At the end of last January, Member of Parliament Ahmed Farghaly submitted a parliamentary briefing request addressed to Counselor Hisham Badawi, Speaker of the House, and Dr. Sherif Farouk, Minister of Supply and Internal Trade, regarding price differentials in the import of wheat and cooking oils carried out through the “Mostakbal Misr” entity, compared to prevailing global prices. He explained that the General Authority for Supply Commodities imports wheat through the entity at an increase estimated at around $30 per ton above the global price of Russian and Ukrainian wheat.
“Mostakbal Misr” is a government entity established by Presidential Decree No. 591 of 2022. It is headed by Colonel Pilot Bahaa El Din Mohamed El Ghannam and is affiliated with the Egyptian Air Force. The entity manages major development projects that include agricultural land reclamation, the import of strategic food commodities such as wheat and oils, food and real estate production, as well as industrial projects including infant formula manufacturing. This broad scope has fueled wide debate over the nature of its role and its operating mechanisms.
In his briefing, the MP stated that Egypt imports nearly 5 million tons of wheat annually, while the average global price stands at around $240 per ton. However, wheat is purchased on behalf of the authority at a price close to $270 per ton. He pointed to a similar situation in the import of cooking oils, where the global average price is about $1,100 per ton, while imports are carried out at prices reaching $1,250 per ton, with annual imported quantities estimated at around 780,000 tons, according to his statement.
Official data show that Egypt’s total wheat imports in 2025 alone reached approximately 13.2 million tons, compared to 14.2 million tons in 2024, marking a decline of 8%. Imports are expected to range between 12.7 and 13 million tons during the 2025/2026 period. Government wheat imports, which are managed in part through Mostakbal Misr, declined to about 4.5 million tons in 2025, down from 6.5 million tons in 2024.
There is no fixed official indicator confirming that the global wheat price stands at $240 per ton. The FAO price index shows that global wheat prices fluctuate significantly, and in some months exceeded $240 per ton when calculated with shipping and insurance costs or in futures markets. However, global wheat prices have declined since the beginning of the current year, ranging between $165 and $200 per metric ton, according to the World Bank.
Egypt consumes between 2.2 and 2.4 million tons of cooking oils annually and imports more than 90% of its needs. In December 2025, the global average price of sunflower oil ranged between $1,300 and $1,650 per ton, while palm oil prices stood between $970 and $1,000 per ton, with expectations of relative price stability.
In this context, the MP revealed that allocations for subsidized food commodities amount to around 160 billion pounds ($3.39 billion) annually. He noted that price differentials resulting from current import mechanisms lead to an erosion of the real value of subsidies on the ground by more than 13%. He criticized current contracting mechanisms for diverging from previous systems that relied on open tenders announced through international news agencies and attended by exporting countries, which, according to him, allowed for securing prices below the global average.
These developments come amid reports documenting accusations directed at the entity, including allegations of waste of public funds in the import of strategic commodities on behalf of the Ministry of Supply, such as wheat and oils, due to price differentials estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars at the expense of citizens’ food subsidies. This is compounded by the expansion of the entity’s investment powers beyond traditional oversight frameworks and the transfer of assets and land to it, alongside a lack of transparency regarding costs and returns.
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Domestically, the “Mostakbal Misr” entity assumed responsibility for managing government wheat imports starting in December 2024, adopting a new procurement strategy based on dealing directly with Egyptian companies and international suppliers instead of traditional tenders. This shift came amid payment delays and tensions with suppliers. The entity contracted more than 600,000 tons from international suppliers, mostly from Black Sea countries and France, for delivery in September and October 2025.
This expansion sparked wide debate over price differentials and contracting mechanisms. Reports by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and UkrAgroConsult indicate that global prices reached around $250 per ton in 2025, with an increase of about 6%. According to press reports, price gaps of $20–30 per ton exist between the global benchmark price and the local supply price, potentially adding hundreds of millions of dollars to the import bill and affecting food subsidies and the state budget.
Globally, wheat and cooking oil prices are subject to sharp fluctuations driven by multiple factors, including production levels, harvest conditions, energy prices, maritime transport costs, and global supply chains. The Russia–Ukraine war played a pivotal role in reshaping global grain trade, as it led at various points to disrupted or delayed shipments and higher insurance and transport costs, pushing Egypt to seek alternatives and reorder its import priorities.
Former adviser to the Minister of Supply and expert member of the General Assembly of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Nader Nour El-Din, explains to Zawia3 that Mostakbal Misr is currently responsible for importing the quotas allocated to ration cards and subsidized bread. He notes that annual wheat imports under the entity’s supervision amount to around five million tons, while the private sector covers the remainder of local market needs, which exceed 7.5 million tons, in addition to importing oils distributed through ration cards.
The former adviser stresses that empowering a single entity to combine roles of import, production, and distribution is not the optimal model. He explains that effective management of strategic commodities relies on diversified import sources and genuine competition among entities, while observing legal constraints and standard specifications for each commodity, including quality, impurity levels, and compliance with standards, alongside the application of oversight upon arrival at Egyptian ports.
Regarding the entity’s role in agriculture and production, Nour El-Din says that the entity has become capable of establishing companies, cultivating crops, importing seeds, and producing agricultural and food commodities for export. However, he adds that this behavior resembles private-sector activity, as the state does not own agricultural land suitable for export; rather, the private sector is the one that effectively manages production and export.
He adds: “The entity reports directly to the Presidency and works internally with ministries such as Supply and Agriculture to supply, receive, and sell commodities, but it does not fall under the oversight of traditional ministries.” He notes that the entity’s projects have expanded to include land in various areas, including New Delta, Toshka, Beheira, and Minya, with the authority to implement development, commercial, hotel, sports, and logistics projects within the scope of powers granted to it by the state.
Nour El-Din does not consider the entity a monopolist in wheat and oil imports, as its role is limited to importing government quotas. He believes that any price differentials, such as a $30 per ton commission on wheat, are classified as administrative expenses agreed upon between the entity and the Ministry of Supply, rather than commercial profits. At the same time, he stresses that all import operations and commodity supplies to the General Authority for Supply Commodities should be conducted in Egyptian pounds, not in dollars or other foreign currencies.
He emphasizes that assigning the entity the task of importing subsidized commodities aims to ensure their delivery to beneficiaries at legally mandated prices, not to generate profits or outperform global prices. He underscores the importance of adhering to laws and international standards to guarantee food security and the effectiveness of Egypt’s strategic supply system.
Land Between Allocation and Owners’ Rights
On January 28, the Cabinet reopened the file of allocating state-owned land in favor of the Mostakbal Misr for Sustainable Development, after approving a draft presidential decree to reallocate vast areas of state-owned land for use in development projects.
This move came within the context of Presidential Decree No. 76 of 2020, issued on February 27, 2020, which reallocated areas of state-owned land in Matrouh Governorate for development projects, approved previous legal dispositions within the El Alamein zoning boundary and its extensions, and suspended any new dispositions, while forming committees to inventory existing situations and contracts.
However, these decisions ignited sharp disputes with landowners who say they purchased these plots through official public auctions nearly two decades ago, only to find themselves threatened with losing possession and having their ownership forcibly converted into “annual usufruct rights,” amid overlapping authorities and contradictory official decisions, according to affected owners who spoke to Zawia3.
In this context, one citizen submitted a complaint to the Presidency—of which Zawia3 obtained a copy—stating that he purchased a desert land plot measuring 170 feddans, Plot No. (26), File No. (4), within the North Coast Project, from the General Authority for Reconstruction Projects and Agricultural Development through a public auction in 2006. He took possession of the land on the ground in 2008, reclaimed and cultivated it, and has remained in actual possession to this day.
The complainant, who requested anonymity, explains that following the issuance of the decree, jurisdiction over some lands was transferred from the Authority for Reconstruction and Agricultural Development to Matrouh Governorate. The disputed plot was included within Plot (A), which was not covered by subsequent amendments and remained under Matrouh Governorate, later designated as “Zahret El Alamein City.”
He says he was later surprised by a campaign involving military police forces and vehicles affiliated with the Air Force, who demanded that he vacate the land on the grounds that it belonged to Mostakbal Misr for Sustainable Development. He adds that he presented documents proving his ownership and purchase of the land via auction, but these documents, according to his account, were not recognized.
He further states that security forces arrested those present on the land, seized vehicles loaded with agricultural crops, fertilizers, and irrigation networks, and forced the owner, tenant, and trader to sign “annual usufruct” contracts under threat that the seized vehicles would not be released and the crops would be destroyed if they refused to sign. He called for the Presidency’s intervention to instruct Mostakbal Misr not to harass him, to provide him with copies of the contracts and papers signed within the entity without his knowledge of their contents, and to release the vehicles that have been detained for more than a month.
In a related context, engineer Ahmed Issa, one of the affected landowners in the El Alamein, Matrouh, and North Coast areas, tells Zawia3 that the lands they own were purchased through public auctions from the General Authority for Reconstruction Projects between 2004 and 2006, with full payment made and official possession cards issued. He notes that the total area of affected land in his family’s case amounts to around 5,400 feddans out of 18,000 feddans targeted by Mostakbal Misr.
He says: “Mostakbal Misr entered the lands using military force. Security and military forces moved in to enforce seizure procedures. We presented coordinates and official documents proving our ownership, including a presidential decree, yet we did not obtain a solution that guarantees our rights. By the entity’s orders, we were compelled to convert our actual ownership into an annual usufruct right governed by a contract with unclear terms.”
He adds: “Landowners faced threats by the entity toward tenants, including the seizure of vehicles and agricultural equipment, which forced some to pay sums of money to avoid greater losses.” He confirms that most of the land is now empty and uncultivated, and that his material losses alone exceeded 400,000 pounds ($8,487.17) due to the suspension of agricultural activity and the disruption of the irrigation network.
Issa reveals that the number of affected owners is around 25, holding roughly 30 to 32 plots of land. He explains that the disputed lands include some of the most important roads in El Alamein, such as the coastal international road, the Army Road, and the Petroleum Road, and that maps and presidential decrees confirm their legal ownership of the land.
He further explains that lands included under the presidential decree establishing “Zahret El Alamein City” had their jurisdiction transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to Matrouh Governorate, before being seized by Mostakbal Misr under the designation of a “national institution for sustainable development.” He says the entity demanded that beneficiaries occupying the land pay 5,000 pounds ($106.06) per feddan as annual rent, which he considers an infringement on the rights of the original owners.
A preliminary sale contract issued by the General Authority for Reconstruction Projects and Agricultural Development, affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture, along with a delivery report—both obtained by Zawia3—for desert land allocated for reclamation under the 42,500-feddan project in the Northwestern North Coast, dated September 9, 2007, shows that the total area amounts to 18 feddans, 3 qirats, and 21 sahms. The land lies within the Hammam–El Dabaa project in Matrouh Governorate and had been officially allocated through public auction procedures for use within the agricultural reclamation project.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities, represented by the New Urban Communities Authority’s Planning and Projects Sector, sent a letter to Engineer Ahmed Mohamed Abdel Razek, supervisor of the Minister’s Office. The letter included directives regarding the future planning of land uses under Presidential Decree No. 76 of 2020, pursuant to which New Alamein City was established south of the International Coastal Road.
The letter referred to a presidential decision amending the boundaries of the decree to allocate certain areas to Mostakbal Misr for Sustainable Development, while excluding Plot (A), measuring 100 feddans, located at the far southeastern edge of Plot (C). It proposed contacting the National Center for Planning State Land Uses to study the matter and take the necessary measures to amend the boundaries of the presidential decree in accordance with established rules.
This official document confirms the formal procedures for amending the boundaries of the presidential decree concerning the allocation of land in New Alamein City to Mostakbal Misr, while excluding the specified plot in the southeast of the project.
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The assumption by the “Mostakbal Misr” entity of responsibility for imports reflects a structural shift in the management of strategic commodities. While this shift may offer greater flexibility and faster contracting, it simultaneously raises questions about pricing, transparency, and the impact of global price differentials on Egypt’s food security.
The entity, which began as a project in 2017 and was renamed in 2022 as the Mostakbal Misr for Sustainable Development, is officially classified as affiliated with the Egyptian Air Force. Its original mandate focused on reclaiming desert land, but its authorities expanded to include the import of basic commodities such as grains and oils, followed by further expansion into infrastructure projects, including roads and electricity, water, and floating solar power networks, as well as real estate, industrial, and food projects, according to researcher in contracting policies and defense cooperation Moamen Ashraf.
In remarks to Zawia3, Ashraf explains that the entity has begun to dominate the import of strategic grains, effectively stripping key areas of responsibility from the Ministries of Supply, Trade, and Agriculture. He argues that this runs counter to the traditional role of the armed forces in import and storage activities, warning that it poses “a risk to governance, oversight, and accountability,” and places state institutions in the position of dealing with an entity that is largely unknown to the public and beyond effective parliamentary scrutiny.
“This expansion makes the entity one of the most dangerous bodies in the Egyptian state,” he says. “It weakens ministerial mandates and effectively turns ministries into secretarial offices subordinate to the entity. The danger lies in the absence of legal oversight, especially given the existence of a law issued by interim president Adly Mansour during his term that immunizes government contracts from judicial challenge, thereby shielding the entity from accountability.”
Ashraf believes that this expansion threatens the accumulation of bureaucratic expertise and institutional knowledge within the state, sidelining experienced civil servants in ministries from decision-making processes and leaving the state dependent on an entity whose internal details and membership are unknown, as he puts it.
For his part, Mohamed Ramadan, an economic researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, argues that Mostakbal Misr is a sovereign entity affiliated with the Air Force, but that its legal nature remains unclear from the perspective of oversight and financial accountability. He suggests that it is most likely not subject to the Central Auditing Organization.
Speaking to Zawia3, Ramadan explains that assigning the import of strategic commodities such as wheat and oils to direct purchasing without public tenders raises significant economic questions and may lead to price differentials that increase the cost of government subsidies borne by citizens. He notes that the General Authority for Supply Commodities was previously managed through a civilian framework that provided a degree of transparency and oversight, whereas the transfer of this file to a sovereign entity now limits disclosure and places Parliament before serious challenges in exercising effective oversight.
He adds that while the private sector remains permitted to import and accounts for roughly half of annual wheat imports, the role of Mostakbal Misr is confined to the quotas allocated for government subsidies. However, the absence of transparency and governance in procurement processes could increase costs to the state, particularly if price gaps between global benchmarks and local supply prices are confirmed, with direct implications for the budget and the effectiveness of food subsidies.
“The investment model adopted by the entity, whether in managing agricultural land or transferring assets, raises questions about sustainability,” Ramadan says, “especially in light of water scarcity, food security challenges, and global trade constraints.” He stresses that the focus should be on the model’s capacity to support national food sovereignty and generate added value for the economy, rather than concentrating solely on the entity’s individual procedures.
Ramadan further argues that transferring agricultural land and assets to the entity’s control raises concerns about transparency and pricing, particularly given the law that shields government contracts from legal challenge. Nonetheless, he emphasizes that the more fundamental issues relate to the efficiency of the investment model itself and its ability to withstand domestic and global crises. He underscores that primary attention must be directed toward public policies governing food security, noting that no single entity, sovereign or otherwise, can resolve the crisis alone. Instead, comprehensive strategic steps are required to ensure sustainable food supply for the Egyptian population.
These dynamics reveal a complex landscape in which the management of strategic commodities intersects with land issues and property rights, amid the expansion of the Mostakbal Misr for Sustainable Development entity beyond traditional frameworks of administration and oversight. While the state justifies this expansion on grounds of food security and accelerated implementation, fundamental questions remain regarding transparency, import pricing, accountability mechanisms, and the protection of public funds and property owners’ rights.
