Many observers of the situation in Egypt believe that there is an increasing likelihood of a large-scale explosion that could affect the state’s ability to perform its primary duties in maintaining public order and security. The scenes of the “Friday of Anger” (January 28, 2011) are still vivid in the minds of many Egyptians. On that day, security forces and police withdrew in the face of massive demonstrations that erupted in various areas of the Egyptian capital and other cities. The protests were accompanied by attacks on police stations and security headquarters, some of which were burned down, while some prisons were broken into and others were opened, leading to chaos and a breakdown of public security. Citizens had to spontaneously and chaotically organize themselves to protect their neighborhoods and homes until the armed forces completed their deployment plan, followed by measures to restore the police force as a civilian body responsible for maintaining public security.
These scenes are often recalled in public political discourse to warn against the consequences of a repeat of the events that occurred during what is now known in political literature as the “January 25 Revolution.” The official narrative portrays it as a foreign conspiracy targeting Egypt’s security and stability, within the context of what is called fourth and fifth-generation warfare, with constant reminders of the situation in neighboring countries like Sudan, Yemen, Syria, or Libya. The message here is to accept the status quo because the alternative is chaos and insecurity.
However, the political unrest witnessed in Bangladesh, a predominantly Muslim country in the Indian subcontinent, located in South Asia between China and India, raises significant questions about the stability of countries whose governments pursue policies that exacerbate social divisions and popular discontent, and about the potential scenarios that could result from a power vacuum, as noted by political and social scientists. These scenarios include the possibility of undemocratic groups seizing power, increased reliance on the military in state management, and the reinforcement of a military governance pattern. Additionally, the emergence of social and political forces inclined towards extremism in response to the aftermath of a ruler’s overthrow could have regional and possibly international consequences.
The events in Bangladesh have provided further arguments supporting the growing belief among many political and social actors that civilian governments are unable to address the pressing problems of large segments of the population. They also present several potential scenarios for political change in societies facing crises due to internal and external challenges, as well as the inability of their governments to gain the approval of the governed.
Despite the significant risks associated with any attempt to change governments by force or through escalating popular protests, the continuation of the current situation and the policies in place often entail even greater risks, as noted by political and social scientists. These policies may lead to spontaneous protests, violent disturbances, and chaos that no power can control, a scenario warned of by figures in opposition parties and many observers of political and social developments in Egypt.
The Egyptian presidential candidate, Farid Zahran, warned during his first press conference to announce his candidacy on October 3, 2023, and during his second press conference to announce his electoral program on November 9, 2023, of the consequences of the current policies, stating that they could lead to chaos. He pointed out the absence of political forces capable of containing and managing such chaos, unlike in 2011, in reference to the political vacuum that Egypt suffers from.
The path that Egypt has taken since 2011 underscores the dangers of the absence of political life, as warned by a report from the International Crisis Group, a prestigious international research institution based in Brussels, published in September 2003, months after the US invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party. The report, titled “The Challenge of Political Reform: Egypt after the Iraq War,” highlighted the close connection between the absence of credible political life in Egypt, and most countries in the region, with issues affecting the long-term stability of these states, even if this absence does not necessarily lead to violent conflicts. The pressures for change that peaked in the 2011 uprisings were another missed opportunity to effect radical changes that could address these issues and the imbalances in the relationship between the components of the political system on the one hand, and between the state and society on the other. The challenges related to rebuilding the state’s structures inherited from the colonial era in a way that allows for the development of societies, known in political development literature as the problems of state-building, form a third aspect of these challenges.
Three Possible Scenarios
These three issues related to the absence of political life determine the possible future scenarios in Egypt and other countries in the region. In general, three scenarios can be discussed regarding the possible paths for political development in Egypt in the short and medium term. The first scenario is managed reform, which maintains the status quo of power relations in the political system and society, aiming to alleviate tensions to prevent an explosion without changing any of the policies pursued by the government. These policies reflect its vision for political change for the future, regardless of the heavy social costs of these changes and the restructuring of society in favor of a new social class that controls wealth and is integrated with global economic centers, controlling vast financial resources, and continually impoverishing segments of the middle class as the economy fully transitions from a productive economy to a service economy that performs specific functions in the global capitalist system. The ruling elite does not recognize the catastrophic consequences of this new social class’s behavior, most of whom made their wealth through real estate speculation and investment in international stock markets or by joining large international companies. Nor does it recognize the dangers of the severe income disparities and the social divisions these policies create. These policies are reinforced by a series of security legislation and measures to deal with dissenting and discontented voices, increasing repression and the suppression of freedoms.
Due to the nature of the political system that concentrates power in the hands of the President of the Republic, it is impossible to know whether these political choices are linked to the orientations of a political and social elite or if they only reflect the president’s orientations and vision. However, there is no doubt that there are social forces benefiting from these policies and defending them. Moreover, these policies lead to further deterioration in the living standards of the vast majority of Egyptians and to the disintegration of the political system, while deepening class contradictions increases the likelihood of violent social conflict.
The second scenario is the triumph of the reformist current within the political system and addressing the problem of the absence of political life as a crisis the system suffers from, rather than as an opportunity it seeks to exploit. One of the major reasons linked to this problem, and also one of the major consequences of its persistence, is related to the concept of the state, which has undergone many changes due to technological and scientific advancements and the complexity of the global capitalist system with the rise of globalization. The world has moved beyond the concept of the state in favor of more complex forms of effective management, associated with the concept of good governance. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has criticized, on more than one occasion, the prevailing concepts of the state. These criticisms seem to be linked to structural and cultural factors, the legacy of social, cultural, and political despotism, and the entrenched patriarchal culture in society. They are also directed to some extent at the central state bureaucracy. The question is whether these criticisms target the concept of the national state linked to the culture of military and security bureaucracy, and whether these criticisms could have any impact in light of the inability of civil currents to develop a practical concept for democratic transition based on specific executive mechanisms and a vision for developing democratic civil state institutions. Can these criticisms help formulate an alternative that could break the long-standing cycle of power struggle, where the state and its hard core confront the Muslim Brotherhood, as the most organized wing of the Islamic movement, which derives its legitimacy from religious discourse that resonates with the socially dominant conservative forces? This duality has often led to a state of polarization, which dissipates when internal contradictions intensify, opening the door to a radical transformation in power relations.
Despite the president’s awareness of the weakness of political forces in Egypt and his repeated statements about relying on popular support to compensate for the absence of political backing, it remains unclear to what extent the absence of political support is one of the main reasons hindering political and cultural reform, and the failure to take bold steps to achieve this reform, despite the president’s repeated attempts to push for these necessary reforms to transition to a democratic civil state. The conservative forces in society and the religious current remain a major source of legitimacy, and the authority is careful not to antagonize these forces, at least by moving forward with steps that do not have their approval and support. As a result, the idea of comprehensive cultural and institutional reform has been scaled back to the idea of managed change with calculated and cautious steps.
It may be useful to study the impact of such policies on similar societies, such as Moroccan society, which presents another model of political management biased towards social classes that dominate power, and the expansion of security measures to prevent protests against the social consequences of these policies under the pretext of “maintaining public order.” This situation has led to the transformation of social and labor struggles against the massive rise in food prices into political struggles denouncing repression, the stifling of freedom of expression, and practices that are contrary to and incompatible with the constitution. It has also highlighted the social contradictions between those who dominate Morocco’s wealth, numbering fewer than ten individuals, including the Prime Minister, who owns fuel stations, and the millions of Moroccans living in slums and shanty towns without the basic necessities of a decent life. While it is true that Egypt’s government policies and programs to eradicate slums and implement social assistance programs, such as the “Decent Life” program, are successful in masking the growing social gap, they will not last long unless supported by human development programs, plans for a productive economy, job creation, and poverty alleviation plans, which are economic challenges that are difficult to address to achieve social justice.
Political Reform or Managed Change?
The third scenario, which is unlikely to materialize in the near or medium term based on the analysis of the outcomes of the national dialogue, is the scenario of political reform that lays the foundations and necessary components for a transition to a democratic civil system. This system would form the basis for a stable system where power is rotated. However, the political system established after the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of the republic, where the military plays a central role in supporting and maintaining it, has shown no intention of transitioning to a democratic constitutional civil system based on the principle of popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and overseeing a political development program that addresses the three mentioned imbalances, primarily the imbalance in relations between the state and society. The balance between the state and society, specifically between society and the political system, is the cornerstone of any desired political stability and the foundation for reforming civil-military relations, which is one of the main issues in state-building and the establishment of democratic civil governance.
Here, the model of the centralized state, with its deep-rooted historical legacy in Egyptian history, stands as an obstacle to such a transformation. The late Egyptian political scientist Nazih Ayubi (1944-1995) believed that the centralized state and the inflation of the state at the expense of society is one of the major obstacles to political development in Egypt and other Arab countries. However, his analysis of the concept of the state and its formation in the Arab region, and the structure of society, reveals other more fundamental imbalances that influence prevailing conceptions of authority. These imbalances allow religiously-oriented political movements to expand to fill the void created by the suppression of political parties and the nationalization of political work, or even the use of these groups when necessary to legitimize the regime in the face of potential popular uprisings, social protests against the regime’s policies, or to counter external pressures. This thesis is linked to the elevation of the state’s administrative role at the expense of its political function, expressed through the promotion of the technocratic concept as a substitute for the political concept, which reinforces the reality of the absence of political life.
Many of the issues related to practices that have undermined the concept of the rule of law and the legal state are connected to the entrenched concept of the inflated centralized state, whose institutions often tend to favor the logic of power over the logic of law and justice. This is associated with the prevalence of corruption resulting from the social alliances of power, which often perceive the law and constitution as constraints on their freedom of movement and their ability to manage society, tying their hands in directing resources as they see fit and in serving the social interests they favor, prioritizing them over any other interests or concepts of priorities. The mechanisms for imposing these decisions have increasingly shifted from methods and tools of persuasion and negotiation with the social forces affected by these decisions, which were relied upon in the past, to the use of coercive force and repression of the affected forces. However, the most significant observation is that these previous practices relied on widespread acceptance among the middle classes in general, and the urban middle classes in particular, of the military’s central role in political life and state management, and their acceptance of this role.
There is little hope for any change in the pattern of civil-military relations in Egypt in the medium term, and this change will only occur through a series of negotiations to resolve the current crisis, which will likely be imposed by internal social pressures and external pressures linked to major regional and global investment interests.
What happened following President Hosni Mubarak’s decision on February 11, 2011, to step down from power and delegate the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to manage the country’s affairs is a repetition of the scenario of military intervention to support the regime, which occurred in 1977 (after the popular bread uprising) and in 1986 (after the Central Security Forces events). This role of the military was reinforced by the amendment made in 2019 to the first paragraph of Article 200 of the 2014 Constitution, which expanded the role of the armed forces to include protecting and safeguarding the constitution, democratic principles, maintaining the civil nature of the state, and safeguarding the people’s gains and the rights and freedoms of individuals. These are tasks that are at the core of the state’s civilian institutions. Although the amendment entrenched the military’s dominance over civilian institutions, it is unclear whether the amendment has precluded the possibility of a deal with elements of the Islamic movement to manage the transitional phase, as occurred in 2011, to circumvent demands for radical reforms aimed at transitioning to democratic governance.
The withdrawal from issuing a special document on women’s rights, which was supposed to be appended to the document that established the idea of the “National Democratic Constitutional Modern State” issued on May 19, 2011, as a compromise between the vision advocating for a civil constitution and the vision insisting on the religious reference of the constitution, issued within the Al-Azhar documents, is an indicator of the limits that political and cultural reform can reach. This position reflects the reality that political change in Egypt is governed by a fundamental problem: the entity capable of effecting change is the very authority targeted by this change. Understanding this issue and the challenges it presents requires defining what is meant by political change, specifying the concept of authority in general, and the concept of political authority more specifically, and the dimensions it involves related to the arrangements, relations, and interactions among its components. This paradox is evident in light of the current challenges facing the Egyptian state, including significant economic and social pressures domestically, as well as external challenges arising from regional conflicts, which exacerbate the ongoing crisis it faces and increase the likelihood of instability and institutional collapse, given the levels of violence involved in these armed conflicts and their potential for spread.
The widespread fear of a social explosion leading to political chaos is based on observations by researchers and scholars of a general deterioration in living standards resulting from the financial burdens borne by millions of Egyptian families due to economic policies that increase inflation, unemployment rates, and the severe devaluation of the local currency. These policies show a clear social bias by the authorities against the lower segments of the middle class, as reflected in the poverty level indicator, with numerous reports pointing to an increase in the percentage and numbers of poor people in Egypt in recent years, according to cost-of-living indicators issued by national and international official institutions. However, these estimates do not seem to affect the economic and social policies pursued by the government, nor is there any indication of a change in these policies despite the recent cabinet reshuffle. The decisions made before this reshuffle, particularly the decision to privatize public hospitals and the individuals chosen to fill ministerial positions, suggest that the government is moving forward with its economic reform program, ignoring the increasing talk in the past five years about potential social explosions resulting from its reluctance to intervene with a reform program to implement changes that would alleviate social and political tensions. It is clear that the strict security approach the regime uses to address these problems increases the likelihood of these mass uprisings, which will likely be accompanied by unprecedented levels of social and political violence, as indicated by predictions and estimates circulating in media reports.
These possibilities are heightened by the noticeable decline in the state’s ability to respond to the challenges imposed by developments on the regional stage, particularly the ongoing war in Gaza and the potential for it to expand into a broader regional conflict. In this context, it becomes legitimate, even urgent, to raise questions about the different scenarios for the future, how the political system will respond to pressures, and how it will deal with the available alternatives that could lead to change, allowing for the rebuilding of the political space to accommodate different political forces, establishing a framework for the peaceful transfer of power, reducing the likelihood of violence, or strengthening institutional arrangements to contain it. How can these alternatives lead to the desired democratic transition, which is a cornerstone for building a modern democratic civil state?
It also becomes necessary to warn of the risks of continuing the current policies, which show no response to these pressures and close off avenues for developing alternatives. The ongoing nationalization and restriction of political work, confining it to narrow circles loyal to the regime, and the reluctance to initiate the desired reform process that harmonizes economic reform with political reform in its legislative and institutional aspects, underscore the inability of the political system to adapt to and absorb the consequences of the economic reform that is progressing at a rapid pace. The concept of the political system here is broader than the government or the political authority, as it includes political and social elites capable of influencing their immediate environment, or what is known as the strategic elite embodied in state institutions, security agencies, political parties, and civil society organizations, such as labor and professional unions, business associations, industry federations, and traditional social structures.
It must be emphasized that the multidimensional and acute crisis cannot be addressed through a comprehensive approach, not just through immediate economic solutions. There is no longer an opportunity for an economic reform program similar to the one implemented by Atef Sedki’s government in the early years of President Hosni Mubarak’s rule. It is no longer sufficient to reform the macroeconomic and financial indicators of the Egyptian economy, nor is it possible to rely on expanding public spending to achieve tangible results in improving household livelihoods and the economy, especially since most of this spending comes from borrowing, adding more burdens in the medium and long term, and exacerbating problems rather than solving them. The indicators of the economic and social crisis form a ticking time bomb due to the accelerated social collapse accompanying the regime’s inability to take any action to avert it, warning of a social explosion at any moment. The transformations are no longer limited to the rise in poverty, unemployment, and migration rates, but also a worrying escalation of violence in its various forms.
However, the problem is that the forces presenting themselves as alternatives to the existing regime, if any, are not yet ready and do not offer convincing alternatives to the public. The ruling authority still benefits from the entrenchment of the clientelist system on which it relies to deal with the opposition. It is unlikely that changing the government at all levels will bring about the desired change—a democratic civil system—unless it addresses the values underpinning the existing regime and chooses the optimal system for rebuilding the political space. It may be worth considering the parliamentary republic model proposed by Egyptian political elites in the 1954 draft constitution, which was discarded, as a way out of this situation, or other alternatives that reinforce the idea of constitutional governance and the rule of law, reviving the dead political life.
