On 13 July, Egypt’s House of Representatives approved legislation giving the Future of Egypt for Sustainable Development agency one year to bring its affairs into compliance, extendable to three years by presidential decision. The legislation redraws the legal and institutional framework of an agency responsible for food security, agricultural development and other strategic projects, and attracted extensive criticism before approval.
The agency was established by Presidential Decree No. 591 of 2022 under the Egyptian Air Force, with pilot Colonel Bahaa El-Din Mohamed El-Ghannam as executive director. It began by managing the Future of Egypt land reclamation project, then expanded into agriculture, food security, strategic commodity imports, food industries and property development, as well as control of 40,000 subsidised-food outlets. Its growth has raised questions about its role, jurisdiction and management of public assets.
The bill reorganises the agency by granting it legal personality and administrative and financial independence, with transitional rules for transferring assets and organisational structures and issuing internal regulations. This raises questions about the limits of its authority, its relationship with ministries and mechanisms for oversight.
Expansion backed by law
In “From Bread to Land: Future of Egypt Takes Root in Everything Grown and Eaten,” Zawia3 reported that the agency’s expansion went beyond agricultural projects to managing strategic imports, particularly wheat and oils for the subsidy system, as some government purchasing shifted to it. The report examined a parliamentary request for information about the difference between wheat and oil import prices and international prices. Experts stressed that transport, insurance and administrative expenses must be considered when assessing those differences.
Another Zawia3 report, “After Land, Wheat and Fish: Future of Egypt Takes Over 40,000 Subsidised-Food Outlets,” traced its expansion from land reclamation and food production into imports, marketing and distribution, including supervision of the development of about 40,000 outlets under the Carry On brand. This expansion across the whole food supply chain, from production to distribution, helps explain the timing of the new bill.
Amr Hashem Rabie, adviser to the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, says the bill contains unprecedented powers and exemptions that give the agency a special legal and administrative status. He places it within a series of exceptional laws passed by parliament over the past decade.
He tells Zawia3 that the bill gives the president a central role in managing the agency, reflected in repeated references to presidential powers across many provisions. This may create the impression of political and administrative immunity that obstructs oversight. Its reliance on dozens of laws and presidential decrees also reflects an unusual breadth within Egyptian legislation.
Rabie notes that several provisions confer broad powers over sustainable development zones, company formation, asset management and rules governing investment, exports and imports. Some powers resemble those of ministers and governors within these zones, potentially overlapping with existing institutions and weakening ministries and local authorities.
What concerns him most are exemptions from general administrative and financial laws and provisions restricting challenges to certain agency transactions involving assets. “Supporting development is compatible with subjecting every public institution to effective oversight. Balancing rapid implementation with transparency, accountability and protection of public money is a necessity, not a choice.”
An independent agency—and the state’s economic administration?
In a paper titled “Inadequate Oversight and Unlimited Exceptions,” the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) says the reorganisation bill does more than restructure an existing administrative body. It creates a legal framework granting broad, exceptional powers over development projects and public assets, making it one of the bills with the greatest implications for the structure of the state’s economic administration in recent years.
The paper says the agency’s board chair would sometimes exercise powers comparable to those of ministers and governors within sustainable development zones. It criticises vague wording such as “national objectives” and “sustainable development zones” without clear criteria, arguing that this allows jurisdiction to expand in ways that are difficult to oversee.
EIPR calls for publication of the agency’s founding decree and every decision granting it powers, assets or land; separation of its regulatory and investment roles so it cannot simultaneously set rules, invest and operate; parliamentary approval for transfers of state-owned assets; a legally specified share of surpluses payable to the public treasury; and competition and disclosure requirements for major contracts on the government procurement portal.
Where is the transparency?
According to the draft reviewed by Zawia3, the bill establishes a new sovereign fund called the Future of Egypt Sovereign Wealth Fund—Pyramids of the Nile—and a service fund called Daem. Both would be affiliated with the agency and have technical, financial and administrative independence. Resources and funding proportions would be set by presidential decision, based on a financing programme proposed by the agency’s chair. Article 46, approved by parliament, defines its aims as sustainable economic development and maximising investment assets for future generations.
The agency itself is reorganised as a fully independent legal entity reporting directly to the president. Its powers include borrowing, establishing companies, managing national projects and sustainable development zones, and operating in agriculture, industry, energy, logistics, tourism and education. The board may add further activities. Between 7% and 10% of the sovereign fund’s annual real returns would be allocated to the public treasury by presidential decision.
Mohamed Ramadan, an economic researcher at EIPR, identifies the absence of transparency since the agency’s establishment as a central problem. He tells Zawia3 that the proposed law calls for its “reorganisation,” although the original founding decision has not been published in a form enabling the public and researchers to understand its powers and their evolution. That makes assessment of its role and limits extremely difficult.
He adds that the agency is not subject to conventional financial oversight: its accounts are examined by an auditor, rather than through publicly disclosed Central Auditing Organisation oversight with periodically published findings. This limits parliament’s and the public’s ability to scrutinise public funds and assets. The transfer of wheat imports and some reclaimed land to the agency also raises questions about the future responsibilities of bodies previously handling them.
“Efficient management of public projects is not achieved simply by creating new entities. It requires stronger transparency, disclosure and parliamentary oversight, and publication of periodic data and reports on performance and spending.”
The source article cites the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International, placing Egypt 130th among 180 countries and the global average at 42 out of 100, its lowest level in more than a decade. These figures are reproduced as the article’s cited comparison, rather than as a measure specific to the Future of Egypt agency.
The state’s traditional executive roles
Officially reported activities include reclamation of 4.5 million feddans; a silo complex with 500,000 tonnes of capacity in the New Delta project; a distribution network of 1,500 commercial outlets under the Super Tawfeer brand; livestock production capacity of 180,000 head annually; the Sphinx crop trading centre with storage and handling capacity of up to 20 million tonnes; 12 poultry slaughterhouses; and renewable energy projects with capacity of 2,320 megawatts.
Hassan El-Barbary, an economic and labour researcher, says the bill gives legal form to a reality already in place. The agency moved beyond its original role years ago, expanding into strategic commodity imports, industrial projects, logistics investments and supply-chain management before legislation organising these powers was enacted.
He tells Zawia3 that the bill reflects a move to turn the agency into a central economic arm of the state, even though Egypt already has major economic institutions: the Sovereign Fund of Egypt, the New Urban Communities Authority, the Industrial Development Authority, public business sector companies and the National Service Projects Organisation. Combining these activities in one entity raises legitimate questions about the reasons for such concentration.
This expansion comes alongside repeated government commitments to enlarge the private sector’s role and reduce the state’s economic presence under the reform programme and agreements with the International Monetary Fund. In his view, combining production, investment, procurement and project management in one body raises questions about equal opportunities and market competition.
El-Barbary concludes that the bill’s powers intersect with the responsibilities of the ministries of supply, agriculture, investment, industry, housing and local development. “Continuing on this path could gradually reduce some ministries’ traditional executive roles as an increasing share of their responsibilities moves to the Future of Egypt agency.”
A law granting powers in agriculture, industry, energy, logistics, tourism and education, with the option to add activities by board decision. A new sovereign fund whose resources are set by presidential decision. Financial review through an auditor without publicly announced periodic reporting. Three researchers interviewed by Zawia3 reached the same conclusion: the expansion is real, while effective oversight is absent.
