The international arena is in a state of turmoil, as a result of the military escalation between the United States and Tel Aviv on the one hand and Tehran on the other, after the launch of wide-scale US-Israeli strikes on Iran this Saturday morning, to which Tehran responded by attacking Tel Aviv, as well as US bases in the Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait (the attacks are still continuing at the time of writing), which portends serious repercussions for the region and the world, especially in the Middle East, and at its heart Egypt and the Gulf states.
On Saturday morning, the United States and Israel launched a wide-scale attack on Iran, after weeks of escalating US threats of military action against Tehran, accompanied by the build-up of additional US forces in the Middle East region.
The strikes were concentrated in Tehran and its surroundings, with reports of the targeting of the compound of the office of the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in the heart of the capital, in addition to sites in the cities of Isfahan, Karaj, Kermanshah and Bandar Bushehr in the south, where sensitive facilities are located, while the degree of damage inflicted on the nuclear infrastructure has not yet become clear. The raids were followed by a wave of successive explosions, and thick columns of smoke were recorded in several areas, prompting the Iranian authorities to close the airspace and issue an emergency alert halting civil aviation traffic over the country and the region as an emergency measure.
The attack also targeted a primary school for girls in southern Iran, killing 57 of its pupils, according to state television, citing a local official in Hormozgan province. Local sources, meanwhile, told the Russia Today network of a rise in the number of victims of the attack to 85, while 92 others were injured.
For his part, US President Donald Trump announced, in a video message, the start of wide-scale combat operations inside Iran, stressing that the aim is “to defend the American people by eliminating the imminent threats emanating from the Iranian regime”, emphasising that Tehran “cannot be allowed to possess a nuclear weapon”, and describing the Iranian regime as “a wicked group of harsh and bad people”.
Trump added that the operations aim at “destroying Iranian missiles and razing its missile industry to the ground”, as well as striking naval capabilities. Trump also held out two options to the Iranian armed forces, either “immunity” or “certain death”, while at the same time addressing a message to Iranians in which he said that “the hour of your freedom is within reach”, calling on the people to “take back control” of their government.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also announced that the attack aims to “remove the existential threat” posed by Iran, calling on Iranians to stand up to the regime in place since the 1979 revolution. Netanyahu said, in a video statement, that Israel and the United States had launched a joint operation to eliminate what he described as “the existential threat posed by the regime in Iran”.
In response, Iran announced the launch of a counter-attack in retaliation for the strikes it had been subjected to, firing missiles towards several sites inside Israel, while explosions rang out in Jerusalem after sirens sounded in the city.
The Emirates News Agency reported that the country’s territory came under bombardment by a number of Iranian missiles, noting that one person was killed when missile fragments fell on a residential area in Abu Dhabi.
For its part, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard said it had targeted US bases in both Qatar and the UAE, in addition to military and security centres inside the occupied territories, and explained in a later statement that it had bombarded the headquarters of the command of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain using missiles and drones. Bahrain also witnessed the sound of explosions, while the Interior Ministry announced the activation of sirens across the country, calling on citizens and residents to head immediately to the nearest safe place.
The Iranian Supreme National Security Council also vowed a “crushing” and “decisive” response, stressing that Tehran will use “all its defensive and military capabilities within the framework of the right of legitimate self-defence” to protect its territorial integrity, and later the council called on Iranians to leave Tehran and head to safer areas.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held a series of urgent phone calls with officials in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Iraq, during which he made clear that Iran will respond to the attacks, and warned these countries against allowing their territory or bases to be used to launch new operations, hinting that they bear legal responsibility for any use of their territory in military actions. In the same context, media outlets quoted Iranian security officials as saying that their country had “warned in advance” that any attack would be met with a “crushing response”, in a message directed at domestic and foreign public opinion alike.
In return, Tel Aviv closed its airspace to civilian flights and declared a state of emergency, amid official expectations of barrages of Iranian missiles and drones arriving during the following hours.
At the level of the Arab Gulf states, reactions appeared to be a mixture of concern and an attempt to keep themselves out of the theatre of direct confrontation, amid real fears that their territory could turn into arenas of retaliation and conflict.
Meanwhile, field reports from Doha, Dubai and Kuwait point to explosions being heard and air defence systems being activated in Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan to intercept missiles that sources said had been launched from Iran towards sites where US forces are likely to be present, with a number of these countries affirming their right to defend themselves while avoiding direct verbal escalation against Tehran.
Within the Gulf capitals, concern centres on two main scenarios: the first relates to the possibility that Iran will expand its bank of targets to include oil and gas facilities, power stations and liquefied gas plants, and the second to the possibility that it will resort to threatening navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, with the catastrophic repercussions this would carry for global energy markets and security of supply. In addition, Arab assessments warn that a possible collapse of the Iranian regime, if a long-drawn-out military campaign succeeds, could open the door to wide waves of refugees, flows of weapons and cross-border armed groups, which some Gulf and Arab states see as a direct threat to their already fragile internal security.
On Saturday, Egypt condemned Iran’s targeting of “the unity and territorial integrity of Arab states and the violation of their sovereignty”, and warned against the entire region sliding into “a state of comprehensive chaos”.
The “Egyptian Foreign Ministry” expressed, in a statement, its concern about “the dangerous military escalation the region is witnessing, and the risks it entails of widening the scope of the conflict and the entire region sliding into a state of comprehensive chaos, which will undoubtedly have catastrophic repercussions on regional and international security, stability and peace”.
Cairo renewed its “emphasis on the paramount importance of political and peaceful solutions”, noting “that military solutions will lead only to more violence and bloodshed, and that the only way to guarantee security and stability lies in commitment to the option of diplomacy and dialogue”.
In addition, the Egyptian Ministry of Aviation issued an urgent statement on Saturday morning, in which it affirmed that the authorities are “closely following” developments in the region after the strikes on Iran and are assessing their potential impact on air traffic in Middle East airspace. The statement affirmed Egypt’s full coordination with regional and international aviation authorities to ensure the highest levels of safety and security for flights, and called on travellers to check departure and arrival times and any changes to schedules in light of the closure of Iranian and Israeli airspace and the suspension of traffic over Iraq.
At the European level, reactions were marked by extreme caution and calls for “restraint” and for avoiding a slide into a comprehensive regional confrontation, along with an attempt to understand the scale of the strategic shift represented by the decision of Washington and Tel Aviv to strike deep inside Iran in such a direct manner.
European capitals, which had been engaged in diplomatic tracks linked to the Iranian nuclear file, fear that this escalation will blow up whatever negotiating opportunities remain and strengthen the position of the hardline current inside Iran, increasing the likelihood of a regional arms race, particularly in the nuclear and missile fields.
In Moscow, the Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the attacks as “a planned and unjustified armed act against a sovereign state”, and accused the United States and Israel of seeking regime change in Tehran under the pretext of the nuclear programme, calling for an immediate halt to the operation and a return to the path of diplomacy.
China, for its part, affirmed its rejection of “the violation of Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”, warning of “dangerous military actions” that could spiral out of control and strike at efforts to settle the nuclear file by peaceful means.
Observers expect the Security Council to hold new emergency sessions in light of this development, amid a clear division between the states supporting the US-Israeli step and those that consider it a violation of the UN Charter and a threat to international peace and security.
How is Tehran dealing with the war scenario?
Iranian political researcher Mohammad Rahmani says that the outbreak of the war was not a surprise, but was expected in light of the previous course of escalation between Iran and Israel, explaining that the first phase of the confrontation, which lasted about 12 days, revealed a gap between the declared aims and the results achieved on the ground, as the Israeli leadership spoke of curbing Iran’s regional influence, and at times even hinted at toppling the regime, yet those aims were not achieved as had been promoted.
Rahmani points out, speaking to Zawia3, that talk of undeclared agreements or understandings during the period of calm did not lead to any actual progress in the negotiations, stressing that stalemate prevailed, and that Tehran took its decisions independently, particularly regarding the management of its regional deployment and the avoidance of certain patterns of direct engagement. In his view, the absence of any political breakthrough made the resumption of the war likely, which is what actually happened.
He notes that Iran expanded the scope of its threats to include a number of Arab states, among them Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, by targeting, or threatening to target, military bases and interests linked to the United States and its allies. On the other hand, he points out that Tehran has so far avoided directing a direct threat at Turkey and Azerbaijan, attributing this to the sensitivity of the national dimension inside Iran, where millions of Azeri Turks live, which gives any escalation with Ankara or Baku a potential domestic cost.
Regarding the US and Israeli statements about continuing the operations until the “final objectives” are achieved, Rahmani believes that these objectives go beyond mere deterrence, to include targeting Iran’s strategic infrastructure, including nuclear facilities, armament centres and the joints of the state’s hard power.
On the domestic level, the Iranian researcher considers that the popular mood in Iran is complex and varied, but he points out that broad sections of Iranians show rejection of the regime, and that the country has witnessed repeated waves of protest in past years, which were dealt with by security means with extreme violence. In his view, continued external pressure may open the way for protests to return to the street, especially if it is combined with economic and security deterioration.
Rahmani says that Tehran had previously announced that it would respond forcefully if subjected to a direct attack, including threatening Israel comprehensively, but he expressed doubts about Iran’s ability to carry out a threat of this kind fully, considering that a large part of its missile capabilities had been used in previous rounds. He judged it likely that the margin of Iranian offensive escalation will shrink in the coming days, with mounting military pressure and the narrowing of the strategic options before it.
For her part, the director of the European North African Centre for Strategic Studies, Dr Sara Kira, believes that the ongoing war represents an extension of a previous round of confrontation that lasted 12 days, but differs from it in its aim and stakes, considering that the direct goal of the current escalation is to topple the Iranian regime, not merely to contain its regional behaviour.
Sara explains, speaking to Zawia3, that the essence of the conflict is linked to the Iranian nuclear programme and the ballistic missile programme, stressing that the United States and Israel will not accept the existence of an advanced nuclear programme in the hands of the Wilayat al-Faqih regime. She adds that “there are Western assessments and reports indicating that Iran has gone a long way in enriching uranium, and that the previously declared level of enrichment does not reflect, according to these assessments, the full picture of its actual capabilities, which strengthened the conviction among its adversaries of the need for decisive action.”
The Egyptian researcher believes that Washington tried at earlier stages to push towards political settlements or internal arrangements leading to a change in the structure of the regime or its leadership, but those tracks did not produce results, which put the option of toppling the regime firmly on the table. She considered that the war will not stop, if it continues at the current pace, except by bringing about a radical change in the structure of government inside Iran.
Regarding the regional repercussions, she points out that the direct effects will reach the Gulf states more than others, whether through rising oil prices or the disruption of global trade, as well as the security risks linked to the targeting of US military bases in the region. She noted that the huge size of Gulf defence spending has not, so far, translated into a complete umbrella of protection from the repercussions of the escalation.
As for Egypt, Sara considers that the direct effects may be limited compared with the Gulf states, given the nature of Cairo’s positioning in the crisis, but she stressed that any wide disruption in energy markets or international navigation will have indirect repercussions on the regional economy as a whole.
She believes that Iran will continue fighting and will try to hold out to the maximum extent possible, benefiting from military and logistical support from its allies, including obtaining drones and advanced weapons systems. On the other hand, however, she considers it likely that the continuation of intensive strikes may lead to internal cracks and divisions in the structure of the Wilayat al-Faqih regime, accelerating the prospects of change from within.
She says that the United States, which had a historical role in shaping the balance of power inside Iran, appears today determined to re-engineer the political scene there, considering that the course of the current war indicates that it is an open battle that may continue until the goal of political change in Tehran is achieved.
The direct effects of the escalation: oil hits the markets
Estimates suggest that the strikes will raise the level of tension in the world’s most important oil region, so the effect on oil markets will come mainly through the “risk premium” and the risk of supply disruption, with scenarios that differ according to the course of the escalation.
In the short term, the most likely expectation is a sharp jump in prices exceeding the usual rises, with a clear increase in daily volatility, because traders price in the possibility of part of Iranian or Gulf exports being disrupted even if oil facilities are not struck directly. The more indicators there are of the war widening, or the closer the strikes extend to oil fields or export ports, the higher this premium will rise, and it may push prices to test ranges close to $100 a barrel or higher if we approach a scenario of threats to maritime navigation.
The most critical nerve centre is the Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fifth of global oil trade passes, and any threat to close it or to target navigation in it will raise prices immediately and violently, because the market will then assume that (15–20) million barrels a day could be exposed to partial or temporary disruption. Even verbal threats without direct action usually add between $10 and $25 to the price compared with previous levels, according to estimates by a number of consultancies that studied the scenario of the strait’s closure in previous rounds of tension.
According to observers, if the escalation remains “militarily controlled”, meaning (exchanged strikes, but away from energy infrastructure and the strait), prices are likely to remain in a high but manageable range, with Brent staying in an approximate range of around $75–85 a barrel, and some calm returning with any signs of mediation or a ceasefire. If, however, we enter a worse scenario, including strikes on oil facilities in the Gulf or Iran, sabotage operations against pipelines and ports, or an actual or near-actual closure of Hormuz, this will be treated as a real “supply shock”, and the estimates of some investment banks speak of a range of $100–120 a barrel, and perhaps higher if the crisis is prolonged.
How will Cairo be affected?
Political and economic estimates indicate that the impact of the strikes on Cairo will be compound, and can be divided into four main interconnected tracks: economic-financial, the Suez Canal and navigation, internal-regional security, and then the political and diplomatic margin.
Economically and financially, any major jump in oil prices puts direct pressure on Egypt’s import bill and on the balance of payments, raising the cost of energy, transport and electricity subsidies, and fuelling an additional wave of inflation in an economy already burdened by a crisis of prices and the exchange rate. Likewise, the rise in the risk premium in the region raises the cost of borrowing for Egypt in international markets and increases investors’ sensitivity to negative news, which may translate into a partial exit of hot money or the postponement of investment decisions that were under study.
As for the Suez Canal and the maritime corridors, any threat to the Strait of Hormuz or escalation of attacks on navigation in the Red Sea (by the Houthis or others) is reflected directly in the movement of ships between the Gulf and the Mediterranean. If shipping companies choose to redirect their routes away from the Gulf or the Red Sea because of insurance and security risks, transit traffic through the canal and its dollar revenues will decline, which puts pressure on one of Egypt’s most important sources of hard currency and increases the fragility of the general budget.
In security terms, the escalation raises the level of tension across the whole region, and with it the likelihood of networks and proxies of Iran or its adversaries being activated in theatres close to Egypt (Gaza, Sinai, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean). Cairo fears scenarios such as: bigger waves of arms smuggling across the border with Gaza, infiltration attempts by extremist elements exploiting the chaos, or the use of Egyptian territory, even indirectly, in operations or exchanged messages, which imposes a greater tightening of the borders and of the Sinai, Red Sea and Taba axes. Any major imbalance in the balance of power in favour of Israel at the expense of Iran also raises a traditional Egyptian concern about an imbalance in the regional strategic equation and its repercussions on the Gaza and peace files.
Politically and diplomatically, Cairo finds itself compelled to hold to the line of “rejecting military escalation and calling for a diplomatic solution” while avoiding crude alignment with one camp against another, so as not to lose its open channels with Tehran on the one hand, and its vital relationship with Washington and the Gulf capitals on the other. Any expansion of the war, or its approach towards the scenario of “toppling the Iranian regime”, places Egypt before new equations: a redistribution of regional influence, possible waves of refugees and shifts in the maps of alliances, and greater US-Israeli pressure on files sensitive for Egypt, such as Gaza and the Eastern Mediterranean.
In this regard, the Egyptian researcher on regional security and terrorism issues Ahmed Soltan says that the confrontation currently under way is nothing but one battle within a wider war, which the United States and Israel want to be the decisive battle. However, the repercussions of this war, by his estimate, are not limited to the region, nor to what is known in political literature as the “Middle East”, but extend to the entire international order.
Soltan explains to Zawia3 that the lessons of history, particularly in the modern and contemporary eras, show that middle powers have played decisive roles in reshaping the international order. From this perspective, the current moment represents a moment of reformulation, not only of the region’s equations, but of the structure of the international order as a whole.
He considers that what Washington has undertaken is a “strategic gamble” built on biased calculations, pointing out that the extent of Iran’s resilience and its ability to adapt to the military operations and to continue imposing counter-pressure will reveal the limits of these calculations, since war is in its essence a “clash of wills” before it is a military conflict.
He adds that developments are still at their beginning, and that the course of escalation may have no clear ceiling. During the first hours, US bases in a number of Gulf states were targeted, but if the Iranian leadership concludes that the aim is to end the regime entirely, there will be, by his estimate, no red lines governing the scope of the response, which means the area of conflagration widening to include the entire region.
Soltan points out that the Strait of Hormuz is a candidate to become a main arena of escalation if the confrontation continues at the current pace, which will be reflected directly in global oil supplies and regional exports, including those of the Gulf states. He also noted that Egypt may once again be affected by the repercussions of any naval blockade that the Houthis may seek to impose, explaining that despite their limited capabilities, they are still able to cause strategic disruption in the course of the conflict. He recalled that global shipping companies have already begun diverting their routes towards the Cape of Good Hope, in an early indicator of the widening scope of the risks.
The Egyptian researcher stresses that the limits of the strike and the paths of escalation are linked to the perceptions of the warring parties. If the war remains within a limited scope, its tools will remain relatively controlled. But if it turns into an all-out war aimed at changing the regime, as the US president hinted, the logic of confrontation will push towards the maximum degree of escalation, since “beyond the maximum there is nothing but the fall”.
He also stresses that the region stands before a decisive test and a moment of reshaping that goes beyond the previous traditional frameworks, with the possible emergence of new axes and of powers leaving the US orbit, and the opening of space for other international powers, foremost among them China. In his view, what is happening represents a strategic shift that affects not only the region, but redraws the features of the entire international order.
The current confrontation does not appear to be merely a passing military round between traditional adversaries, but a turning point that may redraw the maps of influence and alliances in the Middle East, and perhaps in the entire international order. While the scope of the strikes widens and the language of “decisiveness” and “regime change” escalates, fears are growing of an uncalculated slide towards an all-out war that goes beyond the calculations of traditional deterrence.
Amid the fragility of energy markets, the sensitivity of maritime corridors and the overlap of regional and international interests, the capitals concerned face a delicate test between the option of open escalation and the option of returning to a political path that seems, so far, further away than ever. The region is therefore at a historic crossroads: either containing the fire before it spreads, or entering a phase of long conflict that redefines the balance of power for decades to come.
