From Sukuk to Debt Repayment: Egypt’s Presidential Amendment Puts 26,700 Feddans on the Red Sea on the Debt Ledger

Egypt expands the use of 26,700 Red Sea feddans to public debt reduction alongside sovereign sukuk.
Editorial collage of the Red Sea coast turning into a financial document, illustrating land use in debt management.
Picture of Rasha Ammar

Rasha Ammar

President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has amended the purpose for which a state-owned plot in Red Sea governorate, covering approximately 26,690.45 feddans, was allocated to the Ministry of Finance. It may now be used to “reduce the state’s public debt” as well as to issue sovereign sukuk, whereas the original allocation was restricted to sukuk alone.

The amendment was introduced through Presidential Decree No. 448 of 2026, published in issue 44 bis (C) of the Official Gazette on 1 November. It replaced Article 1 of Presidential Decree No. 222 of 2026, published on 10 June. The new article allocates the area, equivalent to 112,122,142 square metres, according to the attached plan and coordinate table, “for use in reducing the state’s public debt and issuing sovereign sukuk” under the relevant laws and regulations. Article 2 requires the decree to be deposited, free of charge, at the competent real estate registration office, with all the legal effects of registration ensuing. The new decree did not add a single feddan to the allocation; it merely expanded the permitted uses of the same land. Under this partial amendment, the remaining provisions of the original decree remain in force. According to published accounts, these include preserving any pre-existing legal positions or contracts and the Armed Forces retaining ownership of strategic land of military significance within the allocated area, a condition explicitly stated in Article 2 of the Ras Shukeir decree.

This is the second decree of its kind in 17 months. In June 2025, Presidential Decree No. 303 of 2025 allocated 41,515.55 feddans, approximately 174.4 million square metres, in Ras Shukeir on the Red Sea coast to the Ministry of Finance for the same two purposes: reducing public debt and issuing sovereign sukuk. Together, the two decrees bring the total land allocated to the ministry in the governorate to 68,206 feddans, approximately 286.5 million square metres, according to Zawia3’s calculations. MP Mohamed Fouad, head of the Justice Party’s parliamentary bloc and a member of the House of Representatives’ Economic Affairs Committee, said the May decree had restricted the land’s use to issuing sovereign sukuk, while the November decree aligned its treatment with that of the Ras Shukeir land. He added that the allocation rests on the Sovereign Sukuk Law and grants usufruct rights rather than constituting a sale.

Following the amended decree, the Ministry of Finance said that state land on the Red Sea allocated to debt reduction “will be directed towards investment and partnerships”, within an asset and liability management strategy and a “strategic plan for developing the Red Sea region”. It outlined three avenues: offering usufruct rights or establishing investment projects in partnership with the private sector; “exchanging part of the investments for outstanding debts”; and directing the economic returns from these investments towards reducing government indebtedness and debt-service burdens, while the state retains ownership of the land. After the Ras Shukeir decree, the ministry had announced that allocation did not mean selling the land or transferring ownership, and that its use would follow two tracks: using part of it as backing for sukuk issues, and entering investment partnerships over the remainder with government entities operating in the financial sector and economic authorities, “to replace part of the existing debt owed by budget-sector entities” to those bodies in return for stakes in productive, tourism and real estate projects. At the time of writing, the government had announced neither a timetable nor a valuation of the land, nor what had become of the Ras Shukeir land 17 months after its allocation.

A Falling Debt Ratio and Rising Servicing Costs

Reducing public debt burdens and diversifying financing sources are among the government’s fiscal policy priorities. On 29 September 2026, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly said that the ratio of budget-sector debt to gross domestic product had fallen to approximately 81.8% by the end of fiscal year 2025/2026, compared with about 95.7% in 2022/2023. The target is to reduce it to around 78% by the end of the current fiscal year and to 75% within three years. On 11 November, Finance Minister Ahmed Kouchouk presented to Madbouly a decline in budget-sector debt of approximately 14 percentage points of GDP between June 2023 and June 2026. The outcomes of “Egypt Forum 2026” target a reduction to around 69.5% of GDP by 2030, while adhering to specified ceilings for public debt, external debt and sovereign guarantees. Madbouly instructed officials to prepare a detailed plan defining each ministry’s responsibilities for submission to the president. Press reports have estimated this reduction at around 12 percentage points over the past two years. The government relies on primary surpluses, increased tax revenue, longer debt maturities and diversified domestic and international financing instruments, including bonds and sovereign sukuk, to meet its targets. The Ministry of Finance’s medium-term fiscal strategy and its 2026/2029 debt management strategy target a reduction in the ratio to 75.2% in fiscal year 2027/2028, then to a range of 71% to 73% by 2028/2029.

However, the government’s chosen indicator is budget-sector debt, the narrowest measure of indebtedness, excluding the Central Bank and economic authorities such as the petroleum authority. This debt stood at EGP 17.85 trillion, approximately USD 322 billion, at the end of March 2026, equivalent to 83.9% of GDP according to the data for that period. External debt, meanwhile, reached USD 166.75 billion at the end of June 2026. Debt-servicing costs remain the heaviest constraint on the state’s ability to direct spending towards essential sectors. According to Ministry of Finance data, debt interest absorbed 60.3% of total expenditure during the first two months of the current fiscal year, 2026/2027, and 96.1% of revenue over the same period. In fiscal year 2024/2025, interest in the final accounts amounted to approximately EGP 1.919 trillion against revenue of around EGP 2.64 trillion, or about 72% of revenue according to Zawia3’s calculations. The proportion rose to 96.4% during the first five months of fiscal year 2025/2026, with interest of approximately EGP 1.06 trillion against revenue of around EGP 1.1 trillion. The government says reducing these burdens would create greater fiscal space for spending on education, healthcare and basic services.

On external debt, Egypt paid USD 12.3 billion in servicing costs during the third quarter of fiscal year 2025/2026, January to March 2026, and USD 28.3 billion during the first nine months of that fiscal year, including approximately USD 22.3 billion in principal repayments and around USD 6 billion in interest. In the current fiscal year, the Ministry of Finance borrowed approximately EGP 4.3 trillion domestically, around USD 77.5 billion, during the first four months of 2026/2027, July to October, most of it to refinance maturing debt. World Bank data indicate external debt payments of approximately USD 60.9 billion falling due in fiscal year 2026/2027, including around USD 53.83 billion in loan principal and USD 7.1 billion in interest. This increases short-term financing needs and makes the fiscal position more sensitive to external shocks or disruptions in capital flows. This comes despite Standard & Poor’s upgrading Egypt’s credit rating in October 2025 for the first time in seven years, followed by Moody’s raising the rating one notch from Caa1 to B3 on 16 October 2026 while maintaining a positive outlook.

Sukuk: New Financing, Not Automatic Repayment

Law No. 138 of 2021 and its executive regulations govern sovereign sukuk issuance. Their structure rests on assets privately owned by the state, most of which are used by granting usufruct rights without ownership of the underlying asset, leasing them, or employing other arrangements compatible with the issuance contract. Each sukuk has a maximum term of 30 years, in return for periodic investor payments and settlement of rights at maturity, without transferring ownership of the asset itself. Egypt first used this instrument in international markets in February 2023 with a USD 1.5 billion issue. It then issued a second USD 1 billion sukuk in June 2025 with a three-year term and a 7.875% yield, subscribed to by Kuwait Finance House. This was followed in October 2025 by a USD 1.5 billion issue in two tranches, then another USD 1.5 billion with a three-year term in the first phase of a USD 5 billion international sukuk programme, announced on 18 June 2026, eight days after publication of the original allocation decree. Domestically, the ministry launched an EGP 200 billion sovereign sukuk programme in late 2025, having expanded it from EGP 25 billion. Its first offering amounted to EGP 3 billion with a three-year term.

Monetising the benefits of land through sukuk does not automatically reduce indebtedness. At its core, a sukuk is a financing instrument that creates a new financial obligation with a specified return and repayment term. Its net impact depends on where the proceeds go: if used to repay existing debt that is more expensive or imposes a longer-lasting burden, it can save on debt servicing and improve the maturity structure. If directed towards new financing gaps without reducing the existing stock, total liabilities will not decline. Mohamed Anis, a member of the Egyptian Society of Economics and Legislation, believes the main motivation for the decree is the preference of sukuk buyers, mostly Arab states and institutions, for instruments backed by real assets. He adds that Egypt no longer faces the same economic pressures it experienced between 2022 and 2024, requiring assets to be managed according to sound investment principles.

On 13 November, Fouad submitted a parliamentary request for information to the finance minister concerning the rules governing the use of Red Sea land for sukuk issuance and debt reduction. He called for a distinction between issuing sovereign sukuk and exchanging existing debt for state assets, and for the legal basis of each to be clarified. Fouad asked how the June 2025 sukuk related to the allocated land, which usufruct rights had been used, how the proceeds were spent, and whether the issuance complied with the Sukuk Law. He noted that the government measures reductions using “budget-sector debt”, whereas the Unified Public Finance Law, amended by Law No. 18 of 2024, adopts the broader concept of “general government debt”, including the debt of economic authorities after eliminating reciprocal balances. The 2026/2027 Budget Appropriation Law sets a ceiling for this net debt. He concluded that transferring a government liability to another government entity does not necessarily reduce consolidated debt, and that using assets should be assessed by its net impact on public liabilities and servicing costs.

Non-Renewable Assets Against Renewing Debt

Fouad, an economist, tells Zawia3 that the decree amended the one issued in May, and that Egypt’s economic problem extends beyond high debt levels to two structural imbalances: the state’s weak revenue-generating capacity and the absence of integrated management of general government debt as a single financial unit. He believes asset-for-debt swaps may ease financial burdens in the short term but do not address the causes of accumulated indebtedness. He warns against turning the use of state assets into a permanent substitute for fiscal reform, consuming the stock of public wealth to improve liquidity without addressing the imbalances in financial flows that continually generate debt.

He adds that the problem is not using state assets to repay debt once, but being forced to repeat the process whenever a new financing gap appears. The state cannot rely indefinitely on non-renewable assets to meet continuously renewing obligations. Fouad distinguishes between selling an asset to repay expensive debt, which may be rational if the cost of that debt exceeds the expected return from retaining the asset, and repeatedly disposing of assets to cover financing deficits. The latter, in his view, raises serious questions about fiscal sustainability because it means exchanging financial solvency for short-term liquidity.

In a televised interview on 14 November, Fouad said land-utilisation deals do not cover 10% of public debt: a deal worth USD 24 billion to USD 34 billion is equivalent to approximately EGP 1.8 trillion, or around 8% of the roughly EGP 21.93 trillion debt ceiling set by the Budget Appropriation Law. Such deals give public finances “breathing space” without resolving the problem, particularly as debt continues to rise. He pointed to the lack of a clear operational plan for the allocated land approximately 17 months after the issue was first raised, calling for disclosure of the planned projects, contracted companies and intended activities. He distinguished between selling a stake in an existing business, such as the state’s stake in Banque du Caire, and disposing of land, a non-renewable asset.

Gulf of Suez: Land Defined by Undisclosed Coordinates

Press reports quoted sources in Red Sea governorate as saying the land lies between Ras Gharib and Zaafarana and has a coastal frontage of approximately 15 kilometres on the Gulf of Suez. However, the officially published text of Decree No. 448 of 2026 did not name those areas, merely describing the land as located “in Red Sea governorate according to the attached plan and coordinate table”. Neither the plan nor the coordinate table was made available with the published text, preventing researchers, urban planners and local communities from verifying the land’s characteristics and its proximity to nature reserves, residential areas or development clusters. If its coastal frontage is confirmed, its valuation will depend on its ability to attract tourism, service or energy projects, the availability of infrastructure, and environmental, planning, legal and security restrictions affecting parts of it. This is in a governorate whose coastline brings together tourism, ports, logistics, renewable energy and mining. On 10 August 2026, Sisi directed that any structures within 200 metres of the shoreline require prior approval from the competent authorities, that a committee be formed to guarantee citizens’ access to beaches, and that the laws and decrees governing land allocated to coastal tourism activities be enforced.

Ibrahim Ezz El-Din, senior researcher and co-founder of Diwan Al-Omran, believes that allocating public land to the Ministry of Finance for public debt management and sukuk issuance raises questions about how using land for financial purposes aligns with the state’s own long-term development strategies. The National Strategic Plan for Urban Development through 2052 identifies priority development areas, including Zaafarana and the Gulf of Suez, to channel investment towards economic and social development and spatial balance. If the land is indeed within this area, the decree therefore raises the question of whether reallocating it for debt management is consistent with the area’s objectives. Ezz El-Din warns that financing needs could become the primary driver of land-allocation decisions and their permitted uses, turning land-use decisions from a tool for implementing a long-term development strategy into a response to budget pressures and short-term financial needs.

These concerns are heightened, according to Ezz El-Din, because reallocation decrees contain no explicit provisions requiring the entities that will use the land to adhere to the planning standards and priorities adopted by the state. Nor do they clarify future uses or mechanisms to ensure compatibility with approved plans, leaving the land’s future open to multiple possibilities. He asks how any potential conflict between the investment requirements of the entities using the land and the priorities set in strategic plans would be handled: would implementing the state’s development vision take precedence, or would that vision be amended to accommodate the requirements of the investor providing the financing? He stresses that this does not necessarily mean an actual conflict exists between the decree and the strategic plan. The absence of an explicit requirement to comply with plans does not extinguish planning obligations established by law and approved plans, but it reveals a lack of clarity and publicly stated guarantees about the future of this land.

Ezz El-Din emphasises that public land is not merely real estate valued by the price per square metre or the expected financial return. It is a strategic resource with developmental, social and environmental value, tied to future development opportunities and local communities’ rights to benefit from their resources. In his view, protecting the public interest therefore requires more than the state retaining ownership. It requires guarantees including explicit compliance with approved strategic plans and planning standards, disclosure of future uses, and subjecting any substantial change to a publicly disclosed development and environmental assessment. Success in managing public land should be measured by its contribution to sustainable development and by ensuring citizens benefit over the long term, not merely by how much it provides to the budget.

Better External Liquidity, a Budget Under Pressure

The decree coincides with the International Monetary Fund programme nearing its end in December, with the eighth and final review, and Egypt’s transition to a post-IMF phase. In an earlier statement to Zawia3, Ahmed Aboud, professor of economics and finance at Britain’s University of Portsmouth, said the course of Egypt’s economy through mid-2027 remains dependent on three factors: political stability, regional developments and the volume of foreign capital inflows. He outlined two scenarios. The first is the state successfully attracting enough investment and financing to strengthen dollar liquidity and reserves, translating into gradual growth, steadily declining inflation and more effective monetary policy. The second involves external shocks, such as rising global energy prices, a continued decline in Suez Canal revenues, and slower foreign direct investment due to geopolitical tensions. That path would intensify pressure on the currency and growth rates and could again force the state to arrange new financing packages through the IMF or alternative channels.

The latest indicators show external improvement alongside domestic financial and cost-of-living pressures. Net international reserves reached USD 57.35 billion at the end of September, up 15.8% year on year and covering more than eight months of imports, before rising to approximately USD 57.5 billion at the end of October. Remittances from Egyptians working abroad totalled USD 33.9 billion during the first eight months of 2026, up 27.2% year on year. Yet despite annual urban inflation falling from 13.9% in September to 12.7% in October, and core inflation from 14.1% to 13.1%, the interest bill continues to consume the largest share of public revenue, limiting the state’s ability to direct spending towards productive sectors and basic services.

At the time of writing, the Ministry of Finance had published neither a response to the parliamentary request for information nor a statement clarifying whether either plot had already been used to back sukuk issuance or in debt swaps, or what actual reduction in the debt stock the Ras Shukeir allocation had achieved.

Add Zawia3 to your preferred sources on Google

Rasha Ammar
Egyptian journalist who has worked for several Egyptian and Arab news sites, focusing on political affairs and social issues

Search