It never occurred to Ahmed Ali that a short trip to the UAE to visit his brother, who lives in Dubai, would turn into a nightmare, with the outbreak last Saturday of US-Israeli military operations against Iran, which resulted in the killing of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the destruction of several Iranian sites. In response, Tehran launched more than 400 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones towards US military bases and civilian and economic facilities in the Gulf states, Jordan and Iraq, amid air interceptions, relatively limited human losses and material damage to some airports and facilities.
Ali had planned to fly back to Cairo on 1 March, but he received a message from flydubai informing him that the flight had been cancelled because of the closure of airspace and the suspension of flights, and he found himself stranded with his brother, gripped by anxiety and fear as the sounds of explosions erupted from attempts to intercept Iranian missiles and drones. Meanwhile, the UAE Ministry of Defence announced that 35 Iranian drones had fallen inside its territory, killing three expatriates and injuring 58 others, including Egyptians.
Between the fire of war and fear for their only source of livelihood, hundreds and perhaps thousands of Egyptians present in the Gulf states stand in the middle of the war, hoping that things will calm down quickly and life will return to normal, or that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will help evacuate them, as they search for a safe route home: either overland through the Sultanate of Oman, on a journey lasting many hours along rough roads, until reaching Muscat airport and from there Egypt, or via the land route to Saudi Arabia, then departing from Jeddah airport to Cairo airport, while their families in Egypt live in intense anxiety as they follow the non-stop news of the war on news channels and social media around the clock.
Nearby, Amr Hussein, who lives in the Emirati capital Abu Dhabi and works at a company close to Zayed International Airport, was with his colleagues at his workplace on 1 March when they heard the sound of a violent explosion, and they soon learned that its source was the interception of a drone that had targeted the airport, causing falling debris that resulted in one death and 7 injuries. Following this, the company’s management decided to evacuate its premises and temporarily suspend work there, with its employees working remotely from their homes.
As a result, Amr was forced to stay in his accommodation, which he shares with three other expatriate colleagues, all of them gripped by fear and anxiety whenever they hear the boom of a nearby explosion, and from time to time he receives a call from Egypt from one of his worried relatives and friends. Despite fears about the war dragging on or widening, Amr’s greatest fear is that it will cost him his job and that he will return to his family empty-handed; he supports his elderly parents, a wife and three children, and is repaying the instalments of a loan he took out last year to buy his sister’s wedding necessities. That is why he prefers not to take leave and return home when flights resume, for fear that he will not get the chance to come back and will end up in the unemployment queue.
Since 28 February, the total number of Iranian attacks on Gulf and Arab states hosting US bases has exceeded 1,400 missiles and drones; Al Udeid Air Base and civilian sites in the Qatari capital Doha were targeted, injuring at least 16 people and damaging the international airport and tourist facilities.
In the UAE, the strikes hit Al Dhafra Air Base, Dubai International Airport and residential buildings, leaving at least three civilians dead and 58 others injured and causing damage to infrastructure, and attacks were launched on Kuwait International Airport and US military bases, including Ali Al Salem Air Base, and on the US embassy, which resulted in the deaths of at least three US soldiers and injuries to 32 people. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and Iraq were likewise subjected to attacks targeting airports, oil facilities and military bases, in addition to the escalation between Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Israel, coinciding with a partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
At the same time, air traffic between the Gulf states and Egypt is experiencing widespread disruption due to the partial or total closure of airspace in a number of Gulf states, and damage to major airports, most notably: Dubai International Airport, Zayed International in Abu Dhabi, Hamad International Airport in Qatar, Kuwait International Airport, Bahrain International Airport, King Khalid and King Abdulaziz International Airports in Saudi Arabia, and Muscat International Airport in the Sultanate of Oman.
Since the outbreak of the war, EgyptAir has announced the suspension of flights to 13 Arab destinations, including: (Kuwait, Dubai, Doha, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Qassim, Dammam, Erbil, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, Muscat), while the Ministry of Civil Aviation confirmed the operation of 69 flights out of 116 scheduled to the Gulf states, and the cancellation of 47 flights.
On 6 March, the company announced the gradual operation of outbound and return flights from Dubai and Dammam, after an earlier suspension due to regional tensions, but flight prices came as a shock to many stranded Egyptians: the price of a return flight from Dubai reached about EGP 165,000, and the price of a seat on the return flight from Dammam rose to EGP 73,000.
The six Gulf states are the largest concentration of Egyptian workers abroad; they host about 4 to 5 million Egyptians, including 1.4 to 1.5 million in Saudi Arabia alone, about 1.3 million in the UAE, around 300,000 Egyptians in Qatar, and about 667,000 in Kuwait, while in Bahrain estimates range between 30 and 40,000, and the number in Oman ranges between 50 and 96,000. In Jordan, estimates range between 900,000 and 1.25 million Egyptians, while the number of Egyptians in Lebanon is estimated at about 11,000, and in Iraq there are about 1,500 to 2,000 Egyptians.
Ahmed Sultan, a researcher in regional security and terrorism, describes the current course of military escalation as carrying a high degree of uncertainty: the war could slide into more complex scenarios and extend from a timeframe of no more than ten days to several weeks. He explains that Iran is moving to widen the scope of the confrontation, as it is facing a decisive test of the ruling regime’s survival, and to raise the cost of operations for the United States and its allies by depleting air defence systems and confusing the regional picture, considering that the widening range of targets, to vital facilities, airports, and oil facilities or infrastructure, indicates that the conflict may not remain confined to military targets, so the margin of safety is gradually shrinking and security risks rise the longer the confrontation lasts.
Speaking to Zawia3, Sultan believes that continued tensions may push Gulf governments to take exceptional security and regulatory measures affecting air traffic, investments and flows of expatriate workers, explaining that any long-term disruption will necessarily be reflected in economic activity, and consequently in the conditions of foreign residents, including Egyptian workers. Nevertheless, he rules out a broad strategic shift in the near term, unless the crisis drags on, which would lead to a decline in Egyptians’ remittances as a result of disruption to some businesses or through wider economic pressures in host countries, and would consequently be reflected in the Egyptian economy.
The Repercussions of the Escalation for Egyptian Communities
Ambassador Rakha Ahmed Hassan, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and of the Egyptian Association for the United Nations, tells Zawia3 that the targeting of sites housing US bases or personnel inside some Gulf states leads to the disruption of economic and service activities and to some sectors moving to remote work, in addition to a growing sense of insecurity and uncertainty about the duration of the war, as well as a halt or decline in oil and gas exports, which represent the largest share of Gulf states’ revenues. He notes that the duration of the war depends on how far Iran seeks to show a retaliatory response proportionate to the scale of the targeting it has suffered, and on the extent of regional and international pressure on the United States to contain the conflict, and that continuing operations with the aim of toppling the Iranian regime could prolong the confrontation for months, a scenario that is extremely dangerous for the stability of the Gulf and of the Middle East as a whole.
Regarding Egyptians stranded in the affected Arab countries because of the suspension of some flights, Hassan believes that short suspension periods can be dealt with by waiting unless there are emergency cases, in which case alternative land routes or airports in neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia can be used, affirming that Egyptian embassies and consulates have had open channels of communication with the communities for years, especially since the coronavirus pandemic, to provide support and coordinate with local authorities when needed, and that community leaders and Egyptian institutions abroad play a complementary role in communicating and coordinating with diplomatic missions to ensure a rapid response to any developments.
As for Egyptian workers, he explains that the impact will remain limited if the escalation stays within a short timeframe of no more than several weeks; Egyptians will be affected just like the citizens of their countries of residence. But he warns that if the war drags on and companies or factories suffer major losses, they may resort to cutting staff or freezing hiring, which will be reflected in the number of workers and their remittances to Egypt. He also fears the consequences of disruption to supply chains for food and basic needs in the Gulf states, which would have a negative impact on the conditions of expatriates, including Egyptians, unless those states find alternative supply routes via third parties.
For his part, Ambassador Ali El-Hefny, a former Assistant Foreign Minister, believes that the strikes that hit targets inside some Gulf states necessarily represent a direct danger to the communities residing there, including the Egyptian community, which is widely spread across the various Gulf Cooperation Council states and numbers hundreds of thousands in some of them, exceeding one million, as is the case in Saudi Arabia. He condemns the targeting of the territory of sovereign Arab states, especially since they have clearly declared that they are not party to the confrontation under way between the United States and Israel on the one hand and Iran on the other, which in turn has a bearing on Egyptian national security.
Nevertheless, El-Hefny rules out large waves of return by Egyptian communities at present, since Egyptians in the Gulf states are tied to their jobs, their families and their stable livelihoods, while some individuals may choose to return to Egypt temporarily as a personal precaution, without this meaning a large-scale shift in employment conditions. As for the readiness of Egyptian embassies and consulates, he affirms that diplomatic missions exist to deal with both normal and exceptional circumstances, and that they have sufficient expertise and experience to provide the necessary support to citizens should the situation develop, affirming that the changes or cancellations seen in air traffic are not limited to Egyptian carriers but have included several international companies that have reassessed their routes in light of the security situation, and considering that these measures fall within the natural repercussions of any military escalation.
For its part, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised Egyptian missions to a state of maximum readiness, affirming that it is following the situation of members of the Egyptian community to ensure the necessary consular support and care, and calling on them to exercise caution, to stay in constant and continuous contact with Egyptian embassies and consulates, and to comply with all instructions issued by the authorities of the countries in which they reside. It also announced measures to facilitate and speed up the issuing of passports for Egyptians residing abroad, including cutting the issuance time to less than a week.
For its part, the Egyptian embassy in Riyadh announced that Egyptians arriving overland from countries neighbouring the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would be allowed to obtain an emergency entry visa directly on arrival at Saudi land border crossings.
For its part, the National Telecom Regulatory Authority directed the mobile operators working in Egypt to give subscribers five free international minutes to call a number of Arab countries, namely: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan, so that they could check on their relatives amid the war.
In a step that stirred controversy, Egypt began applying an increase in the emergency visa fee for entry into the country from $25 to $30, as of 1 March 2026, at border crossings and airports.
The former Assistant Foreign Minister believes that the current scene portends a prolonged confrontation, in the absence of clear signs of imminent understandings between the warring parties, especially given the confusion inside Iran following the targeting of prominent leaders, and the corresponding US insistence on achieving its goals from the escalation, which will be reflected in energy markets, capital flows, investments, tourism, maritime navigation and international trade, as well as in monetary and financial effects linked to currency prices.
A Decline in Remittances from Egyptians Abroad
MP Rawya Mokhtar, deputy chair of the House of Representatives’ Manpower Committee, believes that the worsening of the war and the widening of military escalation in the region may naturally lead to a decline in the remittances of Egyptians working abroad, something that is possible amid regional turmoil, considering that the Egyptian state is preparing for this with pre-emptive moves to preserve its economic stability and the security of its citizens abroad.
She tells Zawia3: “Egyptian embassies in the various countries of the world are fully prepared to deal with any developments that may affect Egyptian communities, and the state always moves with precautionary steps to protect its citizens; any evacuation or mass return operations are usually linked to exceptional and emergency circumstances, and if the situation remains dangerous, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may take measures to bring citizens back to preserve their safety”, pointing out that the effects are concentrated in specific areas of the Gulf states, while life continues normally in other areas.
The MP points out that alternative routes are being used, including travelling overland to Saudi Arabia, adding that “the Saudi authorities have begun granting exceptional visas to Egyptians arriving via land crossings in light of the disruption of some flights, with air traffic continuing to some Saudi cities except for specific areas affected by security developments”.
On the capacity of the local labour market to absorb potential numbers of returnees, the deputy chair of the House of Representatives’ Manpower Committee believes that what is happening amounts to emergency scenarios rather than permanent situations, and such cases are dealt with as exceptional and temporary. Nevertheless, she points to direct economic effects on Egypt, in the form of movements in dollar and gold prices coinciding with the escalation, stressing the need to follow developments cautiously in order to deal with the various scenarios and preserve citizens’ security and the stability of the state.
The total Egyptian workforce in the Gulf states is estimated at about 4 to 5 million people, most of them concentrated in the education, health, engineering, construction and services sectors, and remittances from Egyptians working abroad recorded about $41.5 billion in 2025, an increase of nearly 40.5% compared with 2024, in which remittances reached $29.6 billion.
The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, account for more than 60 to 70% of total remittances, with annual remittances from Saudi Arabia estimated at about $8 to 10 billion, and from the UAE at about $3.6 billion in 2024/2025.
Remittances are one of Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency in some years, exceeding the revenues of tourism, the Suez Canal and exports, and have helped support foreign exchange reserves, which exceeded $50 billion by the end of 2025, strengthen exchange rate stability and support domestic economic activity.
Dr Karim El-Omda, professor of international economics, believes that talk of a mass return of Egyptian workers from the Gulf states in the wake of the military escalation against Iran is still premature, pointing to previous experiences, such as the Libyan crisis, which showed that the return of workers comes after an extended period of conflict, not in its early stages, and that the continuation of the crisis for several months could lead to repercussions of this kind. He points out that the volatility in foreign exchange rates since the outbreak of the conflict has disrupted the pace of remittances from Egyptians abroad.
He tells Zawia3: “A prolonged crisis could be reflected in the incomes of workers abroad, and consequently in the proceeds of dollar remittances, which represent one of Egypt’s most important sources of foreign currency. Any decline in this resource, even by limited percentages, could affect the exchange rate and monetary reserves, especially if it coincides with an outflow of short-term foreign investment or a decline in tourism and Suez Canal revenues, which could create pressures similar to those Egypt experienced during the crisis of the Russian–Ukrainian war.”
Regarding the possibility of Gulf states cutting foreign labour, he explains that this scenario remains dependent on how long the conflict lasts, affirming that the sectors most vulnerable if tension continues are tourism, construction and aviation, and warning of potential repercussions if the Strait of Hormuz is closed, since some Gulf states rely on maritime imports of food, which could raise transport costs and put pressure on their economies.
El-Omda expects that if security fears escalate, numbers of Gulf citizens may head to Egypt to spend temporary periods there, which could give a positive boost to the tourism sector given the Gulf tourist’s high spending and longer stays compared with others. At the same time, however, he rules out a large wave of return by Egyptian workers, suggesting that some of them would come on temporary leave until the picture becomes clearer, and not as a result of mass layoffs.
For his part, Khaled El-Shafei, an economic expert and head of the Capital Centre for Economic Studies and Research, explains that the military escalation so far has been concentrated on US military bases and sites in some countries, and not directly on economic activities, which means that business sectors in the Gulf states are still operating relatively normally. If, however, the scope of the strikes expands to include companies or civilian facilities, especially those housing US investments, he expects some sectors such as oil, tourism and contracting to be affected, which could be reflected in part of the Egyptian workforce employed in them and thus lead to a limited decline in remittances from workers abroad.
He tells Zawia3: “The impact will remain limited if the escalation lasts for a short period, but if it develops into a wide or prolonged regional conflict, the repercussions will reach the entire global economy, including the possibility of disruption to supply chains and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which may push some companies to reduce staff temporarily”, believing it possible to integrate a small portion of the Egyptian workers who may return to Egypt into the local market, especially in small and medium enterprises, given the professional expertise they possess.
By contrast, Ehab Saeed, a capital markets expert, warns that the sudden return of large numbers of Egyptian workers, should the conflict worsen, could be a shock to the local labour market, which cannot absorb these numbers in a short time, and this could lead to higher unemployment rates and affect millions of families that rely on the incomes of workers abroad as a main source of spending.
Saeed points out that the economic repercussions have already begun to appear, particularly on the Egyptian economy, through the exit of part of the short-term foreign investment (hot money), in addition to the possibility of a decline in navigation through the Suez Canal if tensions escalate or some trade routes are disrupted.
While he rules out waves of return during the first days of the escalation, he warns that if the conflict continues for several months, foreign labour may be cut in some of the most affected sectors, such as tourism, construction and aviation.
He points out that the anxiety resulting from regional tensions and the recent changes in the exchange rate have disrupted the pace of remittances from Egyptians abroad, explaining that some workers may postpone transferring their savings while waiting for the exchange rate to improve, and noting that the continuation of the crisis may later be reflected in the incomes of the workers themselves, and consequently in the proceeds of dollar remittances. He affirms that any noticeable decline in remittances will directly affect the exchange rate and monetary reserves, especially as they represent one of Egypt’s largest sources of foreign currency, alongside the Suez Canal and tourism.
Millions of Egyptians in the countries affected by the military escalation, particularly the Gulf, stand between the hammer of the security risks resulting from the military escalation on the one hand and the anvil of anxiety over the spectre of layoffs on the other, searching for any glimmer of hope of an imminent breakthrough that will restore stability to the region.
At the same time, the scenarios remain open to more complex possibilities if the confrontation drags on or widens, unless the crisis is contained and prevented from sliding into an all-out regional conflict that redraws the map of the economy, energy and labour movement in the region. Until the picture becomes clear, caution remains the order of the day, and the eyes of Egyptians abroad and of their families at home remain fixed on developments.
