On April 27, Egypt’s Public Prosecutor announced the referral of 273 money laundering cases to economic criminal courts within a single year—a stark indicator of the widespread nature of this crime in the country. Behind this large figure lie deeper questions about the effectiveness of the state’s oversight bodies and their capacity to detect or prosecute such crimes. The announcement also reflects accumulated institutional failures that have allowed money laundering networks to embed themselves within the Egyptian economy. Although Egypt is a signatory to international conventions against money laundering and terrorism financing, and has a specialized unit within the Central Bank dedicated to this purpose, the persistent rise in the number of cases raises pressing concerns.
The statement noted that the total sums involved in these cases over one year amounted to: 7,748,472,866 pounds ($154,969,457) (seven billion, seven hundred forty-eight million, four hundred seventy-two thousand, eight hundred sixty-six pounds), $319,313,495 (three hundred nineteen million, three hundred thirteen thousand, four hundred ninety-five U.S. dollars), €4,059,455 (four million, fifty-nine thousand, four hundred fifty-five euros), and £552,930 (five hundred fifty-two thousand, nine hundred thirty British pounds).
Although the announcement was published as evidence of the state’s effectiveness in combating such crimes, it sparked controversy—not only due to the size of the figures but also because it lacked any details about the nature of the cases or their outcomes. Analytical readings of the figures point to an unprecedented expansion of the phenomenon and reveal deep institutional and structural gaps that have enabled illicit funds to penetrate the financial system, according to observers who spoke to Zawia3.
Most troubling, according to experts, is the absence of answers to fundamental questions regarding the percentage of these cases relative to total reports received, the number of reports dismissed, the nature of the verdicts issued, and, most importantly, the unknown volume of undisclosed cases—which raises many questions. This lack of transparency undermines the credibility of the official numbers and turns what could have been a marker of progress into a warning signal revealing the depth of the crisis.
Despite more than two decades since the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit within the Central Bank of Egypt in 2002, the unit does not publish detailed annual reports disclosing the number of reports, investigation outcomes, or the effectiveness of cooperation with the Public Prosecutor’s Office—as is evident on its official website. This reflects a weak institutional foundation for transparency at a time when Egypt’s economic climate demands clear reassurance for both local and foreign investors.
International and local reports estimate Egypt’s informal economy at between 30% to 40% of the GDP, making it a fertile ground for money laundering activities, especially amid weak oversight and the difficulty of financial tracking. Data from the Anti-Money Laundering Unit shows a significant rise in suspicious financial activity reports in recent years. Yet official entities have not disclosed the total volume of laundered money or the number of judicial rulings issued, reflecting broader challenges in transparency and oversight. Regional reports—such as those from the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)—indicate that Egypt faces medium to high risks in the area of money laundering, particularly due to the existence of financial channels that lack sufficient regulation, including informal money transfer activities and undocumented business relationships.
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ho Launders Money in Egypt?
The details of ongoing investigations reveal a striking diversity in the sources of illicit funds, underscoring the widespread and deeply embedded nature of money laundering in Egypt. This crime is primarily linked to specific sectors, including informal currency trading, real estate investment, gold trading, and the creation of shell companies or NGOs used as fronts to funnel funds into the formal financial system.
In addition, the expansion of the informal economy, estimated to represent around 40% of Egypt’s GDP, creates fertile ground for money laundering activities. These sectors lack sufficient oversight and allow funds to circulate with minimal traceability. Observers note that some laundering networks exploit loopholes in the banking system, including weak enforcement of Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations in some financial institutions.
In numerous cases, individuals with economic or political influence are suspected of involvement in laundering operations—whether through construction firms or large commercial ventures used to clean money from illicit sources. Yet due to a lack of transparency in investigations and limited public information about those involved, the true scope of these networks remains unclear. Some cases suggest possible involvement of foreign entities or cross-border smuggling operations, but such cases often remain stuck in court or end in undisclosed settlements, amid media silence and a lack of parliamentary or public accountability.
Despite the absence of detailed annual statistics, available data reveals a clear increase in money laundering cases over the past five years. Several cases publicized by security authorities point to the emergence of complex networks involving government employees and commercial entities, reflecting the severity of the issue and its penetration into multiple sectors.
In 2020, Egypt’s Ministry of Interior reported the seizure of 1.3 billion pounds ($26,000,000) in connection with eight cases involving money laundering, bribery, and illicit enrichment. That same year, security efforts also led to the detection of over 1,600 cases of tax evasion and public funds theft. In February 2020, one of the largest laundering cases occurred when 17 people, including postal authority employees, were arrested for creating fake accounts used to transfer around 1.69 billion pounds ($33,800,000). Investigations revealed that the money was used to finance illegal migration, currency trading, and drug trafficking.
Tasneem Ammar, a master’s researcher in governance and anti-corruption and Deputy Director of Projects at the World Organization for Al-Azhar Graduates, told Zawia3 that money laundering is one of the most critical threats facing the Egyptian economy over the past decade. According to her, these crimes have risen significantly since 2020.
One of the key reasons behind this increase, Tasneem explained, is the technological advancement that facilitates cross-border money transfers, alongside intense competition among illicit actors to exploit gaps in financial systems.
Reports from the Central Bank of Egypt indicate that weak regulatory systems and poor law enforcement have fostered a fertile environment for such illegal activities. Moreover, lack of coordination among oversight agencies and low awareness of money laundering risks have worsened the situation.
Tasneem explained, “In some cases, temporary banking channels and advanced encryption technologies were used to conceal identities and suspicious transactions. The Anti-Money Laundering Unit has documented real-world cases involving sophisticated international networks aiming to move criminally obtained funds.”
She added, “Money laundering crimes have had a major impact on the national economy, causing massive financial losses estimated in the billions of pounds between 2020 and the present. Statistical studies show that these losses have reached around 3% of GDP in some years, negatively affecting foreign and local investment and resulting in capital flight. These activities also undermine trust in the financial system and obstruct oversight and transparency efforts.”
Furthermore, according to Tasneem, money laundering contributes to the spread of corruption and the erosion of the legal system, as some money launderers exploit lax oversight to expand their illicit operations. While oversight authorities have taken some steps, poor inter-agency coordination continues to hinder access to accurate data, preventing an immediate and effective response to this phenomenon.
Tasneem continued: “To overcome the problem of money laundering, practical solutions are needed—particularly those that strengthen legal and regulatory frameworks. Reports by the Central Bank and the Anti-Money Laundering Unit stress the importance of enhancing cooperation between relevant bodies both domestically and internationally to exchange information and track suspicious financial activities.”
She added, “Effective solutions include upgrading the digital infrastructure of financial systems, developing modern encryption protocols, and imposing strict penalties on violators. Raising awareness among users and financial institutions is also essential—awareness programs and training are key components of any effort to combat this threat.”
She concluded: “Some government and private sector initiatives have achieved notable success. Statistics show a 15% drop in laundering-related crimes since the implementation of new measures. As part of its oversight role, the Financial Regulatory Authority, alongside the Anti-Money Laundering Unit, continues to activate permanent monitoring mechanisms and update laws to align with global developments—facilitating the early identification and reporting of suspicious transactions.”
Lack of Transparency and Ineffective Deterrence
Zohdy El-Shamy, an economist and leading member of the Popular Socialist Alliance Party, told Zawia3 that the rapid and unexpected developments in Egypt’s economic landscape reflect a lack of transparency and a lack of clarity and stability in public administration. He said, “We are constantly surprised by news of major companies suddenly shutting down branches—most recently a well-known food chain that closed over 130 branches at once, amid conflicting reports of food safety violations and leaked suspicions of money laundering. Yet the state has not clearly announced the facts or the outcome of any investigations.”
El-Shamy added that the swift resolution of the matter, despite the gravity of the circulating accusations, raises suspicion: “If these were merely health violations, does it make sense to shut down all those branches so abruptly? And if there was suspicion of money laundering, how was it settled within two weeks without trial? This reflects a broader state of opacity that now dominates Egypt’s economic climate.” He continued, “We are living in an environment of extreme ambiguity, where the absence of regulatory oversight intersects with the interference of powerful entities in various economic sectors—creating fertile ground for conflicts of interest and unchecked corruption.”
The economist emphasized that the government bears much of the responsibility, stating: “For years, government policy has relied on hot money, whether through the stock market or debt instruments, to cover the foreign currency deficit. Despite promises not to repeat this strategy after the 2021 crisis, the approach continues—deepening the fragility of the national economy.”
On the weakness of oversight bodies, El-Shamy said: “It is unfortunate that security agencies show strong performance in expression and opinion cases, while appearing completely ineffective in fraud and money laundering crimes. I personally fell victim to an online fraud attempt, and I know dozens of similar cases. Despite submitting all relevant data—account numbers, names, and phone numbers—no one was held accountable.” He emphasized the regulatory and legal fragility that encourages manipulation: “It’s inexplicable that all this fraud happens without the state being able to track down those responsible, despite clear evidence. The real solution lies in changing the state’s mode of governance entirely, because the current system has clearly failed to protect citizens and the economy alike.”
Regarding sectors that show suspicious inflation, El-Shamy said: “Real estate remains one of the most commonly used fronts for money laundering. But there are also companies and projects launched across different regions that do not align with actual market demand or economic activity, and some are owned by foreign entities.” He stressed that what is happening “requires explanation and scrutiny by the responsible authorities,” warning that continued ambiguity and official indifference will only deepen disruption in the market and society.
From his side, Karim El-Omda, professor of political economy, told Zawia3 that money laundering is not exclusive to Egypt but a global phenomenon. He explained that “the issue is not just about having deterrent laws—the real challenge lies in the detection mechanisms, which are highly complex even in major countries.”
El-Omda added that several well-known countries are deeply involved in money laundering: “Africa, particularly the Congo, is notorious for laundering operations, as are Iran, Turkey, Dubai, Algeria, and even Switzerland, where illicit funds are estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.” He noted that money laundering harms the economy because it is not driven by profitability or feasibility studies, but rather by the need to justify large cash flows from suspicious sources.
The political economy professor pointed out that the sectors most commonly used in money laundering include:
real estate, cinemas, bars, cafés, and massage and beauty centers—all of which offer services with variable pricing and lack precise oversight of customer volume or actual revenue. “Declared profits are used as a front, with money deposited into banks to make it appear as legal business income, giving it a legal cover and allowing criminals to expand their operations,” he said.
El-Omda affirmed that money laundering will persist as long as illegal activities such as drug trafficking, antiquities smuggling, prostitution, organ trade, and arms dealing continue to exist. “Those who operate in these fields always seek legal facades to conceal the sources of their funds,” he added.
The United Nations defines money laundering as “the process of managing proceeds from crimes to disguise their illegal origin.” This process is critical because it allows the offender to enjoy the proceeds without exposing the source to legal risk. The UN Convention in Vienna (1988) addressed money laundering in Article 3.1, describing it as: “The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from any criminal offense, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person involved in the offense to evade the legal consequences of their actions.”
Additionally, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) includes provisions on combating money laundering in Articles 6 and 7, while Articles 12, 13, and 14 address the confiscation of criminal proceeds. The UN Convention against Corruption (2003) also contains measures to combat money laundering in Articles 14, 23, and 24.
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What Does Newspaper Content Analysis Reveal?
As part of this investigation, Zawia3 conducted a systematic review of a sample of press coverage published in a number of Egyptian newspapers—both state-owned and independent—over the past few months to examine how money laundering issues are reported. The sample included major outlets such as Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar, Al-Masry Al-Youm, and Al-Shorouk, in addition to online platforms like Youm7 and Masrawy.
Through an analysis of the content published in Egyptian newspapers, we found that most of the coverage focuses heavily on the official narrative when addressing money laundering cases. Reports primarily rely on statements from the Public Prosecutor, the Central Bank, or the Anti-Money Laundering Unit, without delving into the background of the phenomenon or initiating independent investigative work that could expose its broader dimensions. Coverage is largely brief and news-oriented, with a notable absence of analysis or interpretation, leaving readers with figures and statistics devoid of the context needed to grasp the scale and complexity of the issue.
While some independent outlets—such as Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk—have covered specific money laundering cases, their reports tend to be cautious, especially when referencing powerful figures or state-affiliated entities.
Additionally, money laundering cases are often presented within a narrative of official achievements by the Public Prosecution or security agencies, rather than being addressed as a serious economic phenomenon requiring systematic intervention. In some instances, money laundering is linked to other issues such as corruption, terrorism, or drug trafficking, but without examining how these are intertwined with the economic structure. The crucial link between the informal economy and money laundering operations—vital to understanding the roots of the problem—is rarely discussed, despite its significance according to experts.
Moreover, the journalistic coverage lacks in-depth or investigative reporting that traces illicit money flows or exposes the networks that facilitate them. There is also a general absence of focus on the responsibility of financial institutions—such as banks or NGOs—that may serve as conduits for laundering funds. Furthermore, the social and economic impacts of money laundering—such as distortion of market fairness, price manipulation, or the illegitimate redistribution of wealth—are seldom addressed in a meaningful way.
Legal and Oversight Gaps: How Illicit Funds Escape Detection
Despite Egypt’s engagement with the international anti-money laundering (AML) framework and its recent legislative updates, glaring loopholes persist that allow illicit funds to flow through formal financial channels undetected at early stages. These gaps are both legislative and operational, beginning with unclear definitions of certain predicate offenses tied to money laundering and extending to poor coordination among oversight and enforcement bodies.
One of the most critical weaknesses lies in the absence of a unified, up-to-date database shared across judicial, financial, and security agencies. This fragmentation delays the tracing of financial flows and the ability to link related cases. Additionally, some financial institutions—especially non-bank entities—fail to strictly enforce Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations or report suspicious transactions, either due to limited technical capacity or fear of losing high-net-worth clients.
In this context, Mohamed Fetouh, a high court appeals lawyer, told Zawia3 that while significant legislative advancements have taken place—particularly the 2020 amendment to the AML law—practical implementation remains deeply challenged. He cited key deficiencies, including the lack of an integrated database connecting state agencies, weak monitoring of cash-based transactions in certain sectors, the widespread use of shell companies whose real owners are hard to trace, and insufficient specialized training for frontline personnel responsible for detecting and analyzing suspicious financial activity.
Fetouh also highlighted the lack of strong legal protections for whistleblowers and witnesses, which discourages voluntary reporting of suspicious activity within institutions. Moreover, some oversight bodies are unable to access accounts or transfers conducted under the names of religious or charitable organizations due to social and political sensitivities.
He emphasized that combating money laundering in Egypt requires more than just legislative reform; it demands actual enforcement and enhanced inter-agency coordination. He called for strict controls on large cash transactions and the creation of a central registry to disclose the ultimate beneficial owners of companies—not just their legal representatives. He also advocated for awareness campaigns targeting the private sector and business owners to educate them about the risks of becoming unwitting participants in money laundering schemes.
“Egypt has made real legislative progress,” Fetouh noted, especially since exiting the FATF grey list, but he added that countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are advancing faster—through the establishment of independent financial intelligence units, and rigorous monitoring of money flows, particularly in real estate and investment sectors. According to him, certain activities are commonly used as money laundering fronts due to the difficulty of income verification. These include the real estate market (especially cash transactions outside the banking system), import-export firms, as well as cafés, restaurants, and the used car trade. He also flagged football player transfers in Egypt as a growing laundering avenue, with money often sourced from drug trafficking, arms dealing, and antiquities smuggling.
Fetouh also expressed concern over the lack of transparency in tracking political funds, particularly those tied to businesspeople or politicians with connections to power. He described this as a form of institutional complicity that helps perpetuate the problem. “Laws alone will never be enough without a genuine political will grounded in transparency, economic justice, and equal accountability,” he said. “There are individuals shielded from scrutiny because of their proximity to influential circles. This remains a major barrier to any meaningful reform of Egypt’s AML system.”
Egyptian law outlines several AML procedures, most notably requiring financial institutions to implement KYC protocols to verify customer identities and scrutinize suspicious transactions. The Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit, housed within the Central Bank of Egypt, is tasked with monitoring suspicious activity and analyzing reports submitted by banks and financial firms.
In terms of penalties, Egyptian law imposes severe consequences on individuals and entities involved in money laundering, including prison terms ranging from three to seven years, and heavy fines that may reach millions of pounds. Courts may also impose additional financial sanctions on companies that facilitate laundering, such as license revocation or fines levied on responsible executives. In some cases, life imprisonment is possible, especially if the offender is a high-ranking official or if the laundering involves complex or international networks.
The law also punishes anyone who provides assistance or support for money laundering, including those who engage in suspicious transactions via informal financial channels or through fictitious companies. Nonetheless, despite these provisions, challenges in enforcement remain. Egypt continues to struggle with inconsistent oversight, weak transparency mechanisms, and the lack of regular public reporting—all of which hinder effective AML implementation.
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The Evolution of Money Laundering in Egypt (2015–2025)
In 2019, Egypt adopted its first National Risk Assessment (NRA) report for money laundering and terrorism financing, covering the period from 2014 to 2017. The report was prepared by the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit, in coordination with relevant authorities. It highlighted challenges in understanding and assessing money laundering risks, particularly in informal sectors and the unregulated economy.
In 2021, Egypt approved the first update to its NRA, which covered the years 2018 and 2019. This updated assessment demonstrated improved risk identification and understanding, with a growing focus on enhancing inter-agency coordination and improving regulatory procedures.
Additionally, in 2020, Egypt underwent an international evaluation conducted by the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). The process concluded in June 2021, and the final report indicated that Egypt had made notable progress in implementing international AML/CFT standards, demonstrating a good understanding of risks and effective cooperation among involved entities.
In July 2022, Egypt amended its Anti-Money Laundering Law under Law No. 154 of 2022, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit and expanding its powers. Furthermore, the country launched a National Strategy for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing covering the period from October 2023 to September 2025.
However, the publicly disclosed figures related to money laundering cases reveal a worsening crisis—one that cannot be addressed through slogans or superficial statements. Behind the billions in suspicious financial flows, lie legal, regulatory, and structural gaps that weaken the state’s ability to detect money laundering in its early stages or even hold perpetrators accountable afterward.
In a country where the informal economy accounts for nearly half of the GDP, and where regulatory agencies suffer from limited transparency and poor coordination, public trust is eroded, and ambiguity prevails. The crisis is not merely about financial crimes—it reflects a broader governance failure and institutional inertia that enables corruption and impunity.
Unless serious reforms are implemented—focusing on transparency, oversight, and institutional accountability—money laundering will not remain a distant threat. It will become a ticking time bomb that threatens the very fabric of Egypt’s national economy.
