Mahmoud Abdullah (39), an employee at a private company in Heliopolis, wakes up an hour and a half before his working hours begin, to take a microbus to El-Bohouth metro station, from which he takes the train to his work. For “Mahmoud”, the journey is just a fixed fare, but with the spread of speculation among microbus passengers about a fuel increase, it has turned into an item open to recalculation. One of the passengers declares without equivocation: “If diesel goes up, the fare will rise”.

Expectations point to an increase in fuel prices during this September, amid a state of anticipation of price rises that the Egyptian street is living through, even though a number of experts have ruled out raising fuel prices. On another side, citizens do not trust the promises of the government, particularly after it broke its promise not to raise electricity prices. On yet another side, news websites are focusing on reports that some countries have raised energy prices.

“If the fare rises by EGP 1 or EGP 2 in each direction, this means a daily increase, then a weekly one, then a monthly one,” as “Mahmoud” tells Zawia3, adding that mere talk of raising fuel prices pushes traders to raise the prices of goods or to stockpile them, as a precaution against the rise in delivery charges. The price of the meal that “Mahmoud” buys on his way home will rise, as he mentions.

If the increase is announced, “Mahmoud” will look for a cheaper means of transport and perhaps walk part of the way, as he says. At the end of the month, the increase will appear distributed across the entire budget, in the items of transport, food and everything linked to the cost of transport.

A study offers a reading of the Egyptian case during the removal of fuel subsidies, and notes that public acceptance of price-rise decisions is not determined solely by the material loss, but is influenced by the way in which the decision is framed and presented to people: when the removal of subsidies is presented as part of rescuing the economy or as bearing a “shared national sacrifice”, the citizen’s perception of the decision may change, from a direct loss in his income to a cost he sees as linked to a larger goal such as stability.

Sociology professor Dr Samia Khedr says that the cost of raising fuel prices does not begin at the moment the decision is announced, but before that, when the street begins to form its expectations of the decision, pointing out that the announcement of an increase in energy prices is associated with a clear decline in the public mood, before this mood begins to recover gradually; consequently, the months following the announcement become a sensitive phase that may turn into popular rejection.

She adds that the “rumour” in itself is a phenomenon worth monitoring, not as automatic evidence that the government stands behind it, but as part of the environment of expectations that precedes the decision, pointing out that when talk of a petrol increase is repeated over a long period, the consumer begins to factor the possible increase into his calculations, the car owner re-estimates the cost of getting around, the driver awaits a new fare, the trader calculates the cost of transport and the family rearranges its spending; in this way, “identification with the decision” may begin before an official price rise is issued.

Paving the way for economic decisions is not limited to leaks or speculation, as the International Monetary Fund refers to the concept of “fiscal news”, meaning new information that changes what individuals and markets expect of fiscal policy. The arrival of information in stages makes the expected change present in the public’s calculations before the moment of implementation, so individuals and companies begin to adjust their expectations and behaviour gradually. But the impact of these messages cannot be separated from the government’s own record: communication is more credible when previous promises match what has actually been implemented, while weak trust leads to government messages being received with doubt and caution.

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What does raising petrol and diesel prices mean?

Zawia3’s review of developments in fuel prices in recent years reveals variation in the size of the increases that petroleum products have seen, depending on the phase: while some periods saw limited movements not exceeding a few piastres per litre, other periods recorded sharp increases exceeding 50% in a single decision.

The historical data collected by Zawia3 show that “butane gas” recorded one of the most severe single increases, after the price of a cylinder rose by as much as 100% in previous movements, while the increase in 80-octane petrol and diesel reached about 55.3% in the June 2017 move.

On the other hand, the smallest single increases came during the period of limited adjustments in 2021 and 2022, when the prices of some products moved by about 25 piastres per litre, equivalent to increases ranging roughly between 2.6% and 4%. The market also saw an exceptional case of reductions between late 2019 and early 2020, when prices fell by limited rates ranging between 2.8% and 3.8%.

Through Zawia3’s analysis of prices from July 2014 to March 2026, the cumulative increase in fuel prices appears clearer. The price of a household butane gas cylinder rose from about EGP 15 to EGP 275, an increase exceeding 1,730%.

The price of 80-octane petrol also jumped from EGP 1.60 to EGP 20.75 per litre, an increase of about 1,196.8%, while diesel rose from EGP 1.80 to EGP 20.50, an increase of about 1,038.8%.

The increase extended to vehicle gas, which climbed from EGP 1.10 to EGP 13, a rise of about 1,081.8%, while 92-octane petrol rose from EGP 2.60 to EGP 22.25, an increase approaching 755.8%.

As for 95-octane petrol, it rose from EGP 6.25 to EGP 24 per litre, an increase of about 284% over the same period, a rate lower than the cumulative increases recorded by the other types of fuel.

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15%… the scenario closest to the average of recent increases

Zawia3 bases its calculations on the fuel price increases in the last six decisions, from 2024 to 2026. Three arithmetical scenarios can be built for any coming increase: 10% as a minimum, 15% as a medium scenario, and 20% as a high scenario. The 10% scenario represents a more conservative adjustment, while the 15% rate appears closest to the average of recent movements, which actually ranged between about 12.5% and 16.9%. The 20% scenario represents the case of the largest compensatory increase, which may become more likely if the cost of importing fuel comes under acute pressure linked to global oil prices or the exchange rate.

If the hypothesis of a 15% increase is applied to current prices, the price of a litre of 80-octane petrol would rise from EGP 20.75 to EGP 23.85, an increase of EGP 3.10 per litre. As for 92-octane petrol, the one most associated with the use of private cars, the price would rise from EGP 22.25 to EGP 25.60, an increase of EGP 3.35 per litre. 95-octane petrol would rise from EGP 24 to EGP 27.60, an increase of EGP 3.60 per litre, while diesel would rise from EGP 20.50 to EGP 23.60 per litre, an increase of EGP 3.10.

If a private car uses a 45-litre tank of 92-octane petrol, the current cost of filling up is EGP 1,001. But with a 15% price increase, the cost of filling up rises to EGP 1,152, meaning that the car owner will pay an extra EGP 151 every time he fills the tank.

If the car’s average consumption reaches 180 litres a month, the petrol bill rises from about EGP 4,005 currently to EGP 4,608, which means an additional burden of EGP 603 a month. On an annual basis, this additional burden reaches EGP 7,236 for the car owner, if price and consumption remain at the same levels throughout the year.

The impact of the increase does not stop at users of private cars, as diesel is directly linked to the operating cost of a large part of the movement of goods and passengers. For example, if a transport lorry consumes 100 litres of diesel per trip, the current fuel cost is EGP 2,050. But with a 15% price increase, the cost of the trip rises to EGP 2,360, a direct increase of EGP 310.

According to this scenario, a 10% increase in diesel may be reflected in the fares of some means of collective transport within the range of 5% to 7%, while it may add about 2% to 4% to the prices of some fresh food goods, with the impact varying from one good to another and from one transport distance to another.

In the medium scenario, a 15% increase means that filling up a 92-octane petrol car with a 45-litre capacity may become more expensive by about EGP 151, while a lorry consuming 100 litres of diesel bears a direct increase of EGP 310 in fuel costs for the trip.

“Mahmoud Abdullah” is one of thousands of workers who come from the governorates in search of a better job opportunity, but he does not have the luxury of living next to his workplace: he spends the weekdays in Cairo, then returns at the end of the week to his family in his village, which belongs to Mansoura.

For “Mahmoud”, the increase in fuel prices may mean fewer visits to his family or incurring larger monthly expenses. He says he receives a fixed monthly wage and cannot bear the additional costs, and at the same time he has to see his family: “Transport is tied to keeping my connection with my family,” as he says.

Zawia3’s analysis of travel fares between Cairo and the governorates after the last fuel price increase, on 10 March 2026, reveals that fares rose by about 15% to 17%, making the trip back to the family more costly for a worker who earns a fixed salary.

The increase does not need to be large to become influential in a worker’s budget, as shorter distances recorded big jumps: the fare to Fayoum rose from EGP 50 to EGP 65, an increase of EGP 15, representing 30% of the old fare before the increase, while the fare to Tanta rose from EGP 43 to EGP 55, an increase of EGP 12 or about 27.9%, and in Beni Suef, the fare increased from EGP 70 to EGP 85, by EGP 15 or 21.4%.

For example, a worker who travels weekly between Cairo and Assiut will pay about EGP 264 extra per month on the basis of 4 round trips, while the increase reaches about EGP 280 for a worker heading to Sohag, and about EGP 320 for someone travelling to Qena, if the travel pattern is weekly.

Dr Hazem Hassanein, a member of the Egyptian Society of Political Economy, says that the more government decisions become clear as a settled direction, the more what is known as “status quo bias” recedes, and the citizen begins to move psychologically from the question “Will the increase happen?” to “How will I deal with it?”, pointing out that this context makes the period preceding the decision as important as the decision itself, because the circulation of information and signals relating to the change gives households and markets time to rearrange their calculations and adapt to what is expected.

He adds, speaking to Zawia3, that the idea of “absorbing the shock“, which governments craft in order to pass the increase, does not necessarily mean that they succeed in maintaining the citizen’s acceptance of it in the long term: if prices rise repeatedly without the citizen feeling an economic improvement or parallel social protection, the initial adaptation may turn into declining trust and accumulated resentment.

A study indicates that leaks before economic decisions are taken are not always mere coincidence, but can turn into a tool for influencing the expectations of markets and the public before the official decision is issued. The study explains that some leaks may be used as “trial balloons” to gauge reactions to a certain direction, while other leaks come from within the institutions themselves without official authorisation; in both cases, the arrival of information about the anticipated decision before it is announced leaves the public a period in which to begin absorbing its likelihood and adapting to it, which may make the impact of the decision, when it is issued, less surprising and less severe.

While the street waits to learn of the increase that has become certain, it is currently searching for solutions with which to rearrange its life when the decision is issued; for a long time now, it has been dealing with decisions that have not yet been issued as if they were a new item in its exhausted budget.

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