The total losses of Egypt’s economic authorities in recent years have reached nearly 236.7 billion pounds ($4.73 billion), according to statements by the head of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. Other estimates suggest the figure has exceeded 250 billion pounds ($5 billion). In the latest updates, data from the new 2025/2026 fiscal year budget, recently discussed in parliament, projects losses in the operations of these authorities to reach 79.8 billion pounds ($1.6 billion). The National Authority for Tunnels tops the list with losses of 44.3 billion pounds ($886 million), followed by the National Media Authority with 17.1 billion pounds ($342 million), while the remaining authorities account for 18.4 billion pounds ($368 million) in losses.
Egypt’s economic authorities have witnessed a significant surge in accumulated losses in recent years, placing increasing pressure on the state budget and negatively affecting citizens’ right to subsidies, as well as eroding allocations for essential services such as healthcare and education, and causing the collapse of infrastructure budgets. In the 2022/2023 fiscal year, the Central Auditing Organization estimated these losses at around 236.7 billion pounds ($4.73 billion), with a negative net financial relationship between these authorities and the budget reaching 170 billion pounds ($3.4 billion)—due to subsidies totaling 354.6 billion pounds ($7.1 billion) against revenues that did not exceed 184.9 billion pounds ($3.7 billion). These figures expose a deep structural imbalance in the performance of many state-owned economic entities.
In the following year (2023/2024), reported losses exceeded 250.7 billion pounds ($5 billion), according to government statements. Meanwhile, parliamentary reports indicated that accumulated losses by mid-2024 reached approximately 233 billion pounds ($4.66 billion), reflecting the continued financial hemorrhaging without effective structural solutions. In the draft 2025/2026 budget, the official financial statement projected losses and deficits totaling 79.8 billion pounds ($1.6 billion) across several authorities, along with a 37.6% decline in the profits of the industrial and petroleum sectors over three years—signaling a gradual deterioration in the returns of sectors once considered pillars of the national economy.
Economic authorities in Egypt are defined as public entities with independent legal personality, established by law or presidential decree, with the aim of managing public utilities or directly conducting economic and service activities that generate revenue for the state. These entities possess broad powers in managing their technical, financial, and administrative affairs, and they provide services for a fee. Their boards of directors hold full authority over setting general policies and managing resources. They also have independent budgets approved by the House of Representatives, and their relationship with the state’s general budget is limited to transferring surpluses or receiving support when needed.
There are currently 59 economic authorities in Egypt, distributed across 12 major sectors. The transportation sector has the largest number (10 authorities), followed by the sectors of energy and electricity, health and religious services, industry and petroleum, and agriculture and irrigation. Among the most prominent of these authorities are: the Egyptian National Railways, the Suez Canal Authority, the National Authority for Tunnels, the National Media Authority, the General Petroleum Authority, the New Urban Communities Authority, the Egypt Post, and the National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.
These authorities play a central role in the Egyptian economy, yet their financial performance varies significantly: some generate substantial profits, while others suffer from accumulated losses.
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Egyptian Railways and National Media Authority at the Forefront
Only 16 out of the 59 economic authorities bear the brunt of these losses, with the National Media Authority and the Egyptian National Railways standing out. Both entities face chronic structural challenges that have eroded their revenues and made them almost entirely dependent on state subsidies.
Observers attribute these losses to several factors, foremost among them the imbalance between costs and pricing, which has led to the erosion of profit margins. Additionally, poorly planned loans and delays in executing many projects have significantly increased the financial burdens on these authorities.
Another contributing factor is the repeated exemptions from loan repayments, which have artificially inflated capital on paper without being backed by productive real assets—resulting in fragile financial structures incapable of ensuring sustainability.
In this context, Talaat Khalil—coordinator of the Civil Movement and a member of the Presidential Council of the Conservative Party—believes that the relationship between the state treasury and Egypt’s economic authorities is plagued by serious imbalances. He explains that these authorities are no longer generating revenue for the general budget as they are supposed to; instead, they have become a financial burden, stressing that what is spent from the public treasury on these entities far exceeds what is returned—making this one of the main causes of the growing deficit.
Khalil elaborates that there is wide disparity in the performance of these authorities: while some entities, such as the General Petroleum Authority, appear to generate profits, those profits are misleading and do not reflect actual financial health. Meanwhile, other authorities—such as the National Media Authority, Egyptian National Railways, and the Exhibitions Authority—are clearly operating at a loss. He notes that in some cases, the losses are due to intentional administrative decisions, not natural financial deficiencies.
Khalil points out that the National Media Authority, for example, has effectively shifted from being an economic entity to a public service body, without any formal announcement. It is routinely tasked with covering official government events using its staff and equipment, but is prohibited from selling or marketing this content—thus generating no revenue to offset its costs. “For years, I’ve been calling for it to be clearly declared a service authority, instead of burdening it with tasks that bring no return. Today, it can’t even pay its employees’ salaries,” Khalil stated.
He also highlighted the diminishing role of the Egyptian Survey Authority, whose functions have been transferred to the Military Survey Authority, stripping it of its revenue sources. Similarly, the Exhibitions Authority has declined since a parallel body was established. Khalil emphasized that the intentional sidelining of these institutions’ functions in favor of other entities has led to their inevitable financial losses.
Regarding the Egyptian National Railways, Khalil described it as suffering from complex problems. It is burdened by continuous loans for development, without real progress in the most critical revenue-generating area: freight transport. He emphasized that passenger transport rarely generates real profit in any country—except for luxury or sleeper trains—whereas freight is the real source of returns, which the Egyptian authority has failed to develop so far. He added that most loans are channeled into massive projects like the high-speed train, while the existing network is left to decay, deepening the crisis rather than solving it.
The Egyptian National Railways Authority has expanded its borrowing significantly over the past five years. According to official statements, the authority announced in August 2024 that it had repaid 90 billion pounds ($1.8 billion) in old debts accumulated over decades, yet it continued borrowing to support its investment plans. In September 2024, it entered negotiations with 25 local banks to secure a 17 billion pound ($340 million) loan, receiving the first tranche—8 billion pounds ($160 million)—from Qatar National Bank in December 2024, with efforts underway to obtain the remaining amount. The authority also signed a €250 million loan agreement with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to convert the Abu Qir rail line into an electric metro, as published in the Official Gazette in August 2024. In February 2025, it secured an additional 5 billion pound ($100 million) loan from a state-owned bank, backed by the Ministry of Finance, to complete its projects.
Khalil concluded by stressing the need to reevaluate the roles and viability of Egypt’s economic authorities and to clearly define their nature:
“They are either economic bodies generating revenue for the state, or service entities providing public functions without profit. But they cannot remain in this hybrid state, which serves neither the state nor the citizen.”
Why Are Egypt’s Economic Authorities Losing Money?
Dr. Mahmoud El-Garf, an expert in international economics, told Zawia3 that the losses sustained by Egypt’s economic authorities are not a passing phenomenon, but rather the outcome of deep-rooted structural problems that require serious and comprehensive reform. He explained that the primary cause is weak governance and poor management, with many authorities suffering from a clear lack of strategic planning and the absence of effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms—essential tools for building an operational plan that improves efficiency, boosts profitability, and reduces losses.
El-Garf emphasized that administrative bloating is a major issue across many of these institutions. He pointed to the inflated number of employees relative to actual productivity, which turns human resources into an additional burden without a corresponding return, worsening the mismatch between staffing and output.
He also highlighted high operational costs as a fundamental problem, particularly in light of ongoing increases in fuel, electricity, and service prices—a burden that impacts service-oriented authorities such as those in transport and utilities. He added that reliance on outdated equipment and technology significantly increases energy consumption and maintenance costs.
El-Garf noted that some authorities provide their services at below actual cost, in line with their social responsibility, but lack the marketing capabilities that would allow them to generate meaningful returns—especially when compared to the private sector, which enjoys much more flexibility and effectiveness in promoting products and services.
He added that debt accumulation is among the most critical challenges facing several authorities. Large infrastructure institutions such as the National Authority for Tunnels, for example, are heavily burdened with interest payments on massive loans, yet continue to depend on borrowing as a temporary solution rather than seeking self-financing options or entering investment partnerships that would ensure sustainability.
Finally, El-Garf stressed that the lack of modern technological infrastructure is a key reason for failure. Many authorities still operate using traditional systems that lack digitalization and artificial intelligence capabilities. This results in reduced efficiency, weakened transparency, and slower decision-making—all of which hinder performance and reform.
El-Garf also stressed that the absence of a clear investment vision is a decisive factor in the continued losses. He explained that there has been a delay in making critical decisions, such as restructuring or merging authorities with overlapping activities, in addition to the lack of a plan to transform these entities into productive institutions capable of generating profit or attracting real investment. He added:
“Unless these problems are addressed at their root, the losses will continue to accumulate year after year.”
How Do These Losses Affect the Citizen?
The losses of Egypt’s economic authorities represent one of the most pressing challenges casting a heavy shadow over the broader economy. Their financial impact extends far beyond the internal deficits of these entities, reaching into the state budget, social services, and the daily cost of living for citizens. These losses deepen structural imbalances that undermine growth and investment opportunities, while forcing the government to allocate massive funds in subsidies and support to loss-making authorities. For example, in the 2022/2023 fiscal year, such grants and subsidies amounted to approximately 452 billion pounds ($9 billion)—further exacerbating the budget deficit and reducing the state’s ability to spend on development priorities.
Instead of directing financial surpluses toward critical sectors such as healthcare, education, or infrastructure, these resources are being used to cover the deficits of entities like the National Media Authority or the National Authority for Tunnels, depriving the economy of sustainable investment returns.
In this context, Taghreed Badr Eldin, Assistant Professor of Economics at the Faculty of Politics and Economics at Beni Suef University, told Zawia3 that despite the Deputy Minister of Finance, Ahmed Kouchouk, announcing an improvement in macroeconomic indicators over the past nine months, the file of economic authorities remains a structural weakness in public finance, and one of the primary sources of pressure on the budget deficit.
She added:
“The draft budget for the 2025/2026 fiscal year indicates that the losses of economic authorities persist without the government presenting any comprehensive solutions. To date, no clear restructuring or reform plan has been announced for these entities. The financial statement shows that the state has allocated massive transfers to support these authorities, without linking this support to any measurable improvement in their financial or service performance.”
Taghreed continued:
“Leading the loss-making authorities is the National Authority for Tunnels, which recorded losses exceeding 44 billion pounds ($880 million); the National Media Authority, with losses estimated at over 17 billion pounds ($340 million); the Egyptian National Railways, which continues to rely on 5.5 billion pounds ($110 million) in direct annual subsidies despite deteriorating service levels; and the General Petroleum Authority, which receives over 119 billion pounds ($2.38 billion) in support while generating only a very modest surplus—a clear distortion in the relationship between state subsidies and productivity.”
She stressed that the continuation of these losses is linked to three main causes:
First, the lack of governance and weak monitoring and oversight systems within the authorities, which leads to shrinking revenues and rising expenditures without effective financial control.
Second, pricing distortions in services, especially in transport, energy, and media sectors, where services are provided below their actual cost without adequate compensation mechanisms.
Third, a lack of political will to implement institutional reform, despite government claims of adopting program and performance-based budgeting as a new methodology.
Taghreed concluded:
“Failure to decisively address these losses greatly undermines the effectiveness of the general budget. Despite targeting a primary surplus of 807 billion pounds ($16.14 billion) (4% of GDP) and a reduction of the overall deficit to 7.3% by the end of June 2026, the ongoing hemorrhaging of the economic authorities threatens to derail these goals. It also squanders the opportunity to reallocate resources to more efficient sectors such as education, healthcare, and public investment.”
The Burden of Economic Authorities on Public Debt
The latest data shows that Egypt’s economic authorities represent a significant burden on public finances in terms of their share of the national debt. The total public debt in the 2024/2025 budget is estimated at approximately 17.4 trillion pounds ($348 billion), equivalent to 101% of the GDP, of which around 15 trillion pounds ($300 billion) belongs to the general budget entities, and 2.3 trillion pounds ($46 billion) is attributed solely to economic authorities, representing 13.2% of total public debt.
According to the consolidated budget, the total debt of general government (general budget + economic authorities) is estimated at 16.4 trillion pounds ($328 billion), or 96.4% of GDP. It is believed that the share of economic authorities in this amount is about 1.4 trillion pounds ($28 billion). This discrepancy between figures in the financial statement and those listed in the consolidated budget is likely due to differences in debt classification, such as external vs. domestic, and whether debts are guaranteed by the treasury.
As for external debt, figures show that economic authorities owe about 1.8 trillion pounds ($36 billion)—equivalent to 16% of GDP, and representing 37% of Egypt’s total external debt, which stands at approximately $168 billion. The General Petroleum Authority, New Urban Communities Authority, and the National Authority for Tunnels are among the most heavily indebted entities, collectively accounting for 82% of loans guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. Although the debts of the Egyptian National Railways are not explicitly listed under public debt data, the authority does receive guaranteed loans, which implicitly burden the public treasury with future obligations.
Dr. Taghreed Badr Eldin, an economics lecturer at Beni Suef University, points out that continuing to convert these losses into “social costs” financed by the public treasury, without serious institutional performance review, undermines confidence in the credibility of fiscal policy. This, she argues, is at odds with Deputy Minister Kouchouk’s claims of a “trust partnership between the state and the business community,” as such trust cannot be built in the absence of accountability for public authority performance.
This situation, she notes, highlights the urgent need for genuine structural reform of these entities. Reform should include:
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Restructuring, merging, or liquidating loss-making authorities,
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Economically pricing public services,
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Expanding partnerships with the private sector,
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Linking all public financing to real performance indicators within a program-and-performance-based budgeting framework.
Taghreed concludes that the new budget serves as a real test of the state’s commitment to achieving fiscal efficiency and sustainability—and that no meaningful economic reform can be complete without fundamentally addressing the crisis of economic authorities.
Poverty Spirals Amid Mounting Debt
Official data from Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) indicates that the poverty rate in Egypt reached 29.7% in 2020—equivalent to approximately 30 million individuals, based on the population count at the time. The Egyptian government defines the national poverty line at 856 pounds ($17.12) per person per month, while the extreme poverty line is set at 550 pounds ($11) per month, for individuals who are unable to meet their most basic needs.
In contrast, World Bank estimates for 2024 suggest that nearly 60% of Egyptians are living below or near the poverty line, amounting to about 63 million people out of a population of 106 million. These estimates are based on the international poverty threshold of $2.15 per day, which equals approximately 107 pounds at the current exchange rate. This sharp increase in poverty is closely tied to the wave of inflation, which hit 35.7% in February 2024, eroding purchasing power and pushing more citizens into poverty. These estimates expose the growing gap between official narratives and the daily economic reality faced by Egyptians.
The significant discrepancy between official and international figures stems from differing definitions and measurement tools. While the government uses local indicators that include spending on food and education, the World Bank applies a standardized global benchmark focused on the minimum income needed to meet basic needs. Moreover, the most recent government household income and expenditure survey dates back to 2020, rendering it insufficient to capture the current socioeconomic landscape after years of successive crises.
While the Ministry of Social Solidarity estimates that there are 12 million poor families (roughly 48 to 60 million individuals), reports highlight Upper Egypt as the most severely affected region, with poverty rates exceeding 66% in some governorates, compared to less than 15% in urban areas like Port Said and Alexandria.
As poverty intensifies and debt accumulates, Egypt’s economic authorities face a deep financial crisis that threatens the state budget and overall economic stability. These entities are no longer able to fulfill their developmental role or generate fiscal returns for the state, while the government appears unable to offer viable solutions. Data from oversight bodies and parliament reveals the depth of structural dysfunction in governance and administration within these authorities, amid continued reliance on loans and public subsidies in the absence of genuine structural reforms.
Furthermore, the lack of strategic vision and the failure to clearly distinguish between service-oriented and economically-driven entities has created a hybrid model incapable of achieving sustainability—or even reducing losses. With the deficit widening and no serious accountability, there is now an urgent need for a comprehensive reassessment of the roles of these authorities, accompanied by transparent reform policies grounded in efficiency and accountability—before these entities evolve into a permanent burden that threatens the financial and developmental foundations of the state.
