With its first session convening on October 18, the Egyptian Senate––the country’s upper parliamentary chamber––sparked a wave of wide-ranging criticism centered on three main issues. The first concerns the appointment mechanism, which grants the president the authority to select one third of the members, creating a bloc fully aligned with the executive branch. The second issue relates to the dominance of businessmen over the chamber’s seats, whether through closed electoral lists or direct presidential appointments, effectively turning the legislative platform into a space for securing immunity and privileges rather than defending citizens’ interests. The third issue pertains to the marginalization of the Senate’s legislative role, as its powers are limited to “providing an opinion” without real ability to propose or amend laws or oversee the government.
Observers described the opening session as an early indication of poor performance, a bloated composition, and a chamber no different from its predecessor. The most widely circulated scene involved several senators stumbling over the wording of the oath, forcing them to repeat it multiple times. Among the most notable cases were MP Ahmed Mostafa Mohamed Adly and MP Ahmed Salam Madkhal Suleiman, who both repeated the oath after misreading it, as well as MP Michel Marai Attallah, who also had to repeat it for the same reason. MP Omar Khamis Omar made three errors while reciting the oath, stumbling over phrases such as “the unity and integrity of its territory” and the word “uphold,” while MP Reem Hussein Ahmed Fouad El-Sawy repeated the oath twice for similar mistakes. MP Eva Maher Nassif likewise repeated the oath twice due to misreading the same phrase “the unity and integrity of its territory.”
Observers who spoke to Zawia3 say the current Senate clearly reflects the transformation of the upper chamber from a legislative platform into a symbolic arena displaying political and economic loyalties. They note that the chamber is dominated by wealthy figures and social elites rather than experts or popular forces representing citizens. According to them, the Senate has come to serve as a venue for showcasing government policies and reinforcing the presence of influential state-aligned figures, while genuine legislative and oversight initiatives remain largely absent. This effectively turns the chamber into something closer to a “businessmen’s club” than a national body of expertise expected to shape major decisions and balance political vision with the public interest.
The Egyptian Senate is composed of 300 members. Two-thirds, or 200 members, are elected through direct secret ballot, while the remaining third, 100 members, are appointed by the president. Elected members are chosen through a mixed electoral system combining closed absolute lists and individual seats, a structure that offers the appearance of diverse representation but in practice remains subject to predetermined political arrangements.

Abolished, Then Reinstated Without Impact
In 2020, the Egyptian state decided to reintroduce the Senate into political life after it had been abolished for six years under the 2014 Constitution. At the time, authorities framed the decision as an attempt to restore balance within the legislative institution, create broader space for debate and vision-setting before laws are passed, and “deepen societal dialogue” by “supporting the parliamentary system with an advisory chamber tasked with reviewing legislation.” However, the years following its establishment showed that the chamber failed to transcend protocol and symbolism to play any real role in policymaking.
Over the four years of the previous parliamentary term, the Senate functioned more as an advisory body summoned when needed to endorse official directions or pass pre-prepared recommendations, rather than an institution possessing genuine legislative or oversight tools. The absence of partisan competition, combined with the dominance of closed electoral lists tailored to pro-government political alliances, deprived the chamber of the pluralism that typically characterizes upper houses in comparative parliamentary systems. And although the Senate held discussions on certain social and economic issues, their impact remained limited and did not translate into public policy or legislation issued by the House of Representatives.
Before 2014, Egypt’s former Shura Council held a limited role, yet attempted to maintain a measure of balance between the executive authority and societal oversight. Under the 2014 Constitution, following the events of 2013, the Shura Council was dissolved and the parliament became unicameral, with strong centralization justified on grounds of maintaining political stability.
The new chamber, reinstated in 2020 as the Senate, was given narrow powers limited to offering opinions and advisory studies on constitutional amendment proposals, development plans, treaties, and draft laws. It was not granted independent oversight or legislative authority, rendering it on paper an instrument to support the legislative process but in practice a chamber for display rather than a genuine legislative platform.
Article 248 of the Constitution stipulates that “the Senate shall be responsible for studying and proposing what it deems necessary to consolidate the foundations of democracy, support social peace, uphold the basic components and supreme values of society, its rights, freedoms, and public obligations, and deepen and expand democratic practice.”
Article 249 defines the chamber’s functions, stating: “The opinion of the Senate shall be sought on the following: proposals to amend one or more articles of the Constitution; the general plan for social and economic development; treaties of peace, alliance, and all treaties related to sovereignty rights; draft laws and complementary draft laws referred to it by the President of the Republic or the House of Representatives; and matters referred to it by the President related to public policy or the state’s policies on Arab or foreign affairs. The chamber shall convey its views on these matters to the President and the House of Representatives.”
Additionally, Article 253 prohibits the Senate from questioning the Prime Minister or members of the government. Legislative tasks generally come as referrals from the government or the House of Representatives, significantly limiting the chamber’s capacity for initiative.
These limited powers are not the only problem. The president’s authority to appoint one third of the members has reinforced executive influence over the chamber, with appointees often drawn from compliant partisan figures, individuals close to the state, or businessmen such as former Foreign Minister Mohamed El-Orabi, former Investment Minister Sahar Nasr, and former Petroleum Minister Osama Kamal. The appointment of actor Yasser Galal prompted exceptional controversy, given his lack of any political or legislative background.
Moreover, the alliance between electoral lists and businessmen, and the increasing penetration of economic influence into decision-making positions—as seen with the election of businessman Ahmed Abu Hashima as head of the Youth and Sports Committee—highlight the dominance of political and financial loyalties over the chamber. This has turned it into a network of economic and political interests rather than a legislative body representing the public.
In his article titled “A Senate Without Powers: A Contest for Immunity and Prestige,” Dr. Amr Hashem Rabie, Deputy Director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, writes that “any close examination of the current Senate’s powers reveals that they are nearly nonexistent compared to all previous chambers since 1923.” He adds: “This situation is tied to the 2012 Constitution, amended in 2019, and to other laws—especially Law No. 141 of 2020 concerning the Senate.”
He continues: “Following calls to amend the 2012 Constitution for a second time in 2019, one of the key sub-amendments was the creation of a second chamber named the Senate. Article 82 of the original 2012 Constitution had established a bicameral parliament consisting of the House of Representatives and the Shura Council.”
He adds: “Since the Shura Council was originally created by the 100-member committee appointed by the 2012 parliament dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood—against the wishes of most civil forces, which were a minority and opposed this chamber due to its weak performance in the political system—one of the priorities of the 2014 constitutional amendments, following the events of June 30, 2013, was to return to a unicameral parliament. Indeed, the vote inside the 50-member committee overwhelmingly supported a single chamber.” Rabie argues that the return of a second chamber in the 2019 constitutional amendments was essentially a return to the 2012 arrangement, but “in a theatrical and caricatured form.”

Dominance of Capital and Power
Zohdy El-Shamy, Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, argues that the alliance between power and capital in Egypt is not new; it has always existed, but it escalated and surfaced more visibly during the era of Gamal Mubarak’s Policies Committee and his right-hand man Ahmed Ezz, who succeeded Kamal El-Shazly as the Secretary for Organizational Affairs of the then-ruling National Democratic Party. This alliance oversaw the notorious 2010 elections, which effectively marked the beginning of the end for Mubarak’s regime due to the blatant manipulation and public provocation that characterized them.
El-Shamy tells Zawia3 that the current scene in both Senate and House elections evokes that past even more starkly, noting that the authorities have already secured the majority of seats in both chambers through the so-called absolute national list. This list has been surrounded by widespread controversy—including from inside the pro-government parties that compose it—regarding the “price tag” reportedly attached to securing a spot on it.
He adds: “Unfortunately, the final composition of the Senate and the preliminary composition of the House point to the complete dominance of various types of businessmen—real-estate developers, contractors, automobile franchise holders, and others—with no genuine representation of what was once called the working people: workers, farmers, the middle class, and prominent intellectuals. As a result, the chamber appears to be nothing more than a council of interest groups, bearing no resemblance to the living Egypt we all know. It is an extremely dangerous situation.”
Membership in the Egyptian Senate grants holders extensive privileges far beyond any actual legislative role. The membership card allows for smooth and expedited passage through airports, border points, and security checkpoints without inspection. In addition, each member receives a monthly remuneration of 42,000 pounds ($891.80), exempt from taxes and fees, and protected from seizure or forfeiture, making it a guaranteed and legally shielded source of income.
The privileges extend far beyond financial compensation. They include first-class comprehensive medical insurance for the member and their family, annual air-travel passes, premium-class railway subscriptions, and the ability to take out loans against the monthly remuneration while retaining full financial benefits from their original workplace for the duration of their term. Membership years are also counted toward pensions or end-of-service bonuses.

The Senate: A Wasted Constitutional Pillar
Dr. Sara Keira, Director of the Euro–North African Center for Political Studies, argues that the Egyptian Senate, in its constitutional and intellectual design, represents a fundamental pillar for balancing the country’s political and legislative system. In her view, it is not merely a second chamber of parliament but a rational space where decisions are reconsidered before becoming binding laws. She explains that the chamber, by virtue of its advisory nature, was intended to be a forum for the country’s intellectual and scientific elite—those with accumulated expertise, knowledge, and the ability to see beyond the immediate political moment—forming a bridge between science and politics, between vision and decision.
She warns, however, that transforming a legislative seat into a position of symbolic representation instead of a platform for specialized minds empties the Senate of its purpose and turns laws from informed, thoughtful texts grounded in an understanding of societal, state, and global dynamics into decisions devoid of advisory depth. She stresses that “the absence of legal and research backgrounds among the majority of members strips the chamber of its essence, turning it from a national body of expertise into a protocol institution with no real impact on policymaking.”
The political researcher adds: “Sound governance is built not on intentions alone but on accumulated knowledge and experience. In its ideal form, the Senate should be the intellectual filter of the Egyptian state—the place where legal, diplomatic, economic, and scientific expertise converge to shape the state’s major future visions.” She emphasizes that the absence of experts harms not just individuals but the state itself and constrains national dialogue: “Excluding or overlooking expertise deprives the state of its rational voice, isolates the intellectual elite politically, and impoverishes national dialogue by stripping it of diversity and perspective.”
She continues: “Reviving the Senate’s true role begins with honoring the idea for which it was created: to be a house of intellect, not loyalties, and a platform for expertise, not prestige. A state that listens to its experts builds a more stable future for itself, whereas a state that confines itself to familiar voices merely reproduces its decisions within a closed loop, without development or vision. Parliament is the force of legislation, but the Senate is the conscience of legislation; if the conscience disappears, wisdom is lost, along with the balance that states need to remain on the right track.”

A Rich History… and a Present Searching for Purpose
Throughout its nearly two-hundred-year history, the Egyptian Senate has represented a consistent parliamentary tradition combining consultation with partial legislative participation. From its earliest years, it embodied a chamber of notables and scholars whose role gradually evolved. The institution experienced periods of abolition and reinstatement depending on political and constitutional conditions, but since 2020 it has re-emerged as an advisory chamber reflecting a limited role in public policy—highlighting the expertise of the private sector and civil society without holding strong oversight tools or independent legislative initiative.
During the era of Mohamed Ali Pasha (1824–1829), the Higher Council was established in 1824, followed by the Consultative Council in 1829, consisting of 156 members, including 99 elected—a foundational attempt at limited parliamentary participation. Under Khedive Ismail (1866), Egypt saw its first significant parliamentary experiment with the establishment of the Chamber of Deputies, whose members were elected for the first time, representing a meaningful step toward political development.
Between 1913 and 1923, Egypt witnessed the Legislative Assembly period, which included the Legislative Council and the General Assembly, before the 1923 Constitution created the Senate as the parliament’s second chamber alongside the House of Representatives, with partial advisory and legislative powers. Three-fifths of its members were elected and the remainder appointed by the king.
After the 1952 revolution, parliamentary structures underwent repeated changes, with new bodies established and old ones abolished or redefined under successive constitutions. The 1971 Constitution established the Shura Council as an advisory institution, which continued until 2013, when it was abolished following the political upheavals of the revolution, leaving the country with a unicameral parliament for several years.
The Senate returned to the political scene after the 2019 constitutional amendments, with the first elections held in 2020, restoring it as the upper chamber of Egypt’s parliament. The new chamber retained limited, primarily advisory powers, composed of elected and appointed members, emphasizing cooperation with the House of Representatives and the formulation of general policies rather than full, independent legislative practice.
With the chamber increasingly dependent on presidential appointments and financial influence—and lacking genuine popular engagement—the upper house has become a symbolic façade for showcasing government policy. Its legislative outputs tend to be administrative or procedural, diminishing its importance as a genuine legislative body capable of protecting citizens’ interests or overseeing the executive authority.