The Egyptian government is preparing to conduct the fifth review with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during May 2025, as announced by Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly, amid growing pressure to accelerate the pace of agreed reforms, foremost among them the state asset privatization program. This step has triggered wide debate in economic and cultural circles, particularly with reports suggesting the potential sale of, or private sector involvement in the management of, service institutions such as hospitals and certain public facilities. The lack of transparency regarding the identity of buyers and the nature of the deals has fueled concerns over possible social repercussions.
The IMF delegation arrived in Cairo to carry out the fifth review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program, tied to a total loan of $8 billion, from which Egypt receives $1.2 billion after each successful review. Ahead of the visit, the government held an expanded meeting focused on speeding up the asset divestment program. It included signing agreements with local and international consulting firms to restructure military-affiliated companies, including Wataniya Petroleum, ChillOut, Safi, Silo Foods, and Wataniya Roads, in preparation for offering some of them in 2025, and completing the offerings in 2026.
The exit plan also includes offering the management and operation of several airports, with support from the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Official data indicates that Egypt carried out about 33 full or partial sales of state-owned assets between March 2022 and June 2024, generating 30 billion pounds ($600 million) in total proceeds.
Egypt has long been on a complex path of economic reform in cooperation with the IMF, the latest chapter of which is the agreement signed in December 2022 for a $3 billion loan under the EFF program. This program aims to address economic imbalances and promote growth led by the private sector. Although the agreement included eight periodic reviews to assess progress, the program’s implementation faced notable delays, reflected in the postponement of the first and second reviews and the merger of the third and fourth—casting a shadow over the fifth review amid intensifying economic pressures.
These pressures were accompanied by a crippling foreign currency crisis, record inflation, and a rapid devaluation of the Egyptian pound, prompting the government to seek urgent solutions. Among them was accelerating the state IPO program and selling some state-owned assets to local and international strategic partners. As Egypt enters the fifth review, the issue of selling public assets emerged prominently as a key IMF condition, stirring sharp internal debate—particularly after reports circulated regarding the offering of sensitive service institutions, such as public hospitals and certain government bodies, for sale.
The fifth review of the economic reform program between Egypt and the IMF officially began in May 2025, after repeated delays that raised doubts about the government’s commitment to the agreed program. This follows the disbursement of the fourth loan tranche in March, worth $1.2 billion, after a positive assessment of the combined third and fourth reviews. This review focuses on several critical areas, most notably: fully liberalizing the exchange rate, reducing the state’s role in the economy, enhancing transparency in public institutions, and accelerating the sale of state-owned assets, including profitable companies and service agencies. The latter is particularly controversial, especially in light of reports suggesting possible private sector involvement in the management or ownership of sensitive service institutions, such as teaching hospitals.
The IMF emphasizes in its reports and statements that these measures do not aim to liquidate assets but rather to achieve “efficient resource allocation” and “stimulate the private sector.” Meanwhile, the Egyptian government states that the offerings represent strategic partnerships that do not conflict with the protection of social national security. However, a segment of experts and citizens view this as a form of “disguised privatization”, potentially leading to deterioration in service quality and higher costs for poor segments of society. What makes this review particularly critical is its timing, coinciding with Egypt’s attempt to attract foreign investment and secure additional funding from partners such as the European Union and the World Bank—support that is often contingent on tangible progress in implementing the IMF program.
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What are the main challenges facing the government?
Economist and leader of the Popular Alliance Party, Ilhami El-Merghani, told Zawia3 that Egypt repaid around $38 billion in external loans in 2024, according to statements by the Prime Minister. He added that the World Bank revealed Egypt is facing a major challenge in repaying $43.2 billion in external debt obligations during the first nine months of 2025. According to El-Merghani, the mentioned amount relates to accumulated external debts, which include loan repayments, deposits, and currency swap agreements involving the Central Bank and commercial banks. The total includes $5.9 billion in interest and $37.3 billion in principal repayments. Therefore, the Egyptian government, the Central Bank, and commercial banks face significant challenges in repaying these large sums.
El-Merghani further explained that the government committed to selling assets in the Letter of Intent it submitted to the Fund before obtaining the loans, and since 2016 until now, it has been selling everything it owns to repay debts and implement the economic exit strategy it pledged to the Fund. In light of this direction, the government has transferred dozens of public hospitals to specialized councils and passed a law to lease government public hospitals. He added: “We all saw what happened in Hermel Hospital and how poor patients were deprived of treatment—something we had previously warned about. The government is also offering to lease vocational schools. It has become a broker in sales and leasing operations, regardless of development or Egyptians’ rights to healthcare and education.”
The map of asset sales: hospitals at the forefront
As part of its commitments to the IMF, the Egyptian government announced a plan to sell four state-owned assets during the current fiscal year, with a total estimated value of $3.6 billion, in order to accelerate the pace of the state’s exit from certain economic sectors. This direction has sparked wide controversy, especially regarding the possibility of involving the private sector in managing and operating public hospitals. In June 2024, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi ratified a law granting the private sector the right to manage and operate some public hospitals, raising fears of the privatization of essential health services. Although the government confirmed that hospitals would remain state-owned and that the goal is to improve service quality through partnerships with the private sector, some believe that this step may lead to a decline in service quality and an increase in treatment costs, placing a heavier burden on citizens, especially low-income groups.
The liquidation of state assets is one of the economic tools governments use to achieve certain financial objectives. Asset liquidation refers to the process of converting state-owned assets—such as real estate, companies, and infrastructure—into cash by selling or privatizing them. Governments use this process to pursue various economic and financial goals, such as reducing public debt or improving economic efficiency to attract investments. For example, in Greece, the government sold some public assets as part of the financial rescue program provided by the European Union and the IMF during the country’s debt crisis in the past decade. In India, the government privatized many public companies, including airlines and oil refineries, in an attempt to enhance financial efficiency and attract investments, according to the Financial Times.
In mid-July, the government announced—within its policy program submitted to the House of Representatives—a project to establish an Asset Liquidation Committee under the Ministry of Finance, aiming to generate 20–25 billion pounds ($400–500 million) annually from divestment revenues in the coming years, and to transfer 1% of GDP from divestment proceeds to the state budget to reduce the debt of budgetary agencies. The formation of the committee came as part of a program aiming to reduce public debt through sustainable pathways, by continuing to direct the primary surplus and using part of the proceeds from divestment and the government IPO program to increase budget revenues and reduce government borrowing. The goal is to reduce the cost of servicing the debt of budgetary agencies to 42.6% of total public expenditures in fiscal year 2026/2027, as part of a comprehensive strategy to put the debt ratio on a downward path, according to the government’s plan.
The Egyptian government’s promotion of the asset sale program focuses on a primary goal: to secure urgent dollar liquidity to support foreign currency reserves and meet short-term obligations, amid scarce dollar inflows and rising external debt servicing burdens. Statements by the Ministry of Finance indicate that the state hopes to collect over $3 billion in 2025 through the sale of stakes in companies it owns, under what is known as the “government IPO program.” But despite the importance of this step in the short term, a number of economists warn of the risks of relinquishing strategic assets without a comprehensive vision for reinvesting the proceeds or ensuring the continued provision of services linked to them. Observers point out that selling assets that generate annual profits for the state budget—such as energy companies, infrastructure assets, or public financial institutions—means the state loses important tools for regulating the market and securing sustainable resources.
On the other hand, some observers believe that the government’s reliance on asset sales to cover the current account deficit and repay debts may not be a long-term solution but rather a temporary remedy for a deeper structural crisis related to weak local production, declining exports, and reduced tourism revenues. These concerns grow when the government does not clearly announce the sale map, the criteria for selecting companies, or the nature of potential partners—especially amid reports of sovereign entities managing sales behind closed doors.
While the state claims that partnerships with Gulf investors or sovereign wealth funds aim to attract foreign direct investment, experts affirm that, in many cases, what is actually happening is merely a transfer of ownership that does not necessarily generate added value for the economy. It may even deepen the gap between the state and its citizens if the process is not managed with transparency and fairness.
Lack of Transparency
For his part, Mohamed Ramadan, an economic researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, told Zawia3 that the details of the IMF’s most recent review have not yet been officially disclosed, attributing this to internal pressures and a general lack of attention from the concerned authorities. He noted that the IMF’s detailed reports clearly reveal its conditions and the timeline for their implementation, which allows for monitoring the government’s level of commitment. He added: “Some of the conditions were positive in principle, such as the legal amendment that expanded the powers of the Competition Protection Authority, and the publication of the state’s final accounts. However, the actual implementation of these conditions was not sufficiently effective.”
Ramadan stressed that the most important current conditions of the IMF relate to the sale of state assets, also known as the government IPO program, and monitoring the indebtedness of state-owned enterprises, emphasizing the importance of these conditions to the state budget amid commercial challenges and global economic uncertainty. He warned that the IMF is likely to pressure Egypt to act swiftly in the event of declining revenues or reduced foreign investment.
Ramadan also pointed out that the healthcare sector is one of the most attractive sectors to investors due to its high profitability. For this reason, the government decided to include it in the IPO program. He explained that Hermel Hospital was one of the most notable recent cases of privatization, despite objections and protests from patients due to the deterioration of services and the loss of access to free treatment, particularly for cancer and kidney failure patients. He noted that the government views the healthcare sector as an easy target for sale, without adequately studying the impact this could have on poor communities—posing a serious threat to social justice.
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How Is the Citizen Affected?
Regarding the impact of these policies on the population, Ramadan affirmed that inflation is the most significant factor affecting people, and it may rise further as the government moves to raise fuel prices again—which would affect the prices of all goods and services, from bread to transportation and energy. He stated: “The core issue is that the government is implementing the IMF’s conditions rapidly and without considering their social effects,” adding that the Fund itself usually allows for flexible delays or adjustments to certain conditions if their social consequences are found to be severe.
He continued: “What is happening in Egypt is not a strict imposition by the IMF, but rather the government itself has adopted this vision and sees fuel and bread subsidies as burdens to be eliminated.” He explained that many government policies are aligned with the Fund’s conditions and are therefore being implemented without hesitation, often in ways that lack social sensitivity. He clarified that the IMF does not impose specific policies but provides general frameworks, and it is the Egyptian government that chose to apply these frameworks with maximum strictness—which reflects a crisis in prioritization and managing socio-economic burdens.
In this context, Ilhami El-Merghani stated that the World Bank estimated Egypt’s poverty rate at 60%, and that it is certain these policies will be paid for by vulnerable segments, who will fall below the poverty line as a result and lose their ability to secure basic food needs. He stressed that the burden is growing, and in the 2025/2026 budget, loans consume 65% of total expenditures, which is why the state is selling and leasing all its assets. “But what will it do after selling everything, without securing fixed sources of income to repay debts?” El-Merghani asked. He called for an end to borrowing policies and the imposition of strict oversight over any new loans, along with searching for real repayment sources through agriculture, industry, and exports. Without this, he warned, Egypt will lose all its assets—as well as its economic decision-making independence.
Between the pressures of the IMF and Egypt’s growing need for liquidity, the government finds itself compelled to accelerate the pace of public asset sales—a move that has sparked heated debate about the future of essential services and the extent to which privatization will affect citizens’ fundamental rights, such as healthcare and education. While the government promotes these measures as strategic partnerships necessary to support the economy, the lack of transparency and the absence of public engagement in discussions surrounding these policies only deepen concern and distrust. Amid these mounting economic challenges, the open question remains:
Is Egypt on a path toward real and sustainable reform, or is this merely a short-term fix for a deep structural crisis that future generations will pay for?
