Since 2013, Egypt’s security agencies have expanded their influence over the political landscape — not only through direct intervention in selecting party leaders or candidates for elections and subjecting them to rigorous security vetting, but also by pushing former military and security officials into the political arena. Many of these figures have launched political parties, joined their leadership ranks, or secured a share of their parliamentary representation.
While Egypt’s pre-2011 party life was marked by weakness and limited attempts to influence the political sphere, and although the period following the January Revolution witnessed a brief phase of political openness, the post–June 30 era has seen a far more radical shift toward what can be described as the militarization of politics. Former military and security figures have come to dominate the political and parliamentary spheres to the extent that their presence has become a structural feature of the political system itself, rather than an exception.
In the 2020 elections that produced the current House of Representatives—comprising 568 elected members and 28 appointed ones, for a total of 596 MPs—the prominence of security officials was striking. The parliament included around 71 former army and police officers, representing roughly 12% of all members, according to media reports and electoral analyses.
Looking back a bit further, the proportion was not much different in the 2015–2020 parliament, where former military and security leaders held about 75 seats across various pro-government parties, amounting to nearly 13% of the total 596 seats. The largest bloc came from the Nation’s Future Party (Hizb Mustaqbal Watan), which holds 316 MPs, an estimated 50–55 of whom are former officers. They are joined by roughly 10–15 members in the Homeland Protectors Party (Hizb Humat al-Watan), which has 23 MPs in total, in addition to several others distributed among the Republican People’s Party and independent representatives.
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Loyalty Parties Do Not Make Politics
Observers note that since 2013, the Egyptian state has deliberately imposed strict boundaries on political activity, characterized by a shrinking margin of freedoms and the preservation of a superficial democratic façade, while granting broad privileges exclusively to pro-government parties in exchange for absolute loyalty to the authorities.
Sief al-Islam Eid, a researcher in political affairs at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, tells Zawia3 that the rise of military and security leaders within Egypt’s party life after 2013 is linked to a set of structural factors that reshaped the political sphere. He explains that the first factor lies in the trust the regime places in figures emerging from the military establishment that effectively rules the country. These individuals are viewed as more competent and loyal than civilians and as more capable of adhering to the general guidelines set by the state. The second factor, he continues, involves a mutually beneficial relationship between both sides: the regime secures a role and position for these former officers after their retirement from military or security service, while they, in return, offer loyalty, discipline, and participation in what is often described as a “symbolic political life.”
Eid adds that discussing political pluralism or democracy in the globally recognized sense is not feasible in the current Egyptian context. What is taking place, he argues, is a form of political engineering aimed at producing nominal parties designed to polish the regime’s image abroad without reflecting any genuine ideological or social diversity. These parties, as he puts it, do not play a representative role for society; rather, they are created primarily to support the state or the president, which distinguishes the Egyptian case from other political experiences.
The researcher further explains that in democratic systems, genuine political parties are expected to represent diverse social, economic, and cultural interests. In Egypt, however, the opposite is true: these parties merely represent the interests of narrow elites allied with or subordinate to the security apparatus. He notes that competition among these parties does not mirror shifts in public sentiment or social interests but instead reflects the internal dynamics of power struggles within the ruling elite itself.
Eid cites recent years as evidence of this pattern, pointing out that the Nation’s Future Party (Hizb Mustaqbal Watan) managed to consolidate its political dominance as the closest ally to powerful state institutions, before the emergence of the National Front Party (Hizb al-Jabha al-Wataniya), backed by other influential circles within the government. In his view, such rise and decline do not represent organic changes in the party landscape as seen in democracies, but rather calculated maneuvers by the authorities to redistribute influence and steer the political scene in ways that serve their own interests.
The researcher concludes that party life in Egypt from 2013 to the present cannot be described as a natural political environment. It is based on appearance rather than genuine representation of society or its real interests. Parties have become mere tools for managing the political scene from above, where the security and military apparatus defines the rules of the game, while parties operate strictly within these boundaries, lacking any genuine space to represent citizens or express the diversity of social forces
Political Fragility Threatens Social Stability
The shift toward the “militarization of party life in Egypt” has not merely taken the form of certain individuals with former military or police ranks entering parliament or assuming senior party positions. It has also manifested in the restructuring of political parties themselves to serve as extensions of official policy. At the forefront of these are the Nation’s Future Party (Hizb Mustaqbal Watan), which has become the dominant force in parliament, and the Homeland Protectors Party (Hizb Humat al-Watan), founded by former military leaders and now serving as a political front for the military establishment.
This has been clearly reflected in the performance of the current parliament, which, according to human rights reports, functions as a tool in the hands of the executive authority rather than as an independent legislative body, as stipulated by the Egyptian constitution. A recent report by the Egyptian Front for Human Rights, titled “Authoritarian Legislation and Absent Oversight,” revealed that the overwhelming majority of the 879 laws passed by parliament were submitted by the government, while MPs independently proposed only 16 draft laws. The report considered these figures evidence of a “shift in the balance of power in the legislative process in favor of the executive branch at the expense of the legislative one.”
Based on desk research and monitoring of parliamentary outputs and bulletins, the report noted that many of the laws passed—such as the Code of Criminal Procedure and amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law—represent “a regression from the achievements of modern law” and serve to “restrict rights and freedoms, allowing for violations of human rights and the justice system.”
Akram Ismail, a founding member of the Bread and Freedom Party (under formation), believes that this reality is consistent with the nature of the current political phase, in which both the political and economic spheres have been opened to former officers and individuals with security backgrounds, granting them an outsized role in public life. More importantly, he says, “the parties established during this period are, at their core, highly engineered entities. They are not genuine parties emerging from society or representing grassroots bases; they are entirely artificial constructs.”
Speaking to Zawia3, he adds: “Since the regime itself does not allow the emergence of natural parties connected to the public, it is only logical that the symbols of these parties are people directly linked to the system. In genuine party experiences, political figures rise organically from unions, universities, and the streets. In Egypt, however, they are the product of top-down engineering, where priority is given to those who demonstrate loyalty or belong to networks close to power.”
Ismail stresses that “the absence of real parties connected to the public transforms the political sphere into a closed arena where figures are manufactured to serve predetermined goals. It is therefore unsurprising that most of these figures are former officers or individuals with direct loyalty to the regime.”
When asked about the future repercussions of this political closure, Ismail replied: “Society and the state weaken in proportion to the weakness of their institutions. A strong society is one that possesses unions, parties, and organizations capable of negotiating with the authorities and managing crises without explosion. A weak society, deprived of such instruments, faces a constant threat to its stability, and any transfer of power within it becomes fraught with danger.”
He continues: “The weaker a society is and the fewer organizational tools it possesses, the greater the risks to political transitions and to handling popular anger resulting from economic hardship. In contrast, the existence of strong unions and parties enables a society to create channels for negotiation and to reach solutions without upheaval, ensuring an orderly and safe transition of power.”
The Egyptian politician concludes in his conversation with Zawia3: “As long as society is prevented from possessing its own organizational tools, it will remain at the mercy of the winds. We have clearly seen this in the collapse of neighboring societies and states that were weak and deprived of active political and trade organizations. In Egypt, the absence of such tools does not only weaken political parties; it ultimately weakens society itself and the state in the long term.”
A Prominent Presence of Generals
Looking at the indicators of security dominance over political party life in Egypt, it is worth noting that the Nation’s Future Party (Hizb Mustaqbal Watan) was officially founded in 2014 by a group of young people close to the authorities. However, it quickly transformed into the largest parliamentary bloc, securing 316 seats in the 2020–2025 parliament. The party not only attracted civilian cadres but also opened its doors to retired army and police officers, who went on to form the solid core of its parliamentary bloc.
The Homeland Protectors Party (Hizb Humat al-Watan) represents the clearest expression of the militarization of the political sphere. Established in 2013 by Major General Galal Haridy—who passed away in January—and several other former officers, the party built its identity around the concept of defending “national security.” From the outset, it included dozens of retired generals in its leadership structure.
Within the current parliament, there is a conspicuous presence of former military and police leaders who have assumed influential positions within parties and parliamentary committees. In the Homeland Protectors Party, prominent figures include Major General Ahmed Al-Awadi (former army officer and head of the Defense Committee), Major General Tarek Nasr (army officer, secretary-general of the party, and first deputy chair of the Defense and National Security Committee in the Senate), and Major General Ayman Abdel Mohsen (army officer and current member of the Senate). Also among them are Sayed Fouad Abu Zeid, a senator representing Qena and member of the Defense and National Security Committee, and Ahmed Mohamed Saleh, a member of parliament for the Aswan constituency and a member of the same committee.
In the Republican People’s Party, Major General Mohamed Salah Abu Hamila (former army officer, party secretary-general, and head of the parliamentary bloc) plays a leading role. In the Nation’s Future Party, notable figures include Major General Khaled Saeed, former governor of Sharqia; Major General Yehia Al-Eisawy; Major General Ahmed Mohamed Saad; and Alaa Abed, a former police officer who heads the Transportation and Communications Committee and previously chaired the Human Rights Committee.
It is worth noting that throughout Egypt’s parliamentary history, the presence of military and security officers had been relatively limited and typically confined to individual cases or presidential appointees, or those included through the ruling party’s lists—not to organized blocs wielding significant influence within parliament.
The National Front Party (Hizb al-Jabha al-Wataniya) is the latest newcomer to Egypt’s political scene and is viewed as part of a new wave of efforts to reshape party life into a support base for the political system. It was founded by businessman Ibrahim Al-Organi, who has built extensive ties with sovereign bodies and opened the party’s doors to a wide array of public figures. The party includes several former military leaders, as well as former ministers, officials, and political figures from both Nasserist and liberal backgrounds.
Although this composition was expected to grant the party considerable political and media weight, it has instead fueled controversy over the nature of its formation and its implications—particularly given the potential conflict of interest between Al-Organi’s economic influence and the party’s new political role. Observers believe the National Front Party could become a key player in the upcoming elections, either by competing with major parties such as Nation’s Future or by positioning itself as an umbrella platform for various factions close to the state.
According to analysts, these parties are not built on traditional social or economic programs but rather on a narrative of security and stability—a narrative that derives its legitimacy from the military institution. The result is that the political arena is no longer a space for competition among diverse civilian projects but a mechanism for reproducing the state’s discourse through similar party channels.
During the 2020 parliamentary election campaigns, it was notable that many former military candidates presented themselves as “defenders of national security” rather than as representatives of local constituencies. This shift in rhetoric illustrates how the concept of “politics” has become synonymous with “security,” and how discussions about social justice, labor rights, or civil liberties have been significantly diminished.
The media has also played a key role in entrenching this trajectory, portraying the presence of former officers in parliament as a guarantee of stability and the preservation of “state prestige,” while depicting independent civilian candidates as weaker or less experienced. In this way, the logic of militarization has been reinforced not only through organizational structures but also through the shaping of public consciousness.
According to data from the State Information Service, Egypt currently has around 104 officially registered political parties. However, genuine political activity remains extremely limited, as only 14 of these parties are represented in the current parliament. Dominating the scene is the Nation’s Future Party, which controls the parliamentary majority.
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Deliberate Assassination of Political Life and Civil Society
According to a study by the Carnegie Middle East Center conducted by Middle East specialist Yezid Sayigh, Egypt’s policies in recent years have generated a clear aversion to any form of independent political organization or activity. This has translated into what the study describes as a three-dimensional assault aimed at draining Egypt’s political sphere of all substance.
The first dimension, the study notes, was the systematic destruction of party life at its core—while simultaneously maintaining a superficial democratic appearance through regular elections and a symbolic parliamentary image. Analyst Marina Ottaway described this hollowing-out of the political sphere as the end of competition between organized forces representing the interests of various social segments, leading to what she called “the death of political life.” Parties have become weak and weightless. Even Egypt’s State Information Service acknowledged in a 2022 report that pre-2013 political parties continue to “struggle between development and extinction” under the so-called “New Republic.”
At the same time, new pro-government parties have emerged—pushed to the forefront by the security apparatus to play a central role in demonstrating popular support for state policies. According to the study, unlike the era of Hosni Mubarak, when the regime relied on the National Democratic Party as the main tool of control, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s political system has adopted a more decentralized model since 2013 by creating multiple loyalist parties.
The study points out that “these parties have become façades tied to patronage networks, while security agencies have taken direct control over candidate selection and the formation of parliamentary blocs—exercising even greater dominance than under Mubarak. This trend became more entrenched following a legislative amendment that ended judicial supervision of elections starting in 2024.” The result, the study continues, was evident in the 2020 elections, when the liberal Free Egyptians Party collapsed, while the pro-government Nation’s Future Party swept the seats of parliament and the recently reinstated Senate.
The study further notes that the parliament as an institution has lost whatever remained of its function as a platform for peaceful political disagreement. Its role has been reduced to rubber-stamping presidential decrees and government bills. The researcher explains that “the regime’s control over the formation of parliamentary blocs and parties was the first step, followed by stripping the parliament of any political weight. Thus, the legislature became a mere façade suggesting openness, while new symbolic platforms and parties were occasionally launched—such as the National Front Party, announced in December 2024 with much media fanfare as a so-called ‘sign of political recovery.’”
According to the same study, this approach has extended into civil society as well. The authorities have worked to redirect civic activity in ways that neutralize any potential political influence. Initially, the government focused on suppressing Islamic charitable associations deemed politically threatening. Then came Law No. 149 of 2019 on Civil Work, which formalized this policy by restricting the role of NGOs to “community development in accordance with the state’s plans and needs.”
What Will the Military Presence Look Like in the Next Parliament?
As Egypt approaches its upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for November, the political and party scene has entered a period of intense activity and preemptive alliances. Observers expect that competition will once again take place within a framework heavily tilted in favor of pro-government parties. Political alliances are already taking shape, national lists are being prepared in advance, and efforts are underway to position figures with security or military backgrounds in prominent spots—both on individual ballots and in joint party lists.
One of the most notable developments is the announcement by the National Alliance of Parties that it will contest individual seats through a unified list comprising about 15 of its 42 member parties, according to Medhat Barakat, head of the alliance’s media sector. Meanwhile, the National List for Egypt, which includes 12 parties—among them major ones such as Nation’s Future, Homeland Protectors, and National Front—has already released the names of its candidates across various governorates.
At the level of party lists, dominant parties like Nation’s Future, Homeland Protectors, and National Front appear intent on including candidates with security and military backgrounds, particularly in constituencies where competition is expected to be stronger, according to political analysts.
On the individual level, observers anticipate that several retired officers or former members of security agencies will run either as independents or through party lists in constituencies where they enjoy notable local influence. In recent years, it has become common practice for parties to include figures with military backgrounds in provincial lists or contested districts to capitalize on their combined social networks and security-linked standing within these communities.
A policy paper published in May by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights titled “Toward Parliamentary Pluralism: The Necessary Review of Election Laws” notes that the 2025 parliamentary elections come at an extremely delicate and critical time for Egypt. The country faces complex regional and international developments, alongside deepening domestic economic, social, and human rights crises that are expected to intensify public discontent and increase the risk of instability.
The paper also points out that the next parliament will likely be tasked with handling the issue of the upcoming 2030 presidential elections—specifically, the question of presidential term limits and the possibility of amending the constitutional clause to allow President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to run for a fourth term, or alternatively, keeping the current text unchanged to open the door for other serious contenders by 2030. These matters, the study emphasizes, will inevitably be referred to the new parliament for legislative deliberation. They will place heavy responsibilities on parliament, demanding professional and genuine representation that truly reflects public sentiment and can engage effectively with citizens.
Ultimately, the seriousness with which the new parliament will handle such critical national questions will depend largely on how it is formed—and on the mechanisms through which its members reach their seats.
