Despite the political and diplomatic role played by Cairo in attempting to de-escalate regional tensions, and its condemnation of Iranian targeting of Gulf states since the beginning of the war, Egypt is facing sharp criticism that extends beyond social media to include prominent Gulf politicians and writers.
These criticisms, ranging from suggestions of a weak Egyptian role to direct attacks on Cairo, have all centered on the perceived absence of Egyptian military support for Gulf states in confronting Iranian attacks. They have also targeted the Arab League, criticizing what was described as the lack of more effective Arab action in response to the escalation.
In contrast, official statements and declarations have continued to affirm Cairo’s supportive stance toward Gulf capitals, while political and diplomatic efforts intensify in an attempt to halt the escalation.
At the domestic level in Egypt, the official position has sparked debate. A number of parliamentarians objected to the statement issued by the Egyptian Senate regarding the developments, stating that it did not clearly condemn the military operations carried out by the United States and Israel against Iran.
For his part, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi conducted an extensive tour last March that included Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, in addition to previous visits to the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. During these discussions, he focused on supporting regional security and stability, emphasizing that Gulf security represents a direct extension of Egypt’s national security.
70 Million for a Seat: The Price of Entering Egypt’s Parliament
What Do Gulf States Want from Egypt?
In a series of separate posts on the X platform, Abdullah Ghanem Al-Qahtani, a former Saudi general known for his proximity to Saudi decision-making circles, argued that the Iranian missile war against Gulf states exposed what he described as the “illusion of Arab brotherhood” long upheld by Gulf countries. He considered that this slogan has been emptied of its meaning and reduced to a media narrative consumed in times of stability and evaporating at the first real test.
He added that political reality has proven to be governed by the logic of interests rather than principles, leading to deep disappointment among Gulf societies and governments that had trusted an Arab environment that did not stand by them in moments of existential threat.
Al-Qahtani explained that sixteen days of Iranian missile strikes were sufficient to reveal the extent of what he described as abandonment, as heavy silence prevailed and even the minimum level of Arab solidarity was absent. He pointed to what he described as “cold justifications and explicit expressions of schadenfreude” from some political and cultural elites. He argued that this exposure revealed a political mindset that does not view the Gulf as an ally, but rather as a wealthy arena open to exploitation, making it necessary to redefine the concept of a friend beyond past courtesies.
He stressed that this war represented a “harsh moment of sorting” that stripped away masks and placed Arab relations before a test they failed, calling on political and media leaders in Saudi Arabia to change the rhetoric that had shaped public perceptions of relations with the surrounding region.
Regarding regional powers, Al-Qahtani considered Egypt a clear political loser in the eyes of Gulf public opinion, due to what he described as “political dissimulation” and inconsistent positions that showed sympathy toward what he characterized as hostile Iranian behavior.
He indicated that this stance created a gap in assessing the sensitivity of the moment, which could push Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to undertake deeper reviews of the level of strategic cooperation with Cairo in line with the realities of a new phase that does not tolerate hesitation in decisive positions.
For his part, Amr Hashem Rabie, deputy head of the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, stated that Gulf states had expected Egypt to mobilize its armed forces and deploy on land and in the waters of these countries to participate in military strikes against Iran.
Rabie explained, in statements to “Zawia3,” that the Egyptian position diverged completely from these expectations, describing it as “logical and sound” for three main reasons: first, that the war did not originate from Iran but that it was the target of U.S.-Israeli aggression; second, that Egyptian participation would have meant involving Gulf states in the war, while most of these countries refused to engage in a conflict that is not their own; and third, that any Egyptian participation would have demonstrated that it was fighting alongside its traditional adversary Israel against Iran, a member state of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Non-Aligned Movement, which constituted a strong justification for not participating in the manner expected by some in the Gulf.
Regarding the potential impact of this position on Gulf investments and labor in Egypt, Rabie stated that the situation is unlikely to reach that stage, noting that labor and investments continue as normal and that Gulf states themselves benefit from these investments. He added that the number of workers is very large in Gulf countries, making any changes unlikely, at least in the short term.
The deputy head of the Ahram Center also noted that the Egyptian president’s diplomatic efforts and continuous visits aim to repair any potential rift, emphasizing that Egypt is not the cause of these disagreements.
He pointed out that Gulf states themselves have not always supported Egypt on certain key issues, such as the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam, where there was support for Ethiopia at Egypt’s expense. He cited investments by the United Arab Emirates in the dam and the recent visit of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to the UAE two weeks ago, arguing that this demonstrates that claims of constant support or full alignment are not always accurate.
Meanwhile, Badr Abdel Aty denied in press statements that Cairo had received any Gulf requests for military intervention in the ongoing conflict, affirming that Egypt had not received such demands.
Abdel Aty noted that there are regional efforts to establish new security arrangements, but stressed the rejection of any attempts to impose external visions or proposals. He emphasized that Egypt prefers diplomatic solutions within legal frameworks and Arab agreements, foremost among them the Joint Defense Agreement.
Article 152 of the Egyptian Constitution stipulates that “the President may not send armed forces outside the state’s borders except after consulting the National Defense Council and obtaining the approval of the House of Representatives by majority vote, and only for combat missions to defend national security.”
How Is Cairo Acting?
The State Information Service published a detailed report outlining the diplomatic and official moves undertaken by Egypt since the beginning of the war.
The report stated that Egypt is adopting a multi-dimensional diplomatic and security approach to contain the repercussions of the war, with a focus on preventing its expansion into the broader Arab region, and recognizing that the stability of Gulf states is an integral part of Egypt’s national security.
Cairo also hosted trilateral meetings that included Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, while continuing to follow negotiation tracks since June 2025, focusing on practical steps to verify Iranian nuclear facilities and enhance transparency.
Following the outbreak of the war, Cairo continued its efforts at both bilateral and multilateral levels with Gulf states and international partners, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Turkey, Pakistan, the European Union, and the United States, with the aim of coordinating Arab and international actions to reduce escalation.
These efforts included high-level ministerial meetings and continuous monitoring of the war’s impact on regional security, energy, and trade, alongside an emphasis on strengthening peaceful solutions, rejecting any violations of the sovereignty of Arab states, and working to safeguard regional security and stability from the risk of slipping into comprehensive chaos.
In this context, The Wall Street Journal revealed in a report that Egyptian intelligence succeeded in establishing direct communication with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps through unofficial diplomacy, which contributed to U.S. President Donald Trump stepping back from launching strikes against Iran.
According to the newspaper, Egyptian intelligence managed to open a communication channel with the Revolutionary Guard, the most powerful paramilitary body responsible for protecting the regime in Tehran and considered the country’s most prominent security and political entity. It presented a proposal to halt hostilities for five days to build trust, paving the way toward a permanent ceasefire agreement.
For his part, Mohamed Saad Abdel Hafiz states that there are no official positions issued by Gulf states criticizing the Egyptian role, and that what is being circulated in this context is limited to certain voices among Gulf politicians and writers on social media, based on unrealistic assumptions that Egypt could militarily engage in the ongoing conflict between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other.
Abdel Hafiz explains, in statements to “Zawia3,” that this scenario is “not conceivable at all,” given what he describes as the strategic constants of the Egyptian state, which cannot place Egypt in alignment with Israel in any regional confrontation. He adds that Egyptian military and political doctrine still regards Israel as the “strategic enemy,” while Iran is viewed as an existing regional state, despite disagreements and competition with it.
He adds that the core issue does not lie in the nature of the stance toward Iran, but rather in the absence of a comprehensive Arab project capable of balancing Iranian influence in the region. He notes that Tehran possesses a clear project it seeks to expand regionally, while there is no unified Arab vision to address this expansion.
Regarding positions within Gulf states, he indicates that a number of intellectuals and figures close to decision-making circles have expressed rejection of engaging in a direct confrontation with Iran, considering that the current conflict carries U.S.-Israeli dimensions and could drag the region into an Arab-Iranian confrontation.
He points to statements by prominent figures, including Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani and Turki Al-Faisal, who considered that engaging in such escalation poses a risk to the stability of Gulf states.
The journalist and deputy head of the Journalists Syndicate also notes that some voices criticizing the Egyptian position stem from pressure resulting from the targeting of territories hosting U.S. military bases, creating the impression of a lack of support, despite the Egyptian role focusing on political and diplomatic backing, mediation, and the exchange of messages between parties, as he describes.
He affirms that Egypt, through its institutions, is engaged in indirect communication channels with regional actors, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as part of efforts to find formulas to contain escalation, highlighting Egypt’s role as a regional mediator during crises.
Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani had stated in a post on the X platform that Gulf Cooperation Council states should not be drawn into a direct confrontation with Iran, despite the latter’s violation of their sovereignty and its initiation of attacks on Gulf territories.
He added that direct engagement between GCC states and Iran could lead to the depletion of resources and open the door for regional and international powers to exert control over Gulf countries under the pretext of assistance, emphasizing the need to avoid slipping into direct confrontation.
Bin Jassim also noted that after the current confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran concludes, new forces will emerge in the region and Israeli influence may increase. He stressed that GCC states must act as a unified front to confront any aggression and reject any attempts at coercion or imposed dictates.
Ahmed Altantawy: Egypt Needs an Alternative to the Government and the Opposition (Interview)
Why Do Gulf States Reject the Idea of an “Arab Army”?
Cairo has repeatedly emphasized the need to activate frameworks of Arab national security and joint cooperation as a fundamental strategic step to protect the sovereignty and stability of Arab states. It has stressed the importance of accelerating practical measures and introducing new mechanisms, including the rapid activation of the Arab League’s 1950 Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty.
However, this proposal has faced Gulf criticism. Abdullah Ghanem Al-Qahtani, for example, describes it as a delayed step that comes too late, considering it a form of political maneuvering and media deception aimed at polishing positions after Gulf states have demonstrated their ability to defend themselves against aggression through international alliances and their own defensive capabilities.
Al-Qahtani argues that the concept of “joint Arab security” has effectively collapsed and become an empty slogan, as events have shown that security issues in the Gulf are not treated as collective Arab concerns except when they affect the interests of others. He adds that the overwhelming majority of Arab positions toward the Gulf during moments of danger were marked by silence or hesitation.
He stresses that the coming phase will see Gulf relations managed according to a “national interests first” approach, whereby assistance and alliances will be granted based on concrete positions and clear political commitments from partners, rather than driven by sentiment or media rhetoric.
In contrast, Rokha Ahmed Hassan affirms that past experiences have demonstrated that Arab states without an integrated defensive shield remain vulnerable, even in the presence of U.S. bases equipped with the latest technologies. He notes that these bases themselves failed to intercept relatively simple Iranian missiles and drones, whether in defending themselves or the host countries.
Hassan also points to Iran’s official position, noting that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Tehran is ready to form a joint committee with Gulf states to verify attacks on oil facilities and civilian areas in the region, emphasizing that Iran has no intention of targeting Arab civilian infrastructure.
For his part, Mohamed Saad Abdel Hafiz believes that the proposal put forward by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs carries a message regarding the necessity of building an independent Arab regional security system. He notes that achieving this would require political, economic, and military coordination among Arab states, particularly in light of the complexities of regional and international relations.
The developments of the war and the ongoing regional escalation reveal a widening gap between the expectations of some Gulf actors and the limits of the Egyptian role. While Cairo relies on diplomacy, mediation, and crisis containment, part of the Gulf discourse remains shaped by a traditional perception of support based on direct military engagement.
