Cairo
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The fate of the Dostour Party depends on Gamila Ismail’s ability to resolve its issues.
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The government is merely the president’s secretariat.
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Citizens overestimate the capabilities of the Civil Movement.
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Altantawy criticizes us, and we also criticize him.
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We strive to release those detained for presidential nominations, but we lack the full capacity to succeed.
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The press now plays the role of mobilizing for the state.
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It is unreasonable for El-Balshi to satisfy his faction at the expense of others in the syndicate.
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There must be an official response regarding Hala Company’s activities and the funds it receives.
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His statements after his release from prison stirred wide reactions in Egyptian political circles. Despite belonging to the opposition, his statements were used by the authorities to paint a different picture of the prisoners’ rights issue. He stated that he was treated well during his pre-trial detention and appeared in 2020 undergoing a COVID-19 test while in custody, which reinforced the official narrative about the quality of Egyptian prisons and the improved treatment of prisoners, especially political ones.
From time to time, Dawoud makes statements that may surprise some, and sometimes even more surprising decisions, such as his resignation from his role as spokesperson for the National Salvation Front, his presidency of the Dostour Party, and recently his resignation as spokesperson for the Civil Movement, which includes 12 opposition parties and political figures.
His resignation from his position in the Civil Movement sparked controversy in political circles, indicating that the movement suffers from significant fragility that could lead to its disintegration.
We interviewed Khaled Dawoud in Zawia3 to uncover his views on various political issues and controversies in Egyptian society.
Journalism is Not a Crime
Since graduating from the American University in Cairo, Dawoud has worked as a correspondent and journalist for several international media outlets. He started his career at the Associated Press, then moved to BBC, Al Jazeera, Reuters, Al-Ahram Weekly, and several other institutions throughout his career.
In your opinion, what does the Egyptian press lack to match global journalism?
The situation in Egypt always ties the political context to press freedom. When the regime does not allow freedom of opinion and expression, the result is the absence of a free and diverse press. We can compare the state of Egyptian journalism before and after the January 2011 revolution. The press enjoyed significant freedom during the revolution and the two years following it, a freedom not seen during the era of former President Hosni Mubarak.
The main difference between Western and Egyptian journalism is that the Egyptian authorities treat the press as a tool for creating public opinion that serves their policies and presents a positive image of the political, economic, and social conditions, even if it’s contrary to reality.
Having worked with national newspapers for many years, I feel they are written for officials rather than the public, losing credibility, especially since citizens are well aware of the economic and social conditions.
After the revolution, there was hope for creating diverse journalism for the masses. For example, Al-Ahram’s circulation increased from 300 copies before the revolution to over a million copies in the following years by maintaining credibility in reporting events, which is what we need in our local press. However, we soon returned to square one since 2014, with the political system using the press as part of moral affairs, mobilizing for the state (referring here to the moral affairs of the Egyptian Armed Forces). While this might be necessary for a period, it won’t last long.
Now, a single company owns all press and media platforms, resulting in a unified message across all platforms because the official system still adheres to a 1960s concept of media and journalism, which is actually a waste of public funds.
What about Egyptian journalists? Do you think they have the capabilities to match their counterparts abroad?
I believe the revolution created a good space for freedom, resulting in a generation of young journalists producing work comparable to global newspapers. They have significant capabilities but lack some tools, training, language, and technology skills
What is your comment on the ongoing disputes between some members of the Independence Current in the Journalists’ Syndicate and its current council regarding how the president managed the events coinciding with the Gaza War?
There is no doubt that the election of Khaled El-Balshi represented a significant achievement for the Independence Current within the syndicate. It sent a message that we do not accept any candidate imposed by the regime, despite the official bodies’ efforts to support the rival candidate for the position of the Journalists’ Syndicate president at the time.
In the end, the Journalists’ Syndicate, like all state institutions, faces significant pressure to comply with the regime’s desires and warnings. Thus, the position of the president is very challenging, and several considerations must be taken into account in the syndicate’s operations, which has a historically influential role in the public sphere.
Practically speaking, the syndicate’s doors had been closed since the Jerusalem protest rejecting former US President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the Israeli occupation in 2017. However, this changed with El-Balshi and his council’s victory in the 2023 elections. Therefore, we must understand the pressures faced by the president and maintain the Journalists’ Syndicate as a fortress defending public freedoms, journalists’ freedom, and their private interests.
Therefore, I emphasize that it is unreasonable for El-Balshi to satisfy his faction at the expense of other factions, as he is the president for all journalists. There are factions, such as the conservative faction, that oppose using the syndicate’s platform for political events, believing that the syndicate’s role is limited to providing services to members outside the political arena. Hence, I hope non-journalists who turn to the syndicate as a platform for defending freedoms and expressing opinions understand the pressures faced by the president.
Some members of the General Assembly describe the current council’s performance as lacking in areas such as housing and women’s issues. What is your comment?
There are certainly some issues that the council is still working on, but what we need to see is that we now have a council working for journalists and has performed well in areas such as training and healthcare.
Overall, now, after many years of stagnation, we can pressure the council to focus on these issues that some describe as lacking. I believe it is not yet time to issue a definitive judgment.
Foreign Affairs
The genocide war on Gaza received massive media, public, and political support. In contrast, the war in Sudan did not receive the same attention. How do you explain this?
The scale of genocide and violations in Gaza is beyond imagination, leading to a decline in interest in conflicts and clashes in places like Libya, Sudan, Syria, and others.
Additionally, the war’s impact on Egypt plays a significant role. We are the only country with a direct border with Gaza and face Israeli threats regarding plans to relocate Palestinians to Sinai, which would mean the liquidation of the Palestinian cause and a threat to Egypt’s national security. Our historical emotional connection to Palestine has also heightened the focus on Gaza over other issues like Sudan and Libya.
Egypt is no longer the sole key player in the region for resolving problems. We have lost our ability to play the expected role, particularly regarding the Sudanese issue, where regional and Gulf parties have become the main supporters of one side of the conflict against the other. Unfortunately, our constant need for Gulf aid, especially from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and international institutions has contributed to this situation.
Do you think it is possible to reach an agreement on the terms of the recent Cairo truce between Palestinian resistance factions and Tel Aviv, especially after Netanyahu announced the invasion of Gaza while Hamas agreed to the truce?
I believe the party most interested in stopping the war now is the United States—even though it is complicit in the genocide in Gaza. The truce might succeed this time due to pressure from Washington, as the American elections are approaching, and President Joe Biden does not want to enter the November election campaign with the war still ongoing. This is especially true given the rising protests and anger among young people inside and outside American universities, which could affect his chances in the election.
Additionally, the severe internal conflicts within the settlements and Tel Aviv, and the resilience of the Palestinian resistance so far, might contribute to reaching a truce or ending the war.
How do you view some Egyptians on social media linking the influx of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese due to the ongoing war since last April to the rise in housing rents, especially after they settled in popular neighborhoods?
Supporting Sudan and its people is a national duty that we cannot abandon. Therefore, this kind of rhetoric is very harmful to our strategic interests, considering Sudan is our neighboring country. On this basis, we will not refrain from assisting the Sudanese people in the extremely difficult conditions they have been experiencing for over a year.
Experience has taught us that social media is deceptive and not a measure of the positions that the authorities should take, especially with the presence of electronic committees that support specific stances.
We must not forget that we are primarily an exporter of migrants, with more than ten million Egyptians abroad, most of whom work in Gulf countries. Therefore, I see the rising anti-Sudanese sentiment as very harmful and entirely exaggerated, often featuring a racist and condescending attitude toward Sudanese people.
Do EU funds control the decisions of the authorities in Egypt, especially with the increase in financial flows to Cairo?
The European Parliament generally has taken a negative stance towards the authorities in Egypt since 2019, issuing decisions against them from time to time; however, they have not been implemented.
Moreover, there has been a decline in raising human rights issues from European countries and the United States more than ever before, due to their need for Egypt’s role in ending the Gaza War and subsequently rebuilding it. I do not believe that this will affect the official relations between Egypt and the European Union in terms of aid and economic agreements (this refers to the continuation of agreements despite violations known to the EU, fulfilling strategic and regional interests where Egypt plays an active role).
Sinai in the Grip of Al-Organi
Criticism is mounting over the appointment of Sinai businessman Ibrahim Al-Organi as the head of the newly formed Union of Arab Tribes. Al-Organi’s name has become prominent since the start of the Gaza War, with media outlets noting his group’s control over the Rafah border crossing and the movement of trucks, in addition to the coordination issue we highlighted in a journalistic investigation last November.
What is your comment on the control of the companies (Sons of Sinai and Hala) over the movement of trucks and people at the Rafah crossing, and how does the authority allow such extensive powers to non-governmental entities during a neighboring war?
I have no information about the company controlling truck traffic, as this movement involves various countries providing aid to the sector. The ongoing discussion is mostly about the movement of Palestinians and the coordination issue, which existed before the current war but has intensified due to the war conditions.
We read journalistic reports about imposing hefty sums of money, up to ten thousand dollars per person, to cross into Egypt. What is troubling is that despite such reports in recent months, we have not heard a detailed Egyptian response on the matter.
I met several Palestinian journalists at the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate’s Iftar last Ramadan. They mentioned that the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had posted a link for those wishing to leave Gaza to register; however, according to them, the response could take up to four months, necessitating coordination through (Hala Company) to escape the dire situation. Thus, we need an official response on the role of this company and the services it provides to receive such large sums of money.
What is your comment on the new city of Sisi, whose foundation stone was laid a few days ago and is owned by businessman Ibrahim Al-Organi, near the Egyptian-Palestinian border?
The reconstruction of Sinai and the expenditure of tens of billions of pounds to establish development projects in the area was clearly a priority for the authorities. The problem lies in the lack of transparency regarding all official economic activities. For example, regarding the Ras El-Hikma deal, which supposedly temporarily alleviated the economic crisis we are experiencing, we do not have full details about the ownership structure, profit distribution, or why the UAE provided such a large sum of money.
The main issue is the lack of transparency and parliamentary oversight. Over the past ten years, almost all regulatory bodies that were supposed to play an independent role have been nonexistent; the parliament is not capable of presenting any interpellations, nor are other bodies. There are many questions about the projects undertaken by the authorities, but there are no answers, and favoring and providing services to a specific individual, in my opinion, does not serve the investment and economic community in Egypt.
Regarding the recent formation of the Union of Arab Tribes, is it possible that the authorities would allow the existence of quasi-military entities that could become armed militias?
I do not have enough information on the matter.
I believe that within the framework of the central state’s role in Egypt, it would not allow the formation of quasi-military entities or independent armed militias outside the control of official security agencies.
Although I am opposed to the regime, we must distinguish between regime opponents and its detractors who were affected by the ousting of former President Mohamed Morsi. An opponent of Sisi, like myself, operates within the framework of the constitution and the law, and no matter how much we disagree with the regime, it will be within a national framework. Despite all the violations against me and my imprisonment, I think about the interests of Egypt and Egyptians, not denouncing an individual personally.
Intersections of Politics and Power
You were arrested in 2019 and opposed Sisi’s government, then you were released and participated in the Egyptian Family Iftar and National Dialogue sessions, which subjected you to widespread criticism and accusations of appeasing the authorities. What is your response?
After my difficult prison experience, my main concern was how we could contribute to the release of all detainees and prisoners. After my release, the authorities showed me and other opposition figures that they wanted to change their policies, especially regarding political prisoners. They released about 45 prisoners we had requested before attending the Egyptian Family Iftar as a gesture of goodwill and cooperation. Therefore, I agreed to attend, accompanied by several public figures.
On the same basis, I later participated in the National Dialogue sessions. This was not just my position but also the stance of opposition figures like Hamdeen Sabahi and Farid Zahran, who also attended.
In the end, we consider ourselves national opposition that has not left Egypt. I do not condemn those opposing from abroad; on the contrary, one of my concerns was to address the issue of Egyptian opponents abroad and their return, so they do not remain in exile.
I felt I had a mission to accomplish because I had experienced the harsh conditions of prison firsthand. Thus, any party inviting me to dialogue to resolve the issue of political prisoners would be accepted. The goal is not only to release the prisoners but also to change the policy of arresting citizens for defending political causes, which I discussed with state agencies.
Has participation in the National Dialogue achieved any real gains?
I estimate that the success rate in releasing prisoners is around 60%.
I focused on preparing lists for the release of civil stream prisoners who worked under the constitution and law and not those whose hands are stained with blood. I left prison with a list of 100 political prisoners, and I can confirm that 90 of them have been released (those who haven’t been released include Alaa Abdel Fattah, Mohamed Oxygen, Marwa Arafa, Nermeen Hussein, and Mohamed Adel). Ahmed Douma was at the top of the names we succeeded in freeing.
There are accusations that we only demand the release of famous politicians, but I believe these are the ones who paid the price, and negotiating their release is very difficult. As for the unknowns, they are released periodically.
Now, there are also open channels with the authorities regarding the prisoner issue. For example, when protesters from the UN protest in Maadi were arrested, we formed a pressure circle that succeeded in their release the next day. However, we cannot always exert such pressure successfully to release prisoners or detainees, but having an open communication channel with the security apparatus might give us more opportunities.
Ahmed Altantawy accused the opposition in an interview with us of operating within safe spaces defined by the authorities and that you did not agree to his proposals to restructure the Civil Movement and push the opposition forward. What happened?
I was one of the biggest supporters of Altantawy’s right to run for the presidential elections and issued a power of attorney for him at the real estate registry, despite my vote being for Farid Zahran. I believed in our right as Egyptians to participate in open, pluralistic elections. I wished he had completed his nomination papers and participated without facing all the obstacles he and his supporters encountered.
In response to Altantawy’s criticisms of the opposition and Civil Movement parties, there are counter-criticisms against him. The most notable is that he makes decisions unilaterally and then seeks to convince other parties without prior consultation, including his decision to run for the presidential elections and insist on running regardless of the positions and decisions of the Civil Movement parties. This created some distance between the Civil Movement parties.
I cannot generalize that conflicts prevailed among all the movement’s parties, as some parties belonging to the Nasserist current or those aligned with Altantawy (Karama, the Nasserist Arab, the National Accord, the Popular Socialist Alliance, Bread and Freedom) supported him. However, other parties wanted to present different candidates like Farid Zahran from the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and Gamila Ismail from the Dostour Party. I hoped Altantawy would show some flexibility in discussions with other opposition parties before making any decisions.
Altantawy also accused the opposition of not contributing to efforts to release detainees from his campaign and the party under formation. Where is the opposition from these issues?
It cannot be denied that there is a deliberate expansion in arresting Altantawy’s supporters. We certainly always demand in all our communications with the authorities the release of his campaign members and support him in the issue of presidential endorsements. We will continue to make these demands, but we do not have the power to release all the detainees.
The security apparatus has a specific stance on Altantawy and his campaign members, which might lead him to believe that the efforts to release them are insufficient. However, some people now think we are working for the Ministry of Interior, which is not true. We are only trying to utilize the trust we have built in the past period to cooperate on this issue.
How do you evaluate the performance of the Civil Movement, and where is it in the public sphere?
The Civil Movement is a political coalition, not an independent political party. Therefore, it is impossible to impose the vision of one party on all the movement’s parties, which does not follow the majority and minority rules.
When I was the spokesperson for the movement, I was always blamed and questioned about the movement’s decisions and actions. I would respond by asking what the movement is doing to be talked about in the media. Hence, some replaced the role of the parties with that of the Civil Movement. It is not an independent entity; it is just a coalition of 12 parties and some public figures. There are many issues we do not agree on, but we gather around agreed-upon issues.
Citizens overestimate the capabilities of the Civil Movement and ignore that its weakness and incapacity are part of the general weakness and incapacity of political parties.
Since the presidential elections, the movement has only met twice in five months. There is now a semi-recognition that the movement will not return with the same diversity and strength it once had but rather disintegrate. Recently, it was announced that a new coalition of Nasserist and leftist parties is being formed. The liberal parties had previously formed the Free Current, which has frozen, and this was one of the main reasons for my previous resignation from the Dostour Party.
You resigned from your position as the spokesperson for the Civil Movement. What were the reasons?
I no longer felt we could work collectively in the way I had envisioned.
Within the Civil Movement, certain parties wanted to use it as a front to express political positions according to their vision and impose them on the Egyptian opposition. I have my positions and opinions as one of the founding members of the Civil Movement. The spokesperson’s role is consensual, issuing statements representing all parties and figures of the movement. Given the disagreements over the movement’s future and the so-called project to restructure it, I could no longer perform this role.
The decisive factor for my resignation was the discussion about changing the decision-making process within the movement to voting instead of consensus, meaning all decisions would be known in advance. We have 12 parties, eight of which are aligned with the Nasserist and leftist currents, and four belong to the liberal current and others. This contradicts the idea of democracy and party plurality.
You became a member of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party. What are the latest developments within the party in the Civil Movement?
I opposed the idea that we either choose a specific presidential candidate as the representative of the opposition or are not opponents at all, stripping Farid Zahran of his status as an opponent and describing him as cooperating with the regime, even though all Civil Movement parties attended the same meetings Zahran attended with the concerned agencies. For example, during the Egyptian Family Iftar, Hamdeen Sabahi interacted with President Sisi and pushed for the release of Hossam Moanes and Ahmed Douma. Therefore, accusing Zahran of being the only one cooperating with the regime is unacceptable.
The matter required more concessions and flexibility from the movement’s parties instead of treating it as a brand, whereby the majority parties distribute labels to the minority parties on whether they are opponents or not. Unfortunately, we reached a point in the movement because of the elections where divisions increased to the extent that it no longer allowed us to continue. Accordingly, the party still has a decision to freeze its activities within the movement.
There are rumors about the April 6 Youth Movement founding a new party, along with political figures from different currents. Some claim this is with the complete agreement of the authorities to improve their image and present them more democratically. What is your comment?
As far as I know, negotiations are taking place regarding formations, not parties, aiming to prepare for the parliamentary elections.
The public sphere, in general, suffers from many restrictions that the regime does not deny, justifying them for national security reasons. It adopts a strict policy in dealing with internal opposition. What we do as opposition is to alert the regime that we do not pose the danger they imagine; on the contrary, we are a safety valve, allowing citizens to express their opinions instead of an explosion.
If we agree with the regime in rejecting the religious state or terrorism, there should be an opportunity for a third alternative to the authoritarian state that has existed since 1952 or the fascist religious state. This is what the civil opposition offers. Therefore, it is in the regime’s interest to have opposition that operates within the framework of the law and constitution. Unfortunately, the regime always uses difficult economic conditions internally or external regional conditions as an excuse.
I have no information about an agreement between the authorities and opposition figures to form new entities. However, if new groups appear working within the same political scene and framework, they will revolve around the same circle unless the scene changes and the authorities show signs of serious political reforms.
As a former president of the Dostour Party, do you think it is now collapsing?
The Dostour Party historically, and I am one of its founders, faces the same problem as parties founded after the January Revolution. It is a party centered around Mohamed ElBaradei, comprising many different currents and ideologies, making its management extremely difficult. I think describing it as collapsing is an exaggeration, but there are long-standing problems I hope will be quickly addressed.
I was the president of the Dostour Party in 2018 for about two years, and there was another colleague who claimed he was the president during the same period. This is an example of the turbulent times we went through. The issue is not new to the party, and the problems have always existed, but now it depends on Gamila Ismail’s ability to solve these problems.
Finally, what is your comment on the delayed formation of the government that the Egyptian public and politicians are awaiting?
Our government is merely the president’s secretariat. Most people do not know the names of 80% of the current ministers because they are executive figures whose roles are unclear. We know well that the center of decision-making is not within the government but in the presidency.
It seems all indications suggest that Mustafa Madbouly will remain in his position, with only a few ministers being changed. Ultimately, changing the government will not make citizens feel a change in policies because policies are not decided within the current government.
