As tensions rise between Cairo and Tel Aviv, diplomatic circles are anticipating a possible meeting in Washington between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and U.S. President Donald Trump. Reports suggest that Washington may also be attempting to arrange a meeting between El-Sisi and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a bid to contain any escalation that could derail the ceasefire agreement signed in Cairo under U.S. sponsorship last October. This diplomatic push comes as Israel continues to breach the first phase of the agreement by targeting Palestinians and intensifying the blockade on the Gaza Strip—threatening to unravel the fragile understandings and reignite regional instability.
On the ground, the foundations of the Gaza ceasefire are already eroding under the weight of ongoing Israeli violations. Since the agreement came into effect on October 10, air raids and artillery shelling have continued across the eastern parts of the Strip, along with heavy fire from military vehicles and drones. Meanwhile, strict restrictions on the entry of shelter materials and humanitarian supplies have deepened the crisis as winter sets in. Displacement camps in Al-Mawasi, Deir al-Balah, and Nuseirat have flooded, and dozens of tents and temporary shelters in Gaza City have collapsed due to heavy rainfall. Though the agreement was promoted as a pathway to calm and a prelude to reconstruction, it has thus far failed to break the blockade or slow the accelerating humanitarian collapse.
These developments follow nearly two months after the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit, held on October 13, which brought together broad international participation and resulted in Egypt, the United States, Qatar, and Turkey signing a ceasefire agreement as part of U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed peace plan to end the war that began in October 2023. The 20-point plan includes highly complex issues: the release of hostages, the freeing of Palestinian detainees, a partial Israeli military withdrawal, the disarmament of Hamas, and the launch of a reconstruction process. However, the gap between political commitments and actual implementation has been widening dramatically.
Field data points to the fragility of the agreement, especially as Israel continues to obstruct humanitarian operations. According to the Gaza Government Media Office, Israel committed 738 ceasefire violations in just two months, including 205 incidents of direct fire at civilians, 37 ground incursions into residential areas—which resulted in 386 Palestinian deaths and 980 injuries—and 43 cases of unlawful arrest. These figures illustrate a systematic erosion of the agreement’s core provisions.
Amid this backdrop, the Rafah crossing has re-emerged as one of the most politically and humanly sensitive flashpoints. On December 3, Tel Aviv announced its intention to reopen the crossing on the Palestinian side within days, claiming it would allow Palestinians to exit Gaza into Egypt—an assertion Cairo firmly denied, stating no such arrangements existed. The crossing has remained closed since May 2024, after Israeli forces seized control of the Palestinian side, halting the entry of humanitarian aid and exacerbating the crisis. Meanwhile, Hamas continues to urge the international community to pressure Israel into lifting restrictions and allowing in shelter materials.
As the first phase of the ceasefire nears its end, Washington is increasing pressure on Tel Aviv to transition to the second phase, which is even more complex and fraught. It includes sensitive files such as the redeployment of Israeli forces, the Philadelphi Corridor, disarmament mechanisms, international monitoring, reconstruction efforts, and the unresolved question of who will dismantle Hamas’ military infrastructure and manage Gaza’s civilian administration. Reports suggest Israel is increasingly wary of anticipated U.S. pressure during a planned meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump on December 29, part of an eight-day visit aimed at nudging Israel to begin phase two—even before the return of the last hostage’s body.
In contrast, Cairo remains committed to stabilizing the ceasefire as an essential prerequisite for any subsequent political or humanitarian process. Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr. Badr Abdel Aaty has emphasized that maintaining calm is a top priority to ensure the unhindered flow of humanitarian aid and the launch of early recovery and reconstruction efforts. He reaffirmed Egypt’s absolute rejection of any attempts to forcibly displace Palestinians from their land.
Similarly, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, in a phone call with French President Emmanuel Macron, stressed that the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza and the immediate start of reconstruction are urgent priorities. He also reiterated the need for a comprehensive political process that leads to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Ambassador Rakha Ahmed Hassan—a member of Egypt’s Council for Foreign Affairs and of the Egyptian Association for the United Nations—confirmed that tensions between Cairo and Tel Aviv are running high due to Israel’s refusal to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor and the Palestinian side of Rafah, in clear violation of the peace agreement. He noted that Israel appears unwilling to comply with any commitments—whether related to the ceasefire or to humanitarian aid delivery. While the agreement stipulates the entry of 600 trucks daily, fewer than 200 actually make it through. Israel also refuses to withdraw from Gaza, continues expanding what it calls the “yellow line,” and bombs the Strip daily without justification.
Hassan explained that the implementation of the first phase of the agreement remains incomplete, despite its two core pillars: a complete ceasefire and the delivery of aid in agreed-upon quantities. Israel continues to block the entry of prefabricated homes and tents and appears to be seeking to entrench the current situation while moving toward phase two without fulfilling its obligations. The second phase includes an Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of international stabilization forces in Gaza—conditions that Tel Aviv outright rejects.
Speaking to Zawia3, Hassan said: “The humanitarian situation in Gaza is utterly tragic. Israel is betting on making life unbearable—through relentless bombing, blocking food and medicine, and forcibly displacing Palestinians. This remains the primary goal, and Egypt categorically refuses to support such a path.”
The veteran diplomat characterized Netanyahu’s upcoming trip to Washington as a summons by President Trump, given the Israeli government’s failure to implement the first phase of the proposed plan. He said the meeting’s aim is to negotiate the broad contours of phase two. Nevertheless, he described the U.S. position as sluggish, noting that despite the recent UN Security Council resolution, Washington has not yet moved to establish a stabilization force, a peace council, or the Palestinian technocratic committee tasked with managing Gaza. None of these steps have materialized, which Hassan sees as a reflection of global distrust in Israel.
The Peace Agreement at a Crossroads
Dr. Ahmed Sayed Ahmed, an expert in international relations and U.S. affairs at the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, believes that Trump’s peace plan is now at a critical juncture. He argues that Netanyahu’s anticipated visit to Washington later this month will be decisive in resolving many outstanding issues—most notably whether the United States is serious about pressuring Israel to implement the plan, or whether it will continue to align itself with the Israeli position, keeping the situation locked in a vicious cycle with no clear horizon for resolution.
Speaking to Zawia3, he said: “Israel is still betting on hollowing out Trump’s plan, failing to implement it in full, or reshaping it to serve Israeli objectives—chief among them the forced or so-called voluntary displacement of Palestinians, by blocking the entry of aid and maintaining catastrophic conditions in the Gaza Strip. This explains Netanyahu’s demand to open the Rafah crossing in a single direction to allow Palestinians to exit. There is no genuine Israeli desire to fully implement the agreement.”
He stresses that one of the most serious aspects of the crisis is the “absence of penalties” for Israeli violations of the ceasefire agreement, due to the lack of effective mechanisms to punish the breaching party—particularly when that party is Israel—despite the existence of guarantees within the ceasefire framework. This, he argues, has encouraged Israel to stall and delay the implementation of its first-phase commitments.
The international and U.S. affairs expert explains that Tel Aviv has failed to adhere to the core provisions of the first phase of the agreement, which came into effect on October 10—whether those related to a complete ceasefire, the entry of humanitarian aid, or halting violations. Despite the release of most Israeli captives—47 out of 48, including 20 alive and 27 bodies out of a total of 28—Israel has continued to procrastinate and delay the transition to the second phase. It has blocked the entry of aid, kept Rafah closed along with five other crossings as stipulated in the agreement, allowed the entry of only around 150 aid trucks per day instead of the agreed 600, and continued its violations and targeting of Palestinians.
At the same time, Ahmed points to growing U.S. pressure on Tel Aviv to move to the second phase. U.S. President Donald Trump has announced that the transition would take place soon. However, this phase is the most difficult, as Israel continues to use the issue of captives’ bodies as a pretext—despite Egypt’s intervention and assistance through facilitating aid entry and deploying specialized teams to locate the remains. These developments unfold amid the complexities of the second phase, which include forming a stabilization force, establishing a peace council, creating an independent Palestinian committee to administer Gaza, and implementing withdrawal arrangements.
He further explains that challenges are intensifying in light of statements by the Israeli Chief of Staff describing the so-called “yellow line” separating northern and southern Gaza as Israel’s border. In his view, this underscores the difficulty of the coming phase, particularly given what he describes as the fluidity of the U.S. position and the absence of strong, genuine pressure on Israel to implement the agreement and UN Security Council Resolution No. 2803.
Ahmed also addresses additional challenges related to disarmament, particularly the weapons of Hamas, and the formation of the peace council. He notes that Trump has announced the council will be formed next year and will include 12 world leaders alongside him, with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair excluded following what he described as an “Arab veto.” He adds that the issue of the “stabilization force” continues to face hesitation from several countries, pointing out that while the United States has invited European states such as Germany and Italy to participate, clear reservations remain.
El-Sisi to Washington: What Are the Goals of the Visit?
In a related context, media reports have spoken of an anticipated visit by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to Washington later this month to meet his U.S. counterpart, Donald Trump, with the aim of discussing the reconstruction of Gaza, supporting Egypt in confronting regional challenges, and addressing developments related to the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its impact on Egypt, in addition to other security and economic issues. However, neither the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the Presidency has issued any statement confirming or denying the reports of the visit.
The American newspaper The National cited unnamed sources as saying that preparations are underway for President El-Sisi’s visit, without disclosing its timing or duration. The paper noted that contacts between Cairo and Washington are ongoing to finalize the agenda for El-Sisi’s first anticipated visit to Washington since Trump assumed his second presidential term last January, and that Egyptian officials have traveled to Washington to hold meetings with members of the Trump administration.
Previously, the Egyptian president canceled a planned visit to the White House last February following Trump’s announcement of a plan to resettle Gaza’s population in Egypt and Jordan and transform the Strip into a tourist zone—an initiative Cairo categorically rejected, viewing it as a threat to its national security.
The U.S. president had visited Egypt last October to attend the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit at the invitation of his Egyptian counterpart. During Trump’s first presidential term (2017–2021), he met El-Sisi on several international occasions, including meetings in Riyadh in 2017, in Washington in 2019, and on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.
A report published by The National said that El-Sisi is expected to discuss with Trump the implementation of the second phase of Trump’s peace plan for Gaza and to gauge his position on the need to introduce “amendments” to the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace treaty to reflect recent geopolitical changes. Quoting unnamed sources, the report said Cairo is primarily seeking to ease restrictions stipulated in the treaty regarding troop numbers and the types of weapons that can be deployed in Zone C—the area adjacent to Israel in the Sinai Peninsula.
Meanwhile, a recent report published by Axios stated that Trump had been seeking to mediate a meeting between El-Sisi and Netanyahu, as the Israeli prime minister is scheduled to meet the U.S. president on December 29.
Commenting on reports surrounding a potential visit by President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to the United States, Ahmed Sultan, a researcher specializing in regional security and terrorism, explains that any presidential visit is, by nature, preceded by arrangements that may leak from within the host country’s institutions. He considers it likely that a visit is being prepared, while noting that its final confirmation remains contingent on understandings and coordination between Cairo and Washington. He adds that, if the visit takes place, it would address key files—chief among them the transition to the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire, pressure on Ethiopia regarding the Renaissance Dam, and developments in Sudan—within a broader regional coordination framework involving Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Regarding the possibility of a meeting between the Egyptian president and the Israeli prime minister, Sultan considers it “unlikely at this stage,” despite American and Israeli interest in such a meeting. He told Zawia3 that “Egyptian state institutions are too astute to grant Netanyahu a new certificate of legitimacy at this moment, in light of international and domestic political shifts—even within Israel itself.”
On the Camp David Accords, the regional affairs researcher notes that the treaty has undergone previous amendments, most notably in 2018, to adjust the deployment of Egyptian forces in Zone C in the context of counterterrorism efforts. At the same time, he points to clear Israeli violations—chief among them the Israeli army’s occupation of the Salah El-Din (Philadelphi) Corridor, which lies within an area where Israeli forces are not supposed to be present—describing this as a blatant breach of the agreement.
He adds that Egypt has deployed additional forces in Sinai for security reasons, including thwarting forced displacement plans. This, he says, has angered the Israeli side, which interprets some Egyptian military maneuvers as being directed against it, despite the defensive nature of these forces. Conversely, Israel—through pressure exerted by the Zionist lobby in Washington—has sought to reduce or withdraw the Egyptian military presence in Sinai, and has even gone further by calling for the dismantling of existing military formations. Egypt, however, “has fixed parameters related to its national security and will not abandon them,” he said.
Sultan notes that preventing the entry of humanitarian aid, reconstruction materials, and temporary housing—alongside Israel’s refusal to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor—has intensified the suffering of displaced Palestinians amid winter conditions and severe weather systems. This has cast a heavy shadow over Egyptian-Israeli relations, which, he says, have not been the same since October 7. Nevertheless, security coordination continues, driven by obligations under the Camp David Accords and Egypt’s pivotal and influential role in Gaza.
He adds: “The tension has become evident, particularly in the Rafah crossing crisis, where Israel is pushing a displacement project, while Egypt has led a political battle to block it—rejecting the unilateral opening of the crossing to allow Palestinians to exit without return, and adhering to the plan’s text, which stipulates opening it from both sides.”
Sultan points out that Israel’s failure on this front has been reflected in hostile steps and decisions toward Egypt, including stalling or abandoning gas agreements and incitement against Cairo within circles close to Israeli decision-making. All of this, he argues, reflects the depth of the existing tension between the two sides.
He describes the current situation by saying that Israel has not ended the war on Gaza but rather halted the fighting under compulsion due to political pressure and international factors, after realizing that what it sought under the banner of “total victory” had not been achieved.
The Egyptian political researcher considers that Israeli violations of the agreement aim to undermine what remains of the leadership and military structures of resistance factions, foremost among them Hamas. He notes that Tel Aviv feels it has “lost a great deal” by reaching this stage, while resistance factions are rebuilding their capabilities. This, he says, is driving Israel to condition the transition to the second phase of the agreement on the disarmament of Hamas—a condition he describes as “unrealistic” and used as a pretext to stall implementation, in the absence of genuine pressure beyond the efforts of mediators, foremost among them the United States.
Netanyahu Meeting Not on Sisi’s Agenda
In this context, Dr. Mohamed El-Ezaby, an expert in international relations, views reports of a potential visit by President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to Washington this December as highly plausible. He suggests the visit may aim to strengthen regional alliances and advance the peace agreement, potentially offering Egypt an opportunity to pressure the United States to act more assertively as a guarantor of the deal, amid ongoing tensions. El-Ezaby also notes the visit may involve discussions on economic partnerships, especially in the energy sector.
Regarding the possibility of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu joining a trilateral meeting, El-Ezaby tells Zawia3 that the chances are relatively low. He points out that Egyptian officials have stated President Sisi currently has no plans to meet with Netanyahu, citing Israel’s continued provocations along the border and absence of any significant behavioral changes as a key reason.
He adds, “The U.S. is attempting to arrange such a meeting to ease strained relations, but current Egyptian-Israeli tensions may prevent it.” Even if it were to happen, El-Ezaby believes it would only be worthwhile if it led to real Israeli concessions, otherwise it could carry risks without benefits.
The Times of Israel previously reported, citing an unnamed Israeli official, that President Sisi has no intention of meeting Netanyahu at this time, despite Netanyahu’s strong push for such a meeting. According to the same source, Egypt has issued sharp criticism of Israel in recent months over unresolved disputes, making a meeting between the two leaders unlikely in the near term—despite pressure from both Tel Aviv and Washington to hold a summit.
El-Ezaby highlights clear Egyptian accusations that Israel has failed to honor key elements of the ceasefire agreement. He emphasizes Cairo’s firm rejection of any proposals involving the displacement of Gaza’s population or the alteration of its geopolitical status.
He explains that Egypt has officially communicated to the U.S. and international mediators its categorical rejection of violations by the occupying power, affirming its commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 2803 passed in November. The resolution upholds the right of return and calls for an end to hostilities. Egypt also hosted a meeting of mediators and guarantors to strengthen joint efforts toward implementation.
Although Washington has provided Hamas with assurances to end the war and has contributed to mediation efforts—particularly alongside Turkey—El-Ezaby notes that some observers criticize the U.S. for failing to exert sufficient pressure on Israel to stop its violations. This gives the impression of partiality, despite the U.S.’s public support for peace. He adds that while the U.S. is now focused on the reconstruction file, implementation remains stalled due to persistent tensions on the ground.
Regarding the rumors of a potential meeting between the Egyptian President and the Israeli Prime Minister, Ambassador Mohamed Hegazy, former Assistant Foreign Minister, tells Zawia3 that Egypt’s leadership would not make any move that undermines the Palestinian cause or destabilizes the region. He dismisses such reports as “media leaks aimed at derailing Egypt’s role.”
Hegazy believes some of the leaked reports, especially those related to opening the Rafah crossing unilaterally, infringe on Egyptian sovereignty. However, he says Cairo is handling them with strategic caution and diplomatic precision, given the central role it plays in the peace process. He notes the recurrence of such reports reflects deliberate attempts to strain Egyptian-Israeli relations at a critical juncture marked by intense regional and international activity to advance the second phase of the peace plan.
He tells Zawia3: “Far-right forces in Israel, along with unreliable media outlets, are spreading such claims to provoke regional tensions and fabricate conflicts with neighboring states—tactics that serve neither Israel nor the peace process.”
The Egyptian diplomat affirms that Egypt is fully capable of addressing any developments, even if some of these reports prove true, through its existing coordination channels—whether on the border or through institutional dialogue with Israel—ensuring that all efforts remain focused on the primary goal: implementing Phase II of the peace plan, which has been endorsed by the international community.
At the same time, Egypt continues its extensive diplomatic outreach to push for the execution of the ceasefire deal and the humanitarian truce agreed upon during the Sharm El-Sheikh summit, based on U.S. President Donald Trump’s peace framework and adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 2803, issued on November 18.
These reports of a possible visit by President El-Sisi to Washington come at a pivotal moment in an exceptionally sensitive regional context, where the worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza intersects with unprecedented tensions in Egyptian-Israeli relations. As the leading mediator bearing the heaviest burden in relief efforts and displacement prevention, Cairo now finds itself confronting Israeli policies that directly threaten its national security—including the closure of border crossings, refusal to withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor, and attempts to impose new facts on the ground.
If realized, the Washington visit will serve as a litmus test for the United States’ willingness and capacity to rein in its Israeli ally, and to ensure serious progress toward implementing the next phase of the agreement. At stake is not only Egypt’s pivotal role but also the broader regional stability—and the fate of Gaza, which remains hostage to clashing political and security agendas.
