{"id":17732,"date":"2025-01-03T18:19:08","date_gmt":"2025-01-03T16:19:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/?p=17732"},"modified":"2026-10-08T09:01:27","modified_gmt":"2026-10-08T07:01:27","slug":"mubarak-era-business-figures","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/mubarak-era-business-figures\/","title":{"rendered":"Madbouly and Mubarak-Era Businessmen: A Fresh Start or the Same Economic Order?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Nearly fourteen years after Egypt\u2019s January 2011 uprising, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly has brought together a group of business figures closely associated with the Hosni Mubarak era. The meeting comes as the government seeks investment and ways to revive an economy under severe strain.<\/p>\n

Mubarak\u2019s rule ended amid anger over political and economic mismanagement. The renewed prominence of businessmen from that period raises a question: is the government drawing on their experience to find a way out of the crisis, or reinforcing an economic order that never truly disappeared?<\/p>\n

\n

The meeting on 25 December 2024, following the weekly cabinet session, focused on obstacles facing the private sector and proposals for growth in 2025. Its political significance lay as much in who was invited as in the proposals put forward.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Those attending included Ahmed Ezz, the steel magnate and former senior official of Mubarak\u2019s now-dissolved National Democratic Party (NDP), and investment banker Hassan Heikal, son of journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal. Heikal was acquitted in February 2020 after eight years of proceedings in the stock-market manipulation case that also involved Alaa and Gamal Mubarak. In a statement following the verdict<\/a>, he said the court-appointed expert committee had found no personal benefit to him from the transactions at issue.<\/p>\n

Hisham Talaat Moustafa, another former NDP figure and a leading property developer, also attended. He received a presidential pardon in 2017 after being sentenced to fifteen years in prison in the case concerning the murder of Lebanese singer Suzanne Tamim.<\/p>\n

Yasseen Mansour was among the participants too. A July 2012 report in Al-Shorouk<\/a> said restrictions on the disposal of his assets had been lifted after an EGP 250 million payment in connection with financial settlements. Lifting an asset restriction is distinct from an acquittal; that report does not establish that the measure concerned Credit Suisse accounts. Other prominent business figures, including Naguib Sawiris and his brothers, were absent.<\/p>\n

The gathering revived debate over the place of influential businessmen in economic decision-making, against the backdrop of a government searching for an exit from a deepening crisis.<\/p>\n

<\/svg><\/div>\n

Public administration, debt and interest rates<\/h2>\n

The participants proposed a greater role for the private sector, a new export-rebate programme, a review of financing costs, revised rules for construction in villages and the recruitment of younger staff into the civil service, including graduates of foreign universities.<\/p>\n

Ezz criticised slowing construction and real-estate activity. He argued that the sector had previously grown much faster than the economy as a whole and that steel and cement consumption were important indicators of its performance. In the figures he presented, steel consumption had fallen from 9.9 million tonnes in 2010 to 6.5 million, 6.4 million and 6.2 million tonnes in the three most recent years. These were his figures and comparison, rather than a separately verified statistical series.<\/p>\n

He estimated that restrictions were preventing 70% of Egyptians from building, referring to some 5,000 villages and 120 administrative districts. He contrasted the situation with the earlier issuance of around 60,000 building permits annually. His argument was for new rules, he said, rather than a return to unplanned construction; continuing along the existing path would hold the sector back severely.<\/p>\n

Ezz also called for government recruitment to resume. He pointed to a pool of approximately 40,000 Egyptian students in foreign universities and said the public administration needed younger people with new skills. He put its workforce at roughly 3.5 million, compared with six million a decade earlier. These employment figures were part of his argument; comparisons depend on which public bodies are included.<\/p>\n

Heikal focused instead on domestic and foreign debt. Taking domestic public debt of EGP 10 trillion and applying a 30% rate, he illustrated an annual interest burden of EGP 3 trillion. This was an illustrative calculation, not the actual interest expenditure recorded in the state budget. He argued that the government\u2019s available resources offered no convincing route to financial balance within the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n

His proposed response was to transfer state assets to the Central Bank of Egypt, eliminate corresponding pound-denominated debts and establish a central-bank sovereign fund incorporating companies, property and land belonging to government and sovereign institutions. Returns could then support development spending while bringing public finances together, he suggested. He drew comparisons with responses to debt crises in Spain, Italy and Greece, although that analogy does not establish that those countries used the same legal or financial mechanism.<\/p>\n

\n

Moustafa questioned how long Egyptian companies could bear financing costs of 32%. He argued that such costs served neither businesses nor the state budget, while identifying the annual foreign-currency shortfall as the economy\u2019s greatest problem.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The 32% figure referred to the financing conditions he was discussing; it should not be read as the central bank\u2019s policy rate. His intervention linked the interest-rate problem to wider banking and dollar shortages.<\/p>\n

<\/svg><\/div>\n

A message to the IMF?<\/h2>\n

Mohamed Ramadan, an economic and social rights researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, tells Zawia3 that the meeting offered no clear route out of the crisis. In his assessment, the discussion concentrated on interest rates and property development: cheaper financing would help developers sell units and avoid a slowdown. He therefore sees much of the agenda as reflecting the participants\u2019 own commercial interests.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, Ramadan argues that Ezz\u2019s comments about public administration deserve serious attention, particularly because they came from a representative of private business. In his view, Egypt faces a substantial administrative-capacity problem, contrary to the government\u2019s repeated emphasis on an oversized bureaucracy.<\/p>\n

He also interprets the meeting as a signal to the International Monetary Fund that the government is engaging the private sector, as the Fund has urged. But the crisis, he says, requires the political will to address its underlying causes rather than another consultation alone.<\/p>\n

Akram Ismail, a founding figure in the Bread and Freedom Party, then still under establishment, and a member of the Civil Democratic Movement, offers a similar reading. He believes the government is using business support to strengthen its position with the IMF after years of complaints from investors about economic policy and the military\u2019s commercial footprint.<\/p>\n

The gathering was an attempt to reassure both the Fund and investors, he argues. Yet he cautions that their decisions depend on factors beyond the views of Egyptian businessmen, important though those views may be.<\/p>\n

Ismail describes the relationship between the authorities and business as a continuing negotiation involving pressure from both sides. He cites disputes over taxes on capital and their subsequent reversal, the arrest and release of businessman Salah Diab, and the withdrawal of North Coast land allocations as examples informing that interpretation.<\/p>\n

\n

For Ismail, the meeting exposes an imbalance in whose interests are represented: the military-bureaucratic state and major capital can negotiate with one another, while ordinary citizens lack comparable influence.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

He argues that weak independent trade unions and left-wing parties leave poorer groups without an effective voice. The most consequential negotiations, in his account, therefore take place within an interconnected social and economic elite. With the government seeking external financing and facing IMF pressure over the state\u2019s role in the economy, he sees the meeting as part of its effort to manage that predicament.<\/p>\n

On 24 December 2024<\/a>, IMF staff and the Egyptian authorities reached agreement on the fourth review of the Extended Fund Facility programme. Access to approximately USD 1.2 billion remained subject to the Executive Board\u2019s approval.<\/p>\n

The sequence of earlier financing matters. The programme\u2019s initial approval in December 2022<\/a> enabled roughly USD 347 million. Completion of the combined first and second reviews in March 2024<\/a> released about USD 820 million; the third review in July<\/a> enabled another USD 820 million. Together, those amounts were approximately USD 2 billion.<\/p>\n

<\/svg><\/div>\n

Reform or an exercise in appearances?<\/h2>\n

Economic researcher Zohdy El-Shamy, deputy head of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, sees the meeting as evidence of continuity in the governing order. Almost fourteen years after the uprising, he argues, the authorities respond to successive crises by turning either to figures from the Mubarak era or to the IMF, rather than pursuing fundamental change.<\/p>\n

Speaking to Zawia3, he criticises what he considers the Fund\u2019s support for an unsustainable status quo. The economic crisis intensified after large portfolio-capital outflows in 2022. El-Shamy believes the ensuing National Dialogue offered the government a way to evade an honest reckoning with the causes of that crisis.<\/p>\n

He argues that returning to Mubarak-era businessmen cannot resolve problems rooted partly in that period, including privatisation, inflation and the treatment of public debt. He also criticises the accounting treatment of social-insurance funds and government liabilities under former finance minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali. The documentation presented in this report does not establish a specific debt write-off or an appropriation of insurance funds, so that criticism should not be treated as a verified finding of wrongdoing.<\/p>\n

For El-Shamy, economic reform requires political reform: changes in the way the country is governed are necessary if economic policy is to produce different outcomes.<\/p>\n

Mona Ezzat, an economic and social rights researcher, sees value in direct discussion between government and private businesses. Such meetings can create opportunities to exchange views, as supporters of the National Dialogue had hoped. But she says they lose credibility when proposals are not followed by clear action and a public account of what the government has accepted or implemented.<\/p>\n

The absence of follow-through discourages people who had invested hope in these discussions, she tells Zawia3. She wants the government to explain the results of its meeting with business leaders and demonstrate consistency between its stated support for the private sector and the policies it puts into practice.<\/p>\n

\n

Ezzat argues that expanding private business should deliver decent jobs, fair wages, contracts and social insurance. Incentives for investment must not come at the expense of workers\u2019 rights.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

She believes delays in achieving those objectives deepen poverty and unemployment and weaken confidence in consultation, including among private businesses themselves. In her assessment, the government is undermining mechanisms that could otherwise help produce better economic policy and development outcomes.<\/p>\n

The backdrop is a weaker pound, which traded beyond EGP 51 to the dollar in late 2024. In March that year the central bank allowed the exchange rate to move according to market conditions, alongside an expansion of the IMF programme to USD 8 billion. A flexible exchange rate, reduced state involvement and more equal competitive conditions for private firms were central components of that programme.<\/p>\n

<\/svg><\/div>\n

A relationship that never disappeared<\/h2>\n

The renewed visibility of businessmen associated with Mubarak prompted talk of a return to the old order. Yet their commercial relationships with the state had continued through major transactions in preceding years, including purchases of public assets that brought in foreign currency.<\/p>\n

In December 2023<\/a>, Talaat Moustafa Group (TMG) announced agreements through its hospitality arm, ICON, for an initial 39% stake in Legacy Hospitality, rising to 51% according to the contractual timetable, with management rights. The announced investment was USD 800 million. In February 2024, ICON announced the definitive acquisition of the 51% controlling interest through a capital increase.<\/p>\n

Legacy\u2019s portfolio comprised seven hotels: Sofitel Legend Old Cataract Aswan, M\u00f6venpick Resort Aswan, Sofitel Winter Palace Luxor, Steigenberger Hotel El Tahrir, Steigenberger Cecil Alexandria, Marriott Mena House Cairo and the Cairo Marriott at the former Omar Khayyam palace. The transaction formed part of the government\u2019s asset-sale programme and its effort to secure foreign currency.<\/p>\n

Another transaction took place in 2023, rather than 2024. Al Ezz Dekheila Steel approved buying out government shareholders as part of its voluntary stock-market delisting. Those public institutions held roughly 32.9%, with the transaction reported at around EGP 8 billion, or approximately USD 241 million at the time.<\/p>\n

The institutions included the National Investment Bank, National Bank of Egypt, Banque Misr, the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation and Misr Insurance. The transaction received approximately 97% shareholder approval, according to the contemporaneous report cited by the Arabic article<\/a>, which also described dollar financing from Emirates NBD. The repurchase price for shareholders who did not wish to remain after delisting was EGP 1,250 per share.<\/p>\n

Economic researcher Elhami El-Merghany interprets such relationships through what he calls an alliance between state capital, property developers, importers and agents of foreign companies. From that perspective, a prime ministerial meeting with major businessmen is unsurprising. His concern is the absence of equivalent representation for farmers, workers, pensioners and professional groups when economic priorities are negotiated.<\/p>\n

He points to Moustafa as an example of the close relationship between major property developers and state institutions, citing projects such as Al Rehab and Madinaty and subsequent expansion. In his assessment, access to state land and partnerships has helped underpin the group\u2019s profitability. That is his political-economic interpretation, rather than proof that individual transactions were unlawful.<\/p>\n

TMG reported net profit of about EGP 2.23 billion in 2022, up 25%, while consolidated revenue rose approximately 29% to EGP 19.9 billion. Its results reflected residential and commercial property activity, including the Celia development in the New Administrative Capital, alongside hospitality.<\/p>\n

A company disclosure dated 22 December 2024<\/a> reported new sales exceeding EGP 500 billion, approximately USD 10 billion, following expansion in Saudi Arabia and Egypt\u2019s North Coast. It recorded around 28,000 units, compared with 17,000 in 2023. Sales value was approximately 3.5 times the EGP 143 billion booked in 2023.<\/p>\n

The group also reported profit of EGP 9.06 billion for January\u2013September 2024, against EGP 2.69 billion in the comparable period of 2023. Revenue from real-estate activity reached EGP 16.05 billion, compared with EGP 13.52 billion.<\/p>\n

\n

Booked sales, recognised revenue and accounting profit are different measures. Strong sales or profits do not, by themselves, disprove a company\u2019s concerns about financing costs.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

El-Merghany nevertheless believes the results challenge a narrative of uniform hardship across private business. He argues that property groups benefiting from partnerships with the state can continue to generate large returns, while currency and interest-rate pressures bear more heavily on agriculture, industry, smaller investors and informal businesses.<\/p>\n

He is sceptical that this meeting will produce more tangible change than earlier gatherings with journalists, experts and participants in the National Dialogue. In his assessment, borrowing, asset sales and existing economic priorities will continue unless the government changes its approach and considers interests beyond those already represented at the table.<\/p>\n

At the time of this report, Cairo was still awaiting Executive Board approval of the fourth IMF review and access to SDR 922.87 million, approximately USD 1.2 billion. The December staff-level agreement was a step towards that decision, not confirmation that the funds had already been approved or disbursed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

A meeting with prominent Mubarak-era businessmen puts debt, interest rates and private-sector interests in focus\u2014and raises questions about whose voice shapes Egypt\u2019s economic policy.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":11520,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[412],"tags":[],"kateb":[728],"class_list":["post-17732","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-politics-en","kateb-shimaa-hamdy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/01\/\u0645\u0628\u0627\u0631\u0643.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17732","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17732"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17732\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17733,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17732\/revisions\/17733"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/11520"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17732"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17732"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17732"},{"taxonomy":"kateb","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zawia3.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/kateb?post=17732"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}