Egypt’s cultural and artistic circles are witnessing a wave of anger and discontent following the Ministry of Culture’s decision to evacuate 120 rented premises of culture houses and libraries across several governorates and return them to their owners, while redistributing the staff working there. Many intellectuals have considered the decision a serious retreat from the support of public culture and a contributor to undermining the cultural justice guaranteed by the Egyptian Constitution.
Article (48) of the Constitution, as amended in 2019, states that “culture is a right for every citizen, guaranteed by the state, which is committed to supporting and making it accessible to all segments of society without discrimination.” Critics of the decision argue that the state’s withdrawal from supporting cultural spaces—especially in marginalized areas—opens the door to the spread of ignorance and intellectual isolation and weakens the enlightening role of cultural institutions.
The decision was issued by Major General Khaled El-Labban, Assistant Minister of Culture for the Presidency of the General Authority for Culture Palaces, tasking regional heads with taking legal steps to redistribute employees from the houses and libraries that are to be evacuated. The decision is based on the approval of the Authority’s Board of Directors in its session No. (324) held on March 5, 2025, and the session minutes ratified by the Minister of Culture on March 13, 2025. The decision set a final deadline for implementing the evacuation by no later than May 29, 2025.
The General Authority for Culture Palaces faces chronic challenges related to the limited budget allocated for cultural activities, which does not exceed 87 million EGP annually, in addition to a shortage of specialized personnel in cultural and artistic fields, and the lack of basic infrastructure in many of its facilities that would qualify them to receive the public. This was confirmed by Egypt’s Minister of Culture, Dr. Ahmed Fouad Hano, during his speech before the general session of the Senate in January of last year.
Despite these circumstances, data from the Ministry showed that the Authority succeeded in 2024 in implementing more than 90,000 cultural and artistic activities, benefiting around 4 million citizens across various governorates—reflecting the level of pressure this institution endures amid its limited resources.
According to officials at the Ministry of Culture, the number of cultural sites in Egypt currently stands at 619. With the implementation of the latest closure decisions, which include nearly 100 culture houses, the number will drop to around 500 sites only. This downward trend is confirmed by a report from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics issued in 2022, which indicated that the number of culture palaces and houses dropped from 594 sites in 2016 to only 347 by 2021, with 2017 marking the start of the sharp decline, when the number stood at just 336 sites.
The Value of Culture Cannot Be Measured in Money
A source at the Ministry of Culture—who preferred to remain anonymous—told Zawia3that the decision to close cultural sites will affect a large number of governorates, foremost among them Sohag, which has 19 cultural sites, including four palaces: Sohag Culture Palace, which has been non-operational for years due to restoration work; Tahta Palace; Al-Manshah Palace; and the newly established Akhmim Culture House. According to the latest ministerial decision, 15 sites in Sohag alone will be closed, including a mix of culture houses and libraries, most of which are rented.
In other governorates, the expected closures include 3 culture houses and 1 library in the Alexandria branch, 4 culture houses and 5 libraries in Beheira, 7 houses and 4 libraries in Gharbia, 11 houses and 4 libraries in Monufia, and 1 culture house in the Matrouh branch, according to the same source.
Poet Yousri Hassan believes that culture palaces represent one of the core pillars of Egypt’s cultural infrastructure, with roots tracing back to the establishment of the “People’s University” and the “Mass Culture Authority” during the era of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser, before becoming an independent authority. The current Authority includes around 600 culture palaces and houses that provide free services to citizens across various governorates, through literature clubs, theater, Arabic music, religious chanting, and events targeted at women and children. The workforce is estimated at around 15,000 employees, many of whom were appointed without sufficient training, yet the institution, according to Hassan, continues to play a positive role worthy of support.
Hassan believes there is a fundamental misunderstanding of the concept of “cultural investment” within the Ministry of Culture, as culture is treated as if it were a profit-generating sector, while its returns cannot be measured financially. Instead, they lie in deepening awareness, expanding public consciousness, and protecting youth from extremism and isolation. He adds that supporting culture is no less important than subsidizing bread or arming the military, warning that the closure decisions may pave the way for the privatization of the cultural palaces sector, which he considers a “red line.”
In a statement to Zawia3, he pointed out that the Ministry of Culture’s budget is approximately 1.8 billion EGP, with the majority allocated to staff salaries and a smaller portion designated for cultural activities. He added that the Ministry recently included the “People’s Cinema” project in its programming, a project aimed at generating commercial revenues estimated at around 6 million EGP annually. However, Hassan sees this model as “superficial” when compared to overall public spending on the sector, arguing that the Ministries of Culture and Education should not operate based on profitability logic.
The poet suggests that true cultural investment should be implemented through well-designed activities that preserve the essence of free public service, such as establishing training centers for handicrafts and music. He adds: “There appears to be an unspoken competition between ministries over which can generate more revenue for the state treasury—a logic that turns the citizen into a customer and the state into a merchant.” He stressed that amid the country’s challenges of poverty, ignorance, and disease, the priority must be to ensure access to education, health, and culture—freely and comprehensively.
The General Authority for Culture Palaces is considered one of the most prominent official cultural institutions in Egypt. It was founded in 1945 under the name “People’s University,” renamed in 1965 to “Mass Culture,” and later transformed into a public authority with special status by presidential decree in 1989. The Authority is tasked with elevating cultural standards and guiding national consciousness in fields such as arts, literature, music, children’s and women’s programming, theater, libraries, and more across Egypt’s governorates.
Culture in Danger
Writer and critic Dr. Ihab Badiwy expressed his concern about the current direction of the Ministry of Culture, considering that since the appointment of the current minister, the signs have indicated a clear negative shift. In a statement to Zawia3, he said that the minister has shown no serious interest in reforming administrative inefficiencies or listening to the concerns of intellectuals. Instead, he has left daily management to long-serving bureaucrats, choosing to honor them and participate in events and travel, without addressing the structural imbalances in the Ministry’s performance.
Badiwy added that the Ministry’s priorities should have focused on supporting cultural branches in the governorates and improving their infrastructure, rather than issuing decisions that eliminate cultural centers under the pretext of reducing burdens. He described this approach as a reduction of cultural activity to a few symbolic events in literature clubs and cultural centers, which already suffer from underfunding and lack of publicity. He stressed that it is real intellectuals who bear the burden through personal initiative.
He considered the closure of any cultural center, regardless of its size or activity level, a clear administrative failure that serves the interests of extremist forces seeking to dominate youth consciousness. He affirmed that “culture is in danger, and the future is heading toward complete darkness,” as he put it.
For his part, novelist Ibrahim Abdel Meguid told Zawia3 that the network of culture palaces and houses—which includes around 150 palaces in cities and nearly 300 houses in villages—has played a limited cultural role since the 1980s and 1990s, having faced multiple difficulties. Chief among them was a decline in public engagement under the pressure of a conservative discourse that promoted the prohibition of visual arts, music, and theater.
Abdel Meguid added that the Ministry of Culture is currently using the excuse of symbolic rents for leased centers to justify the closure decisions—at a time when it should have been thinking about productive alternatives. He suggested transforming culture houses into folk arts centers that include workshops for traditional clothing, crafts, and sculpture, offering training services to citizens for symbolic fees and selling the outputs to support financial independence. He also called for activating partnerships with private sector companies to sponsor and develop cultural events, instead of reducing the spaces available for cultural work.
Parliamentary Movements
The decision to close 120 cultural units—comprising libraries and culture houses—sparked a wave of discontent within Egypt’s House of Representatives, prompting several MPs to submit urgent inquiries to the government, warning of the implications of such a step for the country’s cultural landscape.
On May 13, MP Dr. Maha Abdel Nasser submitted an official inquiry to the Minister of Culture and the Speaker of Parliament, in which she criticized what she described as a “systematic plan” to close a large number of culture palaces and houses, calling it “a cultural catastrophe affecting one of the state’s most important tools for spreading enlightenment and combating ignorance and extremism.” She considered that the closures were being carried out either under the pretext of development, in the name of cost reduction, or under claims of low public interest—framing it as part of a broader trend of the state gradually withdrawing from its cultural role.
Abdel Nasser explained that more than 70 culture palaces, houses, and libraries are either completely closed or partially operating, despite large amounts previously spent on their construction and renovation with no tangible return. She also pointed out that more than 300 cultural establishments across the country offer no real services due to staff absenteeism, deteriorating infrastructure, lack of budgets, or absence of programming. She cited examples from various governorates, including Sohag, where 11 sites were found to be closed or operating without activity, such as Tahta Culture Palace—which has been closed for years for maintenance—and Al-Manshah Culture House, which she described as a “hollow shell.” In Qena, she reported the closure of Al-Waqf Culture House, the dysfunction of Al-Allaqat Library, and the shutdown of Abu Tisht Culture House. In Assiut, Dairout Culture House has been closed since 2020, and Al-Qusiya Culture Palace is nearly abandoned.
The MP revealed that reports issued by the General Authority for Culture Palaces show that more than 120 culture houses and libraries in rural areas operate without permanent managers and offer no real activities. Some are used as storage or left abandoned, and 60% of these institutions did not organize a single event during 2024. She added that most of the Authority’s budget is spent on salaries and allowances for administrative departments that do not follow up with fieldwork, noting that in governorates like Kafr El-Sheikh, Gharbia, and Monufia, culture houses have been transformed into silent administrative offices or left to decay due to the absence of maintenance.
Abdel Nasser criticized the lack of a clear government plan to reopen or rehabilitate closed sites, warning about statements by some officials suggesting that these institutions could be transformed into “cultural investment projects” in partnership with the private sector. She argued that this could lead, in her words, to the “privatization of culture,” turning it into a commodity available only to those who can afford it, rather than a public right for all citizens.
She warned that what is happening is a “clear withdrawal from the state’s role in shaping the Egyptian citizen”—starting with the demolition of libraries and turning culture houses into ruins, and ending with a generation that does not know books, theater, music, or free thought. She described this as “an abandonment of soft national security and a direct blow to Egypt’s cultural identity,” calling for the immediate cancellation of the closure decisions and the development of a comprehensive plan to update and expand cultural institutions. She also called for setting a timeline not exceeding six months to reopen all closed sites, and for boosting mobile cultural caravans and activities in underserved areas.
On the following day, May 14, MP Dr. Freddy El-Bayadi, a member of parliament and deputy head of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, submitted an urgent inquiry to the Prime Minister and Minister of Culture, in response to reports about plans to convert some culture houses and palaces into kindergartens in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Solidarity. El-Bayadi expressed his rejection of this direction, describing it as “tampering with the cultural role of the state.”
He explained that converting palaces into kindergartens does not represent development but rather an emptying of their cultural content at a time when Egypt needs to strengthen critical thinking and combat extremism through knowledge and art. He called on the government to halt any such actions and to announce a clear plan for developing culture palaces, as well as opening an urgent investigation into the reasons behind their deterioration, and holding those responsible for long-standing neglect accountable.
In an explanatory memorandum attached to her inquiry submitted to the House of Representatives—and obtained by Zawia3—MP Dr. Dohaa Assi affirmed that the closure of culture houses and libraries represents a serious regression from the state’s enlightening role and a direct weakening of the tools necessary for building collective awareness, especially in villages and marginalized areas.
Assi emphasized that culture is not a luxury but a constitutional right, as stated in Article (48) of the Egyptian Constitution, which obliges the state to provide culture to all citizens without discrimination. She pointed out that culture houses should not be regarded as loss-making institutions, but as spaces of resistance against ignorance and marginalization. Their symbolic and physical presence plays a major role in ensuring the minimum level of cultural services for citizens in remote areas, and supports community cohesion. She argued that evaluating these institutions based on economic profitability reveals a deep misunderstanding of culture as a public service whose impact cannot be measured in profits.
The MP stated that weak efficiency or low activity in some locations does not justify closure but instead requires the development of flexible and effective operational models. She noted that what is officially presented as “reorganization” appears, in reality, to be closer to “cultural contraction,” which leads to a reduction in the geographic reach of culture and undermines its symbolic and social presence, regardless of official intentions or rhetoric.
The memorandum addressed the official view that justifies closure decisions on the grounds of “economic unfeasibility” in some culture houses—based on visitor numbers or levels of community engagement—and described this logic as inapplicable to culture, just as hospitals or schools are not closed due to low attendance. Rather, the state works to improve their services. She emphasized that low engagement is not the institution’s fault, but rather a result of poor administrative vision, a lack of attractive programs, and inadequate promotion.
Regarding the structural condition of some culture houses, Assi stated that several are located in deteriorating or non-compliant buildings, which the Ministry uses as a justification for closure. She questioned: “Why aren’t budgets allocated for renovation?” especially since many of these houses are built on state-owned land or inside government buildings—making renovation more feasible than closure. She emphasized that the responsibility for the deterioration of these facilities lies not with the public, but with the state that neglected their maintenance for decades.
She also addressed the administrative aspect, criticizing what she described as the “chronic dysfunction in the employment structure.” She asserted that the solution is not to close institutions but to restructure employment, provide training and capacity-building programs, and implement strict performance evaluation and accountability mechanisms. She noted that closing the culture houses will not reduce the number of employees, as they are state employees who will simply be transferred to other departments that are already overstaffed—thus transferring the problem instead of solving it and maintaining the same financial burden on the budget. She warned that the closure decision will directly affect around 1,900 employees, many of whom will be asked to work far from their homes, imposing additional financial, psychological, and social burdens.
Regarding rented properties, the MP refuted the impact of the 2022 law on lease contracts for legal entities, which has been used as justification for increasing rents or handing back some sites. She confirmed that the law does not apply to all houses, as many are built on land allocated to the General Authority for Culture Palaces or are located in government buildings rented at symbolic prices.
She also criticized the Ministry’s proposals, such as “mobile cultural vans,” affirming that they are not real alternatives to stable cultural centers that provide sustainable community services. She described these solutions as temporary, impractical, unfair, and failing to meet the state’s obligation to ensure geographically equitable access to culture.
In conclusion, Assi told Zawia3: “The Ministry of Culture claimed that these houses don’t operate well and are therefore unnecessary. We had a heated discussion with the Minister about this during the budget review. I, along with several MPs, submitted inquiries on this file, but they have not yet been added to the parliamentary agenda for discussion.”
On May 17, the Parliament’s Committee on Media, Culture, and Antiquities held a meeting attended by Dr. Ahmed Fouad Hano, the Minister of Culture, along with senior ministry officials and Counselor Mahmoud Fawzy, the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs and Political Communication. During the session, the Minister of Culture confirmed that the decision to close 120 cultural units was based on a detailed review of the performance of those units, noting that some, like libraries of only 9 square meters, employed nearly 9 staff members while offering no effective cultural activity. He added that the Ministry currently manages 619 cultural units nationwide and that 500 of them are sufficient to meet the cultural needs of the governorates.
In contrast, many intellectuals and parliamentarians argue that the Ministry of Culture’s decision cannot be seen as merely an administrative measure aimed at rationalizing resources. Instead, it is viewed as part of a policy direction toward reducing the enlightening role of public cultural institutions. They assert that this trend signals a gradual transformation in the state’s cultural philosophy—from treating culture as a constitutional right guaranteed to all, to an elite privilege limited to those who can pay, amid growing signs of the privatization of cultural services.
Rather than developing these institutions and addressing their administrative and structural problems, the Ministry—according to critics—is moving toward closing them under the pretext of efficiency or budget constraints. This has consequences that extend beyond administrative concerns to affect the cultural fabric of society as a whole. Opponents argue that shrinking cultural spaces at a time of increasing social and intellectual challenges threatens the future of public awareness and undermines the state’s ability to promote openness, imagination, and creativity—values essential for protecting the present and shaping the future.
