Prices for government housing units offered under the presidential “Housing for All Egyptians” initiative have doubled, according to prices announced in the recently released conditions booklet, surpassing one million Egyptian pounds ($19,231) for the first time since the project’s launch. In previous years, prices for social housing units targeting low- and middle-income Egyptians had peaked at no more than 300,000 to 400,000 Egyptian pounds ($5,769 to $7,692) at most.

At the end of last April, the Ministry of Housing announced partnerships with a number of real estate developers to implement the initiative’s projects, the first time since their launch in 2014, citing the drive to include the private sector in execution, boost facility efficiency, raise the project’s overall standard, and ensure its sustainability.

For more than 12 years, the Egyptian government promoted social housing projects launched in 2014 with the stated aim of providing decent housing for low- and limited-income citizens and eliminating informal settlements. The program subsequently expanded to include other segments under the umbrella of the presidential initiative “Housing for All Egyptians” with its three pillars: limited-income housing, middle-income housing, and above-middle-income housing. But successive price hikes, compounded by problems that plagued a number of projects due to poor execution in some cities, have stripped the program of its most important objectives, according to experts and observers.

Social Housing’s Journey Past the Million

Prices for social housing units in Egypt have followed a clear upward trajectory since the project’s launch, with variations tied to unit location, type of offering, and target income bracket. In the first offering in 2014, a 90-square-meter apartment was priced at 135,000 Egyptian pounds ($2,596), before rising to 154,000 Egyptian pounds ($2,962) in April 2015, and then climbing in subsequent phases to 184,000 Egyptian pounds ($3,538) and then 225,000 Egyptian pounds ($4,327) in a later offering.

Prices did not see dramatic jumps in the years that followed. In 2018, they reached 184,000 Egyptian pounds ($3,538), then 225,000 Egyptian pounds ($4,327) in one phase. In 2019, some announcements put prices back in the range of 184,000 Egyptian pounds ($3,538) and then 220,000 Egyptian pounds ($4,231), differences tied to the geographic locations of the units on offer.

The increases were driven by several factors, according to official statements, chief among them changes in offering locations and rising construction material costs following the exchange rate liberalization in 2016, which sent steel, cement, and finishing prices sharply higher. Differences between the cities featured in various announcements, ranging from El Sadat, 10th of Ramadan, and New Assiut in some rounds to the Canal Zone and Upper Egypt in others, also contributed to price variations from one offering to the next.

In 2024, offerings expanded to cover broader price segments within subsidized housing initiatives. The Ministry of Housing announced prices ranging between 184,000 and 400,000 Egyptian pounds ($3,538 to $7,692) for ready-to-hand-over units in the governorates, while prices in new cities ranged between 415,000 and 530,000 Egyptian pounds ($7,981 to $10,192). Units scheduled for delivery within 36 months reached a range of 542,000 to 700,000 Egyptian pounds ($10,423 to $13,462).

In 2025, the “Housing for All Egyptians 7” initiative recorded a sharper price jump in some offerings, with a 90-square-meter apartment priced at 850,000 Egyptian pounds ($16,346), while a 90-square-meter unit in the Green Housing project reached 900,000 Egyptian pounds ($17,308). Some units available for immediate delivery were priced at 470,000 Egyptian pounds ($9,038) in New Akhmim in Sohag, while offerings for units ranging from 75 to 90 square meters appeared across more than 20 cities.

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Why Do Prices Keep Rising Despite Government Pledges?

Ibrahim Ezzedine, a researcher specializing in the right to housing at the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, says the latest price hikes for housing units are not surprising. They represent, in his view, an extension of a persistent pattern over the past decade in housing projects targeting low- and middle-income citizens, such as “Housing for All Egyptians,” “Dar Misr,” and others.

Speaking to Zawia3, Ezzedine says the more important question concerns the reasons behind this rise. He points to a fundamental shift in the government’s role, as embodied by the New Urban Communities Authority and the Urban Development Fund: the state is no longer acting as a guarantor of the right to housing, he argues, but is instead treating the real estate sector as an investment field aimed at generating returns, which effectively transforms it into a real estate investor and developer.

Ezzedine adds that, based on the figures, government bodies and affiliated companies generated revenues estimated at around 90 billion Egyptian pounds ($1.73 billion) from the real estate sector in a single year (2019/2020) alone, which he says reflects the dominance of the investment dimension over the social dimension in housing policy.

He notes that this orientation has a direct negative impact on eligible citizens, because current price levels are simply incompatible with income realities, particularly given that a large segment of Egypt’s workforce does not even earn the minimum wage, making these projects effectively out of reach for low- and middle-income citizens. He further explains that these units have, in many instances, become a target for investors, who exploit legal loopholes by applying under names that meet the eligibility criteria and then transferring ownership afterward, which hollows the projects out of their core purpose.

On the question of alternatives, Ezzedine stresses the need to revisit the fundamental philosophy underpinning the housing sector, arguing that the state should not see itself as a real estate developer but return to its role as a guarantor of the right to housing, rather than a party seeking to maximize revenues. He insists that the solution does not lie in simply increasing the supply of units, but in targeting policy more precisely at those who genuinely need it, which he describes as a complex challenge given the state’s adoption of an investment-driven approach.

The housing-focused researcher calls for detailed studies to determine the true scale of housing demand and a realistic analysis of income levels, to ensure support is directed at target groups with efficiency and fairness. He also calls for making better use of untapped real estate wealth, noting that estimates suggest there are around 12 million unoccupied housing units across the country, which demands that the property tax law be activated and reviewed to push owners to bring these units back to market. He further emphasizes the need for tighter oversight mechanisms to prevent units from being siphoned off to investors through circumvention, and to ensure support reaches its rightful beneficiaries.

Ezzedine also points to the possibility of adopting alternative models, such as subsidized rental or rent-to-own schemes, as more flexible solutions better suited to the income realities of low- and middle-income citizens. He insists that achieving fairness in housing requires rebalancing the investment dimension against the state’s social role, with the primary objective being to provide adequate housing for citizens, not simply to maximize revenues.

For his part, Dr. Karim El-Omda, a professor of political economy, says the Urban Development Authority has undergone a clear shift in recent years in how it presents housing projects. It is no longer limited to a single income segment, he explains, and now offers a diverse package of initiatives targeting various income levels, from limited-income housing through middle-income housing and all the way up to luxury housing.

He tells Zawia3 that initiatives on offer, such as “Housing for All Egyptians” and “Darna,” reflect this move toward diversification, comprising units for limited- and middle-income citizens alongside more upscale units, and he notes that this expansion is directly tied to rising construction costs in recent years.

El-Omda explains that the sharp rise in the dollar’s value, which climbed from around 15 Egyptian pounds two or three years ago to roughly 50 to 55 Egyptian pounds currently, alongside rising construction material costs, led by steel, has produced a noticeable increase in the cost of implementing housing projects.

He notes that bringing real estate developers in as partners in these projects naturally requires that a profit margin be achieved, stressing that “a real estate developer cannot operate without generating a return, and therefore profitability has become a core component of the pricing equation.”

He counters, however, that the most important advantage these initiatives offer is access to real estate financing on favorable terms, where a citizen can obtain a housing unit through an installment plan stretched over 20 years and at a low interest rate of around 8 percent, something he describes as “an advantage unavailable in the traditional real estate market.”

The economics professor explains that while a unit’s sticker price may appear steep, spreading repayment over a long period reduces its actual burden on the citizen. He argues this mechanism makes units more affordable than the open market and expects demand for these projects to remain high, given that real estate developers outside the government initiative framework offer shorter repayment periods at interest rates approaching the elevated benchmark lending rate, making those alternatives less attractive.

He considers obtaining a housing unit within government initiatives to be, in itself, a form of indirect support, given the financing facilities on offer, which he describes as the decisive factor in drawing citizens to these projects.

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Is This Housing Initiative Still for All Egyptians?

Khaled El-Shafi, an economic expert and head of Al-Asema Center for Studies and Research, says the “Housing for All Egyptians” initiative, and the latest offering in particular, has recorded a significant increase that is inconsistent with its stated objectives, which are fundamentally based on providing decent housing for limited-income citizens.

El-Shafi tells Zawia3 that the government must revisit this planning, as well as its vision and strategy for providing decent housing for every Egyptian citizen, and put forward clear alternatives that genuinely account for the social dimension. There should, he says, be a portion of policy that integrates with the “Decent Life” initiative, to achieve a degree of coherence and sustained dialogue between the government and the Egyptian citizen.

The economic expert notes that citizens want decent and safe housing within their means, and therefore the government is expected to develop a comprehensive vision for social housing that targets limited-income groups while also accounting for middle- and higher-income groups, putting forward multiple programs and housing units capable of meeting the needs of all segments of Egyptian society.

El-Shafi believes the housing system in Egypt needs to be filtered and rebuilt around a comprehensive vision that includes dividing beneficiary categories (A, B, C, D), determining building designs, the number of units per building, the number of apartments, and building heights. He stresses that the aim is not to compete with real estate developers or the private sector, but to create a mechanism that guarantees every segment of society the right to adequate housing, whether through the government, the Ministry of Housing, or contracted developers.

He adds: “This model does not currently exist in adequate form, and the time has come to provide it. There must be a clear and comprehensive offering covering all projects, such as ‘Beit El-Watan’ and others, within a holistic vision for all new and available areas, whether in new cities or in provincial capitals and various regional centers.”

El-Shafi also stresses that achieving this balance would help curb the role of brokers and eliminate those who exploit state initiatives and drive prices up arbitrarily at the citizen’s and the country’s expense. Action in this direction, he says, has become an urgent necessity.

Ahmed Abu Ali, an economic researcher specializing in real estate and a member of the Egyptian Society of Political Economy and Legislation, agrees that the latest offering under the “Housing for All Egyptians” initiative has indeed seen a marked rise in price levels, well beyond the purchasing power of a large segment of citizens hoping to benefit from these projects.

He tells Zawia3 that these developments raise fundamental questions about the essence of social housing policy, which is supposed to be anchored in guaranteeing the citizen’s constitutional right to adequate housing at affordable costs close to the cost price, not to become a mechanism that burdens low- and middle-income citizens.

Abu Ali considers that embracing an investment logic in the housing sector is not objectionable in itself, but it should remain confined to projects of an investment character, such as luxury or middle-class housing, which would allow the state to recoup part of its expenditures and redirect that surplus to support social housing projects aimed at those most in need.

The economic analyst notes that current challenges are clearly reflected in application rates, with many recent offerings seeing relatively weak demand, whether in traditional ownership models, rent-to-own offerings, or offerings that allow the private sector to enter as a partner in housing project implementation.

He warns that expanding the role of real estate developers without clear controls could lead to inflated pricing stripped of any social dimension, threatening to deepen the housing crisis rather than address it, and undermining the prospects of real solutions that meet citizens’ actual needs.

He also points out that a large number of housing units the state has offered in various projects remain closed or unused, owing to their high cost and contracting conditions, which raises questions about the extent to which these offerings are consistent with the concept of social housing, which is supposed to be within reach of target groups, not beyond it.

Who Builds Housing in Egypt?

The annual report of the Urban Observatory, published recently under the title “Who Builds Housing in Egypt 2024,” provides an analytical reading of the map of housing projects in Egypt, covering both those financed and implemented by the public sector and those of the private sector.

According to the report, total residential units constructed during the year reached approximately 1.165 million units, a 13 percent decline compared to the previous year. The informal private sector, represented by individuals and unlicensed contractors, dominated the market, accounting for around one million units, or 86 percent of total residential output.

The public (government) sector contributed only 82,700 units (7 percent), while the formal private sector (real estate development companies) accounted for no more than 76,200 units (6.5 percent). This represents the lowest level of formal production, covering both public and licensed private sectors, in the past five years.

Despite the decline, the report noted that Egypt’s average annual residential output has remained stable at around one million units over the past decade. It also flagged a surplus in the housing supply, with units built exceeding the number of new marriages by 18 percent on average, an annual surplus of roughly 185,000 units.

On the public sector, the report drew a distinction between social (subsidized) housing and investment (profit-oriented) housing. Over the past ten years, social housing averaged 74,000 units per year compared to 26,000 investment units. In 2023/2024, social housing again accounted for the majority, at 72 percent of public sector output, while the share of investment housing gradually increased.

On geographic distribution, the report highlights that 88 percent of formal housing was built in new cities, compared to just 12 percent in existing cities and villages. That concentration rises to 98 percent for social housing, with only 1,440 social units built within existing urban areas. The report attributes this to the availability of land in new cities, combined with policies restricting licensing and tightening requirements in existing areas since 2020 and 2021.

The report concluded that the informal (community) sector remains the dominant force in providing housing in Egypt despite all efforts to control it, and recommended revisiting current policies to integrate this sector, make better use of the surplus housing stock, and direct resources toward more pressing needs.

For his part, Yahya Shawkat, a housing policy expert and director of the Urban Observatory, says the upcoming offering of housing units is exceptional in nature. It will be announced separately by each real estate developer based on their willingness to participate, he explains, running in parallel with offerings made by the Fund.

Speaking to Zawia3, he says that down-payment values represent the most critical factor for applicants, noting that they will be higher in developer offerings than in Fund announcements, and he expects them to range between 30 and 50 percent of the unit’s value, compared to around 20 to 40 percent in Fund offerings, which constitutes a real barrier for limited-income citizens.

He notes that addressing this gap requires direct intervention through cash support covering the down payment, whether in full or in part, rather than limiting support to the unit price alone, or combining both, in order to ensure greater equality of opportunity among limited-income applicants.

The urban studies expert stresses the need for fair controls on down payments, proposing that the maximum be set at no more than double the applicant’s annual income. He explains that equal incomes under the current conditions do not necessarily translate into equal actual repayment capacity, given the disparities in wealth and savings between individuals.

He also points out that some applicants may rely on their savings, assets, or family support to cover the down payment, creating an unfair disparity in access to housing units. He insists that restructuring the down-payment and support system has become a necessity to ensure equitable access to housing.

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And Who Finances It?

These projects depend heavily on unit sales. In 2020, the Egyptian government allocated 390 billion Egyptian pounds ($7.5 billion) to the social housing program, with average annual spending of around 8.3 billion Egyptian pounds ($159.6 million) over seven fiscal years. This funding comprises 40 percent direct government money, 24 percent from housing unit sale revenues, and 17 percent from domestic loans. The Central Bank of Egypt also provided substantial support by allocating 20 billion Egyptian pounds ($384.6 million) in 2014 and an additional 20 billion Egyptian pounds ($384.6 million) in 2019 to finance mortgages at low interest rates, which helped provide housing units at reasonable prices for low-income families.

From abroad, the World Bank is among the most prominent contributors to financing social housing projects in Egypt. In 2015, the World Bank extended a $1 billion loan to support the social housing program through the “Comprehensive Housing Finance for Results” project, which focused on providing financial support to low-income families and promoting initiatives such as the Green Pyramid Rating System. The World Bank also approved an additional $500 million in financing in March 2020 to expand the scope of the Social Housing and Housing Finance Fund, while encouraging private sector participation in these projects.

The Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities manages these funds through the Social Housing Fund, which coordinates financing and implementation. The Fund works with several bodies, including the Guarantee and Support Fund for vetting applications and allocating support, the New Urban Communities Authority for building units, the Central Agency for Construction, and provincial housing departments. The Central Bank of Egypt also plays a role by providing low-interest loans.

What current data reveals, taken together, is that the gap is gradually widening between the stated objective of government initiatives, which is to provide adequate housing for low- and middle-income citizens, and the reality on the ground, which reflects accelerating price increases and growing reliance on market mechanisms and real estate developers.

While data shows an expansion in residential output and greater diversity in target groups, the informal sector’s dominance over the largest share of construction, the concentration of formal projects in new cities, and rising down payments and financing costs are all indicators that fall short of equitable access to housing and the ability of those most in need to genuinely benefit from these programs.