Since Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi came to power in 2014, he announced on December 9 of the same year the launch of a comprehensive national anti-corruption strategy. The announcement coincided with International Anti-Corruption Day and was made during an official ceremony held at the headquarters of the Administrative Control Authority. The strategy was introduced as a means to implement Article (218) of the Egyptian Constitution, which obligates the state to combat corruption. The article explicitly calls for coordination among the relevant oversight bodies to promote integrity and transparency, ensure the proper performance of public duties, safeguard public funds, and develop and monitor the implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy in cooperation with other concerned entities, as outlined by law.
The national anti-corruption strategy is built around three central pillars: the first is enacting laws and legislative regulations that support anti-corruption efforts; the second is strengthening the capabilities of oversight and judicial bodies and enabling them to efficiently enforce the strategy; and the third is political will, considered the driving force behind the first two pillars and a fundamental condition for the success of any anti-corruption initiative. The current phase in Egypt has been characterized by a visible presence of such political will at the highest levels of leadership, reflected in a declared commitment not to shield any corruption or corrupt individuals, regardless of their positions or status. This has contributed to creating a favorable climate for anti-corruption efforts.
Following the launch of this strategy, the National Academy for Anti-Corruption was established in 2017 under the supervision of the Administrative Control Authority. The academy is a specialized institution tasked with organizing annual training courses based on approved programs and plans for members of the authority. It also holds conferences, seminars, and discussion forums aimed at promoting a culture of integrity and transparency and increasing public awareness of the risks of corruption and the methods to combat it.
Don’t miss: How Did Corruption Infiltrate the Grand Egyptian Museum?
A Decline in Corruption Index After a Decade of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy
Ten years after the launch of Egypt’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy and seven years after the establishment of the National Academy specialized in this field, Egypt ranked 130th out of 180 countries in the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) issued by Transparency International. The index monitors the extent of corruption and lack of transparency worldwide.
This ranking marks a significant decline compared to 2023, when Egypt was ranked 108th. It brings the country back to the same position it held in 2022. In the current index, Egypt scored 30 out of 100 points—a clear drop from last year’s score of 35 points.
The Corruption Perceptions Index is based on a range of reports issued by leading international institutions and financial bodies, such as the World Bank and the World Economic Forum. These reports assess risks and challenges related to corruption across different countries. The index monitors specific phenomena including: bribery, diversion of public funds for private purposes, abuse of public office without accountability, weak government capacity to combat corruption, excessive bureaucracy, favoritism and nepotism in public sector appointments, lack of laws requiring officials to disclose assets and conflicts of interest, poor protection for whistleblowers, state capture by narrow interest groups, and the absence of access to public information. On the other hand, the index does not cover other issues such as citizens’ personal experiences with corruption, tax evasion, illicit financial flows, money laundering, private sector corruption, and informal markets.
In this context, economist and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, Zohdy El-Shamy, argues that despite Egypt having introduced a national strategy and established an academy to combat corruption, a network of laws and practices continues to legitimize the absence of transparency and foster an environment conducive to corruption. In a statement to Zawia3, he explained that this environment was formally institutionalized with the issuance of the Law Shielding Government Contracts under interim President Adly Mansour. The law granted legal immunity to government contracts from judicial review, allowing the execution of agreements that harmed public funds—such as in the case of the Omar Effendi Group.
El-Shamy noted that this law stripped citizens and the public from the right to challenge suspicious government contracts in court. Previously, contracts were subject to judicial annulment, as seen in high-profile privatization cases such as Tanta Flax and Omar Effendi. Although legal attempts were made to challenge the constitutionality of the law, they yielded no positive outcomes.
El-Shamy further points to the Public Procurement and Tenders Law, which granted the government broad authority to bypass public tendering and resort to direct contracting in most government dealings. This, he argues, results in the loss of millions of pounds and severely undermines oversight over public finances. He added that the Egyptian Sovereign Wealth Fund, chaired by the President of the Republic, manages trillions of pounds worth of state assets in complete absence of transparency and oversight. He described it as a “black box”—a backdoor for unchecked privatization, with no real accountability, thereby increasing risks and opening wide avenues for corruption.
El-Shamy concluded by affirming that such legislative and executive practices have led to a widespread squandering of public resources—whether through inflated costs of government projects that yield no real returns, or through privatization deals carried out at prices far below market value. This, he argued, has contributed to mounting debt and left Egypt increasingly dependent on the conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund.
A Fertile Environment for Corruption
On January 14, 2023—nine years after the initial challenge to the Government Contracts Immunity Law—the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled the law constitutional. This 2014 law restricts the right to challenge government contracts exclusively to the contracting parties and direct stakeholders, effectively barring judicial appeals against prior privatization agreements and similar deals.
The law, issued by former interim President Adly Mansour, was criticized by the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, which described it as legislation that strips citizens and workers of their right to expose corruption in government contracts—now legally shielded from scrutiny.
The Center’s report stressed that public funds and national wealth are the rightful property of the people, who therefore have a legitimate right to oversee and safeguard them. However, the government chose to seize that right from both citizens and the judiciary—especially the administrative courts, which had previously issued several landmark rulings invalidating corrupt contracts and reinstated public ownership of numerous entities and companies privatized under suspicious circumstances.
Akram Ismail, a member of the Central Committee of the under-formation Bread and Freedom Party, believes that the core issue in Egypt lies in the very structure of the system, which fosters a fertile ground for corruption. He attributes this to the state’s excessive interference in nearly every sector in an irrational manner. The authorities hold vast and unchecked powers, which opens the door to corruption, while government agencies possess sweeping authority. At the same time, Egypt’s administrative apparatus suffers from inefficiency and low wages—conditions that increase opportunities for corruption.
In an interview with Zawia3, Ismail explained that most economic dealings in Egypt contain some level of corruption due to the absence of a transparent governance system capable of preventing it. He stressed that corruption has become a way of doing business, enabled by the broad powers granted to state institutions and the lack of sound mechanisms to ensure integrity. Moreover, the multiplicity of powers held by state officials—from police officers to district engineers to bureaucrats—makes it easier for them to exploit their positions for personal gain. This network of influence also extends to major businesses and large corporations.
“Yes, corruption exists everywhere, even in developed countries,” Ismail notes, “but the difference is that some states actively build systems to counter it. In Egypt, corruption has become institutionalized and reaffirmed through a series of entrenched practices.”
According to Ismail, the military’s expanding involvement in the economy and its growing investments have given rise to a powerful entity within the state, with enormous influence and financial reserves. He also criticized the flawed procurement law, which raises serious concerns about the transparency of economic operations. This is compounded by the absence of a functioning parliament capable of reviewing and evaluating such projects, and the lack of elected local councils that could regulate conditions on the ground. All of these factors, combined with a severe lack of democracy and a concentration of power, contribute to an environment ripe for corruption.
Ismail added that Egypt’s oversight agencies have witnessed a clear decline in their effectiveness. Their role is typically reactive—appearing only when the state decides to target a particular corruption hotspot—and rarely operates independently. Their strength lies in their judicial nature, rather than in representing segments of society with direct interests, such as elected local councils, parliament, or labor unions. These democratic institutions, he argues, are key to ensuring genuine, citizen-driven oversight, since they empower people to elect independent monitors.
From an economic perspective, Ismail stated that corruption contributes to the rise of monopolistic structures, where only the powerful and well-connected are able to amass wealth. This, in turn, worsens the conditions of the middle and lower classes, who already face harsh living standards. He noted that small enterprises struggle daily to survive, while a significant portion of economic activity has shifted into the informal sector to avoid burdensome costs. The expansion of the informal economy is directly tied to systemic corruption and has tangible impacts on economic growth and social stability—creating a complex economic situation with dire social consequences.
Corruption with Historical Roots
On February 8, 2007, the Official Gazette (Issue No. 6) published the presidential decree issued by then-President Hosni Mubarak declaring Egypt’s accession to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, signed on December 9, 2003. Egypt was among the first countries to ratify the convention.
Commenting on this, MP Maha Abdel Nasser, representing the Egyptian Social Democratic Party in the House of Representatives, stated that Egypt’s decline in the Corruption Perceptions Index has a negative impact on the country. Any investor, whether in industry or commerce, considers this index a key factor when deciding whether to invest in Egypt.
In a statement to Zawia3, Abdel Nasser noted that the real problem in Egypt lies in the deeply entrenched nature of corruption, which dates back to previous regimes. Citizens have come to perceive corruption as the norm rather than the exception. The latest indicators reflecting Egypt’s decline in anti-corruption efforts point to a lack of genuine intent to confront the issue. What is being said about fighting corruption, she added, remains nothing more than slogans, lacking real solutions. Although some recent cases have led to the dismissal of certain officials, the absence of public disclosure about these cases prevents citizens and investors from feeling that accountability is being applied to everyone equally.
Regarding the role of parliament, Abdel Nasser believes that if the legislative body included a stronger opposition, there would be clearer demands for tackling corruption and more effective oversight. She added that the issue is more about practice than legislation. Legally, any actions outside the legislative framework are already criminalized. The bigger issue lies in outdated practices and the heavy reliance on direct contracting—a longstanding legal mechanism that opens the door to corruption. While this method may solve issues related to bureaucracy and administrative delays, it remains fraught with corruption risks. “I wouldn’t say that parliament has entirely failed in its oversight role,” she added, “but all we can do is submit briefing requests and interpellations.”
When asked about the fate of the briefing requests she submitted, along with MP Freddy El-Bayadi, regarding Egypt’s drop in the corruption index, Abdel Nasser confirmed that these requests have not been discussed or reviewed.
As for the role of oversight bodies, the MP from the Egyptian Social Democratic Party acknowledged that they are doing their job but stressed the need for their role to go beyond issuing reports. There must be real accountability and serious investigations into corruption cases. Anyone suspected of involvement should be thoroughly investigated to ensure effective and transparent accountability.
Previously, MP Maha Abdel Nasser had submitted a formal briefing request addressed to both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Planning and Economic Development regarding Egypt’s decline in Transparency International’s global anti-corruption ranking.
In her request, she praised the launch of the first phase of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2014–2018) and the second phase (2019–2022). However, in light of the recent decline reported by Transparency International, she stressed the need to question the government about the causes of this regression and to demand a detailed report on the achievements and outcomes of both phases of the strategy.
She concluded by calling for immediate investigations by all oversight agencies to determine what the government is actually doing to genuinely combat corruption, achieve the strategy’s objectives, and understand the challenges and obstacles that continue to hinder progress.
The Absence of Social Justice
In a previous interview with Zawia3, Egyptian MP Freddy El-Bayadi, representing the Egyptian Social Democratic Party in the House of Representatives, emphasized that Egypt’s drop to the 130th position out of 180 countries—after previously ranking 100th—places the country at one of the lowest levels in global anti-corruption efforts. He described it as the most significant decline in 13 years since Egypt joined Transparency International in 2012.
“At that time,” he noted, “our score was 32, which rose to 37 in 2014, but we have now fallen back to 30 in the latest index released last month.” El-Bayadi warned that this regression raises many questions and sounds a serious alarm.
He added in his interview with Zawia3 that corruption is like cancer eating away at the body of the nation, and if we fail to eradicate it, it may consume us all in the near future. Immediate action is necessary, he stressed, because corruption affects numerous sectors, including the country’s reputation, foreign investment, investor confidence, and the economy at large. It also undermines citizens’ trust in their government, prompting some to evade taxes as they perceive a lack of transparency and believe their money will not be spent properly.
He explained that the corruption index also reflects a lack of social justice, as some individuals in the public sector receive enormous salaries while others do not even earn the minimum wage. There is also an ongoing crisis in hiring teachers under the pretext of financial constraints. Moreover, the index points to corruption within the government’s own policies. He emphasized the seriousness of the issue and the need to activate the role of oversight bodies such as the Central Auditing Organization, the Administrative Control Authority, and the Tax Evasion Control Agency. Although these agencies operate effectively, their reports are often disregarded and not utilized.
It is worth noting that on March 28, 2016, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi issued a decree dismissing Judge Hisham Geneina from his position as head of the Central Auditing Organization. The decision was based on Law No. 89 of 2015, which grants the President the authority to remove heads and members of independent bodies and oversight agencies under specific circumstances. The dismissal sparked legal and constitutional debates, as well as questions about the seriousness of Egypt’s anti-corruption efforts.
In December 2015, Judge Geneina announced that the Central Auditing Organization had conducted a study entitled “An Analysis of Corruption Costs in Selected Sectors in Egypt”, estimating that corruption between 2012 and 2015 had exceeded 600 billion Egyptian pounds. His statements provoked outrage within state institutions. In response, the presidency ordered the formation of a fact-finding committee to investigate his claims. In January 2016, the committee issued a report accusing Geneina of “exaggeration and distortion” regarding the extent and value of corruption. It declared the report lacked credibility, claiming it included incidents dating back more than a decade. The committee also criticized the report for “deliberately” ignoring decisions that had already been made in response to previous audit observations and for omitting the referral of some cases to the Public Prosecution and Administrative Prosecution. It accused the report of misrepresenting data and policies in a way that portrayed positive actions negatively.
Following the committee’s findings, the Supreme State Security Prosecution launched an investigation into complaints accusing Geneina of intentionally spreading information that could harm the national economy. A media gag order was issued for the case. On the same day he was dismissed, Geneina was summoned by the prosecution for questioning.
In August 2020, the New Cairo Misdemeanor Court accepted Hisham Geneina’s appeal in form against the case related to his controversial public statements, but rejected it on substance. The court upheld a previous sentence of one year in prison and a fine of 20,000 pounds ($400), with a three-year suspension of the sentence. The ruling was issued under Article 102 bis of the Penal Code, which allows the judge to impose a prison sentence of up to five years and a fine ranging between 50 and 200 pounds for publishing false news.
The Central Auditing Organization (CAO) is an independent body tasked with overseeing public funds, public legal entities, and other entities specified by law. It also monitors the implementation of the state’s general budget and independent budgets, and audits their final accounts.
