On September 23, 2026, the Egyptian government announced its intention to offer lands and buildings overlooking the Nile Corniche in Cairo and Giza to investors, as part of a plan to maximize the use of assets and lands in prime locations. Engineer Khaled Saddiq, chairman of the Urban Development Fund, revealed that the Fund had by that date completed an inventory of 136 land plots on the Nile Corniche in both governorates, in preparation for marketing them to investors within two months.
Saddiq said, on the sidelines of a roundtable held in Cairo, that ownership of the lands overlooking the Nile is not concentrated in one body but distributed among a number of parties, explaining that a committee was formed under the Urban Development Fund’s chairmanship to study investment opportunities and negotiate with investors on behalf of the owning parties. He added that land belonging to Akhbar Al-Youm institution had been offered for partnership, and that a number of companies had submitted requests currently under review.
Ibrahim Izz El-Din, Director of Policies at Diwan Al-Omran, considers that what is underway cannot be reduced to the idea of exploiting a group of vacant or unused lands, describing the recent measures as a broader process of reassessing the Nile strip as a high-value real estate and investment asset, then revisiting the land uses built upon it to allow for a greater economic return.
Izz El-Din tells Zawia3 that this orientation is clear even in official statements, as the government inventory was not limited to vacant lands but included lands and buildings overlooking the Nile, with the custodianship body and current use of each site recorded. Previous official statements had spoken of existing uses that may not be commensurate, from the government’s perspective, with the investment value of their Nile location, such as some government buildings or youth centers, and the possibility of relocating them elsewhere.
This step follows an earlier announcement of an inventory of 745 feddans of lands and buildings overlooking the Nile Corniche in Cairo and Giza, including 430 feddans at 110 sites in Cairo and 315 feddans at 82 sites in Giza, with the aim of identifying unused lands and converting them into investment opportunities. Saddiq also announced that the Fund had received requests from Gulf investors to acquire some of the targeted lands.
In response, Izz El-Din says a distinction must be drawn between the broad inventory of assets and the lands that have actually reached the stage of readiness for offering.
Simultaneously, media reports spoke of the Fund receiving requests from investors from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar for plots overlooking the Nile Corniche, in line with the policy of expanding Gulf investments in Egyptian coastal lands in recent years, most notably the Ras Al-Hekma deal with the Abu Dhabi Sovereign Fund in February 2024, alongside the “Diar Al-Qatariya” deal in the Alam Al-Roum area on the North Coast, in addition to an anticipated deal in the “Al-Jafira” area on the northwestern coast with an announced value of 135 billion Egyptian pounds.
Diwan Al-Omran’s Director of Policies considers that it cannot be said that every act of expropriation or removal on the Nile automatically means the land will subsequently be offered to an investor; this requires proof in each individual case. But what can be observed is a recurring urban sequence in a number of projects: inventorying the land and the presences upon it, then settling ownership and custodianship bodies, then removing some presences or changing the use, then replanning and raising the land’s economic value, and finally making it available for new use or investment.
He points to a clear example of the importance of these stages in the file of Nile riverbank lands. In January 2026, the government announced that the competent committee was working with the Survey Authority and the Real Estate Publicity Office to examine the presences on riverbank lands and verify ownership statuses, in parallel with procedures to remove encroachments and develop the river corridor. In August 2026, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation announced the removal of 37 cases in Munit Shiha conflicting with the course of the Ahl Masr walkway spanning eight kilometers.
He adds that the Warraq Island experience is important for understanding this trajectory, even if it has its own particular legal and urban circumstances. During recent years, acquisition, purchase, expropriation, and replanning procedures coincided with the transformation of the island into a new high-value urban project. He therefore believes the fundamental issue that needs to be tracked is not merely the issuance of an expropriation decision, but what happens to the land after eviction or acquisition, the nature of the new use, and who has the right to invest.
This is precisely where transparency becomes important: if an inhabited or used land is converted, following administrative procedures or expropriation, into an investment asset, there must be public information permitting tracking of the complete chain, from the land’s original status and the residents or users on it, to the removal or expropriation decision, then the allocation and final use.
Is What Is Happening Legal?
The Constitution does not treat the Nile as merely an economic resource but guarantees its protection; Article 44 obliges the state to protect the Nile River and affirms that “every citizen’s right to enjoy the Nile River is guaranteed,” while Article 45 stipulates the protection of waterways and guarantees citizens’ right to enjoy them. Converting lands overlooking the river into investment assets thus opens a file that goes beyond evaluating the land and its financial return to the question of balancing the exploitation of state assets against the rights linked to the Nile space and its public uses.
Lawyer Maha Ahmed, practicing before the Court of Cassation, tells Zawia3 that the constitutional principle is the protection of private property, and the exception is its expropriation for the public good, under the conditions and procedures specified by law and against fair compensation. Therefore, using the expression “public good” in an abstract manner is insufficient to justify expropriation; there must be a real and specific public good, and the procedures must be linked to achieving it.
She emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing between an investment project that simultaneously serves a clear public good, and expropriation of land from its owners in the name of public good then changing its purpose to become an investment or commercial asset for the benefit of investors. The second case raises a serious legal question about the continuation of the reason upon which the expropriation was originally built.
She also points out that Egyptian courts have affirmed the importance of respecting the purpose for which ownership was expropriated, and not moving beyond it to a different purpose merely to achieve a financial interest. Therefore, the land’s subsequent transfer to private investment does not automatically in itself invalidate the expropriation, but it opens the door to substantive examination: what is the nature of the public good specified by the expropriation decision? Was it actually implemented? And is the subsequent activity an extension of it or a fundamental change of the purpose for which the land was seized?
She emphasizes the citizen’s right to object and appeal, as the Constitution does not permit shielding administrative decisions from judicial oversight. Therefore describing a project as “development” or “investment” does not in itself shield it from oversight of the legality of the expropriation decision and its purpose, procedures, and compensation.
Maha considers that the legality of evicting residents or holders of land on the Nile banks in preparation for offering it for investment, particularly if the investment project was not specified at the time of eviction, is one of the most important points in the file. The less defined the purpose of eviction or expropriation at the time of the decision, the more problematic the demonstration of “public good” becomes.
She points out that expropriation law No. 10 of 1990 regulates expropriation as an exceptional procedure linked to public good works, not as a general instrument for assembling lands first and then searching later for the best investment use for them.
She adds: “Therefore in every case one must ask: what is the legal decision on which the eviction or expropriation was based? What is its declared purpose? Are there clear maps and boundaries of the required lands? What project necessitates removing residents from them? Was an investigation conducted into less harmful alternatives?”
She says the existence of this information before eviction is also important from the perspective of residents’ right to object, because a citizen cannot effectively challenge a decision whose purpose or the fate awaiting their land they do not know precisely.
She also clarifies that preventing land or establishment owners from renewing licenses or utilities for extended periods may deserve examination as an independent matter, noting that the Egyptian Constitutional Court has decided in contexts relating to property restrictions that keeping ownership formally in the owner’s hands while imposing restrictions that undermine its economic enjoyment can touch the core of the right to property. Therefore the examination should not be limited to formal expropriation decisions, but extend to the preceding procedures that may make the continued presence of residents or owners practically impossible.
She notes that urban development and investment are not in themselves violations of the right to housing, and the state naturally has the authority to plan, manage lands, and implement infrastructure and development projects. But this authority is not absolute.
The Egyptian Constitution provides for the right to adequate, safe, and healthy housing, and also prohibits all forms of arbitrary forced displacement. At the international level, the definition of forced eviction does not depend only on the use of physical force, but encompasses removing individuals, families, or communities, permanently or temporarily, from the homes or lands they occupy against their will, without providing them with appropriate legal and procedural protections. Therefore there can be a real development project, yet the method of its implementation may be contrary to housing rights standards.
She also clarifies that among the most important guarantees established by international standards are: genuine prior consultation with those affected, the availability of adequate information about the project, examining possible alternatives to eviction, giving appropriate notice and notification, making available an effective means of objection and appeal, providing appropriate compensation, guaranteeing suitable alternative housing for those who need it, and not leaving people without shelter as a result of eviction.
She affirms that financial compensation alone does not always settle the legality of eviction. The right to housing is broader than the financial value of the building or land; it is linked to legal security of tenure, and access to work, services, education, local community networks, and other elements associated with the place of residence.
Subjecting Riverbank Lands to the Armed Forces
Years before this, the Nile riverbank lands had gradually entered a different path of management and exploitation, coinciding with the expansion of new bodies’ roles in issuing licenses, managing lands, and offering them under usufruct rights.
The official website of the Armed Forces Land Projects Agency reveals one link in this transformation; it lists among the Agency’s mandates “managing Nile riverbank lands and floating structures in the sector from Shubra to Helwan,” alongside managing public auctions and exploiting lands. In September 2024, Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam held a meeting with Agency leadership to discuss protecting the Nile’s banks and removing encroachments, and affirmed the continuation of cooperation between the Ministry and the Agency in issuing the necessary licenses for Nile riverbank lands in the stretch extending from Shubra Al-Kheima to Helwan.
Law No. 147 of 2021 on water resources and irrigation defines “Nile riverbank lands” as the lands or islands that the river changes its course from or uncovers, whether within the boundaries of the river corridor or outside it. According to the law, the river corridor extends up to 80 meters outside the regulation lines on both sides of the river, and 80 meters inside islands from the regulation line, in the stretch from behind the Aswan Reservoir to the outlet, with the exception of areas with approved regulation lines, where the public corniche is considered the corridor boundary.
The Agency’s role did not stop at licenses. In December 2022, the Armed Forces Land Projects Agency offered Nile riverbank land plots at public auction under the annual usufruct rights system, covering areas including Zamalek, Al-Agouza, Al-Doqqi, Garden City, Al-Manyal, Dar Al-Salam, Al-Maadi, Al-Ma’sara, Al-Moneib, Imbaba, and Warraq, with specified commercial and tourist uses including floating marinas, restaurants, and cafeterias. The offering recurred in March 2023, at sites including Zamalek, Al-Maadi, Al-Manyal, Old Cairo, Tura, Dar Al-Salam, Al-Ma’sara, and Imbaba.
During that same period, the government was expanding its view of the Nile waterfront as part of an asset portfolio that could be re-exploited. In April 2023, the Council of Ministers announced a review of a number of assets overlooking the Nile in Cairo and Giza, in preparation for offering them for investment, with the Council’s spokesperson saying that the Egyptian Sovereign Fund would begin evaluating the lands and buildings through global valuers to market them and establish investment projects on them, especially assets vacated by ministries and government bodies that moved to the New Administrative Capital.
Two years later this orientation moved to a more organized stage. In August 2025, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly discussed a preliminary inventory of lands overlooking the Nile Corniche in a number of Cairo districts, with the area, custodianship body, and legal status of each plot identified, and directed the completion of the inventory and assessment and the formulation of a plan to exploit them as investment opportunities.
On August 13 of the same year, Law No. 168 of 2025 was issued on some rules and procedures for disposing of state private property, replacing Law No. 144 of 2017 and regulating, among other things, procedures for legalizing the status of adverse possessors and disposing of lands owned by the state as private property. The law does not specifically allocate Nile lands, but its issuance establishes a new legislative framework for dealing with some state private property at the time when the government was proceeding with inventorying and evaluating Nile assets and lands.
Between these steps, other events appear related to changes in the nature of tenure or use along the river. In 2017, 17 Nile islands were excluded from the scope of the natural reserves establishment decision, including Warraq, Al-Qursaya, and Al-Dahab, and were instead declared environmental management areas. The decision in itself did not stipulate offering these islands for investment, but it removed from them the natural reserve status that imposed a special protection framework, which makes what subsequently happened at some of these islands part of a trajectory worth tracking.
In 2022, owners of residential houseboats in the Kit Kat area faced decisions to remove 32 floating vessels. Houseboat owners had filed lawsuits to halt the removal, while officials said the houseboats were required to change their activity to commercial and pay fees. After the removal, houseboat owners entered negotiations about new mooring locations, while some were informed that the moorings had become affiliated with the Armed Forces Land Projects Agency.
In this context, Ibrahim Izz El-Din explains that it is important first to distinguish between two overlapping files: the current inventory of lands and buildings overlooking the Nile Corniche led by the Urban Development Fund in coordination with state bodies, and the Nile riverbank lands in which the Armed Forces have documented roles in management and dealings. He notes that based on published information, there is no basis for considering all lands currently being prepared for investment as subject to Armed Forces management.
As for the Nile riverbank lands, the role is already in place. The Armed Forces Land Projects Agency participates in the system for managing these lands in the sector from Shubra to Helwan, has previously offered lands under usufruct rights for tourist and commercial activities, while the Ministry of Irrigation affirms the continuation of coordination with it in managing requests and dealing with presences and encroachments, while simultaneously affirming that the Ministry remains the original custodianship body in matters concerning violations on the river.
From a planning perspective, Izz El-Din adds, the significance of this lies in the multiplicity of decision-making centers in land management. Urban planning in its traditional civilian form assumes clear roles for planning authorities, governorates, and custodianship ministries, with tools such as detailed plans, use changes, licenses, and community participation. The entry of another body in land management, granting usufruct rights, or participating in procedures for dealing with presences adds a new institutional level to this system.
For her part, Maha Ahmed considers that the mere assignment of implementing a procedure to a military body does not in itself mean the forfeiture of citizens’ constitutional rights to property, housing, compensation, or litigation.
She clarifies that the Constitution provides that litigation is a guaranteed right for all, and that administrative decisions may not be shielded from judicial oversight. The jurisdiction of military judicial committees over administrative disputes relates primarily to decisions issued regarding officers and members of the armed forces themselves, while the Council of State has general jurisdiction over administrative disputes. Therefore the nature of the decision and the body that issued it must be determined in each case to identify the path of challenge and the competent judicial body.
She points out the necessity of not confusing the body that implements eviction on the ground with the body holding the legal decision on expropriation or reallocation. The presence of the armed forces as an implementing or managing body does not in itself turn the expropriation procedure into one outside the scope of the Constitution and law.
But in practice, transparency becomes more important here: the citizen must be able to know who issued the decision, on what legal basis, for what purpose, in favor of which party, how compensation was determined, and before which body they can object and appeal.
She emphasizes the importance of not reducing the debate to the question: “Does the state have the right to develop the area?” The state naturally has planning and development authority, but the more precise question is: how did the state exercise this authority, for what purpose, and with what guarantees for residents and rights holders?
She notes that in the case of Warraq Island specifically, the issue of development-related evictions had previously appeared in the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to housing during her visit to Egypt. Therefore evaluating any new developments must look at the complete sequence of decisions and procedures, not only the final stage in which the land is offered for investment.
She clarifies that this is also important in cases such as the houseboats or other areas where the eviction process was preceded by administrative procedures related to licenses or utilities. The entire path must be examined: was there a declared and clear development policy from the beginning? Were those affected given the opportunity to participate and object? Were alternatives offered? And what is the relationship between the reason on which eviction was based and the final use of the land?
Economic Return or Public Good?
Maha Ahmed affirms that there is a distinction that must be noted between public good and economic return for the state. The two may intersect, and an investment project may achieve a real public good, so it cannot be said that every private investment automatically negates the existence of public good. But achieving a higher return from the land should not in itself be considered a substitute for proving the public good that justifies expropriating citizens or removing them from their homes.
She affirms that real development is not measured only by the value of the investment that comes to the land after its eviction, but also by who bears the cost of this investment, whether residents participated in the decision, whether their rights were preserved, and whether their removal was a necessity for which no less harmful alternative exists.
She adds that the land’s subsequent transfer to a private investor, whether Egyptian, foreign, or Gulf, does not automatically invalidate the prior expropriation decision. Legal assessment requires returning first to the expropriation decision itself.
If the subsequent investment activity is part of the project for which public good was determined, or genuinely linked to it, the mere existence of a private investor is not sufficient by itself to conclude that the expropriation lacks legitimacy. But if the land was expropriated from citizens or its residents evicted based on a specific purpose related to the public good, then this purpose was not achieved and the land subsequently converted to a fundamentally different investment or commercial use, a serious legal question arises about the continuation of the reason for expropriation and the extent of the legitimacy of reallocating the land.
She clarifies that the fundamental issue is not the investor’s nationality or their being a private investor, but the relationship between the legal reason that justified taking the land from its owners in the first place and the final use of the land.
Therefore, in cases such as Warraq Island or other Nile bank lands, it is insufficient to look at the latest investment announcement in isolation; rather the complete chain of decisions must be traced: the residents’ status and their rights to the land, expropriation or eviction decisions and their declared reasons, any prior restrictions on licenses or utilities, the compensation and alternatives offered, then reallocation decisions, up to the offering of the land for investment.
For his part, Ibrahim Izz El-Din considers this the most important point in the file from the perspective of urban economics. Land value is not fixed; a plot of land can increase significantly in value without its location changing, simply as a result of public decisions: changing use, increasing permissible density or heights, building roads and utilities, removing existing occupancies, settling the legal status, or granting it a license for high-return commercial or tourist use.
He points to what is known in planning economics as Land Value Uplift, meaning the increase in land value resulting from planning decisions and public investments. The paradox that should be examined here is the distribution of cost and return.
If the state bears the cost of inventory, removal, compensation, resettlement, utilities, and site preparation, then the land subsequently moves to a higher-value investment use, the question becomes: how much of the increase in land value returns to the public treasury and society, and how much transfers to the developer or investor who obtains the land after it has been prepared?
He therefore inclines to the view that evaluating any of these projects should not start from the land offering price alone. The complete public cost must be calculated: compensation, eviction and resettlement if they exist, infrastructure, utilities, roads, and site preparation, as well as the social cost resulting from relocating residents or existing activities. Then this must be compared with what the state obtains and with the value the asset reaches after replanning.
He says the most important indicator to track in the coming period is the difference between the land’s value before public intervention and its value after replanning, preparation, and offering, and who actually obtains this increase, because this difference reveals whether the development process returns a significant portion of the value created by public decisions and investments to society, or whether the greater part of this value transfers to the ultimate beneficiary of the asset’s development.
In conclusion, the issue does not stop at the state’s right to develop Nile lands or exploit its assets, but extends to what happens to the land from the moment of its inventory or eviction until its reallocation and offering for investment; the purpose underpinning eviction or expropriation decisions and whether it was actually achieved; who bore the cost of preparing the land; how its value rose; and who will obtain this increase. With the expansion of investment plans for the Nile waterfront and the multiplicity of bodies overlapping in its management, transparency in announcing these stages and defining responsibilities and returns becomes an essential condition for understanding whether the replanning process achieves genuine public good, and how the value created by public decisions and investments is distributed among the state, society, and investors.
