Last June, the social media platform “X” witnessed an orchestrated incitement campaign against Egypt, calling for a boycott of Egyptian products, travel to Egypt, and tourism there. The campaign began timidly in the first week of June and peaked from June 23 to June 25, before noticeably declining in intensity in the first week of July.

In this investigation conducted by Zawia3, with the support of the Arab Fact-Checking Community (AFH) – as part of the Digital Tools Support Program – we explore whether the incitement campaign against Egyptian products and tourism in Egypt on digital platforms was organized or spontaneous. Who are the entities or organizations behind directing it? What contributed to fueling it? And we aim to uncover whether these campaigns are systematic or spontaneous based on posting patterns, timing, and coordination, and try to understand the organizational structure of the incitement campaigns.

Electronic accounts on the “X” platform circulated provocative hashtags widely during June, including: #Boycott_Egyptian_Products, #Boycott_Egyptian_Products, #Boycott, #Boycott_Tourism_in_Egypt, #Do_Not_Travel_to_Egypt, #Boycott_Travel_to_Egypt, and simultaneously, the provocative hashtag #Egyptian_Ministry_of_Interior_Attacks_Saudi_Arabia was also circulated.

The incitement against Egypt intensified following Egypt’s refusal to allow the “Convoy of Resilience” to reach the Rafah crossing, and the outbreak of the Iranian-Israeli war, known as the Twelve-Day War – as termed by U.S. President Donald Trump – which began in the early hours of June 13, 2025, when Israel launched a surprise attack on dozens of Iranian targets as part of “Operation Rising Lion,” to which Iran responded with “Operation Promised Truth 3.” This was simultaneously accompanied by posts, tweets, and videos showing Egyptians supporting the missile strikes launched by Tehran on Tel Aviv and other cities in the occupied Palestinian territories, which Saudi users viewed as a threat to the sovereignty of their country and its political stance, which opposed Iran’s moves in the region.

Initially, we searched for keywords such as: “Boycott Tourism in Egypt, Boycott Egyptian Products, Do Not Travel to Egypt, Boycott Travel to Egypt,” and found about 7 related hashtags circulating on the “X” platform (formerly Twitter), which is the most used platform for political campaigns and incitement coordination. The most widely circulated hashtags between June 1, 2025, and the first week of July 2025 were: #Egyptian_Ministry_of_Interior_Attacks_Saudi_Arabia, a provocative hashtag linking Egypt and Saudi Arabia in an antagonistic context, which was circulated 188 times, along with a group of aggregated hashtags expressing calls for boycott or defamation of Egypt, including: #Egypt_Is_Calling, #Egypt, #Boycott, which were circulated 74 times. Additionally, political and regional hashtags, as well as others enhancing the incitement rhetoric, such as #Convoy_of_Resilience, #Boycott_Egyptian_Products, were circulated 22 times, along with the hashtags #Expel_Egyptians_Saudi_Demands and #Boycott_Egyptian_Products, directly expressing hate speech against Egyptians and economic incitement against Egypt, with widespread integration of hashtags in a single tweet, suggesting the use of scheduling tools or bulk copying. The hashtags #Egypt_Sovereignty_is_a_Red_Line, #Sisi_The_Strong_Leader were also circulated as part of counter-tweets or tweets reversing the campaign.

Our initial research showed that the central keyword of the campaign, “Boycott Tourism in Egypt,” was circulated about 361 times. The scope of the campaign was then expanded to include the economy, with the phrase “Boycott Egyptian Products” being circulated 79 times. This was accompanied by direct incitement against traveling to Egypt, as the phrase “Do Not Travel to Egypt” was circulated 5 times, and “Boycott Travel to Egypt” once. Additionally, Egypt’s name, as the targeted country in the campaign, was mentioned 323 times, while the word “Boycott” appeared 317 times, “Tourism” 256 times, “Products” 95 times, and “Egyptian” 70 times. This reflects a direct economic incitement rhetoric targeting Egypt’s reputation and resources.

The most prominent and frequently used incitement sentences (Hit Sentences) on the “X” platform, within the tweets included in the data we collected using the Meltwater tool – which is used for analyzing media data and social media content – were:

“Know, O Saudi, when you boycott tourism in Egypt, you will discipline the servant and his master 😉👌🏻,” which was circulated 179 times. This sentence explicitly called on Saudis in a derogatory tone. The phrase “We witness some Arab voices launching hashtags #Boycott_Tourism_in_Egypt… while Western countries lead support campaigns,” was circulated around 68 times, crafted to stir emotional mobilization against Egypt. Meanwhile, the sentences “Shame on them, they sold Gaza for dollars… we must boycott tourism in Egypt because it is part of the occupying state,” which was circulated 39 times, and “If the Egyptian people do not act, we must boycott Egyptian products…” which was circulated 13 times, directly linked Egypt’s stance on Gaza and the Convoy of Resilience with the incitement campaign against tourism in Egypt and economic boycott as a political pressure tool, relying on a charged religious and political discourse.

In contrast, there was an opposing rhetoric to the incitement campaign, albeit less frequent and less circulated, such as the phrase “Once upon a time, an Arab country wanted to launch a campaign to boycott tourism in Egypt… but the reply came, Egypt is calling 🔥🇪🇬,” which was circulated about 7 times.

The infographic highlights the keywords (in dark blue) such as: “Boycott”, “Egyptian and we urged”, “We must boycott”, “Gaza”, “The servant and his master”, “The ones who sold it”, “For money”, and hashtags (in light blue) such as: #Egyptian_Ministry_of_Interior_Attacks_Saudi_Arabia, #Egypt_Sovereignty_is_Red_Line, #egypt_is_calling, #Boycott, #Boycott_Egyptian_Products, #Convoy_of_Resilience. The people (in purple) include: Sisi, Trump, and the locations (in orange) are: SA (Saudi Arabia), EG (Egypt), KW (Kuwait), AE (UAE), Gaza, Egypt. The brown color indicates the emojis (emoticons): Emojis such as: 👌, 🔥, 😏.

Our analysis of the circulating content showed that the phrase “Boycott Tourism in Egypt” was repeated in nearly 80% of the tweets, indicating that the message was unified and organized. The presence of closely related keywords suggests that various promotional forms were used for the same purpose, either to avoid censorship or to expand reach. We noticed that the incitement rhetoric contained an organized promotional structure, manifested in the repetition of clear words and sentences, as well as hashtags targeting economic, political, and religious incitement simultaneously. The intensive and repetitive use of the same terms and hashtags indicates non-random activity, closer to a coordinated digital campaign.

The repetition of the same sentences points to widespread reposting of the same content from different accounts or an organization, using what seems like a “unified text” that was copied and pasted across the digital campaign. It relied on short, easy-to-share incitement phrases phrased in emotional and sarcastic language, including political derogatory speech like “the servant and his master” and mobilizing mass rhetoric with phrases such as: “If the Egyptian people do not act…,” linking it to the Palestinian cause with words like “Gaza,” “occupation.” Some tweets were also accompanied by links or references to deleted content or accounts that no longer existed, suggesting intensive digital coordination later deleted by the “X” platform.

How did the campaign start?

The starting point and the main amplification of the campaign came from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, either through real accounts expressing a coordinated outrage campaign or via a network of automated/rented accounts targeting the Saudi public. Saudi Arabia formed the largest geographic bloc exporting content for the campaign, with 86 posts out of 142, representing approximately 76%, while other countries contributed 5 posts, likely from accounts using VPNs. The most active cities in the campaign’s distribution were the largest cities in Saudi Arabia, where Riyadh recorded 15 tweets, Jeddah recorded 10, and Mecca recorded 3, in addition to other Saudi and Gulf cities such as: Jazan, Dammam, Khobar, Arar, etc. Meanwhile, Cairo, Egypt, recorded 12 posts and Alexandria 3 posts.

Saudi Arabia topped the geographic distribution of the countries from which the participating accounts originated, with 86 posts, followed by Egypt in second place with 34 posts, and Algeria, the United States, and Oman with 5 posts each. Morocco and the UAE each contributed 4 posts, while Kuwait registered 3 posts. The Palestinian territories contributed only two posts, and 12 other countries participated with one post each. While Saudi Arabia was the main source of the discourse, the noticeable participation from Egypt could be attributed to retweets. The posts from countries like Algeria, Morocco, and Palestine suggest a limited Arab extension of the campaign, while the involvement of countries like the United States, China, and Brazil is linked to the presence of expatriate accounts or users utilizing VPN networks.

The phrase “Know, O Saudi… you will discipline the servant and his master” showed that the primary target audience of the digital campaign was the Saudi citizen. Additionally, the main hashtag, #Egyptian_Ministry_of_Interior_Attacks_Saudi_Arabia, which was circulated 188 times, aimed to provoke a sense of Saudi national pride against Egypt. By framing the conflict in such a way, the campaign sought to manipulate national sentiment and create a hostile atmosphere toward Egypt. The repetition of this specific hashtag emphasized the intent to elevate the perceived confrontation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, amplifying the emotional response from Saudi users by associating Egypt with actions that could be seen as an attack on Saudi sovereignty or political stance. This tactic was part of a broader strategy to mobilize Saudi users, using both political and emotional triggers, to further fuel the boycott campaign.

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The Temporal Explosion of the Campaign

We tracked 455 tweets within the digital campaign inciting a boycott of tourism in Egypt and a boycott of travel to Egypt, spanning the period between June 2 and July 6, 2025, with a clear concentration of activity in the second half of June. On June 12, 58 tweets were recorded, followed by 32 tweets on June 13. On June 22, 80 tweets were posted, and on June 23, the number peaked at 112 tweets. However, this number dropped significantly on June 27, with only 65 tweets.

We observed four active waves during June, with a sharp peak on June 23. However, after June 30, the activity declined sharply, with tweets not exceeding 1–3 per day in July, indicating that the campaign was time-bound and temporary.

While the total number of mentions during this period was 455 posts, the total reach was approximately 10,163,358 views. The peak occurred on June 23, 2025, which recorded the highest number of posts in one day, at 112 posts, and the highest reach on a single day was 9,185,669 views on June 25, 2025. Despite the fact that the number of posts on June 25 was not the highest, the average daily number of posts was around 12.64, with an average daily reach of approximately 282,315 views. Although the daily average number of posts was relatively low (less than 13 per day), the total reach was extremely high, indicating that specific posts achieved wide exposure. The difference between the peak date in the number of posts (June 23) and the peak date in reach (June 25) suggests a compounded or delayed effect, possibly through retweets or the sharing of influential content days after it was posted.

It was observed that the reach (the number of accounts that viewed the content) saw sharp increases on certain days, even when the number of posts was low. This indicates that some posts were interacted with significantly or were retweeted by influential accounts, amplifying their impact. Additionally, the reach did not always correlate with the number of posts, suggesting that the quality of the accounts (such as those with large followings) played a larger role than the quantity of posts. Moreover, peak reach periods were not necessarily accompanied by an increase in the number of posts, indicating the effect of highly viral tweets rather than mass collective campaigns.

The temporal concentration of the discourse points to the likelihood of a targeted and strategically planned campaign. The association of the discourse with incitement-related words and political issues suggests the use of a political or security event as a pretext for the digital campaign. The rapid decline after the peak could be attributed to the campaign achieving its goals or being confronted and suppressed.

Dominance of Negative Incitement Discourse

The most active accounts in the digital campaign were: @7rrgr, which posted 21 tweets, followed by @bertrandgallag2 with 13 tweets, then @wmessili with 5 tweets, @9rrgr with 4 tweets, and @ali22sh with 3 tweets. It was noticed that the accounts @7rrgr and @9rrgr share a similar naming pattern, suggesting a potential link between them (either as duplicate accounts or affiliated with the same entity). These accounts were largely unknown to the public, supporting the hypothesis that accounts were specifically created for the campaign. A small number of accounts generated the majority of the content, indicating clear digital coordination or inorganic activity.

Sentiment analysis of these tweets revealed that around 322 tweets were negative, accounting for approximately 70.8% of the tweets. 126 tweets were neutral, representing 27.7%, and only 7 tweets were positive, making up 1.5%. The fact that the overwhelming majority of the tweets carried clearly negative sentiment indicates a strong incitement tone, while the near absence of positive content highlights the lack of defense or counter-narratives within X during the campaign period.

The overwhelming majority of tweets expressed negative sentiment towards Egypt, either through direct incitement to boycott, spreading political or moral accusations and criticisms, or using sarcastic or hostile rhetoric. This high level of negativity points to the hostile and targeted nature of the campaign. Around a quarter of the tweets took a neutral stance, including retweets without commentary, posing questions or inquiries without taking a clear position, and sharing news or links that could be interpreted depending on the reader’s viewpoint. Only a very small number of tweets expressed positive sentiment (7 out of 455), highlighting the almost complete absence of defense for Egyptian tourism or products and the weakness of counter-narratives or supportive interactions for Egypt in this context.

Analysis of the general activity of the 393 accounts involved reveals that the average total number of tweets per account was around 1.13, with the maximum number of tweets being 21 by a single account. Most accounts (75%) posted only one tweet or fewer, indicating that the activity was concentrated in a few accounts.

The majority of tweets in the sample were negative, with an average of 0.80 negative tweets per account, and a maximum of 21 negative tweets. Positive tweets were almost nonexistent, with an average of only 0.012 tweets per account. The vast majority of tweeters (more than 95%) did not post any positive content.

The similarity analysis between accounts, using Python programming, showed that only 10 accounts out of the 393 had matching data. We found that 3 accounts shared a 100% similarity with other accounts (mean and median similarity = 1.0), suggesting that these accounts were either duplicates (replicated accounts) or posted identical content. Other accounts showed varying levels of similarity, ranging from just 4% to nearly 98%. The standard deviation was very low for the majority of accounts, indicating that the content was largely similar across a limited number of accounts. This suggests that some accounts could be part of a network coordinating content or managed from a single source, especially those with complete or near-complete similarity.

Additionally, the data analysis indicates that the incitement rhetoric did not follow a steady upward or downward pattern but rather exhibited clear fluctuations over the two-month period. There were sudden bursts of activity and temporary increases in both the number of posts and the accounts reached by these posts. The peak of negative activity occurred in June 2025, where nearly 99% of the negative tweets were recorded during this month. This was followed by a sharp decline in July 2025, indicating a sudden halt or tapering off of the campaign, suggesting that the campaign was seasonal, targeted, or short-lived, or that it reached its peak and ended after achieving its intended impact or facing regulatory intervention.

Why did the digital incitement campaign ignite?

During the process of researching and collecting data on the incitement discourse calling for a boycott of Egyptian products and tourism in Egypt, Zawia3 noticed a clear connection between these calls and the hashtag #Egyptian_Ministry_of_Interior_Attacks_Saudi_Arabia, which became active on social media platforms, especially X, between June 22 and June 24, 2025. The hashtag was linked to a controversy involving accusations against the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, claiming that it was either directly attacking Saudi Arabia or supporting attacks against it.

The hashtag gained traction based on claims from Saudi users on X, alleging that an Egyptian officer named Ahmed Magdy admitted that the Ministry of Interior had greenlit attacks against Saudi Arabia. However, no official evidence was provided to support these allegations, leading to the conclusion that these claims were based on unverified reports. This fueled suspicions that the incitement campaign was rooted in political tensions and media speculation, particularly in the context of Egypt’s stance on regional issues.

By reviewing the posts on X that circulated the hashtag, using deep search technology on “Grok,” an AI-powered assistant developed by xAI, it was observed that accounts like @missdior456, @qrnas_ksa4, and @SOBHI_TR made direct accusations against the Egyptian Ministry of Interior. For instance, @missdior456 claimed that the ministry spread rumors about Saudi Arabia, while @qrnas_ksa4 accused an officer named Ahmed Magdy of admitting that the insults to Saudi Arabia were approved by the Minister of Interior, Mahmoud Tawfik. Furthermore, @BoJamman99 expressed clear solidarity with Saudi Arabia, considering the attack on it as an attack on Kuwait as well, while @Tareq_ALbnnan used offensive and harsh expressions.

On June 22, 2025, @Tareq_ALbnnan posted an accusation against Egypt, using an offensive image, which garnered 358,201 views. On the same day, @qrnas_ksa4 published a post alleging that an officer named Ahmed Magdy had admitted that the Egyptian Ministry of Interior approved the insults directed at Saudi Arabia, which garnered 276,607 views. In a post that achieved 152,636 views, @BoJamman99 expressed solidarity with Saudi Arabia and considered the attack on it to be an attack on Kuwait as well. Additionally, a post from @hayaMOdhaib received 91,039 views, which emphasized that this matter would not be overlooked and called for respect for countries. On June 23, 2025, @alshagiri posted a tweet mocking a figure connected to the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, which garnered 222,849 views.

Digital evidence shows that @Tareq_ALbnnan was the first to use the hashtag #الداخليه_المصريه_تهاجم_السعودية, based on a search of X posts, with the earliest post dating back to June 22, 2025, at 17:01. Upon examining the account, there is no evidence to suggest that it is authentic; it appears to be a fake account used for political propaganda within digital campaigns run by Saudi “electronic flies.”

Evidence of an Organized Digital Campaign

Using the Python programming language – which is employed for web development, data analysis, artificial intelligence, and task automation – we tracked four consecutive waves of the digital campaign over an 18-day period, which included a sharp peak on June 23, followed by near-total decline after June 30. This suggests the existence of a pre-defined launch window, followed by a cessation of promotion, a characteristic behavior of paid digital campaigns. We found that the sentiment within the campaign content was 70% negative, with only 1.5% being positive. This high bias towards negative sentiment indicates a targeted discourse. Additionally, the repeated content, such as the phrase “Know, O Saudi…” which was posted verbatim 179 times, points to the use of copy-pasting methods or scheduling programs. We also identified replicated or centrally managed accounts (bots), such as the accounts @7rrgr and @9rrgr, which posted identical tweets with 100% similarity.

The coordinated use of hashtags such as #Egyptian_Ministry_of_Interior_Attacks_Saudi_Arabia, along with hashtags calling for a boycott of tourism in Egypt and Egyptian products, formed a unified narrative that linked Egypt and Saudi Arabia to stir a targeted audience. We observed linguistic similarity in the campaign’s content, with keywords such as “Boycott Tourism,” “They sold it,” “The servant and his master” repeated in 80% of the tweets, suggesting a uniform rhetorical programming. Despite only 455 tweets being published during this digital campaign, the reach (views) saw a sudden surge, exceeding 9 million on June 25, which indicates that high-influence accounts were likely resharing pre-prepared content.

We also observed four additional technical indicators of inauthentic behavior in this digital campaign’s content, including the presence of hashtag blocks and mixed languages in a single tweet, which is indicative of the use of mass posting tools. There was also a subsequent deletion of some links and accounts, a common practice following coordinated digital campaigns to minimize their residual impact. Furthermore, there was a significant similarity (Similarity = 1.0) between account profiles in our comparison files, aligning with X’s definition of automated accounts.

In conclusion, all the digital and content-based indicators show that the campaign monitored between June 12 and June 27, 2025, was not a spontaneous reaction but a short-lived, organized digital campaign launched by electronic accounts within Saudi Arabia. It focused on the latter half of June 2025 and targeted defaming Egypt’s tourism and products through repeated, similar negative rhetoric, supported by high-similarity accounts and unified incitement hashtags.

This investigation was conducted with the support of the Arab Fact-Checking Community (AFH).