How Coordinated Online Accounts Used Gaza and January 25 in a Propaganda Campaign

Social network analysis traces coordinated amplification around pro-government hashtags praising Egypt’s role in Gaza, followed by attacks on opposition voices ahead of January 25.
Picture of Arabi Facts Hub (AFH)

Arabi Facts Hub (AFH)

As soon as a ceasefire agreement between Palestinian resistance factions and the Israeli government was announced, a coordinated campaign began on X under the hashtag #مصر_عطاء_لا_ينقطع, meaning “Egypt’s Giving Never Stops.” It promoted Egypt’s role in humanitarian mediation and aid, then shifted towards attacking the opposition through a hashtag presenting January 25 as Egyptian Police Day.

This investigation examines the campaign through social network analysis of participating accounts. The analysis identified patterns consistent with systematic amplification, including activity attributed to inauthentic accounts.

A coordinated hashtag

Following the Gaza ceasefire, official media emphasised Egypt’s role in pressuring the Israeli government to accept a truce, leading international efforts to end the military escalation and securing humanitarian assistance.

The online campaign followed the same approach, focusing on Egypt’s positive role in reaching the agreement. A closer examination of engagement, however, revealed patterns suggesting that some of the activity was not organic.

Researchers first collected posts using the target hashtag and reviewed participating accounts’ creation dates, follower counts and previous activity. This helped identify unusual engagement and possible collective amplification.

They then used social network analysis to map links between the campaign’s most active accounts. Measures of centrality identified influential accounts and clusters repeatedly interacting with one another, which may indicate organised coordination.

Content analysis also revealed similarities in posts and hashtags. Researchers examined how several accounts reposted the same material within short periods, tracing changes in the political messaging and its direction.

A sudden surge

The report identifies a sharp increase in posts between January 19 and 23, 2025. More than 17,000 posts were recorded, with reported reach exceeding 97 million. Reach is a platform-monitoring metric and should not be read as a verified count of unique people.

The supplied reach chart reports 97.2 million total reach and a daily average of 6.94 million. Its plotted peak falls on January 22; the original Arabic caption gives January 21.
The supplied reach chart reports 97.2 million total reach and a daily average of 6.94 million. Its plotted peak falls on January 22; the original Arabic caption gives January 21.

Saudi Arabia ranked second after Egypt among locations associated with posts on the hashtag, accounting for 788 posts.

Mostaqbal Watan News accounts led the engagement among accounts belonging to news websites. The outlet is the media platform of the Mostaqbal Watan party, known for supporting Egypt’s governing authorities.

The text describes reposts as about 45% of activity and original posts as about 12%. The accompanying chart provides the more precise breakdown below.

Distribution of post types in the supplied chart: reposts 45.3%, replies 35.8%, original posts 12.8% and quote posts 6.1%.
Distribution of post types in the supplied chart: reposts 45.3%, replies 35.8%, original posts 12.8% and quote posts 6.1%.

The reposting figures suggest that the hashtag’s visibility was not simply the result of spontaneous engagement. A network of accounts played a significant role in amplifying it. Many displayed unusual activity, such as frequent posting around the clock or a narrow focus on particular content without personal interaction. Some had participated in similar campaigns.

Several participating accounts lacked personal photographs or biographical details identifying their operators, apart from listing Egypt as their location.

Accounts including Aa56547979, Ward7890 and rushyt1 stood out for intensive, repetitive activity and frequent reposting. The report later lists the Ward account as @Ward789000; these spellings are reproduced as given in the source.

The rushyt1 account’s biography used #عصابة_الريتويت_للفولورز, roughly “the retweet gang for followers,” a hashtag associated with accounts displaying similar activity.

The campaign’s messaging developed in two stages: first highlighting Egypt’s role in Gaza and humanitarian aid, then attacking the Egyptian opposition as January 25 approached.

Recurring language in the campaign

Theme English meaning of terms in the original word cloud
Campaign slogan Egypt’s Giving Never Stops
January 25 January 25 Is Egyptian Police Day
Gaza and border crossing Gaza; Palestine; Rafah; Rafah crossing
National praise Egypt Is a Very Great Country; Egypt, Mother of the World; Egypt Will Win in the End
Other recurring language Our Awareness Is Our Weapon; Trump; expressions praising Egypt and insulting opponents
English rendering of themes in the original Arabic word cloud; no frequency values were supplied.

Accounts driving the campaign

The accounts @BAHAA0003823628 and @BASSEMELMASSRY emerged as major drivers. According to the report’s timeline, the campaign began on January 20, 2025, with the first hashtag posts appearing at 08:35 UTC. @BASSEMELMASSRY was among the early users, posting at 09:21 UTC.

Reported sequence

Time or date Activity
January 20, 2025, 08:35 UTC First hashtag posts identified in the report’s timeline
January 20, 2025, 09:21 UTC An early post by @BASSEMELMASSRY
January 21, 2025 The account’s activity shifted towards the Police Day hashtag
The source’s separate cumulative-adoption chart places account markers earlier in January, which conflicts with these dates. This timeline follows the dates stated in the report rather than inferring exact timings from that chart.

Combining the temporal and network analyses showed that the hashtag initially spread gradually. Engagement rose after several hours as central accounts became involved and carried the campaign into wider circles.

Of 7,062 reposts recorded in the campaign, the report attributes 44.5% to @BAHAA0003823628 and @BASSEMELMASSRY together.

The network’s influence was not confined to those two accounts. Other central accounts acted as intermediaries, distributing posts between groups and extending circulation.

@Aa56547979, @Ward789000 and @rushyt1 appeared among the network’s most influential accounts. They helped recirculate and amplify material, linking different groups of users and sustaining the hashtag’s visibility.

Prominent network accounts

Account Role identified by the analysis
@Aa56547979 A central amplifier connected to the campaign hashtag
@Ward789000 An intermediary recirculating campaign content
@rushyt1 An amplifier and link between groups of accounts
Account roles described in the source analysis; this does not identify the people operating them.
The supplied network map shows links formed through mentions and reposts between participating accounts.
The supplied network map shows links formed through mentions and reposts between participating accounts.
Two posts identified as widely reposted in the source. Both combine praise for Egypt with insults directed at opponents and link the giving campaign to the January 25 Police Day hashtag.
Two posts identified as widely reposted in the source. Both combine praise for Egypt with insults directed at opponents and link the giving campaign to the January 25 Police Day hashtag.

Propaganda that keeps shifting

The analysis links #مصر_عطاء_لا_ينقطع with the later hashtag #25_يناير_عيد_الشرطة_المصرية, meaning “January 25 Is Egyptian Police Day.” Meltwater monitoring data cited in the report recorded 48 posts on January 21, compared with no daily posts in the preceding period displayed.

The tool also reported a 959-fold increase over its usual baseline. The exact underlying baseline was not supplied; the displayed zero for earlier days should not be treated as a mathematical denominator for that ratio.

A January 21 post by @amlkhalil11 combines hashtags praising Egypt and its army with the Police Day and Egypt’s Giving Never Stops slogans. Its closing phrase calls Egypt “the mother of the world.”
A January 21 post by @amlkhalil11 combines hashtags praising Egypt and its army with the Police Day and Egypt’s Giving Never Stops slogans. Its closing phrase calls Egypt “the mother of the world.”

Sentiment analysis classified 92% of posts as positive. The report interprets this as a campaign promoting the anniversary of the revolution as Egyptian Police Day.

Geographical data associated 23 posts with Egypt, a figure described as 505 times the daily baseline. These are monitoring estimates, not independently verified locations for every account operator.

The “Maestro” again

As the analysis above shows, @BASSEMELMASSRY, known as the “Maestro,” helped launch and drive engagement around the giving hashtag. On January 21, 2025, the account gradually moved towards #٢٥_يناير_عيد_الشرطه_المصرية, another spelling of the Police Day hashtag.

At the time of the analysis, the account had 98,502 followers. The report argues that engagement did not reflect ordinary interaction with real followers, but was amplified through repeated reposting by connected accounts.

Mentions of the account rose to 48 on January 21, compared with zero in the preceding days displayed. Of those, 23 were associated with Egypt, described as a 505-fold rise over the usual baseline.

The posting pattern, together with connections to accounts supporting the same messaging, places the “Maestro” among the central elements of the directed propaganda network identified by the analysis.

A January 21 post by @BASSEMELMASSRY praises action against opponents, uses derogatory language comparing them to sheep, and combines hashtags labelling the Muslim Brotherhood traitors with the giving campaign and Police Day slogans.
A January 21 post by @BASSEMELMASSRY praises action against opponents, uses derogatory language comparing them to sheep, and combines hashtags labelling the Muslim Brotherhood traitors with the giving campaign and Police Day slogans.

The account’s posts exaggerate state achievements while demonising opponents through language suggesting threats and instability, the report concludes.

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