The Nile River in Egypt has witnessed a significant rise in its water level since early October, following Ethiopia’s sudden release of large volumes of water, increasing the discharge from 280 million cubic meters per day to 1.1 billion cubic meters. The move led to the flooding of approximately 1,000 acres of agricultural land along the riverbanks in Beheira and Menoufia governorates. Meanwhile, in neighboring Sudan, the Nile’s level reached 16.9 meters—the second-highest on record after 17.6 meters in 2020—threatening 16 states with devastating floods, reflecting the regional impact of Ethiopia’s unilateral management of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
The Egyptian government responded with preventive measures, including increasing water discharge from the High Aswan Dam to absorb the excess flow, which is expected to continue until the end of October. The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation warned of risks in low-lying areas and urged farmers to take precautions, noting that some of the flooded lands were designated for winter cultivation only. The ministry attributed the sudden rise in Nile levels in the downstream countries to Ethiopia’s “uncontrolled unilateral operation” of the dam, storing massive quantities of water and then releasing them abruptly after the dam’s official inauguration in September—causing what it described as a “man-made flood” that damaged Sudanese farmlands.
In a statement issued on Friday, the ministry emphasized that the flooded lands in Egypt were naturally flood-prone riverbank lands, not fully submerged governorates as circulated on social media. It reassured citizens that the High Dam is being efficiently managed to protect Egypt from flood fluctuations while meeting water needs. Simultaneously, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly held a meeting to review the implementation plan for the national waterway cleaning program, attended by the ministers of irrigation, local development, and agriculture, as well as relevant officials.
In the same context, the Egyptian Red Crescent declared a state of maximum alert to support government agencies in responding to the rising Nile levels in affected areas. Dr. Maya Morsi, Minister of Social Solidarity and Vice President of the Red Crescent, directed immediate assistance and field follow-ups. Emergency teams in Menoufia Governorate have reached impacted villages, while the Central Operations Room is monitoring readiness across 15 at-risk governorates. A field assessment in Gezay village reported damages limited to livestock barns, with no human casualties, while Dalhoum village in Ashmoun district was placed under alert for rapid response if necessary.
Former Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Dr. Mohamed Nasr El-Din Allam linked the recent flooding of riverbank lands in Egypt to complex natural and technical factors, foremost among them the lack of coordination over the GERD’s operation. He explained that Ethiopia continues to refuse to sign a binding agreement on the filling and operation of the dam that would achieve its goal of power generation while safeguarding the water security of downstream countries—Egypt and Sudan.
Writing on Facebook, Allam warned that Egypt’s greatest concern lies in prolonged drought periods, during which Addis Ababa could retain massive water reserves to generate electricity, consequently reducing the volume flowing into Egypt. As a precautionary measure, he said, Egypt has implemented major projects over the past few years to secure its water resources, including agricultural wastewater treatment, lining irrigation canals to reduce losses, and limiting water-intensive crops such as sugarcane and rice, to preserve sufficient storage in Lake Nasser for any potential decline in water inflow.
The former minister explained that the recent events coincided with the complete filling of the GERD and limited discharges during August and September, alongside unusually heavy rainfall on the Blue Nile, which raised the river’s inflow to around 750 million cubic meters per day. Since Sudanese dams were already full and unable to absorb additional volumes, vast areas of farmland in Sudan were inundated. The excess water then flowed north toward Egypt, where Lake Nasser was already near capacity following the summer irrigation season, prompting authorities to open the Toshka spillway to release excess water. This led to the flooding of around 1,000 acres of low-lying riverbank land but did not breach the Nile embankments or cause damage to populated areas.
In July 2025, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced that his country had completed construction of the GERD on the Blue Nile, claiming openness to dialogue and readiness to negotiate with Egypt and Sudan to ensure mutual development and shared benefits. On September 9, Addis Ababa officially inaugurated the dam in a ceremony attended by several African presidents and officials.
Egypt, however, reaffirmed that it “will not turn a blind eye to its existential interests in the Nile River.” In a letter to the United Nations Security Council in mid-September, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Ethiopia’s recent actions represent a new violation adding to a long list of breaches of international law and the UNSC Presidential Statement of September 15, 2021, which urged Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia to resume negotiations to reach a legally binding agreement on the filling and operation of the dam.
Ambassador Rekha Ahmed Hassan, former Assistant Foreign Minister and member of both the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and the Egyptian United Nations Association, told Zawia3 that negotiations over the GERD are currently frozen, though their resumption remains possible. He emphasized the need for a legally binding agreement between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to regulate water management, especially during droughts or high floods, stressing that this demand is a non-negotiable cornerstone of Egypt’s position, as it represents the only guarantee against damages resulting from unilateral actions.
The ambassador added that Ethiopia’s sudden decision to open four spillway gates and discharge massive volumes of water toward Sudan and Egypt reflects the absence of coordination among the three countries. “Had there been a binding agreement on dam management, this would not have occurred,” he said. The opening of the gates, he explained, may have been driven by high flood levels or Ethiopia’s desire to showcase its operational capability, yet what remains troubling is the complete lack of prior notification to the downstream nations—once again underscoring the urgent need for tripartite coordination to prevent future harm.
In early October, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emigration, and Expatriate Affairs, Ambassador Badr Abdel Aaty, met with Sudanese Foreign Minister Mohy El-Din Salem in Port Sudan, where both sides reaffirmed their unified position as downstream countries, emphasizing full adherence to international law governing the Eastern Nile Basin and rejecting all unilateral actions on the river.
Commenting on the visit, Ambassador Rekha Ahmed Hassan explained that it took place within the framework of bilateral coordination and consultation over the Sudanese crisis, aiming to advance a political settlement between the conflicting parties. However, the GERD issue featured prominently in the discussions with General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Sudan’s Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister. Both sides stressed the importance of joint coordination between the two downstream countries in confronting Ethiopia’s unilateral measures, and the need for a legally binding agreement that safeguards their interests during both drought and flood periods—especially after floodwaters recently reached the outskirts of Khartoum.
Hassan told Zawia3: “Coordination between Egypt and Sudan has become indispensable at both the regional and international levels. The two countries must exert international pressure on Ethiopia, now that dam construction is complete, as there is no justification for continued intransigence. Any future agreement must be based on the acknowledgment that the Blue Nile is a main tributary of the Nile, not an exclusively Ethiopian river—an acknowledgment that entails clear legal obligations toward downstream nations.” He added that these developments reflect a comprehensive Egyptian vision linking water security with regional stability across the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa.
Proactive Measures by the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation
In the same context, Dr. Bakinaz Abdel-Azim Zeidan, Professor of Water Resources and Dam Engineering at the Faculty of Engineering, Tanta University, links the current increase in water discharge to the high flood levels and seasonal rainfall in Ethiopia and Sudan. She explains that the Ethiopian government was forced to release larger amounts of water after the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) reservoir became completely full and the turbines have not yet been operated. She stresses that the unilateral operation of the dam constitutes an “international crime,” affirming that both Egypt and Sudan have the right to file official complaints to the United Nations and the Security Council against Ethiopia’s unilateral practices that violate international law governing shared rivers.
Meanwhile, Eng. Mohamed Ghanem, spokesperson for the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, attributed the recent rise in the Nile’s water level to Ethiopia’s storage of larger-than-expected volumes of water in the GERD at the end of August, while significantly reducing water discharge. This, he explained, was done to create a media spectacle during the dam’s inauguration, instead of following a gradual storage process extending until October, followed by turbine operation. Speaking on television, he noted that the Ethiopian authorities were later forced—after the dam reservoir reached full capacity—to release a massive two billion cubic meters of water all at once.
Dr. Zeidan expects that the effects of these water releases from the Ethiopian dam will not extend beyond the natural riverbank lands, explaining that these areas are part of the Nile’s natural flow zone rather than external regions. She adds that the slight rise in water levels now observed is similar to what used to occur before the construction of the High Dam, during the flood season, when riverbank lands and surrounding areas were temporarily submerged.
Speaking to Zawia3, she explains: “The current impact is limited to a mild increase in water levels along both sides of the Nile, which may submerge parts of the riverbank lands only, in the governorates through which the two branches of the river flow. Claims that entire governorates are underwater are inaccurate. The problem is that some citizens treat the lands they cultivate along the Nile as private property, even though they legally belong to the state.”
Dr. Zeidan asserts that Egypt’s water management system is fully capable of handling any excess discharge, outlining three main mechanisms for doing so. The first is storing water in Lake Nasser to its maximum capacity—already increased by around 15 billion cubic meters. The second is directing surplus water to the Toshka Spillway, which has been upgraded to accommodate large volumes. The third is opening the High Dam’s gates when necessary to discharge excess water, whether to irrigate agricultural lands directly or to flush out river sediments and pollutants. She emphasizes that Egypt’s new barrages and hydraulic structures are designed to withstand high discharges and allow for controlled storage, ensuring that the situation remains “fully under control.”
Regarding the depressions south of Toshka, Zeidan confirms that the Toshka Lakes are now completely filled due to the recent water inflows. She notes that any additional surplus can be utilized by redirecting it to new agricultural lands in West Delta and Toshka, or toward desert areas to recharge groundwater aquifers, stressing that these waters “will cause no harm to Egypt—in fact, they represent an additional resource that can be effectively utilized.”
Dr. Abbas Sharaky, Professor of Geology and Water Resources at Cairo University, explains that the flooding witnessed in Nile Basin countries over the past weeks lasted about two weeks, one of which was particularly severe, with discharge rates ranging between 750 and 800 million cubic meters per day, volumes he described as “immense.” He warns that if such a rate had continued for several more days, the Roseires Dam in Sudan could have faced a real risk of collapse.
Sharaky adds that the Ethiopian side has since halved the discharge rate—to about 400 million cubic meters per day—which has gradually stabilized the situation, lowering water levels in Sudan’s Blue Nile and Main Nile, and allowing the floodwaters to recede from previously submerged residential areas. He confirms that “the problem is on its way to resolution,” noting that conditions have stabilized over the past three days, and the flood is no longer increasing.
He tells Zawia3: “What happened was not a natural flood caused by heavy rainfall—it was the result of poor dam management. Ethiopia released enormous amounts of water at once—about four times the normal discharge rate of the High Dam—which caused the major flooding in Sudan. The dangerous part is that Ethiopia possesses 21 spillway gates at the GERD but opened only four, and that alone triggered this crisis, meaning Ethiopia has the capacity to flood Sudan at will.”
Sharaky stresses that no flooding has occurred in Egypt, explaining that the High Dam retains all incoming water and stores it in Lake Nasser, while discharge is controlled through dam gates strictly according to irrigation and agricultural needs. He suggests that the recent rise in Nile levels and the temporary submergence of some riverbank lands in Egypt are likely due to proactive measures by the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to release small amounts of water as a safety precaution to relieve pressure on the High Dam. He clarifies that riverbank lands are part of the Nile’s natural course and are used exclusively for agriculture, not for construction, as they are susceptible to periodic flooding.
Regarding Egypt’s strategies for handling large volumes of water, Sharaky notes that the country has multiple solutions—the most important being the Toshka Spillway, which is used only when necessary to divert up to 300 million cubic meters per day into the desert, away from the river channel. If the surplus is limited—around 10 to 20 million cubic meters—it is simply released along with irrigation flows without opening the spillway. He adds that Lake Nasser has not yet reached full capacity and can still receive more water in the coming month, which will help reduce pressure and protect riverbank areas.
Sharaky explains that Egypt’s annual share of Nile water amounts to 55.5 billion cubic meters, most of which arrives during July, August, September, and October, representing about 70% of the total annual inflow. The hydrological year begins on August 1, and the final water share can only be determined at its end, after calculating total inflows over the year.
Egypt’s share of 55.5 billion cubic meters provides about 97% of the country’s drinking and agricultural water needs, while the total water resources—including groundwater and recycled drainage water—exceed 85 billion cubic meters, according to Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly.
Sharaky concludes that the GERD will change the seasonal pattern of Nile flow, as water will no longer be concentrated in summer but released gradually throughout the year under Ethiopia’s management. The heavy rainfall season is limited to July, August, and September, occasionally extending to October, providing nearly three-quarters of the Nile’s annual inflow, while the remaining months are much drier. He affirms that Egypt’s water situation remains completely under control, with all hydraulic structures and dams functioning efficiently under carefully planned management, ensuring safe handling of any additional discharge.
Inaccurate Hydrological Estimates
Dr. Nader Nour El-Din, Professor of Water Resources and Land at the Faculty of Agriculture, Cairo University, and expert at the General Assembly of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), confirms that the Toshka Spillway is currently open and operating at full capacity to discharge large volumes of water. This, he says, has caused water to flow into investors’ farms in Toshka, damaging certain crops. However, he believes that the flooding of lands in governorates such as Menoufia and Beheira reflects joint mismanagement by both the Ethiopian and Egyptian sides. According to his estimates, Ethiopia discharged about 7.2 billion cubic meters of water in just ten days, which led to widespread flooding in Sudan.
He tells Zawia3: “The Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation preemptively released part of the High Dam’s reservoir to make room for the incoming floodwaters from Ethiopia. However, the hydrological calculations were not sufficiently accurate, resulting in the release of large quantities that raised the Nile’s water level and submerged vast agricultural areas in some of the Delta’s lowlands. What happened in Menoufia was not limited to riverbank lands, as the Ministry claimed in its statement—it extended into active farmlands, causing crop damage and livestock deaths in governorates such as Beheira and Menoufia.”
Nour El-Din also criticizes the ministry’s use of the term “riverbank lands (Tahr al-Nahr)” in its statement, calling it scientifically inaccurate, since all fertile clay soils in Egypt are originally formed from Nile silt deposits accumulated over centuries. He argues that the more precise term is “riverfront lands (Shatt al-Nahr)”, referring to areas directly adjacent to the river channel.
He further explains that most of the affected farmers are not encroaching on state property, as is often alleged. Instead, they hold official lease contracts issued by the Ministry of Irrigation itself and pay fees regularly. He dismisses social media claims that the government intentionally flooded these lands to evacuate them for investment purposes, noting that the state possesses sufficient legal and administrative tools to remove any encroachments if they existed—without resorting to such methods. He insists that the flooding resulted from miscalculations and inaccurate estimates by the Ministry of Irrigation.
Regarding the impact of submerging about 1,000 acres of land along the Nile on agricultural production, the FAO expert clarifies that the timing coincided with the end of the summer crop season, which includes rice and maize, so standing crops were not directly affected. However, the greatest damage occurred to crops that were in the drying phase after harvest, as many were spoiled by water accumulation. In contrast, autumn crops such as sugar beet and sugarcane were largely unaffected.
As for inhabited Nile islands such as Warraq, Zamalek, and Dahab, Nour El-Din considers them the most vulnerable to any new water discharges from the GERD, as they are located directly within the river’s main course. He warns that Warraq and Dahab islands could face serious risks in the event of another rise in water levels, while the Delta governorates remain more prone to flooding than Upper Egypt, due to their lower elevations and proximity to the river’s mouth.
Nour El-Din concludes his remarks to Zawia3 by emphasizing that the current situation calls for a thorough review of water management mechanisms and regional coordination frameworks. He warns that the lack of transparency in announcing Ethiopia’s water release volumes increases the risks for downstream countries and underscores the urgent need for an early warning system and binding technical coordination between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia.
In a related context, Dr. Magdy Qorqor, Professor of Soil Science at the Faculty of Urban Planning, Cairo University, explains that the impact of rising Nile water levels on agricultural lands and riverbank areas, as well as Nile islands like Warraq and Dahab, varies according to differences in elevation. He notes that larger islands such as Roda, Zamalek, and Dahab have relatively higher elevations—close to those of the natural embankments and urban corniches—keeping them above water level even during floods. These embankments, he explains, function as natural barriers dividing the river into two channels, thus protecting large islands from full submersion.
In a Facebook post, Qorqor wrote: “Many other islands in Upper Egypt and the Delta lie only slightly above the water surface. When the river level rises, these islands are either completely submerged or their exposed areas shrink considerably.”
Regarding riverbank lands, Qorqor clarifies that they are elevated only a few dozen centimeters above the summer water level. They are essentially Nile silt deposits formed during historic flood years before the High Dam’s construction, making them part of the ancient riverbed or its floodplain—the flat zone between the river bottom and the embankments. As such, they are the most flood-prone areas. He stresses that understanding these topographical elevation differences between islands and riverbank lands is essential for interpreting seasonal submersion patterns and for addressing changes in Nile water levels scientifically, using precise measurements rather than general impressions.
Dr. Tarek Abu Moussa, Professor of Agricultural Economics at the Agricultural Research Center, believes that the damage caused by the current rise in Nile levels is limited to riverbank lands and that water levels have not yet reached alarming thresholds. He notes that the impact is concentrated in Menoufia, Fayoum, and Beheira governorates, where lands are relatively low compared to other regions.
Abu Moussa explains that riverbank lands are cultivated, but they are small plots that do not significantly affect Egypt’s overall agricultural economy. Most are used to grow vegetables due to their small size, making field crops like wheat or rice economically unfeasible. However, some farmers cultivate small rice plots to achieve maximum profit from limited land, given the high returns of vegetable crops.
He tells Zawia3: “Egypt has been preparing for possible increases in Nile discharge for years through the national canal-lining project, which some mistakenly dismissed as unnecessary. In reality, its purpose is to speed up water flow and prevent overflow on both sides, especially in sloped areas. The project has improved water delivery to the ends of irrigation canals in governorates like Gharbia and Kafr El-Sheikh, which previously suffered from shortages and irrigation difficulties.” He emphasizes that effective water management must strike a balance between maximizing resource utilization and minimizing natural loss, while continuously evaluating the side effects of hydraulic infrastructure projects to ensure the sustainability of agricultural resources.
Fears of a Prolonged Drought
In the same context, Ahmed Said, a researcher in meteorology and climate science, warns that the greatest threat ahead for Egypt lies in the potential overlap between a natural drought cycle and the continued filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)—a combination that could lead to what he describes as a “prolonged drought” lasting more than seven years.
He explains that the Nile River follows natural seven-year cycles, alternating between periods of high flood, low flood (drought), and moderate flow. During drought phases, a natural balance usually occurs among the Nile’s three tributaries—the Blue Nile, Atbara River, and White Nile—so that a reduction in one is offset by an increase in another. However, the most severe droughts occur when rainfall decreases simultaneously across all three tributaries, as happened in the 1980s, when Lake Nasser saved Egypt from a severe water crisis.
He tells Zawia3: “In the 1980s, Egypt’s population was much smaller. Today, it has more than doubled. If the current water reserves in Lake Nasser, the Toshka Project, and Egypt’s barrage network are sufficient to meet the country’s water needs for two or three years during the expected drought period, what will happen in the following years? The real danger lies not in the current water releases but in the years ahead—when natural drought coincides with Ethiopia’s water retention—a scenario that could pose an unprecedented water challenge for both Egypt and Sudan.”
Analyzing the climatic factors in the Horn of Africa, Said explains that the GERD reservoir contains about 60 billion cubic meters of water and is located in a hot tropical region with extremely high evaporation rates. This has increased the concentration of water vapor in the atmosphere over Ethiopia and Sudan, contributing to the heavier rainfall observed this year.
He notes that the Nile flood season usually begins in July and lasts until October, peaking in August. However, this year, the flood timing shifted due to Ethiopia’s dam operations, not climatic changes. “This year’s flood was artificial, not natural,” he stresses, adding that its delay was not caused by weather patterns but was a direct consequence of Ethiopia’s unilateral actions. He explains that Ethiopia did not notify Egypt or Sudan in advance of the volume of water it intended to release, as required by international water law.
Said points out that Sudan’s Roseires Dam, which has a maximum storage capacity of 7.4 billion cubic meters, received volumes beyond its capacity, forcing the Sudanese authorities to open the dam’s gates and allow the water to pass through. This, he says, expanded the flood-affected zones in Khartoum and the Nile and Sennar states.
He further clarifies that at the beginning of the flood season, Ethiopia reduced its daily discharge to between 110 and 280 million cubic meters to facilitate dam filling, preventing the natural floodwaters from reaching downstream countries on time. Later, after the official inauguration of the GERD in September and the complete filling of its reservoir, the pressure on the dam structure increased to a level that threatened its safety. Ethiopian authorities were thus forced to release enormous quantities of water, reaching 780 million cubic meters per day, which resulted in widespread flooding in Sudan, especially in Khartoum.
Against the backdrop of rising Nile water levels in Egypt and Sudan, questions are once again being raised about the future of water governance in the Eastern Nile Basin, amid Ethiopia’s continuing unilateral policies and the absence of technical coordination among upstream and downstream countries.
While the Egyptian government continues to assert that the situation remains under control thanks to the readiness of its dam network and water infrastructure, experts warn that the ongoing uncoordinated operation of the GERD without a legally binding agreement leaves the downstream nations vulnerable to sudden floods and prolonged droughts simultaneously, threatening the water and food security of millions.
As the floodwaters gradually recede from the submerged lands, this latest crisis serves as a stark reminder of the dangers of managing the Nile outside the framework of shared cooperation. The solution, experts stress, lies not only in technical measures, but in a genuine political will to restore the Nile’s natural role as a shared source of life—not a tool of pressure—in order to preserve the region’s stability and water future.
