The Civil Democratic Movement chose not to contest the Senate elections while preparing to field candidates for the House of Representatives. It rejects the closed absolute-list system but also rejects a general boycott, instead looking towards individual-seat constituencies.
In this interview, recorded ahead of the August 2025 Senate vote, former MP Talaat Khalil, the movement’s general coordinator, discusses its electoral ambitions, alliances with pro-government parties, the restrictions facing opposition politics and his assessment of Egypt’s economy. References to forthcoming elections in his answers reflect the time of the interview.
The Civil Democratic Movement is criticised for failing to achieve the political influence expected of it. How do you respond?
There is no doubt that the movement is affected by the prevailing climate. We all know that politics is being killed off in this period, and the movement is part of that environment. It does not allow balanced political activity, another voice to be heard or a peaceful transfer of power.
We have been placed within this climate and are subjected to its pressures. We may not accept it, and neither does the Egyptian public. Much of the criticism concerns conditions beyond our control. We are not responsible for a political environment that does not permit pluralism or effective party activity capable of meeting people’s aspirations.
Why participate rather than boycott, despite your objections to the election law?
For anyone working in politics, the starting point is to participate and engage with elections. Nevertheless, we strongly oppose closed absolute lists. They do not ultimately produce representatives chosen with public approval; in essence, they turn appointments into elections.
We considered participating through a list of our own, but found it extremely burdensome and difficult, especially in the Senate elections. The very large list constituencies impose an enormous burden on anyone involved in public life.
The closed absolute-list law is exclusionary. It pushes out those who want genuine engagement with the electoral process.
We did not want a boycott and are not advocates of one, even though we reject the current law and the very large constituencies for individual seats. We will try to participate in the coming parliamentary elections through some individual-seat constituencies, fielding candidates with long political experience and a genuine presence among the public.
Why did parliament retain an electoral system that ignores the problems of the previous law?
Retaining the same system of closed absolute lists alongside individual seats reflects the conviction of those who designed this exclusionary law: they do not want another voice. It extends the character of political life in Egypt, which has come to be built around a single voice.
We see a unified electoral list being assembled instead of parties competing for public confidence. Everyone enters one list through what I regard as a security-mediated arrangement, rather than free political competition. Its purpose is to bring in representatives who can be controlled, not representatives of the people.
The result is to suppress the public’s voice and marginalise politics itself. The law serves those who want to exclude people from political participation and parties from their normal role in competition and representation. Its authors know that the outcome is a parliament acceptable to the security agencies rather than to the electorate.
Will the movement run on lists or for individual seats, and how many seats will it seek?
It will most likely be very difficult for us to run through lists, particularly for the House of Representatives. We did not submit a Senate list because of the difficult conditions.
For the House, there are four list constituencies: two with 102 seats each and two, covering eastern and western Delta areas, with 40 seats each. Who has the financial capacity to fight an election across such an enormous area? Who can organise conferences across all those governorates or mount effective campaigning throughout them?
This is why I describe the law as exclusionary. It places obstacles in the way of genuine engagement rather than encouraging participation.
We will most likely try to enter through individual-seat constituencies. That is difficult too, but we hope to obtain between 20 and 25 seats, the minimum we consider acceptable as political representation.
What do you fear during the campaign, and how will you protect candidates and volunteers?
The law provides protection for candidates and their campaigns, but we know there are those who resort to hired thugs or unlawful practices. Political money still plays a dangerous role.
We fear that poverty will be exploited to pressure people into taking part. People struggling economically can be vulnerable to direct payments or pressure through social-support networks, including programmes such as Takaful and Karama and assistance from some civil-society organisations.
In theory, the law protects candidates, voters and the electoral process through clear procedures. Those who violate those procedures are the same people who reject pluralism and another voice, and seek to entrench a one-voice parliament.
Do you expect the next parliament to differ in its performance or representation?
Unfortunately, we are heading towards a parliament that could be worse than the current one and its predecessor. In my assessment, many candidates entering through the lists have obtained places through substantial financial contributions.
They do not represent the people, and their presence will not serve citizens’ interests. A candidate who reaches parliament through money and deals cannot defend the public because the public did not choose them.
Do alliances with pro-government parties empty pluralism of its substance?
What are called electoral alliances are not alliances in a political or electoral sense. They are arrangements for dividing up the cake, securing places for those who are approved of or operate within the orbit of loyalty, rather than agreement on politics or an electoral programme.
Worse, the conferences being organised do not offer real political debate, economic visions, legislative plans or discussion of social issues. What is offered is intimidation and an assertion of control, as if politics did not exist. The criterion becomes security approval rather than public approval.
These alliances empty pluralism of meaning because they do not involve competition between programmes and positions. They accept a single list that cannot be challenged with an alternative. The problem is not opposition parties themselves, but the imposed law and a political will that does not want genuine representatives. The lists emerging from these arrangements will not reflect people or their needs.
How do you assess economic performance and its effect on society?
Our assessment begins with the government’s announcement of economic reform in November 2016. We have not seen a genuine path towards that reform, or the kind of direct investment that meaningfully reduces unemployment and increases exports. Policy is often haphazard.
The deterioration has produced very high inflation while basic needs go unmet. People struggle to afford food and transport, alongside rising electricity, water, sanitation and other prices. They bear heavy costs for services that should be within reach.
The debt situation is especially dangerous. Unchecked borrowing for projects that do not generate development creates greater economic instability and puts pressure on independent political decisions. We see state assets being relinquished to creditors, with consequences for sovereignty and Egypt’s regional role.
Currency depreciation, inflation, the budget deficit and a failure to control public spending together warn of further deterioration.
What is your position on the government’s programme for offering state assets?
We do not oppose investment. But what is happening is not investment in the genuine sense. Ras El Hekma, for example, does not inspire confidence: we still do not know the details of the contract with the Emirati side. Reports about other areas, such as Ras Gamila and Ras Shukeir, are also deeply concerning.
Reports suggesting that sukuk would be issued to pledge assets against debt describe an extremely dangerous direction. The debt burden is enormous, and offering sovereign land as security raises national-security concerns.
Does offering public hospitals for investment threaten healthcare as a public service?
Healthcare is particularly serious. Poor people, and even the middle class, struggle to obtain treatment. I am concerned about the consequences of privatisation, shortages of medicines and supplies, and inadequate funding for treatment at the state’s expense.
In governorates where comprehensive health insurance has been introduced, such as Port Said, Ismailia and Suez, people face serious difficulties. Bodies are being withheld by hospitals over unpaid bills that families cannot afford. These are deeply troubling issues.
People struggle to secure even basic treatment. University hospitals, which have relieved a significant burden on the Health Ministry, do not receive sufficient allocations. Donations to hospitals such as El Demerdash and Kasr Al Ainy have also been affected by the economic crisis, leaving them with limited resources.
The concerns and allegations in these answers are Khalil’s. The interview does not independently establish specific incidents of bodies being withheld or a transfer of ownership of the hospitals he discusses.
What risks do you see in using land-linked sukuk or assets to address debt?
The situation is worsening. Expanded borrowing leaves us facing both principal repayments and interest. I estimate the burden discussed here at around 65% of state revenues. The resort to exchanging assets for debt is dangerous because it weakens political decision-making.
Some Gulf states take advantage of Egypt’s economic crisis to acquire assets in return for debt. Reports about the sale of historic buildings and land in central Cairo raise serious national-security concerns for us.
Did the crisis end after Ras El Hekma? No. Nor do further asset-linked arrangements resolve it if we continue borrowing for projects without developmental returns. Medium-term borrowing, short grace periods and repayment obligations keep us under pressure.
The debt crisis will remain a burden hanging over Egyptians, Khalil argues, as long as borrowing finances projects that do not generate genuine developmental returns.
The 65% figure is the interviewee’s estimate, with no fiscal year specified in the answer. Interest payments and repayment of principal are distinct budget measures and should not be conflated.
