The visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty to Cyprus in early September highlighted strategic dimensions directly linked to the natural gas file in the Eastern Mediterranean. At a moment charged with regional political and security tensions—especially between Cairo and Tel Aviv—Egypt is seeking to redraw its energy needs in a way that guarantees a broader margin of maneuver, moving away from dependence on a single source. At the heart of this strategy, Cypriot gas emerges as an alternative or complementary card to Israeli gas, which for years has been a central pillar of Egypt’s energy supply.
During his visit, which included an intensive agenda to strengthen bilateral cooperation, Abdelatty met with Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, in the presence of Egypt’s petroleum minister. They reviewed bilateral relations, especially in the energy sector, and discussed ways to link Cypriot fields to Egyptian infrastructure, alongside political coordination regarding the European Union. Observers described the visit as an Egyptian step within broader moves to secure gas sources.
A senior Egyptian diplomat told Zawia3 that Egypt is implementing a work plan to secure natural gas supplies, including partnerships signed with Cyprus. These partnerships are not new, but work on them has been accelerated, with Egypt expected to begin receiving Cypriot gas in mid-2027. When asked whether Cypriot gas is meant to replace Israeli imports, the source stressed that it is a strategic option for Egypt, which has the right to diversify its energy partnerships and sources—particularly since Cyprus is a member of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, enabling broader partnerships under its umbrella.
The East Mediterranean Gas Forum is a regional organization established in January 2019 with headquarters in Cairo. It aims to create a regional natural gas market in the Eastern Mediterranean, enhancing commercial cooperation and balancing supply and demand among member states. The forum was initiated after a trilateral summit in Crete, Greece, in October 2018, which brought together the leaders of Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece. At that summit, they agreed to coordinate policies on gas exploitation to serve mutual interests and accelerate the use of the region’s gas reserves.
Forum members include Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Italy, and France, with the United States participating as an observer. The forum is open to any Eastern Mediterranean country—whether producer, consumer, or transit state—that meets membership conditions. It serves as a leading platform for regional cooperation, aiming to maximize the use of gas reserves and infrastructure, and is linked to partnerships with the European Union and key players in the energy industry, making it one of the most prominent strategic cooperation frameworks in the region.
In February, Egypt and Cyprus signed new agreements for the re-export and marketing of Cypriot gas—a step that underscores the growing strategic importance of their energy cooperation, particularly as Egypt’s domestic production has declined over the past two years. Under these agreements, gas extracted from the “Cronos” field off Cyprus’s southwest coast and the “Aphrodite” field southeast of the island will be transported to Egypt’s liquefaction plants in Idku and Damietta, to be re-exported as liquefied natural gas to global markets.
In televised remarks following the signing, Osama Mobarez, Secretary-General of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, estimated the yet-to-be-discovered gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean at around 300 trillion cubic feet, according to studies. He emphasized that the Cyprus-Egypt gas transfer agreement is a significant strategic step that will impact not only the two countries but also gas markets in the region and globally.
Observers believe these agreements hold double importance for Egypt amid its current economic challenges. Officials are striving to offset declining domestic production, which has reached its lowest level since 2017, forcing Cairo to increase imports of liquefied natural gas. At the same time, the foreign currency crisis and the resulting accumulation of arrears owed to international oil companies have slowed investments in Egyptian fields. In this context, Cypriot gas represents a crucial support card for Egypt’s plans to restore its export capacity by 2027.
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Tensions with Israel
Egypt’s visit to Cyprus comes at a time of unprecedented escalation in disputes between Cairo and Tel Aviv. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has hinted at the possibility of halting the gas export agreement with Egypt, as part of attempts to pressure Cairo into accepting a plan for forced displacement.
In this context, Cypriot gas stands out as a strategic option that can serve as a reserve alternative in the event of any disruption to Israeli supplies. Egypt currently imports between 1 and 1.1 billion cubic feet per day of Israeli gas, under an agreement to increase the quantities to 1.15–1.25 billion cubic feet per day starting in January 2026, with the goal of gradually reaching 1.5–1.6 billion cubic feet per day by the end of 2026, in parallel with the expansion of infrastructure and transport pipelines.
In mid-August, Israeli government-aligned newspapers reported that Netanyahu had instructed officials not to proceed with the massive gas deal signed with Egypt about a month earlier, worth around $35 billion, for the supply of 130 billion cubic meters until 2040, without his personal approval. This move was aimed at tying the implementation of the deal to new conditions and guarantees from Egypt, based on claims that Cairo violated the Camp David Accords by increasing its military presence in Sinai.
Cairo, for its part, dismissed Netanyahu’s statements as lacking “realism.” The response was sharp, voiced by Diaa Rashwan, head of Egypt’s State Information Service, who stressed that Netanyahu’s remarks lacked both political and economic realism. Rashwan asserted that Cairo does not view these threats as a danger to its energy security or stability. In televised remarks, he said: “I advise him to cancel the deal if he can bear its economic consequences”—a clear signal that the political and financial costs would fall primarily on the Israeli side.
Egypt also reiterated that it would not submit to any Israeli pressure, whether regarding energy or matters related to Gaza and the borders. The threats were described as political bargaining chips aimed at undermining Egypt’s firm stance on the Palestinian issue and its rejection of the forced displacement of Palestinians. Official statements pointed out that Egypt has the capacity to protect its national security and economy, and that the real loss from scrapping the deal would fall on Israel.
In this context, two sources—one diplomatic and the other security-related—told Zawia3 that Cairo does not give much weight to Netanyahu’s statements about freezing the gas agreement. They consider them a performance directed at Israeli public opinion and an attempt to cover up Tel Aviv’s failure to achieve its goals in Gaza, chief among them the displacement project. The sources confirmed that Egypt draws a clear red line in its absolute rejection of any scenario leading to displacement. Beyond that, it remains ready to deal with new developments, supported by alternative and strategic options in the energy sector and in its broader regional files.
The diplomatic source emphasized that Cairo will activate its responses through actions, not words, explaining that Egypt is capable of safeguarding its resources and securing safe alternatives, as it presses ahead with wider agreements on gas liquefaction and exports to protect its interests. On the bilateral level, the two sources described relations as “the most tense in years,” confirming that Cairo has no intention at present of returning to the level of ambassadorial exchange. At the same time, they stressed that Egypt still prefers the diplomatic path in managing all external files, but remains prepared to use all necessary tools to protect its national security and safeguard its strategic assets.
Cypriot Gas as a Strategic Alternative
The outlines of Egypt–Cyprus cooperation in the energy sector began to take shape with the major gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean at the beginning of the past decade, when Nicosia discovered the “Aphrodite” field in 2011—one of Cyprus’s most important fields, capable of reshaping the region’s energy map. With the rising importance of gas as both a strategic and economic tool, Cairo saw in these discoveries an opportunity to reestablish itself as a regional energy hub.
In recent years, Egypt and Cyprus have signed a series of agreements aimed at turning Cypriot gas discoveries into an active element in the regional energy equation. The most notable of these was the 2018 government-to-government agreement to establish a direct subsea pipeline transporting gas from the Cypriot Aphrodite field to Egypt’s liquefaction plants in Idku and Damietta, from where it would be re-exported to European markets struggling to secure alternatives to Russian gas.
In addition, the two countries have strengthened cooperation on electricity interconnection, within a broader project involving Greece, aimed at linking Eastern Mediterranean electricity grids with Europe. This initiative opens up new horizons for energy exchange and partnership expansion, though financing challenges have delayed parts of the projects.
The central project, however, remains a roughly 90-kilometer subsea pipeline connecting Aphrodite to the facilities of Egypt’s Zohr field in Egyptian waters. This pipeline is expected to deliver around 1 billion cubic feet per day of Cypriot gas into Egypt’s national grid, paving the way for liquefaction at the Idku and Damietta plants, whose combined capacity exceeds 12 million tons per year. Cyprus plans to begin exports through Egypt between 2027 and 2028.
In this context, Mohamed Hamed—Director of the East Mediterranean Studies Forum—told Zawia3 that the Egyptian foreign minister’s visit to Cyprus, and his meetings with his Cypriot counterpart and the Cypriot prime minister, reflect Cairo’s cards in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly regarding gas. He explained that Egypt is seeking to benefit from Cypriot gas, whether for domestic consumption or re-export to Europe, as a potential alternative to Israeli gas, whose agreements may be hindered by the positions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Hamed noted that alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean remain fluid and adaptable, but the Egypt–Cyprus–Greece alliance established by President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in 2014 continues to be among the strongest and most stable in the region. He pointed out that regional variables include the situation in Syria, Turkish pressure regarding maritime border demarcation with Syria, and Lebanon’s entry into the dynamics after finalizing its maritime border agreement with Israel, with the possibility of resolving its border with Syria soon under international law and the Law of the Sea.
The forum director added that the technical and logistical challenges related to Cypriot gas remain, but these are a matter of time and cost. He stressed that Cypriot gas could be Egypt’s closest option at present to offset the shortage caused by strained Egyptian–Israeli energy relations over the past two years—tensions further complicated after Israel’s strike on Doha.
Hamed underlined that the energy market is experiencing constant volatility amid the Russia–Ukraine war, Israel’s ongoing operations in Gaza, and escalating Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. All of these factors negatively impact the stability of global energy markets. He pointed out that the international community has failed to address these crises—whether in lowering energy prices or securing supply and food chains—leading to rising hunger levels worldwide. He affirmed that the United Nations has not succeeded in finding real solutions to these challenges over the past three years.
According to estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey, the Eastern Mediterranean basin holds about 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 1.7 billion barrels of crude oil, based on a 2010 assessment. A more recent review, issued in July 2021, raised these figures to 286 trillion cubic feet of gas and 879 million barrels of oil, after expanding the geological assessment to include areas off Egypt’s coast. While the region represents a modest share of global reserves (5.1% of gas and 0.15% of oil), these figures underscore its strategic weight given its geographic location and political circumstances, which have placed Europe in a frantic race to secure alternatives to Russian gas.
What Does Egypt Gain?
According to a recent study published by the Egyptian Center for Ideas and Strategic Studies by Dr. Ahmed Sultan, a researcher specializing in energy and oil affairs, cooperation between Egypt and Cyprus in the field of natural gas represents a major opportunity to increase joint production from gas fields in the Mediterranean. The Cypriot Aphrodite field serves as a model for such cooperation: Egypt can capitalize on its liquefaction facilities to export Cypriot gas to European markets, thereby contributing to stability in the European gas market, particularly in light of Europe’s growing reliance on alternative gas sources.
The partnership between Egypt and Cyprus also strengthens Egypt’s position as a regional energy hub. Egypt could become the main export point for gas from the Mediterranean to global markets. This partnership contributes to consolidating Egypt’s role as an energy center in the Middle East and North Africa. It also allows Egypt to enhance its technological capabilities in the gas sector and reap economic benefits through gas exports and expanded access to global markets.
The study further notes that cooperation in natural gas helps promote energy sustainability for both Egypt and Cyprus, as it will reduce dependence on traditional energy sources. Natural gas is a less polluting energy source than coal and oil, and both countries can leverage this resource to achieve long-term energy sustainability. In addition, natural gas can be used as a power source in renewable energy projects—for instance, in generating electricity for solar and wind power plants.
The researcher argues that cooperation between Egypt and Cyprus in the natural gas sector could also open opportunities for expansion into new markets, particularly in Africa. The African continent holds vast potential in terms of natural gas reserves and a growing demand for energy, offering both countries the chance to expand their gas export networks and achieve significant economic growth.
Economically, Cypriot gas represents a significant opportunity for Egypt to diversify its supply sources and reduce its reliance on Israeli gas, which may be subject to political and security disruptions beyond Cairo’s control. Incorporating Cypriot gas into the equation provides Egypt with greater control over supply flows and bolsters its position as a key exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe. For Egypt, which is seeking to maximize the use of its massive infrastructure in Idku and Damietta, Cypriot gas is an additional resource that helps ensure full utilization of these plants and increases economic returns.
Geopolitically, cooperation with Cyprus strengthens Egypt’s network of alliances in the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating Cairo’s ability to build alternative and stable partnerships outside Israeli or Turkish pressures. Integrating Cyprus into Egypt’s energy equation also reinforces Egypt’s regional role as a key intermediary between Eastern Mediterranean states and Europe, magnifying its influence on strategic issues and giving it greater room for maneuver in the face of regional crises.
Is It Possible?
Although Cypriot gas presents itself as a strategic option for Egypt, the essential question remains: how realistic is it as a direct alternative to Israeli gas? From a technical perspective, the infrastructure needed to transport Cypriot gas to Egypt is still in its early stages and requires massive investments and broad regional cooperation. This makes relying on it fully in the short term impossible. At the same time, the political dimension of this option cannot be overlooked: Cypriot gas serves as a pressure card for Cairo, brandished both before Tel Aviv and European partners. The mere demonstration of alternatives enhances Egypt’s negotiating capacity and grants it wider room to maneuver in the face of Israeli threats to cut supplies. Thus, Cypriot gas does not currently constitute a full and realistic substitute, but it is a strategic option that provides Egypt with an element of energy security and is wielded as a smart political tool in the game of regional balances.
Fadi Eid, a political analyst specializing in Middle Eastern and North African affairs, believes that relying on Cyprus for gas remains limited, given the lack of large volumes sufficient to meet regional needs. He stresses that Cyprus’s reserves cannot be compared with the massive gas fields in Egypt and Israel or with other sources in the Eastern Mediterranean. He adds that Cyprus has opened its doors wide to cooperation with Israel, making it more tied to Israeli interests than to any other party, while Cairo approaches the issue with extreme caution.
Eid further told Zawia3 that Israel’s heavy presence in the Eastern Mediterranean poses a clear threat, especially to Northern (Turkish) Cyprus. Cyprus finds itself squeezed between two pressures: from the east, Turkey, and from the west, Israel. He pointed out that in the event of direct confrontation between Israel and Turkey, Lebanon would inevitably become part of this complex picture, with repercussions for the entire regional balance.
He added that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is trying to counter Greek moves at sea, particularly amid increasing cooperation between Greece and Israel. This, he said, reflects the magnitude of the geopolitical struggle in the region. Eid emphasized that these dynamics expose Cyprus’s vulnerability and its lack of significant energy resources that could form a true strategic bet for Egypt or other Eastern Mediterranean countries. He noted that Egypt needs partners with large, tangible gas reserves it can depend on—such as Algeria, Qatar, or Iran—rather than betting on Cyprus’s limited resources. He concluded that relying on Cyprus alone does not achieve the energy security Cairo seeks, stressing the need to approach the issue from both political and economic angles.
For its part, the European Union pays close attention to the trilateral cooperation between Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece, viewing it as a strategic opportunity to secure its energy needs away from Russia. This partnership has extended beyond energy, encompassing security and political cooperation as well, with a regular mechanism institutionalized through periodic summits between the three leaders.
The energy file in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot be discussed in isolation from Turkey’s role, which remains one of the most influential factors shaping any regional cooperation project. Ankara considers the agreements signed between Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece an encroachment on its maritime rights, based on its own interpretation of maritime border demarcation, which contradicts the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In recent years, Turkey has sent exploration vessels into disputed areas and at times threatened to disrupt Cypriot gas projects.
From this standpoint, Egypt–Cyprus cooperation constitutes a direct challenge to Ankara’s policies, showing that Cairo seeks to build a regional axis capable of containing Turkish ambitions. Should gas projects between Egypt and Cyprus move forward practically, they would directly impact Turkish influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly as the European Union views Turkey’s moves with concern and sees Egypt–Cyprus cooperation as a more stable and viable alternative.
In conclusion, a review of the trajectory of Egypt–Cyprus cooperation shows that gas in the Eastern Mediterranean is no longer merely an economic file but has become a strategic tool that defines regional power balances. Egypt, currently importing gas from Israel, finds itself compelled to search for alternatives that ensure energy stability and strengthen its ability to withstand political pressures. In this context, Cypriot gas represents a strategic option—not necessarily a full alternative, but a card that adds to Egypt’s negotiating strength and enhances its ability to build regional and international alliances.
Moreover, the European Union sees Egypt–Cyprus cooperation as a guarantee of its energy security, while Turkey views it as a direct challenge to its ambitions. Domestically, Cairo’s success in diversifying its sources and reinforcing its role as a regional energy hub adds to its political and economic capital in confronting present challenges. Accordingly, the future of cooperation with Cyprus goes beyond gas and supplies, becoming part of Egypt’s broader vision to consolidate its strategic independence and entrench its place in the global energy equation.
