At a political moment marked by a sharp decline in freedoms and a contraction of the public sphere, the debate over the usefulness of party work in Egypt is returning to the fore, particularly as the next parliamentary elections approach. Amid this scene, the “Progress Party” presents itself as a political project under formation, trying to find a foothold for itself between the duality of political closure and necessary participation. In this interview with Zawia3, Yasser El-Hawary, the party’s secretary-general, speaks about the motives for founding the party, its intellectual references, and the reasons for choosing this timing in particular. He also explains his position on the National Dialogue, the usefulness of participating in parliament and the limits of coordination with loyalist parties, and responds to accusations of security coordination and of drifting away from the opposition stance.
The interview also extends to his assessment of the authorities’ performance on the economic and human rights files, his position on the file of prisoners of conscience, the issue of the return of opponents from abroad and the blocking of news websites, all the way to his view of Egypt’s role in the war on Gaza. It is an interview that goes beyond ready-made rhetoric and tries to raise the question once again: is there still a possible place for political work within the state?
What are the features of the political project that the “Progress Party” is putting forward? And what factors led you to choose this timing in particular to launch the party?
The idea of the “Progress” Party began nearly three years ago, specifically after the launch of the National Dialogue, when a group of people (I was one of them, and certainly not the most important of them) began discussing the idea of founding a new political party. Among these figures are well-known and weighty names, such as Dr Raed Salama and others.
The motive behind the idea was a feeling shared among us that the existing parties no longer adequately expressed our aspirations. Some of us had already joined existing parties and then withdrew after disagreements with their leaderships, disagreements that were not so much personal as political. We were therefore looking for a political framework reflecting the values and ideas we hold, which we did not find genuinely represented in the existing party scene. From here arose the idea of founding a new party based on the principles of “social democracy”, an ideology we see as the closest to the reality of Egyptians.
We do not adopt the extreme liberal orientation, nor do we identify with the socialist or communist left in its most extreme manifestations. Rather, we aspire to a centrist current that balances social justice and freedoms and is committed to economic policies that take the citizen’s rights into account and work to improve his life. The party adopts the idea of “Egyptian nationalism”, a proposition we have not seen clearly put forward in the political arena before. This proposition is not the antithesis of Arab nationalism or of the Islamic circles; rather, we consider it an all-encompassing framework for the identity of Egyptians, with all its historical stages.
As for the timing, we found that the current stage (before the next House of Representatives elections) is the most suitable for putting forward the project. We had no interest in engaging and participating in the Senate elections, but we may participate in the next parliamentary elections.
Have you completed collecting the legal powers of attorney required to register the party officially? And how do you see the impact of the restrictions on freedoms and the public sphere on the chances of founding the “Progress Party” at present?
We are still at the “under formation” stage, and in the coming period we seek to build popular bases in the various governorates, with the aim of collecting the legal powers of attorney needed to register the party officially. This stage may extend beyond the next parliamentary elections, but we are now announcing clearly that we are in the process of founding a new party under the name “Progress Party”.
We fully realise that the political reality is not easy and that the road to freedoms is not strewn with roses, but we never expected anything else. Throughout its history, Egypt has not been an easy arena for political work. There may have been a wider space in the aftermath of the January Revolution, which is understandable in the aftermath of revolutions. But we believe that we must work amid the challenges, not wait for ideal conditions, because these conditions may never come.
Some parties have circulated accusations that the founding of the “Progress Party” took place in prior coordination with security bodies. How do you respond to these claims?
This did not happen with us at all, perhaps because we are not considered influential enough to warrant it. I recall that this talk was said before, when I was one of the founders of the “Al-Adl Party” after the January Revolution: the same rumours circulated that it had been done in coordination with the Military Council, which is untrue.
Perhaps the large parties, which contest electoral races for hundreds of seats, need forms of coordination with the state or its agencies, not newborn parties like us. Incidentally, there are opposition parties in Egypt, such as the “Bread and Freedom” Party, the “Socialist Popular Alliance” and the “Egyptian Social Democratic Party”, and no one says that they are coordinated with security.
Do you think the current electoral system provides a fair and motivating environment for participation in the parliamentary elections, or is there something that calls for changing it?
I do not see it as the ideal form. The better form is the one that allows for the presence of a wide spectrum of political forces and currents, which is what the proportional list achieves, and I have said this repeatedly in the sessions of the National Dialogue from three years ago until today. The current system does not achieve this goal.
I see proportional lists as the ideal, but at the same time I acknowledge that it is not in my power to impose the rules of the game. If this form has been agreed upon, so be it, in the hope that in the next parliament we will have an opportunity to return to the proportional list system, which I see as fairer and more effective.
So far, the party has not taken a final decision on the form in which it will contest the electoral battle, whether through the lists or the individual seats. I say this out of respect for my colleagues in the party; it is not right for me to issue a personal position as though it were a collective one. I think that competing for some individual seats will be strongly on the table. We may also enter the absolute list, but so far matters have not been settled definitively.
Is there an intention to ally or coordinate with parties classified among the “loyalist parties”? And do you think this type of coordination has become a necessity for participating in political work within the existing reality?
The absolute list is not a political alliance; rather, it is an electoral alliance in the narrow sense of the word. The parties included in these lists do not necessarily adopt a single political programme or unified visions; rather, what brings them together is a shared electoral goal under the rules of the existing election law, which, unfortunately, does not promote political diversity as it should.
The essential question is: is it better for there to be an opposition inside parliament, or do we leave the arena entirely to those who resemble one another? This is a question we are discussing even inside the party. The presence of a genuine opposition inside parliament, even under an imperfect law, is better, in my view, than complete absence.
Some question the usefulness of having an opposition inside parliament, considering that political hegemony limits its actual impact. How do you respond to this argument?
I understand this argument, but it does not cancel out the value of the presence of some opposition voices that have played important roles. In the 2020 parliament, for example, we saw respectable MPs who performed well, such as MP Amira Saber, MP Mohamed Abdelaziz, Diaa El-Din Dawoud and others.
And in the 2015 parliament, although I personally did not take part at the time, in objection to the way the parliament was formed, and I had opportunities to do so as the official spokesperson of the Free Egyptians Party (which won the majority at the time), I respect the performance of MPs such as Mr Ahmed Tantawi and the 25-30 group, who proved that serious practice is possible even under imperfect laws.
An investigation prepared by Zawia3 concluded that the electoral lists are determined in advance within state institutions, and that businessmen and political influence dominate the electoral scene. What is your opinion of these findings? And do you agree with what was put forward in the investigation?
I do not have accurate information about that, and therefore I do not like to discuss what I do not know. But from my experience and my knowledge of some parties, such as the “Available Space” alliance, which includes the “Egyptian Social Democratic”, “Al-Adl” and “Reform and Development” parties, led by Mr Anwar El-Sadat, I see that they hold serious meetings, which witness genuine internal disagreements, in which names are put forward and discussions take place, and this refutes the idea that matters are settled in advance in a closed or arranged manner.
How do you assess the course of the National Dialogue since its launch? And do you think it has achieved any tangible political or legislative results on the ground?
I see it as an important experience, because the mere call for the National Dialogue created a climate different from the one we were living in before it, and even different from what began to take shape anew after 7 October, when the public space began to narrow again. In fact, the National Dialogue is an integral part of the path of political reform, and I am among those who have come to believe that nothing works for this country except gradual reform, not big explosions or anything resembling revolutions.
The model of the 25 January Revolution is over and will not be repeated, simply because the composition of society has changed. There is a worrying violence present among some currents, and this violence frightens me; it may not frighten others, but I see it as a real danger. Therefore, my bias has come to be towards the path of gradual reform, and the National Dialogue was an important station on this path.
When the idea of the National Dialogue was put forward at the Egyptian Family Iftar on 26 April 2022, the parties went back to opening their headquarters, politicians returned to the scene, statements were issued, and the voice of the opposition appeared again (even if in a limited way) in the Egyptian media.
We began to see a party with which dialogue was possible. We learned to sit together, to respect time, to respect the dissenting opinion. Regardless of the results that were achieved, the National Dialogue as an approach and an idea was a serious step. Political reform is not accomplished in a year or two; rather, it is a long road full of obstacles, and it may advance at times and retreat at others. And I hope that we return to the climate of dialogue once again.
I fully understand that the security agencies have their fears about the dangers surrounding the country after 7 October, but the solution is not in closing the public sphere; rather, it lies in giving people spaces and margins to express their opinions in a civilised manner, so that they do not resort to extremist spaces. The National Dialogue was one of the tools of civilised expression. I hope that this matter returns once more, even if the results were not as we had hoped, but as a step it was very respectable.
Some observers believe that you have moved from the position of an opponent to the position of a negotiator, or someone close to the authorities. How do you respond to this perception? And what changed in your positions or in the political context that pushed you to this shift?
The past years have changed me. I have become, as they say, one of the “negotiators” rather than the “confrontational opponents”. I do not see a flaw in that, but rather maturity. Was my previous opposition right or wrong? I do not look at it that way. I see it as a stage of my experience, and it is natural for a person to change with the passage of time.
The pivotal point for me was in September 2019, at the time of the calls for protests launched by Mohamed Ali. I was outside Egypt, and I heard voices calling for the return of extremist faces such as Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, and others inciting in a frightening way. And I refused to accept this fate for my children.
I have three children, the eldest of whom will begin her university studies this year, and I do not want them to live through the scenario of chaos or civil war, as is happening now in Syria since Ahmed al-Sharaa came to power.
I am not a “supporter”; I am someone who “negotiates”. I have a point of view and I express it in a way different from the way I used to express it 10 years ago. That is all there is to it. I say the same things, but in a calmer, more balanced way that suits me and my stage of life. And I see that this way suits me better now. I have come to hold a more balanced position. I do not support; rather, I express my opinion in a more aware and calmer way. It is wrong for a person to remain the same in his manner after 15 years.
How do you assess the performance of the current authorities on the core files, specifically with regard to the economic situation, the human rights situation and the file of political prisoners?
The performance of the authorities and the successive governments, especially the government of Dr Mostafa Madbouly, is very bad on the economic file. As for the human rights file: I think the human rights document that was issued needs to be put into effect. The human rights file, even though the expansion in prison construction has improved prisoners’ conditions little by little compared with the past, still has some crises. I strongly object to the Criminal Procedure Law, for example, and I see that this law strikes at the human rights file and causes it a very big problem. Therefore, yes, the human rights file needs a lot of work, and I call on human rights defenders to intensify their work further on the real file in which the country needs them.
Because I see that a confusion between the role of the human rights defender and that of the politician has spoiled matters. Some human rights defenders waste their time quarrelling with politicians. It is not the politician’s task to say things by the “ruler”. The politician has a “scale” with which he weighs matters and sees where the country’s interest may lie. This is the difference between the politician and the human rights defender. The human rights defender has a “ruler” with which he measures everything, while the politician uses the scale. Human rights defenders do exist, but there is effort wasted in bickering with politicians, and this is not the human rights defender’s field of work. I am not saying that they do not work; they do work, but if they worked more, there would be an improvement in the human rights file.
Some believe that there are human rights defenders who make efforts to present proposals and legal solutions to improve the human rights situation, but without tangible results. In your opinion, does the crisis lie in the absence of political will, or in the way these initiatives are presented?
I see that the crisis lies in both, in the way and in the will. Incidentally, I very much salute the group of respectable lawyers (and I do not want to mention names so as not to forget anyone) such as Khaled Ali, Nabih El-Ganadi, Gamal Eid, Ragia, Malek Adly and others. They are doing wonderful work. But there is a missing link, which is that, alongside the human rights defenders who present these files, we need people inside parliament who work on these issues, so that even if they are not approved, at least there is a voice that is heard. And this brings us back to the old question of how the opposition enters parliament in this way. My opinion is that if there were 10 opposition MPs able to stir up debate and make noise about the Criminal Procedure Law, the state might have made more concessions.
The file of political prisoners
My opinion on the file of political prisoners is still as I expressed it during my participation in the National Dialogue: it does not befit a state like Egypt to have what are called prisoners of conscience or political prisoners. This is not right. The principle is that a person is imprisoned if he commits a crime, but opinion is not a crime.
We first need to get rid of the heavy legacy represented by pretrial detention, which has turned over time into a punishment in itself. People are held in pretrial detention for long periods, then, when they are referred to court, it may acquit them, but they will have spent a year or two of their lives in detention without a conviction. This is an unjust practice, and it is one of the main reasons the file of political prisoners has remained open until now.
In the National Dialogue, I proposed a practical and more humane alternative: creating a mobile phone application that obliges the person in pretrial detention to log in twice a day to determine his geographical location, with a range set that he is not allowed to go beyond. If he violates this condition, he is dealt with legally as having committed a violation. This solution guarantees oversight, preserves human dignity, and keeps him with his family and his work.
But for a person to remain in pretrial detention for long periods is unacceptable. The file of prisoners of conscience needs great effort; indeed, it needs to be closed for good. The time has come for us to say: enough.
The selection of figures and competent people to take up public posts?
Until this moment, I still see models that perform very well, and this is something that must be acknowledged objectively. But I will not mention names so that the matter is not understood as flattery; rather, I want to talk about the principle.
The way in which we choose some executive officials, foremost among them the governors, is still, unfortunately, based on the logic of “honouring”. It is as if appointing a governor is considered a crowning of someone’s long career, after his retirement from a particular job or sector. The truth is that this approach is wrong, because the governorate is neither a prize nor an end-of-service reward; rather, it is a very great responsibility that requires energy, effort and vision.
I hope to see young people take up the posts of governors, rather than waiting for an official to reach retirement age and then appointing him to a sensitive executive position. We need to inject new blood, with new ideas and practical energy, and not for posts to be rewards for the past.
Incidentally, I am among those who hope that we reach a moment in which parliament is the body that forms the government. This is a dream that may be deferred, but it is not impossible. It is our right to dream of it and to demand it.
What we actually need is a change in the way leaders are chosen, and for there to be greater openness and clear criteria for nomination and appointment that guarantee that the principle in posts is competence, not favouritism or appeasement.
It is true that there are ministers, officials and governors who are indeed performing well, and who are recognised for that, but on the other hand there are also those who do not deliver the required performance and are not held sufficiently to account. The final outcome is that overall performance is affected by this gap.
Do you think the civil opposition is subjected to organised exclusion or systematic restriction within the current political scene?
I do not see that there is total exclusion. The space is not large, but there is an available margin. Two or three years ago, this margin began to widen. Yes, there are restrictions, and the road is not paved, but it is not completely closed. We go to our party headquarters, we meet, we talk, we write, and we appear in the media. This was not possible after 2019. Therefore, we must be fair in the description.
Is this margin sufficient? No. But it exists and it can be expanded, and this is what we are demanding. The space that was available during the National Dialogue has shrunk, and we must demand it again anew, because expanding the public sphere serves the state; it does not threaten it.
A report by “Zawia3” documented the deaths of 25 citizens inside police stations within a limited period of time. How do you view these figures? And what is your position on the reality of detention centres in Egypt?
The growing concern about the conditions of detention centres in Egypt calls for a clear and transparent response from the National Council for Human Rights, as the official body on which the state is supposed to rely to regulate this type of file. If a case of torture or violation emerges in one of the police stations or places of detention, the council must move directly, send a committee to the place, conduct a transparent investigation, and announce its results.
On the other hand, room must be made for society, and especially the media, to exercise its role in oversight and criticism. I believe that holding wrongdoers to account does not mean criminalising the state; on the contrary, it means that the state activates its legal tools and holds the wrongdoing individuals to account, whatever their ranks or positions. This is the state we aspire to: a state that does not cover up wrongdoing and does not bear the burden of individual actions itself.
But on the other hand, everything that is said on social media cannot be treated as established facts, as much of it lacks credibility. I personally have been subjected to such rumours. Therefore, I rely only on what is issued by credible human rights institutions when it comes to a serious or systematic violation.
- Aida Seif El-Dawla: Testimonies from the heart of the struggle against torture (interview)
- Belqas, Zagazig, Girga, Imbaba: Death as a side effect of detention in police stations
The past period has witnessed interest in the file of the return of opponents from abroad, whether through official initiatives or community efforts. How do you assess the developments in this file so far? And do you see it as still being seriously on the state’s agenda?
The file of the return of opponents from abroad needs interest in it to return with the same momentum and positive spirit that we witnessed at its beginning. This file was, at one moment, a bridge that calmed the tension between the state and a segment of its opponents. The truth is that people rejoice at the return of those who have lived abroad for a long time, because in many cases they were living there with their bodies, but their souls and hearts were here in Egypt.
Unfortunately, the file has stalled recently, perhaps because of the complex regional developments, especially after 7 October, but that does not mean that we should ignore it. The forced expatriate is in no less pain than the prisoner, and both deserve reconsideration.
How do you view the policies of blocking news websites in Egypt, especially with regard to independent platforms such as “Zawia3”? And do you see a need to set clear and transparent criteria to regulate this file?
My testimony on Zawia3 is biased, as I appreciate this website and those who run it. When we talk about blocking websites, I see that there is a need to set clear and explicit criteria. It is not permissible for a website to be blocked merely because its discourse is different or critical. A website should be held to account only if it deliberately promoted false news whose falsehood has been verified, or if it incited violence or called for chaos. These are the limits at which alone we can talk about a measure such as blocking, and this decision is supposed to be in the hands of the head of the Journalists Syndicate, not any other body.
Excluding respectable websites leaves a vacuum that is filled by unprofessional foreign platforms, which promote rumours, stir up anger and may push people towards extremism. Therefore, the presence of a critical, professional and responsible media discourse inside Egypt is the real guarantee against chaotic discourse.
How do you assess the official Egyptian position on what is happening in Gaza? And do you see that the state has done the utmost possible, politically and humanly, under the current regional and international circumstances?
Although I had hoped that the Egyptian position would be stronger than it is, I see, with complete objectivity, that Egypt has taken the most respectable and humane positions in the world towards what is happening in Gaza. Egypt was the country that provided the most aid, and it endured a great deal of intransigence in extremely complex negotiations, including from Palestinian parties.
Yes, we had hoped for the Rafah crossing to be opened more widely for humanitarian cases, and for political and diplomatic pressure to be intensified to bring in aid, but in the end we must realise that the crossing is no longer a crossing in the practical sense; rather, there is now an Israeli party standing directly on the other side and refusing the entry of aid.
Let us not burden the Egyptian state with more than it can bear; we must distinguish between the limits of the possible and the limits of the dream. Israel, with the mass crimes it is committing against civilians, has committed what exceeds in its atrocity what the Nazis did, yet the world deals with this criminality as if it is not seen. Therefore, we must preserve for Egypt its balanced position, even as we demand more pressure for the sake of humanity.
