Egypt’s Food Security Gap: 21% in Multidimensional Poverty, 49% of Households Short of Food

In a modest apartment on Cairo’s outskirts, Hamida El-Sayed—a pseudonym—spends her evenings recalculating what remains of a monthly income no higher than EGP 4,000. Rent takes roughly a quarter. With the rest, she tries to support two children, the older no more than seven. Since her divorce and their father’s refusal to contribute, she has faced the daily task of securing food, medicine, education and shelter alone.

Not yet thirty, Hamida tells Zawia3 that her family last ate red meat about two months ago. Since then, she has relied on cheaper meals: fried potatoes, pasta and fava beans. When she can afford animal protein, she usually chooses chicken because it costs less than red meat.

Her experience reflects the growing difficulties many Egyptians face in meeting basic needs. The WFP country page cited in the Arabic report gives a population of 107.5 million, a multidimensional-poverty rate of 21% and 49% of households lacking sufficient food. It also cites Egypt’s 2024 Global Hunger Index ranking of 63rd among 127 countries. These measures come from different definitions and reference periods; the 21% population figure and 49% household figure are not interchangeable.

Finance Minister Ahmed Kouchouk has said food-support programmes reach more than sixty million people and reiterated Egypt’s commitment to food security during a G20 meeting. Families’ accounts nevertheless reveal a gap between official statements and lived experience. Using local and international data, Zawia3 examines whether policy has secured adequate food—or whether the figures tell a different story.

The food households can actually afford

Hamida’s cheaper meals fill her stomach, but she says her health has suffered. In recent months, she experienced recurring weakness, dizziness and exhaustion severe enough to disrupt ordinary tasks. At a hospital offering reduced-price treatment, she says a doctor diagnosed severe anaemia and attributed it to poor nutrition. This is her account of a clinical consultation.

WHO defines malnutrition as deficiencies, excesses or imbalances in energy or nutrient intake. It encompasses undernutrition—including wasting, stunting and underweight—micronutrient problems, and overweight, obesity and related noncommunicable disease. Deputy Health Minister Abla El-Alfy, in remarks cited by the Arabic report, put nutrition-related illness at approximately 40% and cited stunting of 13%, anaemia of 43% and obesity of 11%. Their age coverage and survey periods are not specified consistently in the accompanying graphic, so they should not be combined into one population breakdown. The WFP page’s separate 6.5% child-malnutrition figure likewise uses a different formulation and should not be equated automatically with the minister’s 13%.

Hamida’s story shows that food being available does not ensure people can afford it or obtain a balanced diet consistently. Food security, as developed around the 1996 World Food Summit, rests on four connected dimensions: availability through production and stocks; economic and social access; nutritional utilisation supported by health; and stability through shocks and fluctuations.

A Zawia3 questionnaire for its earlier report on meat becoming a class luxury involved 100 respondents across several governorates. Most said rising meat prices had directly affected them. Among the figures reported for respondents aged 25–40, 89% said their purchasing power had fallen over the preceding year and 96% identified price rises as a cause. These findings describe a small questionnaire sample, not national prevalence.

The questionnaire reported that 43% ate meat once a month, 73% bought smaller quantities, 79% felt an effect on their dignity and 52% held the government responsible. Respondents called for immediate state intervention. The percentages should remain attributed to the questionnaire rather than all Egyptian citizens.

Red-meat and staple-food prices have risen repeatedly amid currency depreciation since 2016. The CAPMAS-attributed series used in the report shows red meat increasing from approximately EGP 65 per kilogram in 2012 to more than EGP 400 in 2025, putting it beyond the regular reach of many households.

Farm chicken, the popular white-chicken variety, cost approximately EGP 18 per kilogram in December 2012 and EGP 28.50 in December 2016. Prices rose sharply in later years as feed, transport and production costs increased, before easing towards the end of 2025 alongside a modest fall in the dollar’s local-currency price.

Milk and eggs also became substantially more expensive over the period, showing that the pressure extends to everyday foods relied on by millions.

Rice, lentils and fava beans—the cheaper staples and plant-protein sources used by lower-income households—have also experienced major price increases. The CAPMAS-attributed series shows several-fold rises, turning former budget alternatives into additional burdens. Rice is a cereal, rather than a pulse, although the Arabic text groups it with beans and lentils.

MP Freddy El-Bayadi of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party says food security is a broader concept than government statements or stock figures.

Its four pillars, he tells Zawia3, are food availability, access, quality and safety, and long-term stability. Government claims of ample supplies of some staples are insufficient to demonstrate sustainable security.

With repeated price increases, many citizens can no longer obtain enough balanced food, he argues, meaning access is inadequate. Heavy import dependence for wheat, edible oils and animal feed also exposes Egypt directly to wars and global price fluctuations.

“Food security in Egypt remains fragile. We need to narrow the gap between official statements and the figures reflecting reality, support domestic production, regulate prices and expand social protection so citizens can obtain enough healthy food at an affordable price,” he says.

Inflation data cited in the report show an initial peak exceeding 30% in June 2017 after flotation, followed by rates below 10% in June observations for 2019–21. Domestic and international pressures then drove another peak close to 36% in 2023, before a relative slowdown in 2025. These June year-on-year rates are not full-year averages, and slower inflation does not necessarily mean food prices have fallen.

Multidimensional poverty: a deeper picture of hardship

Government statements say approximately 20% of the budget supports food security and assistance reaches sixty million people. A paper on the 2025/26 budget prepared by economic researcher Elhami El-Merghani for the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, obtained by Zawia3, offers a more complex picture. Of EGP 742.5 billion allocated to subsidies, grants and social benefits, substantial amounts cover obligations to pension and insurance funds, allowances and electricity subsidies. The individual ration-card allocation has remained EGP 50 since 2018, while beneficiaries declined. The paper puts public debt service at EGP 4.38 trillion—approximately two-thirds of its budget-use measure. Debt service including principal is not the same as recurrent expenditure alone.

An EIPR analysis of the 2021/22 budget similarly found that payments to insurance funds absorbed a large share of social-protection allocations, citing totals of approximately EGP 286 billion in 2020/21 and EGP 283.3 billion in 2021/22. Food-support allocations rose modestly to EGP 87.2 billion, while support for the household sector declined 1.4% and allocations to government entities rose 7%.

A CAPMAS multidimensional-poverty report cited as published in 2022 found that more than a fifth of Egyptians experienced overlapping deprivation. Unlike an income-only measure, it captures disadvantages in education, healthcare, housing and basic services.

The income, expenditure and consumption survey is central to measuring monetary poverty and changes in living standards. EIPR researcher Mohamed Ramadan says detailed results after the 2019/20 survey were not publicly available when this report was prepared, despite subsequent inflation and falling purchasing power. The absence limits evaluation of policy and social protection; it is presented as the reporting situation at the Arabic article’s January 2026 publication date.

The multidimensional report puts national incidence at approximately 21%, with poverty intensity of 37%: poor households experience deprivation in more than a third of the weighted indicators used by that measure. The national incidence and intensity percentages describe different aspects of poverty.

It gives approximately 28% multidimensional poverty in rural areas, compared with 12% in urban areas. This is a substantial geographical disparity. The earlier Arabic description of “around one-third” in rural areas is approximate; the explicit 28% and 12% figures are used here.

The Arabic report also attributes a 32.5% monetary-poverty rate in 2022 to the World Bank, compared with 29.7% in 2019/20. The linked multidimensional sources do not establish that 2022 monetary estimate. CAPMAS’s separately cited historical series places 32.5% in 2017/18 and 29.7% in 2019/20. These should not be conflated or presented as proof of a newly observed 2022 rate.

The World Bank began using an international “dollar-a-day” poverty benchmark in 1990 and has revised it using purchasing-power parity (PPP). The Arabic article calls $2.15 the current line and converts it into pounds at a market exchange rate. By its January 2026 publication, however, the June 2025 update had already replaced $2.15 in 2017 PPP terms with $3.00 per person per day in 2021 PPP terms. PPP international dollars are not ordinary US dollars and cannot be converted into a valid Egyptian poverty threshold simply using the market exchange rate; the original EGP daily and monthly equivalents are therefore not reproduced.

Malnutrition and health

The FAO regional food-security and nutrition report cited in the Arabic article records a worsening nutrition challenge. The article gives undernourishment of 4.8% in 2002 and 8.5% in 2023, with affected populations of 6.2 million and 9.4 million. The earlier rate and headcount are not numerically consistent with Egypt’s population at that time; they should not be treated as a reconciled pair without checking the underlying reference periods.

The report also notes adult obesity above 30% in several Arab countries, including Egypt, alongside childhood stunting and overweight. Nutrition problems can thus coexist: inadequate nutrients and excess body weight, with associated noncommunicable diseases.

Ramadan says the economic crisis has clearly affected living conditions, but its precise extent is difficult to establish without published detailed income-and-expenditure results for subsequent survey rounds.

“There is no doubt the economic crisis directly affected people’s lives, but we still do not know the precise scale. The income and expenditure survey—the main indicator for understanding poverty—has not been published for the later rounds, so the figures are not available to us,” he says.

He refers to IFPRI research as showing a major reduction in food spending during pandemic lockdowns. The specific IFPRI study linked in the Arabic article, however, surveyed more than 6,000 poor and near-poor households in October–November 2022 about changes since March 2022. Its 85% figure concerns respondents reporting reduced meat consumption, not all households reducing all food expenditure during the initial COVID-19 lockdown. It also found 75% reporting reduced chicken and egg consumption. This distinction corrects the period and outcome attached to the linked evidence.

Higher prices naturally push families towards smaller quantities, cheaper substitutes and less meat or chicken, Ramadan says, worsening longer-term health risks. Anaemia and thinness can coexist with overweight and obesity when diets are filling but nutritionally unbalanced. The Arabic text’s claim that overall inflation exceeded 30% in 2020 and 2022 is not supported by its own June graphic; the much higher later surge and food-specific inflation should be distinguished.

He doubts that current policy establishes food security, arguing that announced increases in agricultural land are smaller than promoted, according to data and fact-checking reports.

CAPMAS defines poverty in its household survey as inability to afford minimum basic needs, including food, housing, clothing, education, healthcare and transport.

The historical income-and-expenditure survey put monetary poverty at 27.8% in 2015, 32.5% in 2017/18 and 29.7% in 2019/20. The report describes the subsequent lack of comparable, fully published survey detail and the release of multidimensional-poverty findings instead. The two measurement frameworks answer different questions.

Dependence on imports

Egypt has approximately ten million feddans of agricultural land. Despite reclamation projects, domestic output does not meet all food needs. The report estimates wheat production covers only 45–50% of consumption, leaving millions of tonnes to be imported annually.

FAO analysis cited in the report highlights vulnerability from heavy food-import dependence, especially when harvests fall or world prices rise. The article estimates imports at around 45% of domestic demand, although the precise commodity or calorie coverage is not specified. The pandemic, Russia’s war on Ukraine and climate shocks have raised prices and disrupted supply, affecting domestic affordability.

CAPMAS-attributed per-person meat series show beef falling from 9.2 kilograms in 2015 to approximately 5.4–5.7 kilograms during 2019–23. Buffalo meat declined from 3.2 kilograms to roughly 1.1–1.5 kilograms in the later years. These national availability figures should not be read as direct measurements of every household’s intake.

Chicken rose from 8.7 kilograms per person in 2015 to a peak of 16.7 kilograms in 2021, then approximately 13–14 kilograms in 2022–23. The pattern is consistent with increasing reliance on cheaper poultry as red-meat prices rose.

The article cites an FAO comparison of approximately 41.3 kilograms of all meat per person globally. Its linked FAO chapter is historical, so that value should not be described as a current 2025 global average or compared directly with only one Egyptian meat category.

The vegetable series shows potatoes rising from 29.3 kilograms per person in 2015 to 45.3 in 2023, while tomatoes fell from 56.1 to 47.4. The report interprets higher potato use as consistent with reliance on a cheaper staple, though the national data alone do not establish individual households’ reasons.

Aubergine availability fluctuated; courgette, pepper and cucumber figures remained comparatively low. The Arabic text also mentions an aubergine price of EGP 12 per kilogram in 2025, a price observation that is distinct from the 2015–23 consumption series. Fruit figures vary by type, as the complete English tables below show.

El-Merghani argues that falling per-person availability of several crops and foods reflects production struggling to keep up with population growth and economic pressure. He attributes this to weak farmer incentives and poor agricultural policy.

Contract farming has not achieved its aims, he says, because government procurement prices do not match production costs. Some farmers have avoided certain crops, including sugarcane in Minya. Delayed payments further undermine trust, rural investment and stable supplies of strategic crops.

He also alleges that a small group of large traders dominates staple imports and divides the market on terms that weaken food security and food sovereignty. In his assessment, this increases exposure to world-price changes and limits the state’s capacity to regulate supplies and prices. This is the researcher’s account, rather than an independently established finding about particular companies.

Dependence on wheat imports left Egypt highly exposed when Russia’s war on Ukraine disrupted supplies and prices, he adds, demonstrating the risks of relying on external sources for strategic commodities.

Exchange-rate liberalisation since 2016 also harmed food access for the poorest groups in his view. Currency movements raised import and domestic-food costs, pushing households to reduce meat, poultry and dairy consumption and switch to less nutritious alternatives. Field studies have documented reductions in protein and essential nutrients.

He points to increasing criticism of strategic-stock procurement, with continuing dependence on imports for wheat, oils and other commodities and unstable local purchases. The degree of dependence varies by commodity; the report’s reference to most needs for sugar and pulses should not be treated as one uniform import ratio for all products.

“Current agricultural and supply policies have not resolved the food system’s fragility. Real reform requires redesigning farmers’ incentives, improving procurement and strategic storage, tackling import monopolies and ensuring effective social protection for those most affected,” he says.

Repeated official assurances about expanding farmland and securing food contrast with households’ declining ability to obtain balanced diets. Import dependence and debt-service pressure further complicate the picture. As the gap between official rhetoric and daily life persists, the urgent question remains: what future does food security hold for Egyptians?