The Civil Democratic Movement has opted not to participate in the Senate elections scheduled to be held during August, but at the same time it is preparing for the House of Representatives elections. Between its position rejecting the list system, and also rejecting the option of a boycott, the Civil Democratic Movement is preparing to contest the elections under the individual-candidacy system.
In this context, we pose several questions: How many seats is the movement preparing to contest? What is its position on the electoral alliances being formed between some parties counted as opposition and those counted as loyalist? What are its most prominent potential fears regarding the upcoming elections? And how does the Civil Democratic Movement view the current economic crisis? All these questions and more are answered by former MP Talaat Khalil, General Coordinator of the Civil Democratic Movement, in the following interview.
The Civil Democratic Movement faces criticism that it has not yet risen to the hoped-for level of political influence. What is your comment?
There is no doubt that the Civil Democratic Movement is affected by the climate currently prevailing. We all know that politics is being killed and slaughtered in this era, and that the Civil Democratic Movement is part of this prevailing climate. The prevailing climate does not allow balanced and measured political performance, does not allow the other voice to be heard, and does not allow the peaceful rotation of power. So the Civil Democratic Movement has today become part of this climate in which we have been placed and within whose framework we are being pressured, and with which we may not be satisfied, nor are the Egyptian people satisfied with it.
But there is no doubt that the criticism directed at us is due to matters beyond our control. We are not responsible for the political climate being poor, or for this climate not allowing pluralism, or not allowing good and effective party work that rises to the level of the aspirations of the Egyptian people.
Despite the declared objection to the elections law, what pushed the Civil Democratic Movement to take a decision to participate instead of a boycott?
There is no doubt that for anyone who works in politics, the principle is to participate and engage with any electoral process. Despite that, we object strongly to the system of absolute closed lists, which in the end does not produce MPs who enjoy the approval of the people, but in its essence represents appointments in the form of elections.
We decided to participate through the lists and for the Civil Democratic Movement to have a list, but we found that the matter was extremely exhausting and very difficult, especially in the current Senate elections, which are marred by many undesirable aspects. Dividing the republic into only four constituencies is an extremely difficult matter and constitutes a severe burden on any actor in the public sphere.
Thus, this law, the absolute closed list law, has become an exclusionary law. It effectively drives out everyone who seeks genuine engagement with the electoral process.
Basically, we did not want to boycott, and we are not advocates of boycotting, even if we are dissatisfied with the current electoral law, which is based on absolute closed lists and relies, in the individual system, on extremely vast constituencies. Nevertheless, we will try to engage in the upcoming parliamentary elections through some individual constituencies, by fielding our candidates who have a long political track record and a real presence on the Egyptian street.
In your opinion, why did parliament insist on passing an electoral law that ignores the crises that marred the previous elections law?
Ignoring the law’s crises and insisting on the same law as the last elections, which included an electoral system of absolute closed lists alongside the individual system, reflects a firm conviction among the drafters of this exclusionary law that they do not want another voice to exist. The matter comes as an extension of the nature of political life in Egypt, which has come to be built entirely on the idea of the single voice.
We see today how a unified electoral list is being formed, instead of parties competing over who enjoys the trust of the street. Everyone has become part of a single list through security consensus, not free political competition. According to their point of view, these unified lists are sufficient to achieve the purpose of passing through MPs who are under control, not MPs who represent the people. They are working to obscure the voice of the people and to marginalise politics itself in Egypt. The current law serves everyone who seeks to exclude people from the political process, and to exclude parties from their natural role in competition and representation.
Consequently, whoever drafted this law knows full well that its only outcome is a parliament that brings in those approved by the security agencies, not those approved by the Egyptian street.
Does the Civil Democratic Movement intend to field its members under the list system or the individual system? And how many seats does the movement intend to compete for under the individual system?
In all likelihood, it is very difficult for the movement to contest the upcoming elections through lists, especially in the House of Representatives elections. As I mentioned earlier, we did not submit any lists in the Senate elections, which will be held within days, because of the difficulty of the conditions. As for the House of Representatives, the republic has been divided into four electoral constituencies: two constituencies allocated to the National List (each comprising 102 seats), and another two for East Delta and West Delta, each comprising 40 seats.
When we look at the reality of the governorates, we find that the pressing question is: who today has the financial solvency that enables them to wage an electoral battle in this enormous division? Who can organise electoral rallies in governorates stretched out in this way? Who has the ability to carry out effective electoral campaigning covering this wide scope?
That is why I say clearly: this is an exclusionary law that does not encourage participation, but rather puts obstacles in the way of anyone who tries to engage genuinely with the electoral process.
Accordingly, we will most likely not participate through the lists, but will try to enter through some constituencies in the individual system. It is true that this option also carries many difficulties, but we will try as far as possible to participate in a way that allows us to obtain a number of seats that we hope will range between 20 and 25 seats, which is the minimum we consider acceptable and representative of us politically.
What does the Civil Democratic Movement fear during the electoral campaign period? And what is your plan to protect volunteers and candidates and secure their movements?
Although the law provides for the protection of candidates and their electoral campaigns, we all know that there are those who will resort to using thugs, or to practices outside the law. Political money also still plays a dangerous role in the elections. We fear that people’s poverty will be exploited as a tool to push them into coerced participation in the elections. The public suffering from difficult economic conditions has become vulnerable to exploitation, whether through direct political money or through social support networks that are used as a tool of pressure through programmes such as “Takaful and Karama” or the aid provided by some civil society associations.
Although the law, theoretically, provides protection for the candidate, the voter and the electoral process through clear and defined paths, those who violate these paths are the very people who do not want pluralism, do not accept the existence of another voice, and instead seek to entrench a single-voice parliament.
Do you expect the next parliament to be different in terms of performance or representation? Or will we witness a repetition of the same pattern?
Unfortunately, what we are approaching is a parliament poised to be worse than the current parliament and the one before it. We know that most of the candidates who will enter through the lists obtained their places through huge financial donations. These people do not represent the people, and their presence inside parliament will not produce anything concerned with citizens’ interests. A candidate who reaches parliament through money and deals cannot defend the people, because he did not arrive by their will.
How do you view the electoral alliances built on understandings with loyalist parties? And do you see them as emptying the idea of pluralism of its content?
What are called “electoral alliances” are in reality not alliances in the political or electoral sense, but rather “cake-sharing alliances”, based on guaranteeing places for those in favour and for those who orbit in the sphere of loyalty, not on the basis of political consensus or an electoral programme.
Worse still, in the rallies currently being organised, no real political discourse is put forward: no economic visions, no legislative plans and no societal discussions. All that is offered is intimidation, terrorising and attempts to assert control, as if politics did not exist in the first place. The only criterion has become “security approval”, not the approval of the people.
That is why I see that these alliances empty political pluralism of its content, because they are not based on competition between programmes and positions, but on acceptance of a single list that may not be confronted or offered an alternative. The problem is not in us as opposition parties or political forces, but in the law imposed on us, and in the political will that does not want real MPs who represent the people. Thus, these lists that
will be produced through these alliances will produce nothing but an absurd scene that expresses neither the people nor their needs.
How do you assess the current economic performance? And what is the impact of economic policies on society?
We assess the performance of the economy starting from what the government announced regarding economic reform in November 2016. Up to this moment, no real paths have been laid down for this reform. We have not noticed any real direct investments leading to a reduction in unemployment rates or to an increase in the volume of exports; rather, the economic policies being pursued are often characterised by randomness.
There is an abnormal economic deterioration that has led to very high inflation rates, and the citizen’s basic needs have gone unmet. The Egyptian citizen is no longer able to secure his daily bread, and cannot bear the costs of transport, which have seen a large increase, in addition to the rise in the prices of basic goods and services, such as electricity, water and sanitation. All of them have come to be provided at exaggerated prices, which has placed great burdens on the citizen in exchange for services that are supposed to be within his reach.
The overall economic performance is also clearly flabby. The debt file has become extremely dangerous, as there is an uncalculated expansion in borrowing to finance non-developmental projects, which leads to greater confusion in the economy and places severe pressure on the independence of political decision-making. Today we are witnessing the relinquishing of state assets in favour of creditors, which casts a heavy shadow over Egypt’s sovereign decision-making and remarkably weakens its regional role. This turbulent economic scene, with the collapse of the currency, rising inflation, the widening budget deficit and the absence of rationalisation in government spending, portends further deterioration.
What is your position on the government’s programme for offering state assets?
We do not oppose investment, of course, but what is happening is not investment in the true sense. For example, what is happening in the Ras El-Hekma area is not reassuring. We still do not know the details of the contract concluded with the Emirati side, and what is being said about other areas such as Ras Gamila and Ras Shukeir raises grave concern.
The news circulating is that these sukuk will be issued only so that these assets can be mortgaged in exchange for debts, and this is an extremely dangerous approach. We are facing an enormous volume of debt, and the situation has come to threaten national security itself, especially when sovereign lands are put forward as collateral.
What is your opinion of the state’s move to offer government hospitals for investment? And do you think this threatens the idea of health as a public service?
The health file in particular is an extremely dangerous file. The poor, and even members of the middle class, have become unable to receive treatment, because a large number of government hospitals are no longer fully owned by the state because of privatisation. There is also an acute shortage of medicines and medical supplies. As for treatment at the state’s expense, the budget allocated to it is not sufficient to cover the needs of the poor who request this treatment.
As for the Universal Health Insurance system, in the governorates where it has been applied, such as Port Said, Ismailia and Suez, people are suffering severely. There are bodies being held in hospitals because their owners have debts that their families are unable to pay. The system, which has been applied on a pilot basis in some governorates, is extremely dangerous.
Likewise, many of the health services that the state used to provide have been withdrawn, and the citizen now struggles to obtain the most basic of his rights to treatment. University hospitals, which used to bear a large burden on behalf of the Ministry of Health, do not receive sufficient financial allocations. Even the donations that used to go to hospitals such as El-Demerdash and Kasr Al-Ainy have been negatively affected by the economic crisis, so these institutions have come to rely on very few resources, amid the complete absence of the state in supporting these hospitals.
What is your opinion of the government resorting to offering areas of land in the form of sukuk for the purpose of repaying part of the debts? And do you see a danger to Egypt in this?
The situation is getting worse. The expansion in borrowing has led us to a point where we are required to repay the principal of the debt and debt service (the interest), which today reaches 65% of the state’s revenues. Therefore, the state is resorting to swapping these debts for some of its assets, and this is a severe danger, as I mentioned, because it weakens political decision-making.
Today, some Gulf states are exploiting this economic crisis that the Egyptian people are going through, and are beginning to obtain state assets in exchange for debts. We all hear about what is happening in Downtown Cairo, the sale of heritage buildings and the sale of land, and all of these matters constitute a grave threat to Egyptian national security.
Has the crisis ended? After the sale of Ras El-Hekma, has it ended? On the contrary, the crisis has become worse. And after offering sukuk on Ras Shukeir, has the debt crisis ended? It will not end. Because we are proceeding on the same path, expanding borrowing for non-developmental projects, and these loans are medium-term, with short grace periods not exceeding five years, and are repaid over 15 years, which keeps us constantly under continuous pressure.
= The debt crisis will not end soon; it will remain a burden, and it will remain a sword hanging over the necks of the Egyptian people, because it was used in projects that do not bring a real developmental return.
