereignty before the founding of the modern Saudi state.<\/p>\n

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In his account, the litigation brought two sharply opposed historical narratives into conflict: a government seeking to establish that Egypt had administered Saudi islands, and opponents seeking judicial recognition that the islands belonged to Egypt.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

He regards the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s ruling as a document opponents could draw on in future international arguments, notwithstanding the subsequent constitutional litigation. As a matter of political analysis, he believes sovereignty disputes can return to public debate when a country\u2019s political circumstances change.<\/p>\n

Although the issue had not emerged as an international dispute between the two governments, Adly argues that Egypt relinquished the islands and then promoted the agreement domestically to secure public acceptance.<\/p>\n

He says the Egyptian Center collected the evidence and legal documents used in the court battle in a book, a copy of which Zawia3 obtained. The aim, he explains, is to preserve the record for future generations who might revive the claim under different political conditions.<\/p>\n

Adly questions the justification for giving up the islands when, in his view, historical maps and records contradict the argument that Saudi territory was simply being returned. He maintains that no state body may relinquish national territory or redraw its borders merely through a political decision, and believes the controversy could generate further legal and political challenges.<\/p>\n

\"Historical
Historical map of Egypt, identified in the accompanying documentation as first issued in 1912 and revised in 1913. Tiran and Sanafir are named on the map, which opponents cite in support of their claim.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
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A competing view of sovereignty<\/h2>\n

Public international law professor Ayman Salama takes a different position. He considers the islands Saudi territory and says Egypt assumed their administration in coordination with Saudi Arabia in 1950 to protect the area amid regional tensions. That date predates Gamal Abdel Nasser\u2019s presidency.<\/p>\n

Speaking to Zawia3, Salama argues that successive Egyptian administrations postponed a resolution for decades. He credits Sisi\u2019s administration, which he describes as strong and balanced, with settling the issue with a country he regards as one of Egypt\u2019s most important political and economic supporters.<\/p>\n

In remarks published in October 2024<\/a>, Salama said an MFO detachment had moved its work from Tiran to southern Sinai in 2023 and described Saudi Arabia as exercising effective sovereignty in 2024. These were his account of field arrangements; the UN\u2019s recorded date for the agreement\u2019s entry into force remains July 2017.<\/p>\n

Salama declined to comment on the Egyptian court judgments that had supported the opponents\u2019 sovereignty claim by reference to historical documents and maps.<\/p>\n

Nearly eight years after the agreement was signed, debate continued over security, navigation and the political consequences, even though the boundary treaty had already entered into force.<\/p>\n

On 30 November 2024, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed reported<\/a> that Egypt had circulated a draft letter to Saudi Arabia and Israel, and that objections concerned security language and the scope of Egypt\u2019s role in the strait. That report also acknowledged the agreement\u2019s registration at the UN in 2017.<\/p>\n

The sources presented here do not include a final, approved version of that correspondence. Details about it therefore remain attributed reporting, rather than verified evidence that sovereignty was being transferred anew or that the boundary treaty\u2019s entry into force had been postponed.<\/p>\n

Political disagreement can persist, but a change of government does not automatically terminate a boundary agreement. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties<\/a> excludes treaties establishing boundaries from termination or withdrawal on the ground of a fundamental change of circumstances.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Egypt and Saudi Arabia\u2019s maritime boundary agreement took effect in 2017, but security arrangements and competing historical claims continue to fuel debate over Tiran and Sanafir.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":11838,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[412],"tags":[],"kateb":[7839],"class_list":["post-17675","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics-en","kateb-mai-ali"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/02\/\u062a\u064a\u0631\u0627\u0646-\u0648\u0635\u0646\u0641\u0627\u064a\u0631.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17675","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17675"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17675\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17676,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17675\/revisions\/17676"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/11838"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17675"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17675"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17675"},{"taxonomy":"kateb","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kateb?post=17675"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}