Emirati businessman Mohamed Alabbar has sparked widespread controversy in Egypt due to the expansion of his investments in recent years, which now span Greater Cairo and several coastal cities. His recent statements about his desire to acquire land and buildings in Historic Downtown Cairo—an area the government is offering for private investment and redevelopment after relocating ministries and administrative offices to the New Administrative Capital—have reignited public debate.
Alabbar, who began investing in Egypt in 2005, became associated with major real estate projects that expanded notably after 2016, when Egypt faced severe financial challenges and opened its doors wide to Gulf investments. He drew particular controversy in September, after publicly expressing his wish to invest in Downtown Cairo—a move that coincided with multiple reports about his alleged links with Tel Aviv, which deeply unsettled many Egyptians and likely prompted the government to issue clarifications later.
On September 8, immediately after signing an investment agreement for the “Marrasi Red Sea” project, Alabbar declared his admiration for Cairo and his wish to invest in its historic downtown, saying:
“We are looking for more investment opportunities in Egypt. I want Downtown Cairo. My love for this area comes from what it represents—the grandeur of Cairo. It’s not just an investment interest, it’s love for the city itself.”
His remarks stirred significant debate and fears that the historic district could be transformed into a luxury real estate project that would threaten the area’s identity and displace its original residents. Experts in architectural heritage argue that Cairo’s rich historical and architectural legacy requires any redevelopment plan to respect its original character and authenticity, taking inspiration from global models of cities that successfully balanced modernization with heritage preservation.
This was not the first time Alabbar spoke about his ambitions for central Cairo—a site of strategic, historical, and security importance. In February, several business media outlets reported what they described as “Alabbar’s vision for redeveloping the heart of Egypt’s capital”, comparing it to Downtown Dubai.
The Egyptian government, for its part, clarified in February that the Egypt Sovereign Fund had been tasked with creating a comprehensive vision for the redevelopment of Downtown Cairo. This includes offering state-owned units and properties—recently vacated following the government’s move to the New Administrative Capital—for investment, in order to maximize the economic returns of these public assets.
At the time, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly stated during a press conference that “the Sovereign Fund, as the entity owning these assets, is currently preparing a master plan in coordination with the relevant authorities, to launch investment projects in Downtown Cairo in line with a developmental vision that ensures maximum economic benefit.” He added that “many investment entities, both domestic and international, have shown strong interest in participating in the redevelopment of this area, as well as in projects along the North Coast and the Red Sea, which are among the most promising regions for launching investment ventures in both the tourism and real estate sectors.”
In August, the Prime Minister reaffirmed that redevelopment works in the Khedivial Cairo and Downtown districts aim to preserve their architectural and urban identity without altering their historic composition. He stressed the importance of monitoring revival projects in Khedivial Cairo and Downtown, as these areas constitute a vital part of Egypt’s national history and offer significant potential to leverage the state’s substantial real estate wealth concentrated there.
Capital Expands Along Egypt’s Shores: The Sea as an Unspoken Private Property
How and When Did Alabbar Begin His Business in Egypt?
Mohamed Alabbar began his investments in Egypt in 2005 through Emaar Misr for Development, during the government of Ahmed Nazif under former president Hosni Mubarak. By the end of 2021, the company had acquired around 2,600 feddans in Cairo (approximately 10.92 million square meters), represented by projects such as Uptown Cairo in Mokattam, Mivida in New Cairo, and Cairo Gate in Sheikh Zayed. In addition, Emaar Misr expanded to the North Coast, developing Marassi on an area of 1,600 feddans (about 6.5 million square meters).
According to data compiled for this investigation, by 2025, the total land owned by Alabbar in Egypt reached roughly 4,300 feddans (equivalent to more than 17 million square meters), in addition to 2,900 feddans—over 12 million square meters—that he is developing in partnership with other entities.
Looking back to the Mubarak era, observers note that Egypt’s economic structure was reshaped along market-oriented and liberalization lines, as the state’s social role declined in favor of private capital, which rose to dominate key sectors such as real estate, tourism, and services. Since the 1990s, with the implementation of privatization and structural adjustment programs supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), public land shifted from being a sovereign resource to a commodity sold under the banner of “development.”
The Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law No. 8 of 1997 granted broad privileges to investors, whether foreign or Egyptian. These included long-term tax exemptions, facilitations in land allocation, and protections against nationalization, confiscation, or government control. Over time, development was no longer measured by the improvement of public services or the strengthening of productive sectors, but by the government’s ability to “attract investment.” This redefined social rights as conditional privileges subject to the priorities of capital.
Under this legal framework, vast tracts of state-owned land and property were subject to extensive violations that contravened both the law and the constitution. According to a report by the Urban Development Authority titled “The Impact of Allocation Policies on State Lands During the Mubarak Era,” former officials exploited their positions to gain illicit profits through irregular land allocations.
The report documented interconnected patterns of administrative and financial corruption that extended to public lands themselves. Major projects such as Madinaty, Palm Hills, and Cairo Festival City were not merely real estate ventures but became symbols of how the state managed its lands during the final decade of Mubarak’s rule.
The report also revealed that land sale contracts were signed through direct orders, without public competition or transparency, and at prices far below market value. Subsequent rulings by the Administrative Court exposed the scale of the irregularities, annulling several contracts for violating the Public Bids and Tenders Law, and confirming that the New Urban Communities Authority had handled state property as if it were private ownership.
Despite the clarity of these violations, the core system remained unchanged. The policy of special investment facilitation continued—and its enduring effects will be explored in the following sections.
What Lies Behind Alabbar’s “Emaar Misr”?
Mohamed Alabbar—internationally renowned for projects such as the Burj Khalifa in Dubai—entered Egypt with ambitions as vast as the tracts of land his newly founded company, Emaar Misr for Development, would soon acquire. From its establishment, Alabbar signed a series of contracts that made him one of the most powerful players in Egypt’s real estate market, after his company obtained extensive land plots in the North Coast, Mokattam, and New Cairo.
Projects such as Uptown Cairo in Mokattam and Marassi on the North Coast were born under Emaar Misr, becoming icons of luxury housing and gated living—symbols of a new urban geography reshaped to serve a narrow class of the wealthy. From Mivida in New Cairo to Cairo Gate on the Cairo–Alexandria Desert Road, passing through the company’s plans in Sheikh Zayed, Alabbar’s investments expanded across multiple strategic locations in and around the capital, covering thousands of feddans transferred from state ownership to a private company in less than two decades.
Emaar Misr was established as an Egyptian joint stock company through a partnership between Emaar Properties (Dubai), which held 40%, and Egyptian businessman Shafik Gabr, who held 60%, in accordance with Company Law No. 159 of 1981 and the Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law No. 8 of 1997. These laws provided extensive exemptions and facilities for foreign investors, particularly in the tourism and real estate development sectors.
However, the partnership between Alabbar and Gabr was short-lived. Disagreements led to Gabr’s exit in exchange for financial compensation, while Emaar Properties expanded its control over Emaar Misr in 2007. Since then, Emaar Misr has effectively become a subsidiary almost wholly owned by Emaar Properties PJSC, which is listed on the Dubai Financial Market, and now holds approximately 89% of its shares.
According to Emaar Misr’s Board of Directors Disclosure Report for the fourth quarter of 2021, the company’s ownership structure was as follows: Emaar Properties PJSC held 88.74% of the shares—including ownership through Emirates Hills Phase 1 LLC. Among international institutional shareholders were the Government Pension Fund Global (Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund – Norges Bank) with 0.84%, Schroder Investment Management Limited with 0.14%, and The Vanguard Group with 0.07%. The free float on the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) represented 10.21% of the company’s shares.
Why Does Alabbar’s Land Acquisition Stir Concern and Controversy?
Mohamed Alabbar’s investments, which encompass more than 17 million square meters of Egyptian land—valued at approximately 35 billion dollars (1.65 trillion pounds) according to his own statements—fall within the broader wave of Gulf investments in Egypt, particularly from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which have expanded significantly over the past two decades.
According to a report by the British real estate consultancy Knight Frank, more than 94% of high-net-worth Gulf investors are targeting Egypt’s real estate market.
Observers note that these investments are not limited to injecting capital into real estate or tourism projects. They have evolved into an economic and political network of influence extending across strategic sectors ranging from real estate to logistics and energy.
As analyzed in an article published in Egypt and the Arab World, a journal issued by the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), these investments operate through three main axes:
“First, securing high financial returns in a promising real estate market expanding on the outskirts of the capital and coastal cities; second, expanding geo-strategic influence in a country that represents a pivotal power in the Middle East; and third, gaining access to the domestic market and its institutions through state-provided partnerships and incentives under the banner of ‘investment attraction.’”
The same study argues that “Gulf capital has effectively come to dominate the major real estate projects in Greater Cairo,” adding that the role of the Egyptian state has shifted “from being a direct producer to a partner or intermediary in these ventures.” It considers large-scale real estate projects—such as those of Emaar and similar developers—as a model for Cairo’s transformation into an open laboratory for Gulf capital.
In the same context, a report by researcher David Butter, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) under the title “Egypt and the Gulf,” emphasizes that Gulf investments in Egypt cannot be viewed merely as capital inflows seeking profit, but rather as a tool of economic and political influence that has redefined the relationship between the Egyptian state and both domestic and international investors. The report further notes that these investments are frequently tied to political understandings that go beyond pure economic logic, making them part of a wider network of regional influence that is reshaping power balances within Egypt’s economy and raising fundamental questions about who holds economic decision-making power—and who actually benefits from these partnerships.
Over the past two decades, Alabbar’s investments have accumulated to form one of the largest private landholdings in Egypt. By the end of 2021, Emaar Misr for Development owned approximately 2,600 feddans in Cairo (about 10.92 million square meters). By 2025, the total area of land owned or co-developed by Alabbar in Egypt had reached more than 17.2 million square meters, spanning Greater Cairo, the North Coast, and the Marassi Red Sea development project, which he is implementing in partnership with Sky Tower for Real Estate Development and Golden Coast, a subsidiary of City Stars Saudi Arabia.
The Marassi Red Sea project, covering about 2,400 feddans, remains surrounded by ambiguity and a lack of transparency, fueling further questions about the nature of these partnerships and their long-term implications for Egypt’s land ownership and sovereignty.
Did Alabbar Receive Government Privileges?
Emaar’s large-scale projects in Egypt rely on two main approaches: either direct land ownership—as in Uptown Cairo, Marassi, and Mivida New Cairo—or strategic partnerships, such as Mivida Gardens El Mostakbal and Marassi Red Sea, where the company pays substantial upfront fees and assumes responsibility for development and sales.
Emaar Misr made its formal entry into Egypt’s real estate market in 2006 with the launch of Uptown Cairo, built over approximately 1,200 feddans (around 5 million square meters) atop the Mokattam Hills. The project’s master plan was approved by Cairo Governor’s Decree No. 501 of 2008, published on March 1, 2008, in the Official Gazette (Issue No. 50). The project introduced one of Egypt’s first gated residential communities, targeting the country’s wealthiest classes.
In 2007, Emaar Misr won the public auction to develop the Sidi Abdel Rahman area on the North Coast, covering approximately 1,600 feddans (about 6 million square meters). The deal was valued at around 1.004 billion pounds ($21.3 million), with a price of 160.5 pounds ($3.41) per square meter, following a decision by the General Assembly of the Holding Company for Tourism, chaired by then-Minister of Investment Mahmoud Mohieldin, to sell the entire land parcel to a single strategic investor. The deal later triggered widespread controversy, as competition was restricted to a limited number of investment consortia before the land was ultimately awarded to a coalition led by Alabbar and Shafik Gabr.
Around the same period, the company signed another contract with the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) to obtain land in New Cairo for the Mivida project, covering approximately 890 feddans (about 3.8 million square meters). In 2008, Emaar Misr for Development also acquired a prime 133-feddan plot (around 558,310 square meters) extending along Sheikh Zayed City, to establish an integrated residential community later named Cairo Gate. The allocation was made in one of the most vital areas west of Cairo, at a price not exceeding 200 pounds ($4.24) per square meter at the time, even though the commercial market price for similar plots in Sheikh Zayed exceeded 50,000 pounds ($1,061) per square meter.
In 2021, Emaar launched Belle Vie in Sheikh Zayed City as part of the wave of luxury urban expansion west of Cairo. It became the latest project by Emaar Misr for Development, owned by Emirati businessman Mohamed Alabbar. The project spans roughly 500 feddans (about 2.1 million square meters) in a strategic location near 26th of July Corridor and the Cairo–Alexandria Desert Road, under a direct land allocation contract signed with the New Urban Communities Authority.
In 2025, Emaar Misr for Development announced a partnership agreement with Midar for Investment and Urban Development to implement a fully integrated residential project—“New Mivida” in New Cairo. The project is located in a strategic area along the Cairo–Suez Road, covering about 2 million square meters (500 feddans). Under this arrangement, Emaar Misr participates as a co-developer without owning the land, while no details have been disclosed regarding Midar’s agreement with the Egyptian government concerning the ownership and allocation of the land.
Mohamed Ramadan, an economic researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, told Zawia3 that the fundamental question surrounding foreign real estate investments in Egypt is not about the amount of land acquired, but rather about the developmental pattern of these investments. He explained that most Emirati and Saudi investments in the real estate sector consist of purchasing land and constructing luxury housing units priced in U.S. dollars, due to the investors’ need to repatriate profits abroad. This, he said, drives up real estate prices across the entire market and, over the long term, negatively affects Egypt’s balance of payments while intensifying pressure on the local currency.
Ramadan pointed out that while the real estate sector maintains strong backward linkages with industries such as steel and cement, it contributes little to stimulating the broader economy or achieving sustainable development, due to its weak forward linkages—that is, the limited spillover benefits to other productive sectors.
He further explained that this investment model, if it remains the sole form of attracting foreign capital, neither supports inclusive economic growth nor reduces unemployment, and instead reinforces dependence on profit repatriation rather than on sustainable productive investments. Ramadan added that the state’s role in land pricing, particularly in new urban communities, has been a major factor in pushing the entire market toward higher prices, even for housing units supposedly intended for Egypt’s middle class.
From Dispute to Reconciliation: Alabbar’s Legal Trail in Egypt
Tracing the timeline of Mohamed Alabbar’s investments in Egypt reveals that his expansion was no coincidence, but rather the result of a cumulative plan that began in the mid-2000s, amid the rise of Gulf capital in the final years of Hosni Mubarak’s rule, and continued under Egypt’s post-2014 policy of actively courting Gulf investors.
Behind this trajectory lies a series of legal disputes and administrative conflicts that accompanied nearly every phase of Alabbar’s growth—yet all ended in settlements favorable to Emaar Misr.
In 2009, the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) decided to withdraw about 50% of the land allocated for the Cairo Gate project in Sheikh Zayed City. The decision came after Emaar Misr failed to pay the fees required to convert the land’s status from agricultural to fully urban use, even though the company had obtained the land in 2008 at the symbolic price of 200 pounds ($4.24) per square meter. At the time, the authority explained that other cities—such as 6th of October City—offered investors two options: either to pay in kind (by relinquishing part of the land) or in cash without reducing the land area. However, this second option was unavailable in Sheikh Zayed, as there was no additional land to allocate for infrastructure and public services.
In November 2019, Emaar Misr for Development reached a settlement agreement with NUCA regarding its lands in the Sheikh Zayed extension. The company had submitted an official request to change the land’s designation from agricultural to residential, agreeing that the authority would receive 50% of the total land area in return. Emaar later purchased the authority’s 52.4-feddan share, while the settlement also included the areas relinquished by the company for the construction of external roads. The total project area thus reached 120.9 feddans, with NUCA committing to provide utilities and approve the land-use change. This allowed Emaar to proceed with the Cairo Gate integrated residential project, at an estimated investment of 11.5 billion pounds ($244 million). The two parties also signed another agreement to allocate an additional 500 feddans for a fully serviced residential project worth approximately 37.8 billion pounds ($802 million).
Another major dispute involved Uptown Cairo, where the Nasr Housing and Development Company, a state-owned enterprise that had sold the land to Emaar, filed an arbitration case in 2017, accusing Emaar of breaching contractual terms by failing to complete development within the agreed timeframe and by appropriating about 47 extra feddans beyond the contracted area. The dispute lasted more than two years before being settled in October 2019, when Emaar Misr paid 100 million pounds ($2.12 million) in compensation for the excess land.
It is noteworthy that in April 2019, just months before this settlement, Mohamed Alabbar announced a donation of 878 million pounds ($18.63 million) to support the redevelopment of informal settlements in Egypt, as part of the “Beit El-Kheir” housing initiative in cooperation with the Misr El-Kheir Foundation. Shortly after the legal resolution, Alabbar, through Emaar Misr, made additional donations of 10 million pounds ($212,000) to the Tahya Misr Fund and Egypt’s public health sector, as well as 40 million pounds ($848,000) to the Misr El-Kheir Foundation, under a cooperation protocol with the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Since then, Emaar Misr has continued contributing to the Tahya Misr Fund.
From the Cairo Gate dispute to Marassi Sidi Abdel Rahman in Marsa Matrouh, further lawsuits emerged in 2019, with several Egyptian parties claiming ownership rights or compensation for previous entitlements before the land’s transfer to Emaar Misr. The most prominent was Case No. 481 of 2019, filed by businessman Waheed Rafat before the South Cairo Court, in which he claimed ownership of more than 400 feddans of the project’s land.
Emaar Misr, however, denied the allegations, calling them “unfounded.” In an official statement, the company reiterated that it had legitimately acquired the Sidi Abdel Rahman tourist land in August 2006 through a public auction for 1 billion and 4 million and 569 thousand pounds ($21.3 million) at 160.5 pounds ($3.41) per square meter. In January 2020, the presiding judge recused himself from the case, prompting the plaintiff’s lawyer, Khaled Abou Bakr, to announce further legal steps to protect his client’s rights. No final ruling has yet been issued.
It is worth noting that between 2016 and 2020—the same period in which Emaar Misr faced multiple legal disputes—the company donated about 155 million pounds ($3.29 million) to national projects, the Tahya Misr Fund, and several charitable organizations such as Misr El-Kheir, as well as to hospitals including Sheikh Zayed Hospital, according to Emaar Misr’s audited financial reports for that period. This figure represents only the portion of donations publicly documented and accessible.
How Philip Morris International secured a stake in one of the world’s few growing cigarette markets
The Sidi Abdel Rahman Project and Its Environmental Risks
In September of this year, a group of Marassi unit owners on Egypt’s North Coast—represented by 22 owners and their legal representatives, led by Dr. Hossam Lotfy—filed a lawsuit before the South Cairo Court against Emaar Misr for Development. The plaintiffs demanded that the company fulfill its contractual obligations stated in the unit sales agreements and compensate them for material, moral, and exceptional damages, in addition to legal interest of 5% from the due date.
The owners sought 100 million pounds ($2.12 million) in compensation: 50 million ($1.06 million) for material damages, 30 million ($636,800) for moral damages, and 20 million ($424,500) for exceptional damages. They also requested that the court impose a fine of 100,000 pounds ($2,120) for each day of delay in fulfilling contractual commitments.
According to the lawsuit, Emaar Misr had signed a contract on January 27, 2007, to purchase a land parcel exceeding 6.2 million square meters in Sidi Abdel Rahman for the establishment of the Marassi North Coast tourism development project. However, as stated in the plaintiffs’ petition, the company failed to meet several contractual obligations, prompting the owners to seek specific performance of the signed contracts. The case is scheduled to be heard by the Civil Division of the South Cairo Court on October 20.
Beyond the legal dispute, the construction of the Marassi yacht marina in Sidi Abdel Rahman, executed by Emaar Misr for Development, has sparked a major environmental controversy, as it has led to coastal erosion along the neighboring beaches. According to an investigation published by Zawia3, collective complaints from residents of nearby North Coast villages began surfacing in the winter of 2020, pointing to visible shoreline erosion and the emergence of rocky layers along some tourist villages east of the marina.
Geospatial measurements revealed that the beaches east of the Marassi Marina suffered erosion ranging between 8 and 11 meters, based on Google Earth imagery. This level of erosion violates Article 91 of the Water Resources and Irrigation Law No. 147, which prohibits altering the natural course of the coastline without prior approval from the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation.
In July 2022, the Ministry of Environment announced the suspension of dredging operations at Marassi Marina and the formation of a technical committee to examine the project’s negative environmental impacts. Despite this official decision, Emaar Misr continued construction, prompting local residents to pile sandbags along the shoreline as a temporary measure to mitigate the effects of erosion.
How Emaar, the UAE Company, Contributed to the Erosion of Egyptian Beaches?
Marassi Red Sea: Alabbar’s New Foothold Under the Banner of “Development”
Egypt’s Red Sea coast has become a new strategic frontier for Mohamed Alabbar’s investments through Emaar Misr for Development. Among his most prominent ventures is the Marassi Red Sea project in Soma Bay, south of Hurghada, spanning approximately 2,426 feddans (over 10 million square meters). In the first week of September, Emaar Misr for Development signed a major agreement to develop the project in partnership with Sky Tower for Real Estate Development—in which Emaar holds a stake—and Golden Coast, owned by the Saudi City Stars Group. The deal followed a legal settlement with the Egyptian government, which extended the land usufruct period and allowed Emaar to enter the project as the main real estate developer.
To date, Emaar’s exact share in Sky Tower has not been publicly disclosed, nor have the details of the partnership structure between Emaar and the two Saudi companies involved in the Red Sea development.
The Red Sea region represents one of the most strategically significant investment areas for Alabbar in Egypt, due to its proximity to Hurghada International Airport, easy access to global tourism markets, and prime seafront location, which confers substantial real estate value to his projects.
Amid the absence of official information about the partnership’s details, a senior government source told Zawia3 that Emaar’s role is limited to property development and that the company does not own any portion of the land directly. The source explained that Emaar was chosen for this role because of its successful track record in previous real estate ventures, making it a trusted partner for managing development and marketing in the project—though the source did not clarify the extent of Emaar’s stake in Sky Tower.
For his part, Abdel Moneim Imam, a Member of Parliament and head of the Justice Party, told Zawia3 that any foreign investment—especially in U.S. dollars—is positive, but he warned against relying solely on one type of investment. He noted that real estate investment is indeed important, as it sustains around 16 related professions and stimulates economic competition, yet Egypt’s core challenge lies in attracting major productive investments and localizing industries.
Imam added that idle land in Egypt often remains without added value unless there is transparent and publicly announced investment. He stressed that the key criterion for any foreign investment should be transparency and fair competition, ensuring that the best offer is selected. Reflecting on Egypt’s historical experience with state institutions since 1952, Imam observed that any project lacking genuine investment and added value becomes a “dead asset,” whereas ventures that create jobs—such as restaurants and chalets—are welcome because they energize the local economy.
Nevertheless, Imam cautioned that if real estate and tourism investments become the only forms of foreign investment, Egypt’s economy will lose balance and fail to build a sustainable productive base capable of employing the workforce and anchoring industrial activity. He emphasized that criticisms of specific deals—such as the Ras El-Hekma agreement—are about transparency, not opposition to investment itself, noting that any party, including the UAE, could justifiably win a bid if the offer is strong and transparent.
Alabbar’s Ties with Tel Aviv: A Major Question Mark
Emirati businessman Mohamed Alabbar has been one of Egypt’s largest investors since 2005, yet over the past decade his relationship with Israel has sparked persistent controversy. As his real estate projects continue to expand across Egypt—acquiring land to build tourist resorts, entertainment complexes, and high-end residential compounds—his documented connections with Israel have raised serious doubts and concerns.
In December 2020, Alabbar called for strengthening social relations between Israelis and Emiratis during his participation in the UAE–Israel Joint Economic Conference, held on the sidelines of the GITEX exhibition in Dubai. Speaking as Chairman of Emaar Properties, Alabbar argued that economic cooperation between the two sides “cannot be sustained without building strong social and human bridges.” He added, “Business with Israel will inevitably happen,” but emphasized the importance of family visits and direct interaction between younger generations in both countries. Activists condemned his statements as a dangerous normalization step, extending beyond economics to popular legitimization of the occupation.
In August 2021, Israeli media revealed that Mohamed Alabbar had made what were described as “generous donations” to support an Israeli initiative in the occupied Palestinian territories, specifically to assist thousands of impoverished Israeli families.
According to the Israeli business website Calcalist, the National Food Security Initiative Conference in Tel Aviv publicly identified, for the first time, five major donors who had financed food aid programs for thousands of families in need, amounting to about 550 million shekels (over $170 million or 8 billion pounds). The report added that these donations had been provided secretly for eighteen years before being disclosed, and that Israeli families were the primary beneficiaries of this assistance.
Earlier, in 2005, Alabbar—then Chairman of Emaar Properties and Director of the Dubai Department of Economic Development—met with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his deputy Shimon Peres, marking the first publicly known meeting between officials from the two sides despite the absence of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel at the time.
During the meeting, Alabbar reportedly proposed an initiative to purchase the homes vacated by Israeli settlers as part of Israel’s planned withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005—a move that Israeli media described as an attempt to preserve the infrastructure of the settlements. Alabbar later denied the report in February 2005, asserting that his visit to the Palestinian territories was personal and intended solely to assess humanitarian conditions and provide aid, with “no intention of normalization or dealings with the Israeli occupation,” contrary to what was published in Israeli outlets.
In this context, Talaat Khalil, former Member of Parliament and General Coordinator of the Civil Democratic Movement, told Zawia3 that while foreign investment in Egypt is vital, he remains deeply concerned about the nature of Emirati investments, which he described as acquisitions of land and strategic projects rather than productive investments. Khalil noted that Mohamed Alabbar controls projects and land in areas of strategic significance to national security, such as the Red Sea region, raising serious questions about the potential implications of these deals for Egypt’s sovereignty and security.
He added that Alabbar’s activities invite suspicion, especially amid his potential ties with Israel, warning that opening the door wide to such investments without rigorous evaluation poses a potential threat to national security. Khalil emphasized that Egypt’s focus should be on productive investments that generate employment and advance comprehensive development, rather than on mere land acquisitions or real estate speculation.
From Marassi on the North Coast to the heart of Cairo, and from the Red Sea to Mokattam, Mohamed Alabbar has woven an economic web of influence over millions of square meters of Egyptian land. Yet behind the shimmering towers and polished façades, questions persist about opaque investment contracts and the lack of transparency, at a time when evidence suggests that this type of investment has not served as a lifeline for Egypt’s struggling economy over the past decade.
