Following the US–Israeli strikes on Iran last Saturday, the Tel Aviv government announced the suspension of natural gas exports to Egypt indefinitely, on the grounds that operations were impossible as a result of the current war. This led to the halt of about 1.1 billion cubic feet per day that were being pumped to Egypt, which represents a large share of Cairo’s gas imports through the pipeline coming from Israel.
This decision comes only about two and a half months after the announcement of a huge agreement between Cairo and Tel Aviv for the export of natural gas, valued at about $35 billion, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described as “the largest gas deal in Israel’s history”.
The agreement, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ratified last December and which came into force at the start of the new year 2026, was scheduled to run until 2040, and includes the supply of about 130 billion cubic metres of gas from the Leviathan field in the eastern Mediterranean.
It is the agreement that provoked a state of controversy and criticism inside Egypt, particularly as it came in the wake of the war Israel waged on Gaza after 7 October 2023, which lasted nearly two years and resulted in tens of thousands of people killed and hundreds of thousands injured, according to estimates by official and rights bodies.
On the other hand, Reuters news agency considered that the agreement provided relief for the energy crisis Egypt has faced for two years, after it was forced to spend billions of dollars on importing shipments of liquefied natural gas to compensate for the shortfall of domestic production in meeting rising demand, particularly during summer peak periods.
However, the suspension of gas exports “indefinitely”, according to the Israeli statements, opens the door to questions about the domestic market’s ability to absorb a prolonged halt in exports, in addition to the nature of the scenarios for managing domestic demand in the coming months, especially if a prolonged crisis coincides with peak consumption in the summer season. This may bring back to the fore options such as rationing consumption ( load-shedding), which caused power cuts in a large number of neighbourhoods and areas in Egypt, as well as rearranging supply priorities among the different sectors, until the course of regional developments becomes clear.
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Egypt Responds to the Israeli Position
For its part, the Egyptian government affirmed that it had implemented a package of pre-emptive measures to secure the domestic market’s energy needs and to ensure the stability of supplies amid rapidly unfolding regional developments.
The Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources said in an official statement that over the past period it had implemented an integrated plan in coordination with the Cabinet and the relevant ministries, with the aim of strengthening the readiness of the energy sector to deal with any new developments, stressing that energy security represents a fundamental pillar of national security.
The ministry affirmed the diversity of supply sources and the availability of alternative capacities ready for operation, noting that throughout 2025 it had worked to secure additional quantities of liquefied natural gas for extended periods, to meet the needs of the electricity sector, industry and citizens, through multiple import sources alongside domestic production, contracting for LNG shipments from multiple sources, and concluding long-term supply agreements with international companies.
It also pointed to the establishment and preparation of an integrated infrastructure to receive LNG imports, and the bringing in and operation of regasification vessels, which strengthens the flexibility of the supply system and gives the state greater capacity to manoeuvre and to respond quickly to changes, stressing that these measures come in parallel with continued support for increasing domestic production through regular payment of partners’ dues, which encourages the intensification of exploration and production activities.
Sarah Kira, director of the European North African Center for Studies, considers that Israel’s announcement that it is halting natural gas exports to Egypt “indefinitely” is linked to the ongoing military escalation between Israel and Iran, and reflects the absence of certainty about the duration of the conflict, and an Israeli desire to preserve a strategic reserve or to send indirect political messages to Iran about the length of the conflict. She notes that Israel may be prepared for a long-term war, in which it may be forced to use its commercial resources as tools in the battle.
Sarah tells Zawia3 that the Israelis may feel that Egypt “exploited them” by re-liquefying the gas and later selling it to European markets at multiplied prices, benefiting from its strong gas liquefaction infrastructure, which Israel lacks. She explains that Egypt is not entirely dependent on Israeli gas for domestic consumption, and that it has its own wells, as well as the ability to import from other countries.
Sarah adds that Cairo was prepared for such a scenario as a result of what she describes as an “information war” with Israel, which led it to take a package of pre-emptive measures to secure the domestic market’s energy needs in preparation for this moment.
As for the likelihood of a return of load-shedding or power cuts in Egypt, Sarah rules this out, explaining that the alternatives and the current strategic reserve make the state better prepared compared with the previous crisis linked to the halt in production of some fields.
Egypt has witnessed a notable shift in the natural gas market in recent years. After it had been an exporter of liquefied natural gas, domestic production declined significantly as a result of the drop in production of some fields, which pushed Egypt to rely increasingly on imports to close the gap between production and consumption. Its LNG imports rose sharply during 2025, in an attempt to compensate for the domestic shortfall, reaching about 9 million tonnes, after its LNG imports in 2024 had been about 2.7 million tonnes.
The estimates of the American company S&P Global Energy indicate that Egypt’s LNG imports could reach about 11.1 million tonnes in 2026, an increase of nearly 26% compared with the previous year, amid continued high demand for electricity and from the industrial sector.
Political Warnings
This is not the first time Israel has announced that it would not commit to exporting the agreed quantities of natural gas to Egypt. In May 2025, Israeli gas imports to Egypt saw a sharp decline, after Israel suspended production at its gas fields, against the backdrop of fears of a possible escalation in the region following a series of Israeli attacks on targets inside Iran.
This led to a reduction in the quantities of gas supplied by the Egyptian government to the industrial sector, including the fertiliser sector, which experienced a state of confusion as a result of this decision, as well as a recurrence of the load-shedding crisis inside Egyptian homes during the summer months. This prompted the Egyptian government to begin concluding long-term agreements with a number of countries to import gas.
For his part, political and economic researcher Elhamy El-Merghany says that “political forces, researchers and experts had previously warned against relying on importing gas from Israel, but the Egyptian government insisted on pursuing this path on the grounds that its price is lower compared with gas imported from some Gulf states.”
El-Merghany adds, speaking to Zawia3, that the escalation of the military confrontation in the Gulf, led by the United States and Israel, and what is being raised about the possibility of the Strait of Hormuz being closed, could push towards a new wave of rising global oil prices.
He explains that Egypt will be affected by these developments, as it relies on global markets for part of its needs, particularly amid the pressures linked to the scarcity of foreign currency, which may be reflected, “in his estimation”, in the form of additional inflationary pressures and a rise in the dollar exchange rate in the local market.
El-Merghany points out that a continued rise in global energy prices may put the government before the option of revising the prices of petroleum products domestically to cover the expected financing gap, despite previous pledges not to raise prices during 2026.
He also notes that the halt of Israeli gas supplies may affect a number of factories that rely on it in production processes geared towards export, in addition to the possibility of gas supplies to power stations being affected, which may aggravate the pressure on the national grid during the summer, amid high consumption rates, something that portends a “hot summer”, in his words, on both the economic and service levels.
For his part, Freddy El-Bayadi, a member of the House of Representatives and deputy head of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, submitted an urgent parliamentary question addressed to the Prime Minister and the ministers of petroleum and electricity, regarding the extent of the government’s readiness to manage the energy file and ensure security of supplies amid the escalating military escalation between Iran, Israel and the United States and its regional spread, and its likely repercussions on the national economy and energy security.
El-Bayadi explains to Zawia3 that any disruption in natural gas supplies, which accounted for about 76% of electricity generation in Egypt in 2023, may directly affect the stability of the electricity grid, particularly given Egypt’s increasing reliance on liquefied natural gas imports.
The Egyptian MP points out that a large part of the imported gas is linked to Israeli supplies, which makes any halt, even a temporary one, a source of great concern for industry and electricity, noting that talks are being held between the Egyptian government and a number of international companies and national energy companies in Arab countries, to buy between 40 and 60 LNG shipments at a cost that may reach $3 billion, which raise questions about their impact on the general budget, the public debt and the exchange rate. He stresses that the current situation requires the government to put in place integrated contingency plans to ensure energy stability and protect the national economy from any potential fluctuations in global markets.
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Political Implications and a Crisis Hostage to Time
The latest agreement is an extension of the previous agreement between Egypt and Israel signed in 2019, which provided for the supply of 60 billion cubic metres of natural gas until 2030, before rising in the new latest agreement to about 130 billion cubic metres until 2040, relying on the production of the Leviathan field located in the eastern Mediterranean.
The agreement provides for the supply of gas to begin partially from 2026, with the final quantities to be completed after the expansion of the connection lines between the Israeli field and the liquefaction plants in Egypt, which makes Cairo a main gateway for exporting Israeli gas to European and international markets.
The Leviathan field is operated by the American company Chevron, which owns 40% of the field and supervises operations, while its reserves are estimated at about 600 billion cubic metres of natural gas.
In this context, Mohamed Ramadan, economic researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, questions the validity of the Israeli claims that the military escalation between Israel and Iran is the direct reason for the halt, as he describes the decision as “a flimsy excuse” or a pretext, especially since the gas field itself was not struck. He notes that the continuation of gas supplies domestically and their halting, “cutting off”, for Egypt alone confirms that the decision is merely a political pretext.
Ramadan tells Zawia3 that Israel’s decision to halt gas supplies to Egypt is not necessarily linked to the recent military operations, but is being used as a political pretext, as Israel relies on what is known as the “force majeure clause” in contracts, which gives it the right to suspend gas supply in the event of military operations.
He points out that the gas agreement with Israel carries drawbacks, most notably the increase in gas quantities and the reliance on Israeli supplies at a time when Tel Aviv is engaged in continuous conflicts, which makes such repercussions expected.
On the readiness of the Egyptian government, Ramadan explains that Egypt has become better prepared compared with last year, thanks to increased reliance on LNG shipments since last year. He expects that gas supplies to factories will not be affected in the short term, if the war does not drag on, in addition to the awareness that LNG is more costly, but it is the available option for facing any deficit in the local market.
A research paper by the Masar Foundation for Humanitarian Studies titled “The Gas Deal Between Egypt and Israel: Intersecting Interests and Risks” attributed the increase in the volume of Egypt’s natural gas imports to five factors.
The first of these factors was the notable decline in the production of Egyptian fields, as the production of the offshore Zohr field fell by more than 40% in 2024 compared with its production peak in 2021. The impact of this decline becomes more serious considering that natural gas represents about 51% of total energy production in Egypt, and covers about 76.8% of locally generated electricity. In addition, there is the accumulation of the Egyptian regime’s debts to foreign energy companies, which led to a decline in investment in developing the fields, and consequently a weakened capacity to increase domestic production.
Added to this, the electricity grid suffers from high rates of losses, due to electricity theft, which reaches 45% in some areas. Within only six months, the Ministry of Electricity managed to collect about EGP 4 billion out of EGP 6 billion, the value of the electricity theft reports, which numbered 1.6 million reports. On top of that, domestic consumption has doubled over the past two decades with the growing population, which has exceeded 110 million people, and the energy crisis peaks in the summer months, when temperatures exceed 50 degrees Celsius in some governorates. Energy imports are also affected by seasonal conditions, as the rate of gas imports, particularly Israeli gas, falls by nearly 8% during the summer, as a result of increased domestic demand in the occupation state itself.
The recent political and military developments in the region reveal the fragility of relying on unstable external sources for strategic commodities such as gas, despite huge agreements and long-term contracts. The Egyptian government appears to have taken pre-emptive steps to secure domestic consumption and mitigate the impact of any potential crises, but the question remains: if the crisis continues for a long period, “indefinitely”, will the state be able to maintain stable supplies to avoid power cuts and a worsening situation for industry?
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