In critical condition, Mostafa Hegazy, one of the victims of the gas pipeline explosion on the Wahat Road in 6th of October City, has been hospitalized at Ahl Masr Hospital for Burn Injuries for over a week. His wife, Mayar Hassan, told Zawia3 that neither the authorities nor the company responsible for the incident have shown any concern or provided support so far. Meanwhile, investigations are moving at an extremely slow pace, with no formal announcement of any trial or accountability for those responsible for an explosion that claimed six lives and injured at least 13 others.
The tragedy began on the morning of Thursday, May 2, when Wahat Road at kilometer 26 suddenly turned into a scene of fire, as a major underground gas pipeline exploded without warning while cars were passing normally. Flames erupted from beneath the ground, engulfing everything in their path in a shocking and horrific event.
A technical committee formed by the Engineers Syndicate concluded last Thursday that the main cause of the explosion was a contractor who broke the pipeline during excavation works and then backfilled the area without notifying the relevant authorities. This led to a large gas leak. The committee noted that the smell of gas lingered at the site for a considerable time without any official response, until the next day, when a fire broke out due to the saturation of the air with gas, high temperatures, and vehicular movement—resulting in significant human casualties.
The inspection also revealed a complete absence of warning signs or indicators marking the presence of a gas line in the work area. This was deemed a dangerously negligent act that posed a direct threat to the lives and property of citizens. The Engineers Syndicate confirmed that it is currently preparing a detailed technical report documenting all the violations observed. The report will be submitted to the relevant ministries and authorities, along with a demand to take the necessary legal and technical actions to hold those responsible accountable and ensure such disasters are never repeated.
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What Happened?
According to eyewitnesses and the families of the victims who spoke to Zawia3, flames erupted from the ground at incredible speed, rising several meters into the air. The explosion caused several vehicles to catch fire and trapped passengers inside, with some managing to escape only after sustaining injuries. Panic quickly spread among residents and bystanders.
Mayar Hassan, the wife of victim Mostafa Hegazy, told Zawia3:”My husband works in sales, so his job requires him to regularly visit the market to follow up on product distribution. On the day of the incident, he visited the factory in 6th of October City. After finishing, he and his colleagues went to the market before heading back to New Cairo. On their return, while driving along Wahat Road, they suddenly saw cars coming toward them from the opposite direction. To avoid driving back on the same road, they moved forward and changed direction.”
She added: “Suddenly, all cars came to a stop, and a strong smell of gas filled the air. Fearing an imminent fire, Mostafa and his colleagues tried to get out of the car and leave the area. But the fire broke out abruptly, injuring several of them. A colleague drove them to the nearest hospital, Dar Al Fouad, and then my husband and other injured individuals were transferred to Ahl Masr Hospital, which specializes in burn treatment. This was made possible thanks to direct contact with Mrs. Heba El-Sewedy, chairwoman of the hospital, who took full responsibility for their transport, treatment, and accommodation—without any support or involvement from official entities. To this day, no government body has reached out to us, and my husband remains in critical condition.”
Mayar also emphasized that the investigation is proceeding at an extremely slow pace, to the point of negligence, despite the week that has passed since the tragedy. She said the family made intensive efforts to push for an investigation, which resulted in the public prosecution visiting the hospital to take testimonies from injured witnesses. However, the family has no information about the status of the investigation, and no official entity has publicly named those responsible.
“No government official has contacted us or offered any assistance since the explosion,” she said. “Even when the explosion was reported in the news, there was no mention of the exact number of victims at Ahl Masr Hospital. We’ve had to take the initiative ourselves, contacting the prosecution to demand an investigation, but we’ve received no governmental support whatsoever.”
For its part, NatGas, the company responsible for managing the gas line in the area, issued a statement hours after the explosion. It confirmed that the primary cause of the incident was a prior rupture in the gas pipeline, which occurred during excavation and backfilling works conducted as part of a road development project by a contracting company. The company said the area had been backfilled without notifying or coordinating with NatGas, which resulted in an underground gas leak.
The statement further explained that the rupture was carried out without following the required technical procedures, which led to pressure building up inside the pipeline—eventually causing it to explode days later. Initial investigations by the Public Prosecution revealed that the local contracting company, named El-Meligy Contracting, had been carrying out the roadwork in the area. The company had ruptured the pipeline without notifying NatGas or the relevant authorities, and then covered up the site to conceal the damage, in blatant violation of public safety regulations.
El-Meligy Contracting and the 6th of October Authority
El-Meligy Contracting is the main party accused of causing the gas pipeline explosion on Wahat Road, according to the initial findings of the Public Prosecution, and official statements issued by both the Engineers Syndicate and NatGas, which confirmed that the rupture occurred during excavation and backfilling works carried out by the company at kilometer 26, without notifying the owner of the gas line.
Notably, the company has no clear institutional presence or official website detailing its operations or contract portfolio. Additionally, no records were found indicating that it is accredited by either the Armed Forces Engineering Authority or the General Authority for Roads and Bridges, despite having participated in projects supervised by the Engineering Authority—such as the Omar Suleiman Axis Bridge in New Cairo, according to an employee of the company who spoke to us on condition of anonymity.
According to a comprehensive report of administrative tenders for the fiscal year 2021–2022 issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, a copy of which was obtained by Zawia3, the New October City Authority awarded three limited tenders to El-Meligy Contracting totaling over 100 million pounds ($2 million). These included the second phase of road construction, Wahat Road development, and asphalt and surface patching works at Gate 104 of Nilesat, all contracted in October 2021 via limited tender procedures.
In Egypt, a limited tender is one of the procurement methods used in government contracts under Law No. 182 of 2018 regulating public procurement (the modern replacement of the old tenders and auctions law). Under this system, a limited number of contractors or suppliers—either registered with the administrative authority or known for their competence—are invited to carry out specific works, without a public announcement in newspapers or the official government portal. This contrasts with public tenders, which offer greater transparency.
The law does not allow arbitrary use of limited tenders. It requires clear and justified grounds, such as the specialized nature of the work that only select companies can perform, the need to complete a project within a tight timeframe not compatible with public tendering procedures, or to protect sensitive security or economic data. The procedure also requires approval from the competent authority (such as a minister, governor, or head of authority), with reasons documented in an official memorandum issued by a technical committee.
Despite these legal safeguards, a civil engineering expert and former official at a public authority told Zawia3 that in practice, limited tenders often rely on recommendations from certain individuals or entities. He explained that the companies are typically preselected, meaning the process functions almost like direct assignment. He added that each city tends to have a handful of “regular” companies, and projects are usually divided among them.
Regarding the Wahat incident, the same source stated that El-Meligy Contracting failed to follow any safety protocols. The company was supposed to fully coordinate with the City Authority, which in turn would coordinate with utility companies (electricity, water, gas) and provide detailed maps to engineers before work began. He admitted not knowing whether coordination occurred in this case or if the Authority was ever notified. Regardless, he emphasized that all responsible parties—including City Authority officials—are accountable, as the excavation took place on a public road owned by the state, and work should have been halted immediately if coordination was lacking.
To date, no official body has publicly named the company involved in the incident. Although it has been officially confirmed that the company’s executive director was arrested, based on a technical report from the Engineers Syndicate assigning full responsibility to the contractor, there is still significant opacity surrounding the company and its relationship with the 6th of October City Authority. Moreover, the accused engineer has not been named, and families of the victims insist that the person arrested was merely a loader operator, not the executive director responsible for the project.
Zawia3 obtained a copy of the official report issued by the General Administration for Crisis and Disaster Management and Risk Reduction at the Giza Governorate, which reads:“At 6:45 PM on Wednesday, April 30, 2025, gas emergency services reported a gas pipeline rupture at: Wahat Road, heading from the Wahat area toward the entrance of the 6th of October City Authority, near the Wataniya gas station. The rupture occurred in a 125 mm pipeline with a pressure of 7 bar, resulting from unauthorized excavation by El-Meligy Contracting, causing the ignition of 10 cars and 1 minibus. The fire was extinguished, the gas valve was shut off, and a damage assessment and formal notification process are ongoing. The incident resulted in 13 injuries (8 admitted to Zayed Specialized Hospital, 2 to October Central Hospital) and 3 fatalities, with further follow-up underway. The matter has been referred to the prosecution.”
Zawia3 attempted to contact several officials within the 6th of October City Authority, but they declined to comment on any details related to the incident or the company. However, a source inside NatGas confirmed to us that the company received no prior coordination request from the contracting firm responsible for the explosion. The source added that NatGas received multiple reports from residents in recent days about a strong gas smell at the incident site. Upon reinspection, no further pipeline breaks were found.
This account aligns with eyewitness testimonies from residents of Horus Compound, Sakan Misr, and West Sumed, who told Zawia3 they had noticed a strong gas odor in the days leading up to the explosion—and had in fact reported it to the relevant gas company.
Complete Absence of Safety Measures
Hesham Ali, a consulting engineer in safety systems and a member of the Higher Council of the Engineers Syndicate, told Zawia3 that the explosion was a direct result of poor coordination and a failure to follow legal safety and construction procedures.
He confirmed: “The executing company did not comply with the requirement to obtain the necessary excavation permits, whether from the city authority or the district, which constitutes a clear breach of regulatory procedures and the established protocols for implementing infrastructure projects.”
He added:“Before starting any excavation, construction, or demolition work, the company is legally obligated to submit an official request for a permit from the relevant administrative body. That authority then refers to the Information Center, which is responsible for the infrastructure map of the area—including the exact locations of gas, water, electricity, and sewage lines—to prevent any conflict or damage to existing networks.”
He pointed out that the violations didn’t stop there, but also included failing to notify the Occupational Safety and Health Office, as required by Labor Law No. 12 of 2003, amended by Law No. 14 of 2025. This law obligates contractors to inform the office with full details of the operation—including the type of work, its duration, and the number of workers—in order to secure the site legally and effectively.
The safety expert emphasized:“All relevant parties share responsibility—starting with the executing company, passing through the asset owner, and ending with the oversight bodies that failed to enforce or follow up on procedures.”
Regarding safety systems in new cities, Ali stated that the absence of accurate underground infrastructure maps is one of the primary reasons such disasters recur.
“The Information Center is supposed to maintain detailed maps of underground infrastructure, including pipeline routes, depth, safety distances, and plastic warning tapes above every line. None of these elements were observed at this site,” he said.
Ali emphasized that these maps are not only essential for protecting infrastructure, but also for ensuring the safety of workers and nearby residents. He stressed the need to implement modern underground utility detection technologies before any excavation begins.
On the details of the incident, Hesham Ali explained:“The first explosion was caused by a loader hitting the gas pipeline, leading to a major leak. The valves were indeed shut off that day. However, the alarming part is that a second fire broke out at the same location the following day, which suggests that *repairs were conducted without fully verifying the welds and ensuring there was no leakage.”
He added:“Proper procedures require that after repairs, a comprehensive technical test be carried out on the weld using radiographic detection techniques to confirm there are no leaks before reopening the valves and resuming gas flow. Clearly, this was not done adequately, leading to another leak and a second fire that caused severe human and material losses.”
He stressed:“Gas is lighter than air and should have dissipated in open air. However, it seems the gas concentration and density were miscalculated, leading to a sudden ignition the moment a spark source was present.”
He called for the establishment of a unified national registry for underground infrastructure, requiring all operating companies to submit accurate and regularly updated maps, as well as the activation of occupational safety and health offices—making it illegal to carry out any excavation without first meeting comprehensive safety standards and preventive measures.
What About the Victims’ Rights?
Yasser Saad, a lawyer specializing in economic and social rights, told Zawia3 that the victims of the explosion must be recognized as martyrs in the line of duty, and their families are entitled to full compensation under the law establishing the National Council for the Care of Martyrs’ and Injured Families, similar to the compensation provided to the families of armed forces and police martyrs.
He added: “There is an official authority in Egypt known as the ‘National Gas Transmission Network,’ which is responsible for transporting gas to homes, factories, and all areas requiring gas supplies. By law, this authority, in solidarity with the contractor executing any affiliated project, bears full responsibility for any error or damage resulting from the execution of the works—whether due to negligence, carelessness, or failure to coordinate properly.”
Saad explained that Egyptian courts have ruled in similar past cases, obligating both the executing company and the supervising authority—i.e., the national network—to pay financial compensation to those affected, whether for human loss or material damage.
In the case of the Wahat explosion, Saad said that the contracting company is the party that caused the harm, according to initial investigations. Therefore, it bears full legal responsibility for the incident, including criminal prosecution and compensation obligations.
He also emphasized that local and executive authorities must be held accountable for their failure to ensure safety standards during excavation and repair operations.
One dimension of the crisis, he noted, lies in the nature of state contracting procedures, which often award projects to specific companies through direct assignment, without evaluating the quality of implementation or the company’s experience. Instead, contracts are often granted based on networks of interests and influence within government agencies.
Finally, the contract documents and official investigations reveal that El-Meligy Contracting, the main party implicated in the catastrophic Wahat explosion, received multiple projects worth millions of pounds from the 6th of October City Authority in recent years through limited tenders—raising serious concerns about transparency and oversight.
While the victims’ families await justice, the case raises alarming questions about how public contracts are awarded, and whether companies that disregard safety regulations and cause loss of life are ever held accountable.
Continuing to grant public contracts to companies implicated in such disasters, without review or oversight, is not only a grave disregard for human life, but also a recipe for future tragedies—unless there is real accountability and strict legal consequences for all parties involved.
