In recent months, Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly has repeatedly stated on more than one official occasion, whether during Cabinet meetings or weekly press conferences, that Egypt’s unemployment rate continues to decline, considering this achievement to be “one of the most important indicators of the success of the economic reform program.” In his latest remarks, Madbouly said during a meeting with military attachés that the unemployment rate had fallen to 6.2%, recording a historic low in the country’s history.
The Prime Minister stressed that current rates are the lowest in decades, noting that the expansion of national projects, employment programs, and public and private investments has contributed to absorbing growing numbers of new entrants into the labor market, despite regional challenges and global economic pressures. He also emphasized that the state “does not settle for reducing unemployment numerically,” but rather aims to create “sustainable” job opportunities and improve labor market efficiency over the long term.
However, observers and economists who spoke to Zawia3 argue that government statements, despite being based on official data, do not present a comprehensive picture of the reality of Egypt’s labor market. They explain that a decline in the unemployment rate does not necessarily mean an improvement in employment conditions, especially amid the expansion of the informal economy, rising rates of precarious work, and declining job quality. They stress that part of the decline in unemployment is due to large numbers of citizens exiting the labor force altogether, whether because of frustration with job searching or a shift toward informal or temporary work, which does not appear in official indicators.
In addition, experts believe that reading unemployment figures in isolation from wages, job stability, and social protection strips these numbers of their economic and social substance. Labor market experts also distinguish between the unemployment rate and the employment rate, two indicators that are often conflated in official discourse. The unemployment rate measures the proportion of jobseekers without work within the labor force only, while the employment rate measures the proportion of those actually working out of the total population of working age.
According to this definition, the unemployment rate can decline even when job opportunities are shrinking, if a large number of individuals exit the labor force or shift to informal activities. Economists emphasize that focusing on unemployment alone conceals a more complex reality, namely weak real employment rates and low participation of women and young people in the labor market, which represents one of the most prominent structural challenges facing the Egyptian economy.
Commenting on this, Wael Gamal, Director of the Social and Economic Justice Unit at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, says that any decline in the unemployment rate should theoretically be considered a positive indicator. However, he stresses that reading this figure in isolation from the method of its calculation and its broader economic context does not reflect a complete picture of the reality of the labor market. He explains that the core problem in Egypt is not only related to the officially announced unemployment rate, but rather to the low employment rate itself compared to the size of the labor force.
Gamal points out that Egypt’s employment rate is among the very low rates, as the proportion of those employed out of the total number of individuals able and willing to work does not exceed about 40%, according to data from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. He notes that this figure reflects the exit of a broad segment of those capable of working from the labor market altogether, rather than a genuine improvement in employment opportunities.
It should be noted that the total labor force represents the sum of individuals who are able and willing to work; the total number of unemployed refers to those who are actively seeking work but unable to find a job; while the total number of employed includes those who are actually working.
He adds that the decline in unemployment during certain periods, particularly in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic, was not the result of new job creation, but rather due to large numbers of individuals exiting the labor force itself. Their number is estimated at around 1.5 million people, most of whom are women. This statistical shift led to a decline in the unemployment rate, despite the deterioration of actual employment conditions.
Gamal also points out that the method used to calculate unemployment in Egypt relies on field surveys conducted by official bodies, whereby an individual is considered “employed” if they engaged in any economic activity, even for just one hour during the week preceding the survey. Likewise, a person is only counted as unemployed if they explicitly state their desire to work and are actively searching for a job. According to Gamal, this methodology automatically excludes millions of individuals who are capable of working but have lost hope or stopped searching, despite possessing qualifications, including university degrees.
The economic researcher stresses that the true success of any economic policy should not be measured solely by reducing the unemployment rate, but by increasing the overall employment rate through the creation of stable and productive jobs that can absorb the country’s vast human capacity, especially given that the majority of this capacity belongs to young people at the peak of their productive potential.
Gamal further emphasizes that official unemployment figures reflect only a partial aspect of the picture and do not express the full reality of the labor market, particularly in light of the challenges faced by workers themselves, such as low wages, non-compliance with the minimum wage, the absence of social insurance, health insurance, and occupational safety standards. These issues, in his view, are no less important than unemployment itself when assessing labor market conditions in Egypt.
For his part, economic expert Zohdi El Shami believes that such statements do not accurately reflect the true scale of unemployment nor the depth of the crises facing the Egyptian labor market, which have become more complex and widespread.
El Shami attributes what he describes as the “artificial decline” in officially announced unemployment rates to the officially adopted measurement mechanism, which excludes large numbers of unemployed individuals for illogical reasons. These include classifying someone who worked for only one hour during the measurement period as employed, or removing those who have stopped searching for work from unemployment records, despite the absence of real opportunities available to them. He argues that this methodology leads to polishing the figures rather than diagnosing the problem as it truly exists.
In his remarks to Zawia3, El Shami adds that the official unemployment rate fails to shed light on the fragility of labor market conditions, as the majority of those employed work in the informal sector, which accounts for about 65% of employment and is characterized by the absence of job security and social insurance. In addition, a wide segment of workers in the formal sector are employed on temporary contracts and receive wages below the minimum wage, stripping the concept of employment of its social and economic substance.El Shami stresses that the low figure announced by the Prime Minister cannot conceal the alarming indicators embedded in the details, foremost among them the rise in urban unemployment to 10.1%, and its increase to 14.2% among young people, in addition to growing unemployment among holders of intermediate and higher educational qualifications. These indicators, he says, reflect a deep structural imbalance in the labor market and raise serious concern about Egypt’s economic and social future.
What Do the Official Figures Say?
Data from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics for 2024 reflect a decline in the unemployment rate to 6.6%, down by 0.4 percentage points compared to 2023. At face value, this decrease appears to be a positive indicator of improving labor market conditions. However, a careful reading of these figures reveals that the decline remains limited in terms of its structural impact, particularly when compared to the continued increase in the size of the labor force, which grew by about 2.9% in just one year.
It is worth noting here that reducing the number of unemployed individuals by around 77,000 does not necessarily reflect the economy’s ability to create stable and sustainable jobs. Rather, it may indicate a temporary absorption of part of the new entrants into the labor market, or the transition of some of them into informal forms of employment.
According to official 2024 data, young people aged 15–29 holding intermediate, above-intermediate, and university qualifications account for about 18.7% of the labor force within this age group, yet they represent the segment with the highest unemployment rates.
The data also show that holders of university degrees constitute the largest share of the unemployed in Egypt, a paradox that reflects a deep imbalance in the relationship between education and the labor market. Egypt graduates hundreds of thousands of university students annually, at a time when the economy is unable to provide jobs suited to their educational levels. Experts argue that this crisis is not only related to the number of jobs available, but also to their quality, wage structures, and weak investment in labor-intensive sectors with added value.
In the results for the third quarter of 2025, the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics indicates that 83.1% of the total unemployed are holders of intermediate, above-intermediate, university, or higher qualifications, up from 78.2% in the previous quarter.
Although graduates of universities and higher institutes represent a limited share of the total labor force, they make up more than four-fifths of the unemployed. Data for the third quarter of 2025 show that about 83% of the unemployed hold intermediate qualifications or higher, compared to 78% in the previous quarter, while the unemployment rate among young people with intermediate, above-intermediate, and university qualifications reached 18.7% in 2024.
In addition, the continued clear gap between unemployment rates in urban areas (9.6%) and rural areas (4.2%) reflects differing patterns of employment. Unemployment in rural areas is partly lower due to irregular agricultural work, rather than a genuine improvement in job quality or employment opportunities.
Moreover, unemployment data among youth and women highlight deeper structural challenges in the Egyptian labor market. Despite the decline in the unemployment rate among young people aged 15–29 to 14.9%, the gender gap remains stark. Unemployment among females in this age group stands at 37.1%, compared to 9.8% among males, reflecting the economy’s limited capacity to integrate women into the formal labor market.
At the same time, the high share of previously employed individuals among the unemployed (42.3%) reveals that a significant portion of unemployment does not stem from failure to enter the labor market, but from the loss of previous jobs. This raises questions about job stability and the ability of available employment to withstand economic fluctuations. Thus, the numerical decline in unemployment does not conceal the fact that the labor market continues to suffer from structural imbalances related to job quality, the exclusion of women, and the fragility of employment opportunities available to educated youth.
Overall, available quarterly data throughout 2025 indicate that the unemployment rate has remained stable within a range of 6% to 6.5%, which the government cites as evidence of the consolidation of the downward trend that began in previous years. However, this numerical stability cannot be read as a qualitative transformation in the labor market, but rather reflects a limited capacity to absorb the continuous increase in the labor force, which keeps growing due to population growth and the annual entry of new cohorts of young people.
In the same context, the absence of comprehensive annual data so far, and reliance on fluctuating quarterly indicators, reveal that the labor market has not yet reached a state of balance. Instead, according to observers, it is moving within a narrow margin between job creation on one hand, and the exit of other groups from the labor force or their shift into informal employment on the other.
Another indicator highlighted by official data shows that declining unemployment does not necessarily mean improvement in actual employment indicators or job quality. The continued low rate at around 6% coincides with other, less positive indicators, most notably weak economic participation relative to the size of the working-age population, and the persistence of a wide gender gap, especially in urban areas.
Most importantly, a significant share of new job opportunities remains concentrated in traditional, low-productivity sectors such as trade, services, and agriculture. These sectors are often associated with irregular or low-wage work. As such, the 2025 data reflect a labor market model capable of reducing unemployment mathematically, yet still unable to provide stable employment, achieve genuine absorption of educated youth, or deliver tangible improvements in income levels and social protection.
Rising Poverty Rates
Despite official talk of declining unemployment, poverty rates in Egypt remain high relative to this decline. Official data and independent studies indicate that nearly one-third of the population lives below or close to the poverty line, while broader segments have been adversely affected by inflation and rising living costs over recent years.
Economists stress that a decline in unemployment does not necessarily translate into lower poverty levels, particularly when the majority of available jobs are low-paid or unstable. In this sense, poverty becomes a more telling indicator of the real conditions of the labor market than the headline unemployment rate alone.
Estimates by the World Bank of the poverty rate at Egypt’s national poverty line over recent years show that it has hovered around a level close to one-third of the population, with limited fluctuations linked to changing economic conditions. Available data indicate that poverty declined to 29.7% in 2019/2020, but later rose again to around 32.5% in 2022, amid successive waves of inflation and declining household purchasing power. Despite the absence of regular annual publication of poverty indicators for each individual year, the overall trend reflects the persistence of living pressures on wide segments of Egyptians. Other estimates, using higher international poverty lines, suggest that the share of those living below the poverty line may be significantly higher than the official national figures.
Workers’ Problems: Low Wages and Lack of Protection
A broad segment of workers in Egypt faces accumulated challenges, foremost among them the decline in real wages compared to inflation rates and the absence of social and health insurance, particularly in the informal sector. Despite the approval of successive increases in the minimum wage, these increases do not cover all workers and are not strictly enforced in the private sector. In addition, millions of Egyptians work without employment contracts or in temporary jobs, depriving them of any form of social protection.
According to the latest edition of the quarterly Labor Force Survey bulletin issued in February 2025, levels of enrollment in social insurance, health insurance, and employment under legal contracts and permanent jobs, which the statistical authority uses as indicators of job quality, have declined compared to 2014. Those enrolled in social insurance accounted for 39.5% of total employed persons in December 2024, down from 59.2% in 2014. Enrollment in health insurance fell from 50.5% in 2014 to 35.6%. The share of workers with permanent contracts declined from 68.3% in 2014 to 66.9% in December 2024, while those working under legal contracts dropped from 57.4% to 37.1%.
For his part, Shaban Khalifa, Head of the Private Sector Workers Syndicate, stresses that the reality on the ground differs entirely from official statements on unemployment rates. He explains that private-sector employers hold ultimate authority within their establishments, leaving workers to suffer daily from low wages, non-compliance with the minimum wage, long working hours, as well as poor treatment and arbitrary dismissal. He adds that such statements are often directed at the international community or for domestic consumption and do not reflect the lived reality of workers.
Regarding unemployment, Khalifa says in remarks to Zawia3 that there is a clear gap between official figures and what workers actually face. He explains that the official rate issued by government bodies is limited to individuals who have been actively searching for work during the recent period, while reality includes wide categories of unemployed people, such as those who have stopped searching out of despair, part-time workers, those employed in jobs that do not match their qualifications, or those in temporary, poorly paid work. He emphasizes that the real unemployment rate is higher than the official figure and more accurately reflects labor market conditions.
Khalifa also stresses that current employment indicators do not fully reflect the quality of job opportunities. Job stability, he notes, includes social insurance, adequate health care, fair wages, and legally regulated working hours, conditions that are absent in most private-sector establishments due to weak enforcement of labor laws and legislation skewed in favor of employers. He adds that the apparent decline in unemployment is often linked to seasonal or temporary jobs, such as security, restaurants, agriculture, and construction, as well as short-term investments based on quick profits followed by withdrawal, all of which undermine labor market stability.
Khalifa outlines the most pressing challenges currently facing private-sector workers, including the government’s inability to enforce laws on employers, failure to compel compliance with the minimum wage, the absence of enforcement of international labor standards, and weak state authority in ensuring job stability and social and health protection. These challenges are compounded by difficulties in regulating markets and the prices of basic commodities needed by workers and their families.
As for the measures required to improve workers’ conditions, Khalifa explains that the government must work to raise wages in line with living costs, regularize temporary employment, provide a safe working environment, expand social protection coverage, support training and qualification programs, link wages to productivity, support local industry, liberalize trade union organization, protect low-income workers from price hikes, strengthen social dialogue, review labor legislation, and encourage young people to establish small and medium-sized enterprises.
Regarding the role of the private sector in absorbing new labor entrants, Khalifa notes that it has become the last resort following the weakening of the public sector and the liquidation of state-owned companies. However, he stresses that current policies do not encourage expansion or the provision of decent jobs, particularly in light of the new labor law, which has curtailed workers’ rights and legalized temporary contracts. He adds that what is legislatively required is a review of the law to ensure a genuine employment relationship between workers and employers, guarantee government neutrality, equality and fairness in wages, working hours, and leave, ensure job stability and social and health protection, and include irregular workers, domestic workers, and workers in construction and agriculture within the scope of the law to protect their rights.
