Egypt did not need a cyberattack to face almost complete digital paralysis, only a limited fire at the Ramses Exchange. On the evening of Monday, 7 July, a truth that specialists had long warned of was confirmed: the country’s digital infrastructure hangs by a single thread.
The fire cut off internet and communications services for millions of users, banking systems were disrupted and electronic payment services stopped, while some emergency centres also faced difficulties operating as a result of the outage.
The crisis brought back to the fore the term “single point of failure”, which refers to the state’s dependence on a single technical path whose disruption leads to an almost complete paralysis of the digital system.
Telecom Egypt (WE) monopolises the internet infrastructure in Egypt, including the submarine cables, the terrestrial networks and the transit exchanges, and it is also the sole provider of the international gateways.
The three mobile operators, Vodafone, Orange and Etisalat, depend on Telecom Egypt to buy the service wholesale.
Although these companies present themselves as competing providers, Telecom Egypt’s complete control over the infrastructure makes competition a mere formality and weakens the chances of improving quality or reducing prices.
The World Bank has described this situation as “a structural monopoly that threatens digital and economic security”.
The World Bank’s Warning: The Single Point of Failure
In 2020, the World Bank warned, in a report entitled Egypt Digital Economy Assessment, of the risks of excessive dependence on centralised telecommunications infrastructure, noting that “the heavy dependence on Telecom Egypt’s fixed infrastructure is a model of a single point of failure that threatens the entire telecommunications network. In the event of any malfunction, the internet and mobile companies will not be able to continue providing their services.”
The report called for diversifying the sources of infrastructure by enabling other companies to access alternative fibre-optic routes, in a way that strengthens the resilience of the national network and reduces the risk of outages.
According to the World Bank’s definition, a “single point of failure” refers to any essential, non-redundant component in a system whose failure leads to the collapse of the entire system. In Egypt, this flaw appears clearly in the telecommunications sector, where a single entity controls the key joints of the infrastructure.
The report also described the Egyptian telecommunications network as “a perfect example of a single point of failure”, warning that any malfunction in the Telecom Egypt (TE) network could lead to a comprehensive shutdown of telecommunications and internet services.
It noted that the absence of real competition, and the reluctance of other companies to invest in alternative infrastructure, aggravated technical centralisation and raised the level of risk.
The report explained that this centralisation exposes vital sectors such as banking, aviation and the financial market to a complete shutdown whenever a technical failure occurs at a central point, as actually happened in the Ramses Exchange fire.
Reports by the World Bank also warned that excessive dependence on the centralisation of infrastructure in Greater Cairo, and the neglect of less developed regions such as Upper Egypt, increases the fragility of the system as a whole and makes the entire state vulnerable to paralysis if a single central point suffers any damage. These reports stressed that the infrastructure crisis in Egypt is not merely an incidental technical failure, but the result of structural accumulations that include centralisation, weak competition, the absence of contingency plans and funding gaps.
The World Bank had called for the adoption of a package of structural reforms and preventive policies to overcome this flaw, including: (encouraging investment in alternative networks and distributing the geographical centres of the infrastructure; developing disaster recovery plans, while building effective backup communications systems; improving governance and institutional coordination in times of crisis; attracting private investment and international partnerships to enhance the efficiency and diversity of the network).
MP and engineer Maha Abdel Nasser, speaking to Zawia3, criticises the current design of the telecommunications network in Egypt, which depends entirely on a single central site to manage this enormous volume of services. She describes this model as “an outdated technical philosophy” based on what is known as a “single point of failure”, which, in her view, contradicts the principles of contemporary cybersecurity.
Abdel Nasser adds: “Complete dependence on a single centre of this size is dangerous, and any failure in it leads to an almost complete collapse of the service, which is what we have actually seen. This is not an infrastructure befitting a state that is planning a real digital transformation”.
She calls for a comprehensive restructuring of the national telecommunications network, one that ensures vital functions and digital services are distributed across multiple backup data centres that are geographically dispersed and operate automatically in times of crisis, without the need for human intervention. The aim, according to Abdel Nasser, is to guarantee continuity of operation and avoid sudden outages.
Abdel Nasser continues: “It is not right for a digital infrastructure of this size to be run without disaster recovery centres operating in parallel, not merely as static backup copies. What is required is for these centres to be active and capable of intervening immediately when any failure occurs”.
She also questions the continued reliance on the Ramses Exchange as a main operating centre despite the burden it represents, at a time when the New Administrative Capital has infrastructure suitable for establishing secure and flexible data centres, to which vital functions could be transferred gradually without putting the service at risk.
Abdel Nasser calls for the launch of an urgent national plan to rehabilitate and secure Egypt’s critical telecommunications system, under the joint supervision of the ministries of communications, defence and finance, and for linking this plan to the state’s strategy for digital transformation and for strengthening its cybersecurity.
She stresses that what happened at the Ramses Exchange must not pass without accountability or reform, but should instead form a starting point for building a flexible and secure telecommunications network, capable of responding rapidly and absorbing shocks, and of ensuring the continuity of digital services under all circumstances.
The Telecom Egypt Monopoly and Digital Transformation
The roots of Telecom Egypt’s dominance over the telecommunications market in Egypt go back to the middle of the nineteenth century, when it was founded in 1854 under the name “Eastern Telegraph Company” and opened the first telegraph line linking Cairo and Alexandria. As its services gradually expanded, it became the main provider of fixed-line telephony.
In 1918, the Egyptian government nationalised the company and transferred its ownership to the “Telegraph and Telephone Authority”, making it the sole official body responsible for telecommunications services. The National Telecommunications Authority was then established in 1957 as the exclusive provider of wired and wireless telecommunications services, and this centralisation continued until the authority was transformed into a joint-stock company under the name “Telecom Egypt” in 1998.
Despite the entry of foreign mobile companies into the market since the late 1990s, Telecom Egypt retained its control over the core infrastructure. The three mobile operators, Vodafone, Orange and Etisalat, depend on the company to buy the service wholesale.
In this context, Engineer Shehata El-Sayed, an artificial intelligence expert, believes that the concept of a “single point of failure” manifested itself clearly during the Ramses Exchange fire, explaining that the exchange houses nearly 40% of Egypt’s telecommunications system, which makes it a central node that exposes the digital network to almost total paralysis whenever any failure occurs.
El-Sayed points out, speaking to Zawia3, that dependence on a single centre of this size represents a structural risk, especially since Telecom Egypt, in which the state owns a majority of the shares, controls the submarine and land cables, whether those linking Egypt to the outside world or those passing through its territory in exchange for transit fees.
The company also dominates the international internet gateways, which gives it almost absolute control over outgoing and incoming data traffic, in addition to its full ownership of the terrestrial networks, whether of fibre optics or copper cables. As a result, all the other telecommunications companies are forced to rent the service from it in order to provide their services to customers.
El-Sayed stresses that World Bank reports had previously warned of the risks of this situation, calling for the promotion of fair competition among service providers as a step towards improving quality and reducing costs. He believes that the absence of competition has led to a decline in service quality and to bills that are high compared with the actual level of the internet.
He continues: “If a user decides to switch from Telecom Egypt to another provider, they face many obstacles, including the line being cut off and the new service not being activated easily, which drags them into a spiral that guarantees them continued service from neither the original company nor the alternative one”.
He adds that this type of structural monopoly makes it difficult for new competitors to enter the market, hinders innovation and weakens funding and development, even though the telecommunications sector is one of the arteries of national income. Moreover, the slow shift from copper cables to fibre optics has directly affected internet quality and data transfer speeds. Although some gradual progress has been made, the pace, in his words, “is still very slow because a single company controls the system”.
He says: “The government has invested huge sums in cloud computing projects and data centres, and there is indeed an advanced centre in the Administrative Capital that is considered one of the most important in the Middle East, but these projects remain isolated from the actual infrastructure of the networks”.
El-Sayed stresses that the existence of advanced data centres does not remove the need for a comprehensive restructuring of the infrastructure, especially given the continued dependence on central points that are vulnerable to failure, as the Ramses Exchange crisis revealed. He emphasises that any failure at these points threatens the stability of vital services such as emergency services, banks and hospitals, stressing that these services must be protected within backup systems that guarantee their continuity in times of crisis.
He concludes by saying: “The network infrastructure in Egypt needs comprehensive and urgent development. It may be a costly project, but it is a necessity for building a stable digital economy, ensuring data security and achieving the digital transformation that the state has been talking about for years”.
No Digital Transformation Without Infrastructure
In recent years, Egypt has taken accelerating steps towards digital transformation, within the framework of a national strategy that aims to build an integrated digital society giving citizens direct access to electronic services.
In this framework, the state connected most government buildings to fibre-optic networks and established advanced data centres, most notably the “Imhotep” centre in the New Administrative Capital. It also strengthened the mobile phone networks by adding thousands of towers, and launched fifth-generation (5G) services and electronic SIM (eSIM) technology.
The government also activated the “Digital Egypt” platform, which includes more than 180 electronic services for about 9 million users, covering various fields such as the judiciary, health insurance, the post, notarisation and others, with millions of transactions a year.
But despite this progress, Egypt still faces deep structural challenges that threaten the stability of the digital transformation project, foremost among them what is known as the “single point of failure”, which results from the concentration of the infrastructure in a single operational point.
In this context, Mohamed El-Taher, a technology researcher at the Masaar foundation, believes that the Ramses Exchange fire exposed the fragility of the digital system in Egypt and showed its complete dependence on a central operating point that runs most telecommunications services, such that any failure in it leads to widespread paralysis. El-Taher describes this dependence as “a structural flaw that threatens the continuity of digital transformation”.
He stresses, speaking to Zawia3, that Telecom Egypt, which monopolises the management of the telecommunications and internet infrastructure, holds the key joints of the digital network, from the communication gateways to the land and submarine cables, which makes the system fragile in the face of any crisis.
He points out that real digital transformation is not measured by the number of government applications, but begins with establishing a strong, distributed and secure infrastructure. He explains: “Infrastructure does not only mean internet speed; it means having a network capable of absorbing shocks and responding rapidly to emergencies, and this cannot be achieved while depending on a single centre without alternative systems or effective protection plans”.
He also notes that the governorates outside Cairo suffer from very weak network coverage, in terms of both technology and connection quality, considering that this geographical disparity excludes wide sections of citizens from benefiting from the digital transformation project.
He adds: “As long as the infrastructure is concentrated in Cairo and the areas of economic weight, digital transformation will remain a project of limited scope that serves a particular group and excludes the majority, instead of being a means of achieving digital justice”.
El-Taher believes that breaking Telecom Egypt’s monopoly and opening the market to new competitors is a basic condition for developing the infrastructure, improving internet quality and reducing prices so that they are more consistent with the level of income and service, which will enhance the chances of digital inclusion across the country.
He concludes by saying: “Any talk of digital transformation is incomplete without a fair, distributed and resilient infrastructure. Without that, the project remains within the bounds of the slogan, not in the depth of reality”.
The Ramses Exchange fire revealed the extent of the fragility of the digital and communications infrastructure in Egypt, and showed how dangerous it is to depend on a “single point of failure” that leaves the state vulnerable to total paralysis whenever a malfunction occurs at this pivotal point. Experts believe that what happened should be understood as a clear warning that calls for restructuring the digital system, distributing the infrastructure geographically, strengthening competition and developing active backup systems that guarantee the continuity of vital services in the most difficult circumstances.
Only through comprehensive reforms and sustainable investments can Egypt build an effective and secure digital economy that keeps pace with global transformations, protects its cybersecurity and gives its citizens the right to fair access to the digital infrastructure that a modern state deserves.
