A few metres from one of the polling stations in the Sohag Markaz constituency, in southern Egypt, Safia appeared enthusiastic about taking part in the electoral marathon held last month. That is what encouraged us to talk to her. We asked her about the candidate she supported, and she replied with his name, saying he was a helpful man from her village, but that she did not know which party he belonged to or what his political background was. She stressed that she did not care about such matters and was content to know the candidate and his electoral symbol, and that he had provided services to her or to a member of her family in the past.
Safia Ali (37 years old), who holds an intermediate technical qualification, does not really understand what the term “political party” means. She says: “We hear about parties through the adverts we watch on television, and sometimes I see banners with the names of parties written on them, such as (Mostakbal Misr / she means Mostaqbal Watan). What we know about parties is very little. In the past, for example, we knew the National Party, but today the parties have multiplied and of course we do not know how many there are or what they are called.”
While we were talking with her, Hajj Saeed broke off his close reading of the newspaper he was holding and seemed interested in the conversation. We turned to him and asked him “How effective are political parties in Egypt? What is the most important party in his view? And how does he see the electoral marathon?”
The man in his fifties smiled the smile of someone grieving over a memory from a distant past, and said: “Parties have become like corner shops, gentlemen.” He said it while pointing to a grocery behind him, and went on: “In the old days we had parties, and each party had a set of ideas. The Wafd Party, for example, was known to be liberal and to be in opposition; it is no longer so now. On the other hand, there was the National Democratic Party, known to be the party of the authorities, but it had competent people in it, we do not deny that.”
“Today, however, there are dozens of parties in Egypt that are of no use or benefit. Some of them distribute food goods (oil, sugar, pasta and rice) at election time to harvest votes, and some seek alliances with particular bodies to guarantee seats in parliament, and once the elections are over, ‘neither sight nor sound’,” meaning that the parties disappear completely for the five years separating one electoral cycle from the next.
The testimonies of Hajj Saeed and Safia intersect with (100) other testimonies collected by Zawia3 as part of a questionnaire it conducted over the past weeks to measure the effectiveness of parties and their connection with the street, in light of shrinking electoral participation, which did not exceed 17.1% in the Senate elections held last August, while the House of Representatives elections are the subject of controversy after the annulment of two-thirds of the constituencies in the first phase, held in early November, and the continuing appeals against the first and second phases.
All those who took part in the questionnaire (a sample of 100 people from different age groups and educational levels), distributed to cover the widest possible geographical range with a focus on governorates with a high voting density such as Cairo, Alexandria, Giza and the governorates of Upper Egypt, believe that parties do not represent them or express their demands, while 97% stated that they do not trust political parties, 72% of participants considered that the performance of parties in general in the previous parliament (2020–2025) had been weak, and 92.1% of them stated that parties do not actually compete in elections, but take part as political decor complementing the electoral process.
In April 2022, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi called for the launch of the National Dialogue, which aimed to bring together the various popular, political, party and academic forces, in a step intended to accommodate all visions and proposals on Egypt’s domestic issues at the political, economic and social levels. The National Dialogue addressed several files, including political reform, the role of parties in public life, and support for community participation in decision-making.
The National Dialogue stressed at the time that an active party life represents a fundamental pillar of the New Republic, as it is considered one of the main tools for guaranteeing the legitimacy and stability of the political system and for providing channels of direct interaction between the state and the citizen. Participants affirmed that developing the party experience contributes to building an aware political community, capable of exercising its oversight role and participating in decision-making, in a way that strengthens the state’s ability to manage crises and achieve sustainable development. It affirmed that supporting parties is not merely a formal procedure but a necessity for deepening political participation, enabling young people to engage in public life, and ensuring that parties are genuine tools that reflect citizens’ aspirations and serve the public good.
How many parties are there in Egypt?
The number of officially registered parties exceeds 100, while some official lists merely refer to around 87 parties only. A review of the approved licences, however, confirms that the figure closest to accuracy is nearly a hundred parties holding an official licence to operate within the Egyptian political system. Despite this numerical momentum, parliamentary representation remains limited: the number of parties represented in the House of Representatives before the 2025 elections did not exceed around 13, while the number of parties represented in the Senate during the 2025 term reached around 19, which reveals a clear gap between the large number of parties on paper and their actual ability to compete and to reach the legislative institutions.
The answers show a striking confusion about the number of political parties in Egypt, with estimates ranging from 30 parties to more than 140, while a large number of participants preferred to state that they did not know or were not interested in the first place. Despite this, a limited number of parties were repeatedly mentioned as the most prominent on the scene, led by the Mostaqbal Watan Party, followed by Homat Watan, the National Front, the Republican People’s Party and the Wafd. What is notable, however, is that this presence was not coupled with trust or support; rather, it mostly came in a critical context, with these parties regarded as “parties of the authorities” or merely the most visible in the media, without this implying conviction in their role or a feeling that they represent the Egyptian street.
Parties in one valley, people in another
The results of the questionnaire point to widespread frustration with the current role of political parties in Egypt, as a considerable segment of participants (87%) expressed the absence of a clear perception of these parties’ effectiveness, alongside repeated demands for radical reforms touching on their structure, their organisation and the political climate surrounding them.
The results reveal an almost complete absence of party affiliation among participants, as the overwhelming majority stated that they do not belong to any party or political entity. Even among the few who declared a past or current affiliation, a clear sense of actual disconnection from party work emerged, whether because of dissatisfaction with performance or a sense that they lack any real influence. As for the affiliations that were mentioned, such as the Wafd, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, Mostaqbal Watan, Al-Adl, Al-Wasat, Al-Ahrar and the Conservative Party, they appeared to be limited exceptions that do not reflect a general state so much as they confirm the crisis of political engagement within parties.
The answers also highlight that crises lie in the weakness of leaderships and cadres, as participants called for preparing genuine political leaders, especially from among young people, through serious training programmes and fair internal elections, instead of appointments or closed leaderships. They considered that the absence of qualified leaderships was reflected in fragile performance and a limited ability to put forward convincing political alternatives.
Likewise, the responses showed a weakening of the link between parties and the street, with many stressing the need to go down to citizens, engage with their daily concerns and listen to the party bases from the villages up to the governorates, instead of settling for a media or seasonal presence. Participants considered that an effective party is one that “sides with the citizen, not with the authorities” and makes defending people’s interests a real priority.
In the same context, the issue of political awareness emerged as one of the core themes, as participants called for intensifying political education and electoral awareness, considering that weak awareness among voters and parties alike has contributed to emptying party work of its substance. Some also called for tying parties to their natural role as a link between the state and the citizen.
At the structural level, the answers expressed a clear rejection of the inflated number of parties without substance, with calls to reduce the number and to merge ideologically close parties into larger and more influential entities representing the main political currents (right, left, liberal, religious). Participants considered that having a limited number of strong parties is better than dozens of nominal entities.
Politically, a large proportion of the responses focused on the absence of a free climate for party work, calling for opening up the public sphere, lifting security restrictions and ending the interference of the various agencies in running or directing parties, alongside amending the election laws and the division of constituencies, which they believe have strengthened the influence of political money and weakened the chances of genuine party representation. They also stressed the need to hold fair local elections as a fundamental school for training cadres.
Dr Amr Hashem Rabie, adviser at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, believes that the crisis of political parties in Egypt is not about their number so much as about their complete disconnection from the street, noting that the existence of more than 100 licensed parties is not reflected in any way in actual political life, because these parties lack a real popular base.
He tells Zawia3 that nearly 95% to 97% of Egyptians are politically classified as independents, a negative phenomenon that reflects the failure of parties to attract members and build social bases. This is directly linked to the electoral system based on the absolute list rather than proportional representation, which allows for broader representation, and it pushes citizens to run as individuals instead of engaging in party work, unlike proportional party systems, which strengthen the role of parties.
Rabie stresses that parties raise the slogans of democracy while lacking it internally: they do not hold regular general conferences, do not activate their organisational structures or executive committees, and are often run with a mentality of individual leadership, which has cost even the historic parties their ability to offer a different model. He also links the decline of party life to the closure of the public sphere and the penetration of the security agencies into the political sphere, which has created a climate of fear among citizens about joining parties, amid prevailing perceptions that associate party work with surveillance and persecution.
As for the parties described as “big”, Rabie explains that they are not big by virtue of their own strength or popular reach, but because they were created with direct support from the authorities, considering them political arms that lack the means to survive without this support. He concludes that reforming the party landscape begins with reducing the number of parties and reclassifying them on the basis of issues and programmes, asking: “It is not logical for Egypt to have more than a hundred parties, as if we had more than a hundred major issues, while reality says that the state’s fundamental issues do not exceed a limited number around which clear political currents can compete.”
Why has party life declined in Egypt?
Most participants agree that the decline of party life in Egypt is due to a complex set of reasons, foremost among them political restrictions and the absence of a free climate, the weakness of the parties themselves at the organisational and intellectual levels, and the absence of serious political programmes, as well as citizens’ reluctance to participate. Issues of political money, the electoral system, security interventions and the backing of particular parties also emerged as key factors in weakening party competition. The majority’s choice of the answer “all of the above” reflects an awareness that the crisis is structural and comprehensive and cannot be reduced to a single cause.
For his part, Akram Ismail, a founding member of the Bread and Freedom Party (under formation), believes that a large number of the parties formed in this period are in essence engineered entities: not real parties emerging from the street or expressing popular bases, but entirely artificial entities serving goals set by the authorities, while the state of closure in the public sphere leads to the weak effectiveness of the other parties.
Speaking to Zawia3, Ismail explains that the political system itself does not allow natural parties connected to the public to emerge, and party figures therefore become people directly tied to the regime. In natural party experiences, figures are produced politically by trade unions, universities and the street, whereas in Egypt they are the product of engineering from above, in which priority is given to those who have loyalty or who belong to networks of influence close to the authorities.
Ismail stresses that the absence of real parties connected to the public turns the political sphere into a closed arena whose figures are made according to predetermined goals, which explains why these figures are often concentrated among former officers or personalities directly loyal to the regime. He warns that “the weakness of society and the state is linked to the weakness of their institutions. A strong society is one that has unions, parties and organisations capable of negotiating with the authorities and managing crises without an explosion, whereas a society deprived of these tools is at risk, whether in its stability or in the transfer of power within it.”
He continues: “The absence of organisational tools puts the steps of political transition at risk and increases the likelihood of an explosion of popular anger because of economic conditions. By contrast, the existence of strong unions and parties provides channels for negotiation and peaceful solutions, and guarantees a safe and orderly transfer of power.” He affirms that preventing society from possessing its organisational tools leaves it at the mercy of the winds, as was seen in the collapse of some neighbouring societies and states, adding: “In Egypt, the absence of these tools does not only weaken parties; it weakens society and the state in the long term.”
Party life in Egypt began in the early twentieth century with the emergence of the first national parties in the context of resistance to the British occupation, and the Wafd Party, which was founded in 1918, was the most prominent expression of this phase, as it played a pivotal role in mobilising the street and linking politics to popular demands. Over the following decades, party life went through periods of ebb and flow: after the July 1952 revolution, parties were dissolved and a one-party system was established, before party pluralism returned in a limited form in the 1970s with the policy of the “platforms” and then the official authorisation to found parties. Although the number of parties has grown since then, particularly after 2011, this expansion has remained mostly nominal, as party entities multiplied without being matched by any real development in their political role or their ability to influence the street and decision-making.
The laws regulating party work in Egypt revolve mainly around Law No. 40 of 1977 on the Political Parties System, amended by a decree-law in 2011, which affirms citizens’ right to form parties by notification, sets strict controls on their founding (no religious, class or military basis), and defines the powers of the Political Parties Affairs Committee, amid continuing calls to review and update the law to keep pace with constitutional developments and the need for a more effective and pluralistic party system, as affirmed by the Egyptian constitutions, which guarantee party pluralism.
When participants were asked about the possibility of party life improving in the future, the majority leaned towards the answer “maybe”. By contrast, only a limited proportion expressed outright optimism, and they often linked this optimism to radical changes taking place in the structure of the political system and the nature of the relationship between the authorities and the parties.
A clear set of demands recurs in participants’ answers, most prominently opening up the public sphere and lifting security restrictions on party work, parties siding with the citizen instead of the authorities, preparing qualified young leaders, and putting forward realistic and national political programmes, as well as going down to the street and communicating directly with citizens. Some also called for merging ideologically similar parties, holding genuine internal elections, reducing the number of parties, and intensifying political education and developing electoral awareness. On the other hand, a not insignificant number of participants expressed complete despair about the usefulness of party work.
The deliberate killing of political life and civil society
According to a study by the Carnegie Center for Studies, by Yezid Sayigh, a researcher specialising in Middle East affairs, the policies of the Egyptian authorities over the past years have produced a clear aversion to any independent political organisation or activity, which translated into a three-pronged assault aimed at emptying the Egyptian political arena of its substance.
The first was striking at party life at its very foundations, while at the same time maintaining a formal democratic appearance through holding periodic elections and preserving a nominal parliamentary image. Analyst Marina Ottaway likewise described the emptying of the political sphere as an arena of competition between organised forces representing the interests of the different segments of society as having led to “the death of political life”, with parties becoming weak and lacking weight. The government’s State Information Service affirmed in a 2022 report that the old parties predating 2013 were still “struggling between development and extinction” under the “New Republic”.
In contrast, new loyalist parties pushed to the forefront by the security agencies emerged to play the main role in displaying popular support for the authorities’ policies, according to the study. Unlike the era of Hosni Mubarak, which relied on the National Democratic Party as a central instrument of control, the political system of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi relied on a more decentralised model through the creation of multiple loyalist parties after 2013.
The study notes that “these parties turned into fronts linked to patronage networks, while the security agencies took charge of selecting candidates and forming parliamentary blocs with a degree of control greater even than under Mubarak, and this trend became more entrenched after a legislative amendment ended judicial supervision of elections starting from 2024. The result was clear in the 2020 elections, in which the liberal ‘Free Egyptians’ Party collapsed, while the loyalist ‘Mostaqbal Watan’ Party swept the seats of parliament and of the recently revived Senate.”
The study also indicates that the institution of parliament lost what remained of its role as a platform for peaceful political disagreement, as its role shrank further to become a mere instrument for ratifying presidential decrees and government bills. The researcher explains that “control over the formation of blocs and parties inside parliament was the first step, followed by emptying it of any political weight. Thus, parliament became a mere facade suggesting openness, while nominal platforms and parties are established from time to time, such as the ‘National Front’ Party, whose founding was announced in December 2024 amid media celebration of it as ‘a sign of political recovery’.”
According to the study, the same approach extended to civil society, as the authorities worked to redirect civic activity in a way that would absorb any potential political influence. At first, the government focused on suppressing Islamic service associations that were considered a political threat; then the Civil Work Law No. 149 of 2019 came to codify this approach by confining the role of organisations to “developing society in accordance with the state’s plans and needs”.
Editorial correction: The first version of the report stated that 77% of participants considered the performance of parties in the previous parliament to be weak; the correct figure is 72%, according to the questionnaire data published in the accompanying chart.
