Ahmed Ali never imagined that a short visit to his brother in Dubai would become a nightmare. The US–Israeli military operation against Iran began on the previous Saturday, February 28, 2026. This report, written during the first week of the conflict, recounts the reported killing of Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei and attacks on Iranian sites, followed by Iranian missile and drone strikes against US bases and civilian and economic facilities in Gulf states, Jordan and Iraq. It cites more than 400 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones in those early reports, with interceptions, casualties and damage at some airports and facilities.
Ali planned to fly back to Cairo on March 1 but received a Flydubai cancellation notice after airspace closures and flight suspensions. Stranded with his brother, he heard explosions from interceptions of Iranian missiles and drones. At the time, the UAE Defence Ministry reported 35 drones landing in its territory, three expatriates killed and 58 people injured, including Egyptians. These were contemporaneous reported figures, not a final conflict toll.
Hundreds or perhaps thousands of Egyptians in the Gulf faced a choice between danger and protecting their only livelihood. Some hoped for calm or Foreign Ministry evacuation assistance. Alternative routes involved lengthy overland journeys through Oman to Muscat airport, or through Saudi Arabia to fly from Jeddah to Cairo. Their families in Egypt anxiously followed round-the-clock coverage.
Amr Hussein, who works near Abu Dhabi’s Zayed International Airport, was at his company on March 1 when he and colleagues heard a powerful explosion. They learned that debris from an intercepted drone targeting the airport had caused one death and seven injuries. Management evacuated the office and temporarily moved employees to remote work.
Amr stayed in accommodation shared with three expatriate colleagues, frightened by nearby explosions and receiving worried calls from Egypt. His greatest fear, however, was losing his job and returning without an income. He supports elderly parents, his wife and three children and repays a loan taken for his sister’s wedding expenses. He was reluctant to take leave once flights resumed in case he could not return to work.
The article cites more than 1,400 Iranian missiles and drones directed at Gulf and other Arab countries hosting US bases since February 28. It describes attacks on al-Udeid air base and civilian sites in Doha, with at least 16 people reportedly injured and damage to the airport and tourism facilities. The numbers refer to reports available at the time of writing.
It also recounts strikes affecting al-Dhafra air base, Dubai airport and residential buildings in the UAE, with at least three civilian deaths and 58 injuries reported; attacks on Kuwait airport, US bases including Ali al-Salem and the US embassy, with at least three US soldiers killed and 32 people injured cited in the report; and attacks affecting Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and Iraq. Escalation between Hezbollah and Israel and a partial Strait of Hormuz closure added to regional disruption.
Flight traffic between Egypt and Gulf countries suffered widespread disruption from airspace restrictions and airport incidents. Airports mentioned include Dubai, Zayed, Hamad, Kuwait and Bahrain, as well as Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid and King Abdulaziz airports and Muscat. Their inclusion in this list does not mean each sustained the same degree or type of physical damage.
Suspended Flights and Prohibitive Fares
EgyptAir suspended flights to 13 Arab destinations: Kuwait, Dubai, Doha, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, al-Qassim, Dammam, Erbil, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut and Muscat. The Civil Aviation Ministry reported operating 69 of 116 scheduled Gulf flights and cancelling 47.
On March 6, EgyptAir announced gradual resumption of flights to and from Dubai and Dammam. Prices shocked stranded passengers: the report cites a Dubai–Cairo return journey at approximately EGP 165,000 and a Dammam–Cairo seat at EGP 73,000. These were prices reported during the disruption, not current fares.
The six Gulf states host an estimated four to five million Egyptians, the article says: around 1.4–1.5 million in Saudi Arabia, 1.3 million in the UAE, 300,000 in Qatar, 667,000 in Kuwait, 30,000–40,000 in Bahrain and 50,000–96,000 in Oman. It separately cites 900,000–1.25 million in Jordan, about 11,000 in Lebanon and 1,500–2,000 in Iraq. These estimates come from different sources and should not be read as a single reconciled census.
Ahmed Sultan, a researcher on regional security and terrorism, describes a highly uncertain escalation that could last from around ten days to several weeks or enter more complicated scenarios. He sees Iran widening confrontation as a test of regime survival and attempting to raise the cost to the United States and allies by exhausting air defences. Strikes on infrastructure, airports and oil facilities reduce the margin of civilian safety as fighting continues, he argues.
Sultan told Zawia3 that prolonged tensions could produce exceptional Gulf security and regulatory measures affecting aviation, investment and foreign labour. Extended disruption would affect expatriates’ work and remittances. He considered a broad strategic shift unlikely in the immediate term unless the crisis persisted, in which case reduced work and wider host-country pressures could affect Egypt’s economy.
Implications for Egyptian Communities
Ambassador Rakha Ahmed Hassan, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and Egyptian United Nations Association, says attacks on sites hosting US forces disrupted economic activity, encouraged remote work and increased insecurity. Reduced oil and gas exports threaten Gulf revenue. The duration would depend on Iran’s response and pressure to contain the conflict; efforts to overthrow its government could extend war for months, he warns.
For Egyptians stranded by short flight suspensions, Hassan suggested waiting where no emergency existed, with overland routes or neighbouring airports as alternatives when necessary. He says embassies and consulates maintain established community channels, particularly since COVID-19, and coordinate with local authorities. Community leaders and Egyptian institutions abroad complement diplomatic missions.
Employment effects may remain limited if escalation lasts only weeks, Hassan argues. Longer fighting and substantial company losses could trigger layoffs or hiring freezes and reduce remittances. Disrupted food and essential-supply chains would also affect expatriates unless alternative supply routes were found.
Former assistant foreign minister Ambassador Ali al-Hefny says attacks within sovereign Gulf states directly threaten resident communities, including large Egyptian populations, and affect Egyptian national security. He condemned strikes on Arab states that had declared themselves outside the US–Israeli confrontation with Iran.
Al-Hefny considered mass Egyptian return unlikely at that stage because residents’ work, families and livelihoods tie them to the Gulf. Some might temporarily return as a precaution. He says diplomatic missions have experience handling both routine and exceptional circumstances and that flight cancellations affected international as well as Egyptian airlines reassessing security.
The Foreign Ministry raised readiness at Egyptian missions, said it was monitoring communities and asked citizens to exercise caution, remain in contact with embassies and consulates and follow host-country instructions. It also announced faster overseas passport issuance, reducing the stated period to under a week.
The Egyptian Embassy in Riyadh announced that Egyptians travelling overland from Saudi Arabia’s neighbouring countries could obtain emergency entry visas directly at land crossings. This describes the announcement at the time; travellers need to check applicable requirements before attempting a route.
The National Telecom Regulatory Authority instructed Egyptian mobile operators to provide subscribers with five free international calling minutes to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan to contact relatives during the crisis.
Egypt meanwhile increased its emergency entry-visa fee from US$25 to US$30 from March 1, 2026, at airports and other entry points, a step that drew controversy.
Al-Hefny warned that unclear prospects for agreement, uncertainty inside Iran after strikes on leaders and US determination could prolong confrontation. Effects would reach energy markets, capital flows, investment, tourism, shipping, trade and exchange rates.
Remittances and the Risk of Return
Rawya Mokhtar, deputy chair of the House Manpower Committee, believes a worsening regional war could reduce expatriate remittances. She says Egypt is taking preventive steps to protect economic stability and citizens abroad.
Embassies are ready for developments affecting communities, Mokhtar told Zawia3. Evacuation or mass return usually responds to exceptional emergencies, and the Foreign Ministry could arrange returns if dangerous conditions persist. She notes that disruption is concentrated in certain areas while normal life continues elsewhere.
Mokhtar points to alternative overland travel through Saudi Arabia and its announced exceptional visas, with flights continuing to some Saudi cities outside affected areas.
She characterises possible mass returns as emergency scenarios rather than permanent conditions. Dollar and gold movements already showed direct economic effects, she says, calling for careful monitoring and preparedness.
The article estimates four to five million Egyptian workers in the Gulf, concentrated in education, healthcare, engineering, construction and services. Egyptians abroad remitted approximately US$41.5 billion in 2025, around 40.5% above US$29.6 billion in 2024, according to the figures cited.
The report estimates the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, accounts for over 60–70% of total remittances. It separately cites US$8–10 billion annually from Saudi Arabia and US$3.6 billion from the UAE in 2024/2025. These country figures and the wider share are source estimates for differing periods and do not constitute a complete country breakdown.
Remittances are among Egypt’s largest foreign-currency sources, at times exceeding tourism or Suez Canal receipts and some export measures. They helped support reserves that exceeded US$50 billion at the end of 2025, exchange-rate stability and domestic activity.
Different Assessments of the Economic Fallout
Dr Karim al-Omda, professor of international economics, considers talk of mass return premature. Earlier conflicts, such as Libya’s, produced returns after extended fighting rather than immediately. Months of disruption could alter the picture, he says, while exchange-rate volatility had already disturbed the timing of transfers.
Prolonged conflict may lower expatriate earnings and dollar remittances, al-Omda told Zawia3. Even a modest decline could pressure exchange rates and reserves if accompanied by short-term investment outflows or weaker tourism and Suez Canal revenue, potentially echoing pressures during Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Foreign-labour cuts depend on duration, he argues, with tourism, construction and aviation especially exposed. A Strait of Hormuz closure could raise food-import transport costs for maritime-dependent Gulf countries and pressure their economies.
Al-Omda also envisages some Gulf citizens temporarily staying in Egypt because of security fears, benefiting tourism through longer visits and relatively high spending. He still expected Egyptians’ early returns mainly to take the form of temporary leave rather than mass dismissals.
Economist Khaled al-Shafei, head of the Capital Center for Economic Studies and Research, argues that escalation at that stage primarily targeted US military sites and business activity remained relatively normal. His assessment differs from the civilian and infrastructure incidents described earlier. Broader strikes on companies or civilian facilities, especially US-linked investments, could affect oil, tourism and construction and a portion of Egyptian workers, he says.
Effects may remain limited if fighting is brief, al-Shafei told Zawia3. A wider or prolonged conflict could affect the global economy, supply chains and Hormuz, prompting temporary staff reductions. Some returning Egyptians’ skills could be absorbed by domestic small and medium-sized enterprises, he suggests.
Capital-markets expert Ehab Saeed, however, warns that sudden large-scale returns could shock Egypt’s labour market, which cannot quickly absorb such numbers, increasing unemployment and affecting millions of families dependent on overseas incomes.
Saeed says economic effects had already appeared in short-term foreign-investment outflows and risks to Suez Canal shipping if tension or trade disruption escalated.
He too considers a return wave unlikely in the first days but warns that months of conflict could reduce foreign employment in tourism, construction and aviation.
Anxiety and exchange-rate changes can lead workers to postpone transfers while waiting for more favourable rates, Saeed explains. Prolonged disruption could later affect their incomes themselves. A substantial remittance fall would directly pressure exchange rates and reserves alongside tourism and canal revenue.
Millions of Egyptians in countries affected by the escalation, especially in the Gulf, face security risks and fear of job loss while hoping for a quick restoration of stability. A longer or wider confrontation could reshape energy, economies and labour flows. At the time of this report, uncertainty left expatriates and their families closely watching every development.
