In early May, the Egyptian government announced the signing of an agreement with Dubai Ports Authority granting it long-term usufruct rights over several zones within the core area of the Suez Canal Economic Zone. According to Cairo’s official statement, the agreement is part of what it described as “expanding strategic partnerships with Gulf countries.” The disclosed terms include the development of industrial and logistical zones, as well as the management and operation of certain ports located in the southern extension of the canal. The agreement grants the Emirati authority a 50-year renewable usufruct in exchange for 15% of the project’s total revenue.
In recent years, Emirati presence in Egypt’s port sector has expanded significantly through direct investments and long-term operational partnerships. These investments currently include six of Egypt’s sixteen state-owned commercial civilian ports. Emirati activity has not been limited to container terminal operations—it has also extended to the acquisition of local companies working in regional shipping, logistics services, and loading and unloading operations. Emirati entities have also signed long-term concession agreements to develop and operate facilities dedicated to cruise ships at several Red Sea ports, including Safaga, Hurghada, Ain Sokhna, and Sharm El-Sheikh—reflecting the growing influence Abu Dhabi has gained in Egypt’s maritime transport sector.
Dubai Ports is one of the most prominent Emirati entities that has solidified its presence in this sector, particularly through its management of the container terminal at Ain Sokhna Port, a strategic hub south of the Suez Canal, where it holds 90% of operational concession rights—one of its largest investments outside the UAE. In addition, other Emirati companies have expanded their footprint through agreements to develop and manage logistical and industrial zones linked to ports like Adabiya and East Port Said. Advanced negotiations are also underway concerning investments in Arish Port and other ports along Egypt’s Mediterranean coast. These developments run in parallel with plans to invest in dry ports and inland logistics hubs, positioning Abu Dhabi in a near-dominant role over Egypt’s maritime shipping and logistics infrastructure in key strategic areas.
Despite the Egyptian government’s consistent welcome of Gulf investments, this rapid expansion has sparked growing questions about the balance between economic partnership and geopolitical influence—particularly given the strategic importance of some of these ports, which go beyond commercial value and form part of Egypt’s national security infrastructure and vital international trade routes.
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Do UAE Investments in the Suez Canal Conflict with Its Strategic Interests?
The growing role of the United Arab Emirates within the Suez Canal Economic Zone raises critical questions about the nature of the relationship between Egypt’s canal development project and the UAE’s broader strategy to bolster the position of Jebel Ali Port. The Egyptian waterway is a direct competitor to the Emirati port in terms of shipping traffic and attracting logistical investments. From an economic standpoint, it is difficult to separate their interests—unless they are, in fact, in conflict.
The UAE promotes Jebel Ali Port in Dubai as one of the Middle East’s most prominent commercial hubs and describes it as a vital node in global supply chains. Ironically, it is operated by Dubai Ports World—the same company granted usufruct rights to develop parts of the Suez Canal Economic Zone. For years, the UAE has worked to position Jebel Ali as a gateway for goods flowing between Asia, Africa, and Europe, capitalizing on its strategic location, advanced infrastructure, and favorable economic policies.
Concerns are mounting that granting the UAE development or operational control over key areas within the canal zone may lead to the intentional slowing of certain infrastructure projects or a redirection of cargo flows toward Gulf ports. Dubai Ports is known for its global strategy of operating multiple ports simultaneously to ensure distributed control over maritime trade routes and coordinate shipping patterns in ways that serve its own commercial priorities.
This concern was echoed by economics professor Alia El Mahdy, who said: “I find it difficult to accept the idea of the UAE entering into a major project within the Suez Canal Economic Zone for two main reasons. First, this move seems contradictory to the UAE’s own interest. Developing the Suez Canal as a global logistics and trade hub could negatively affect Jebel Ali Port, which is Dubai’s most important strategic port. It simply makes no sense for the UAE to help strengthen a direct competitor.”
For years, the UAE has also backed a project known as the India–Europe Economic Corridor, which starts in Mumbai, passes through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, then reaches Haifa Port on the occupied Palestinian coast, before crossing the Mediterranean to Europe. The corridor, supported by the United States, is seen as a strategic alternative to the Suez Canal—particularly in the context of global shipping disruptions and the search for safer and more cost-effective trade routes.
In a post on her social media page, El Mahdy elaborated: “Second, the UAE is a leading supporter of the alternative trade route that begins in Mumbai and passes through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to Israel, and then to Europe. This corridor is designed as a strategic alternative to the Suez Canal, which raises serious doubts about the UAE’s true motives in investing in the canal corridor. Frankly, I do not trust the UAE’s intentions in this matter.”
Controversy Over the UAE’s Acquisition of Egyptian Assets
In an interview with Zawia3, economic expert and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Popular Socialist Alliance Party, Zuhdi El-Shami, criticized what he described as the UAE’s growing “penetration” into Egypt’s vital economic sectors. He stated that the Egyptian government is moving forward in relinquishing key levers of the national economy to the UAE through a series of agreements that target strategic sectors—most notably ports, supply chains, and trade.
El-Shami warned that this trajectory poses serious risks, arguing that the government is pursuing a path that contradicts Egypt’s national interests and threatens its economic security. “There are sectors that have been dangerously infiltrated by the UAE, including the health and pharmaceutical sectors—areas that directly impact Egypt’s economic sovereignty,” he said. “But the greatest threat lies in the file of ports, trade routes, and supply chains, where the extent of Emirati penetration into this system has become undeniable.” He noted a direct conflict of interest between the two countries, especially as Egypt works to develop the Suez Canal area as a global logistics hub—while the UAE owns and seeks to elevate Jebel Ali Port as a competing regional gateway.
In his conversation with Zawia3, El-Shami questioned: “How can we hand over the corridor that is supposed to be our point of strength? Instead of developing our own route, we find ourselves surrendering strategic projects to a direct competitor. It defies logic and raises alarm.” He also highlighted the lack of transparency surrounding the signed contracts, pointing out that official discourse was limited to a mere “memorandum of understanding,” with no disclosure of financial terms, revenue shares, or contract durations. “Some contracts extend to 50 years, and 15 years of revenue is supposedly paid upfront—without any clarity on the collection or distribution mechanisms—and the total amount is laughable,” he said.
El-Shami pointed to the UAE’s previous involvement in Ain Sokhna Port as a cautionary example that yielded no positive outcomes. “When a competitor takes over a strategic asset, it’s in their interest to stunt its growth—not develop it,” he said. “The head of the General Authority for the Suez Canal Economic Zone mentioned a new agreement, but offered no details. We don’t know what we’ll gain—if we gain anything at all.”
The economist and politician continued: “What’s happening now amounts to a full handover of Egypt’s ports. There are also reports about similar deals involving Alexandria Port. So the real question is: what will remain of Egypt’s strategic assets?” He affirmed that the government is surrendering state-owned assets to foreign parties, fully aware of the security and economic conflicts of interest involved.
El-Shami linked these developments to regional dynamics—particularly the India–Gulf–Europe Corridor project, which he said “targets the Suez Canal and benefits Israel. It’s part of a broader trend that threatens Egypt’s national security.” He added: “This project undermines the role of the Suez Canal and offers Israel and the UAE alternative routes that could push Egypt out of the global trade map.” Criticizing the government’s silence, he said: “We are stunned—who’s managing Egypt’s national security? Who is making these decisions? Is anyone reviewing what’s happening?”
He stressed that this situation cannot be separated from Egypt’s commitments to the International Monetary Fund, which has pushed for port and airport privatization as part of a broader economic reform agenda—an agenda that, he argues, is driving Egypt to abandon public assets under the guise of reform.
El-Shami also recalled how the United States once blocked a deal for Dubai Ports to acquire U.S. ports, asking: “If America, with all its strength, rejected this, how can Egypt—facing such a fragile economic situation—agree to hand over its economic keys to the UAE?” He concluded by calling for government accountability: “This administration must be removed and held responsible. If there had been accountability years ago, we wouldn’t have reached this point of economic decline and the erosion of sovereignty.”
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Ambiguity and National Security Concerns Surround UAE Agreements in Egypt
Talat Khalil, general coordinator of the Civil Democratic Movement and a member of the Presidential Council of the Conservative Party, told Zawia3 that the agreement signed between the Suez Canal Economic Zone and the UAE grants the latter extensive usufruct rights over a large area within the industrial zone in East Port Said. He confirmed that the available details point to a major imbalance between Egypt’s returns and the UAE’s gains.
Khalil explained that “the Suez Canal Economic Zone includes an area of approximately 63 square kilometers allocated for the establishment of an industrial zone in East Port Said. The land was leveled and infrastructure installed by the zone’s administration—at a substantial cost borne by the state.” He continued: “Russia previously acquired about 5.2 square kilometers in this area under an agreement signed in 2021. But we were surprised to see the UAE granted more than 20 square kilometers in the same zone, without any clear announcement from the government about the timing or the basis of the allocation.” He emphasized that the agreement grants the UAE usufruct rights for 50 years in exchange for just 15% of the revenue, which he described as “a very low percentage in investment terms that does not reflect the real value of the location or the scale of infrastructure provided by the state.” He added: “When the state invested in public utilities for the industrial zone, the expectation was real returns for the Egyptian economy—not to hand over this area for a marginal percentage over such a long period.”
Khalil expressed concern over the UAE’s increasing role in Egypt’s economy, saying: “Our problem isn’t with investment or investors. But what’s happening now is not normal investment—it’s domination over key sectors of the state, which is alarming and extends beyond economics to directly impact national security.” He added: “The UAE is now investing in every direction in Egypt, but in reality, it is acquiring control over projects of strategic significance. What it’s doing doesn’t fall under pure investment—it is a form of dominance over vital sites, which may weaken national decision-making in the future.” He pointed out that “the area being granted to the UAE today is highly strategic—located in East Port Said, a crucial logistical location for industrial, commercial, or storage purposes. It could become a magnet for container traffic and poses a direct threat to any competing projects.”
Khalil warned that “this development closely resembles the model of Jebel Ali Free Zone in the UAE, making it hard to believe that the UAE would accept the rise of a competitor to its main free zone. That’s why the whole matter raises deep suspicion—just like most UAE-backed projects in Egypt in recent years.” He stressed: “We’re not against industrial development, but national security considerations must be respected, and investment balance must be genuinely evaluated. A 15% return over 50 years is insignificant, and this deal should not pass so easily—it carries significant strategic harm in the long run.”
The agreement—described by official Egyptian entities as “a reflection of international confidence in the capabilities of the economic zone”—reportedly includes plans for a fully integrated industrial zone featuring a multipurpose terminal, storage areas, and shipping, unloading, and handling services. It also includes an investment of over $500 million in its first phase, with promises of thousands of jobs and increased exports. However, behind these promising headlines lie serious questions about the 50-year term, the revenue share, and the project’s location in a sensitive area near the Suez Canal—prompting some observers to describe it as a form of strategic hedging by the UAE, especially given its links to competing commercial routes.
The Suez Canal Economic Zone Authority was quick to clarify that the project “does not affect the Suez Canal’s shipping lane and is not a competitor,” asserting that the site lies on the Mediterranean and is not part of the navigational route connecting the Red Sea and Mediterranean. Yet this explanation did not settle the debate, particularly since the project fits within a broader pattern of UAE moves suggesting a long-term interest in securing a foothold in regional maritime trade. From an economic sovereignty perspective, analysts questioned Egypt’s ability to enforce operational and customs oversight in the zone, and whether the agreement would truly integrate with the Canal’s ecosystem or instead create a parallel trade corridor benefiting regional actors.
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The UAE and Its Control Over African Ports
Over the past decade, the UAE has become a major player in Africa’s port sector through its key logistics arm, DP World, which has expanded operations across critical ports along both the east and west coasts of the continent. However, it has faced growing criticism for not merely acting as an investor, but for pursuing economic dominance and building geopolitical influence in what some see as a monopolistic strategy over sensitive maritime routes.
One of the most cited examples is the public dispute with Djibouti, which in 2018 canceled DP World’s concession to operate the Doraleh Terminal, one of the most important ports in the Horn of Africa. The Djiboutian government stated that the contract was “unfair” and harmed its national interests, accusing the Emirati company of obstructing the port’s development and causing economic losses. Djibouti subsequently nationalized the terminal. Although international arbitration rulings favored the UAE, Djibouti stood its ground and began developing the port in partnership with China, declaring that UAE investments were more about control than partnership.
In 2017, DP World signed a 30-year agreement with the self-declared Republic of Somaliland to develop and operate Berbera Port, in what was described by local authorities as a “historic shift.” However, Somalia’s federal government in Mogadishu rejected the deal, calling it a violation of Somali sovereignty because it was signed without federal coordination—exacerbating political and security tensions in the country.
In Kenya, controversy erupted over a potential DP World deal to manage Mombasa Port, forcing the government to issue denials after public protests accused elites of selling off national assets in opaque agreements. In Senegal, maritime unions criticized DP World’s contract terms and labor practices, prompting the company to revise parts of the agreement.
During the Yemen war, reports indicated that the UAE used Assab Port in Eritrea as a military base after signing a deal with the Asmara government in 2015. This triggered international criticism, particularly from rights organizations, which accused the UAE of repurposing civilian infrastructure for military objectives aligned with its regional ambitions.
In general, the UAE is accused of pursuing a systematic strategy to build a network of ports stretching from the Gulf of Aden to West Africa, allowing it to control the flow of goods, oil, and essential resources to Europe and Asia.
At Stake: Egypt’s National Sovereignty
Ultimately, a deeper crisis is taking shape—one that goes far beyond economics and touches the core of Egypt’s national security and sovereignty. While the government promotes its agreements with the UAE under the banner of attracting investment and expanding partnerships, growing fears suggest that these deals may be a façade for strategic power redistribution in one of the world’s most sensitive regions: the Suez Canal axis.
The ambiguity surrounding the contracts, the conflict of interest between the parties, and the lack of transparency and accountability make it necessary to raise fundamental questions: Who sets Egypt’s economic priorities, and in whose interest are these vital assets being managed?
What is happening in the Suez Canal region cannot be separated from broader regional dynamics aiming to reshape global trade routes—at Egypt’s expense. These shifts are supported by emerging alliances that do not prioritize Cairo’s interests. Unless Egypt moves quickly to develop a comprehensive national strategy based on transparency, asset protection, and restored control, the risk of reducing the Suez Canal to a marginal transit point could shift from concern to reality.
