The unilateral recognition by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of the so-called “Republic of Somaliland”, or what is known as the “Somaliland” region, as an “independent sovereign” state, has provoked angry Egyptian and Arab diplomatic reactions. Egypt strongly condemned it, considering it a flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations that undermines the foundations of international peace and security and contributes to destabilising the Horn of Africa region. In a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Saturday, it affirmed its total rejection of the recognition of any parallel entities or of secession by illegitimate and illegal means, and its full support for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, in line with the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
For his part, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud considered the recognition a clear departure from internationally recognised diplomatic and legal rules, while the Council of the Arab League held an emergency meeting on Sunday at the level of permanent representatives, during which it described the recognition of Somaliland as illegal and as part of Tel Aviv’s attempts to destabilise international security and peace, expressing its rejection of the violation of northern Somalia’s ports and accusing the occupation state of seeking to establish military bases there. In contrast, the Minister of the Presidency in the Somaliland region, Khader Hussein Abdi, said that the Israeli recognition does not necessarily mean the establishment of an Israeli military base.
Somaliland is located in the Horn of Africa region, on the African mainland, on the shore of the Gulf of Aden, specifically in northern Somalia. It is bordered by Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti to the north-west and the Gulf of Aden to the north, up to the maritime border with Yemen. The area of its claimed territory is 176,120 square kilometres (68,000 square miles), and its population was about 6.2 million in 2024. Its capital and largest city is Hargeisa. It had previously declared its independence from Somalia in 1991, but it has not obtained any official recognition. In 2001 it held a popular referendum that enshrined absolute separation from Somalia and the establishment of the Republic of Somaliland, and it later created a government, a parliament and an army; it has also issued a passport for its residents since September 2000.
Observers expect wide regional repercussions from Tel Aviv’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland, extending from Somalia to Sudan and the countries overlooking the Red Sea, and this step cannot be separated from the ongoing struggles for influence in the region, according to Ahmed Jesod, a Somali researcher in international relations. He explains that previous experiences in the region have shown how such moves can affect the course of conflicts, particularly in Sudan before the outbreak of its current crisis, pointing to previous accusations of military and logistical support being provided to the Rapid Support Forces through areas in northern Somalia, including Bosaso, the largest city in Somalia and its main port, and Berbera Airport, in the context of well-known regional interventions.
He tells Zawia3: “The Israeli recognition of Somaliland may have direct repercussions on the war raging in Sudan. It may also contribute to stifling a number of Arab countries overlooking the Red Sea, foremost among them Egypt and Saudi Arabia, by tightening the squeeze on vital maritime corridors and threatening the security of navigation in this strategic region.”
The Somali researcher points out that the latest Israeli step may encourage separatist tendencies in more than one country, whether in Sudan, by spurring separatist forces in the east or the west, or in Somalia, by reinforcing the reality of division in the north of the country and the escalation that may result from it between the forces opposing and supporting secession within the Somali regions. He points to a growing similarity between the cases of Sudan and Somalia in terms of the risks of disintegration and the fragmentation of a single state, affirming that any external support for separatist entities deepens these crises rather than addressing them.
He warns that the countries overlooking the Red Sea will be negatively affected by any intention of military or intelligence expansion in these corridors, considering that the military, security and economic dimensions of the Israeli move constitute a direct threat to the stability of the region and may lead to long-term negative consequences for all the countries of the region.
In addition, the decision is seen as an attempt by Tel Aviv to strengthen its influence in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region, and this does not come in isolation from the repercussions of the genocidal war it waged on the Gaza Strip after 7 October 2023, and its plans to displace the Strip’s residents. Earlier, Hebrew media outlets claimed that US President Donald Trump was planning to deport them and resettle them in three countries: Somaliland, Puntland and Morocco, and alleged that the government of “Somaliland” had expressed its readiness to receive Palestinians displaced from Gaza in exchange for its recognition as an independent state.
However, Trump announced, in an official interview published on Friday, his refusal to recognise the independence of “Somaliland”, asking: “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?” Meanwhile, the foreign minister of the so-called government of Somaliland, Abdirahman Dahir Adan, claimed in an interview with Israel’s Channel 12 on Saturday evening that Israel’s recognition of his country has nothing to do with the Gaza issue or any political commitments.
A Struggle for Influence at Bab el-Mandeb
The unilateral Israeli recognition of Somaliland comes within the framework of what is described as a phase of Israeli expansion and spread pursued by the current right-wing government in Israel, which is taking advantage of the absence of any effective international punishment or any real capacity to deter its policies, despite the resolutions issued by the United Nations and by regional and international organisations, according to Ambassador Rakha Ahmed Hassan, member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and member of the Egyptian Association for the United Nations. He explains that Israel has managed, in recent years, to carry out military and political moves in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank without facing deterrent consequences, which has encouraged it to press ahead with an expansionist strategy that aims, in one of its main dimensions, to secure a military presence at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as a strategic entrance to the Red Sea.
He tells Zawia3: “This orientation carries a second strategic dimension, represented in the proximity of this potential military presence to Iran, allowing Israel to move militarily via a maritime route that passes through the Arabian Sea alongside the Yemeni coast up to Iranian territory, without the need to pass through other countries. These objectives explain an important part of the Israeli motives behind the recognition of Somaliland.”
“This step also comes in the context of Israel’s quest to present itself as a major power in the Middle East, capable of moving freely and imposing new realities without regard for international law or for the positions of Arab and African states, and the basic message that Israel seeks to entrench is that it does what it wants,” Hassan adds.
While he stresses that the Israeli recognition constitutes an explicit aggression against a member state of the Arab League, the African Union and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, a new breach of international law and an attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state that does not neighbour it, the event, in his view, called for stronger Arab action, reaching the level of a meeting of Arab foreign ministers instead of settling for a meeting of permanent representatives, if there is a real awareness of the seriousness of the repercussions. He wonders whether this Israeli step will encourage other regional parties, foremost among them Ethiopia, to take a similar path, recalling that Addis Ababa had stirred wide controversy, during November and December of last year, over its intention to recognise Somaliland in exchange for obtaining military and commercial facilities in the port of Berbera, before African parties intervened to mediate and halt the process, with emphasis on the need to negotiate with the Somali federal government in Mogadishu.
Hassan believes that the Israeli recognition may encourage other countries to take similar steps towards Somaliland, given a historical reality dating back to 1991, when the region unilaterally declared its independence following the collapse of the Somali state. He warns that these developments may redraw the maps of influence in the Horn of Africa, with direct repercussions on Egyptian interests in the region, pointing out that Egypt has strengthened its presence there through its participation with forces in peacekeeping missions, in addition to bilateral agreements to train Somali forces.
The member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs draws attention to circulating claims that this recognition is linked to plans aimed at displacing Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to Somaliland, as former US President Donald Trump had put forward this proposal earlier and did not officially withdraw it, but merely remained silent about it. He also points out that the United States has been in undisclosed negotiations with Somaliland since last March, despite Trump’s statements in which he claimed not to know enough about the region, which he described as a clear contradiction in US positions.
The Egyptian diplomat affirms that Israel’s continuation of its plan, especially if it proceeds to establish a military base in ports such as Hargeisa or Berbera, may open the door to internal conflicts between the Somaliland region and the central Somali government, calling for new regional and international interventions, warning that this represents a direct threat to Arab national security, and especially to Egyptian national security.
Observers believe that the Israeli recognition represents a direct threat to Egyptian national security, as it comes in the context of geopolitical tensions with Ethiopia, which in January 2024 signed a memorandum of understanding with the so-called Somaliland region allowing it to exploit the port of Berbera on the Red Sea commercially and militarily, which may in future constitute a threat to navigation in the Red Sea and consequently to the Suez Canal.
Egypt and Somalia signed, in August 2024, a military cooperation protocol aimed at strengthening the capabilities of the Somali state and its national institutions in order to maintain security and stability and to combat terrorist and extremist organisations, and a year ago, a shipment of Egyptian military aid for the Somali army arrived in the Somali capital, “Mogadishu”.
For his part, Ambassador Mohamed Hegazy, former Assistant Foreign Minister, affirms that the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region is passing through a delicate moment of transformation in which maritime security considerations intertwine with the rearrangement of regional and international maps of influence, warning that the Israeli recognition of the “Somaliland” region cannot be read in isolation from regional and international efforts, which have become clear, to open new maritime outlets on the Red Sea, whether for Israel or for Ethiopia, through sites such as Eritrea’s Assab or Berbera in Somaliland.
He tells Zawia3: “These developments raise a fundamental question as to whether they are merely circumstantial security measures, or the beginning of a new strategic engineering to reshape the region. From the perspective of Egyptian interests, these moves must not be treated as separate events, but as an interconnected chain with direct repercussions on the security of the Red Sea, the balances of the Nile Basin and Egypt’s regional position, in addition to the explicit challenge they represent to the principles of international law and the sanctity of borders under African and international charters.”
The first reading of these moves, which are backed by regional and international powers, reflects, in his view, a broader effort to redistribute influence in one of the most important maritime corridors in the world, noting that the Red Sea is no longer merely a trade corridor, but has turned into an international security space in which the calculations of the major powers intersect with the interests of the countries of the region. He affirms that the threat is not measured by a single step or an isolated decision, but by the nature of the cumulative path, explaining that any Israeli or Ethiopian presence, direct or indirect, on the Red Sea and under the umbrella of international arrangements, means introducing a new element into the equation of Egyptian national security, which has historically rested on rejecting any presence of states that are not littoral to the Red Sea and to the coasts facing the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb, considering that this path opens the door to a broader internationalisation of the region’s crises.
The former Assistant Foreign Minister points out that diplomacy alone is not enough, considering that the most effective path lies in building regional alliances based on the common interests of the Red Sea littoral states, affirming that Egypt has a realistic opportunity to coordinate a collective position with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea, and with Somalia itself, to affirm that the security of the Red Sea is a regional responsibility, and that any arrangements imposed through unrecognised entities will lead to destabilisation, not to protection.
He adds that “the option of Egyptian naval repositioning remains a necessary element of deterrence, not with the aim of escalation, but to establish a clear equation, namely that the Red Sea is not an open arena for geopolitical re-engineering in favour of landlocked states”, noting that strengthening the Egyptian naval presence and reviving the frameworks of regional cooperation among the states overlooking the Red Sea, foremost among them the Council for Cooperation of the States Overlooking the Red Sea, headquartered in Riyadh, along with intensifying joint naval exercises and demonstrating readiness to protect navigation lines, represent strategic messages complementary to the diplomatic track. He calls for effective Egyptian action at the Arab, African and international levels to thwart a plan that goes beyond the unity of the Somali state and strikes at the foundations of coexistence within the single homeland.
Escalating Geostrategic Competition
Tel Aviv’s recognition of Somaliland comes as part of an attempt to encircle Egypt and stifle it strategically from the direction of the Red Sea to the south, and it serves directly the interests of Ethiopia, which has been seeking for years to obtain a maritime outlet on the Red Sea, as it gives Addis Ababa indirect political cover to strengthen its moves in a region that is not internationally recognised, has broken away from the Somali state and does not enjoy the recognition of the United Nations or the international community. This comes in parallel with the increasing pressures on Egyptian national security resulting from the war in Sudan, according to Dr Sarah Kira, an international relations expert and director of the European North African Centre for Research.
She tells Zawia3: “The danger of Somalia stems not only from its prolonged crises, such as poverty, famines and the maritime piracy that the region witnessed over the past two decades, but from its extremely sensitive geostrategic location, which represents a stifling pressure point on Egypt at the southern entrance of the Red Sea, with direct repercussions on the security of the Suez Canal and international navigation.”
“Israeli moves in this context represent an insidious political pressure tool against Egypt, aimed at pushing it on specific positions, foremost among them its refusal to meet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and its rejection of any scenario related to the displacement of Palestinians to Sinai,” the expert affirms, considering that Israel is using the Ethiopian card to exert indirect pressure through the “Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” file and by expanding its influence in the Horn of Africa.
She points out that any potential military or logistical cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland, including the establishment of military bases or granting Addis Ababa a land outlet or a port on the Red Sea, would constitute a direct threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal, considering that the Israeli recognition of the breakaway region comes precisely in this context.
Regarding the possibility of the port of Berbera or Somaliland turning into a hotbed of military conflict affecting navigation in the Red Sea, she says that “this scenario is theoretically possible but unlikely in the near term”, but she explains that the parties involved in this path do not have the capacity to engage in a direct military confrontation with Egypt, and that Israel itself is unable to act alone without an American green light and support from other international parties, which makes a comprehensive military escalation unlikely at the current stage.
She adds that the current pressures fall within the framework of using political cards to unsettle the Egyptian position and stir stagnant waters, noting that Egypt got ahead of these moves by sending forces to Somalia, which reflects a pre-emptive approach to securing its strategic interests in the Horn of Africa.
Regarding Israeli influence in the Horn of Africa, Kira believes that Israel has wide economic influence in Africa, based on the exchange of interests, which previously benefited from the absence of an Egyptian role during the rule of former President Hosni Mubarak, but it does not rise to the level of waging war or imposing independent military hegemony. Cairo, however, returned strongly to the African arena before 7 October and dealt with this file with a pre-emptive strategic vision, strengthening its relations with pivotal countries in the region, including Eritrea. She affirms that Israel cannot move without the United States, which has a major military base in Djibouti and which will not allow a war to break out between Egypt and Israel at this stage.
The unilateral Israeli recognition of Somaliland was neither surprising nor can it be separated from a previous path of security and intelligence relations between the two sides, as these relations predate the events of 7 October and fall within a broader process of reshaping regional alliances in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region, according to Ahmed Soltan, a researcher in regional security and terrorism, who notes that Somaliland had been put forward, in the aftermath of 7 October, as one of the possible destinations within the scenarios for displacing Palestinians, which contributed to accelerating the official announcement of the recognition.
He points out that the emergence of the Houthi group in northern Yemen as a front exerting pressure on Israel, even if a secondary one from a military standpoint, constituted an influential source of disturbance that pushed Tel Aviv to strengthen its moves in the Red Sea, considering that Somaliland represents an important intelligence and security foothold for Israel in this context.
He tells Zawia3: “Through this recognition, Israel seeks to control its vital sphere in the Red Sea, which constitutes a direct threat to the countries of the region, foremost among them Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Israeli move falls within a broader geostrategic confrontation between Israel and its allies on the one hand, and Egypt and a number of Arab countries on the other.”
He adds: “After 7 October, Israel tried to expand the scope of its moves and reshape these maps, but military power alone is not enough to settle geostrategic confrontations. Despite its military superiority, it remains a regionally ostracised entity and does not possess the components of comprehensive hegemony in the region.”
Soltan notes that the statement issued by the Arab Group and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which condemned the Israeli recognition, reflects an Arab awareness that this step changes nothing in the legal reality, but aims to impose a path that serves Israeli interests, within the framework of an escalating geostrategic competition of which the Red Sea is one of the main axes.
The researcher believes that the Israeli recognition of Somaliland may backfire on Israel itself, explaining that despite its possession of an intelligence station in the region, which includes signals and human intelligence capabilities, and its recent use of it to monitor missiles launched from northern Yemen, this step represents a direct antagonising of influential regional powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which will in turn continue to work to curb Israeli influence in the Horn of Africa.
Regarding the relationship between the Israeli recognition and the existing tensions over the “Renaissance Dam” file, Soltan says that the Ethiopian moves towards Somaliland predate the Israeli step, explaining that Ethiopia has been seeking a maritime outlet for some time, while Somaliland is looking for international recognition, which led to an intersection of interests between the two sides. He points to previous understandings between Ethiopia and Somaliland providing for Addis Ababa’s recognition of the region in exchange for obtaining a maritime outlet and a military zone, but these understandings did not enter into force because of regional pressures, foremost among them the position of Somalia, Egypt and other countries.
He explains that the Israeli rapprochement with Somaliland may encourage Ethiopia to press ahead on this path, especially given the close military and intelligence relations between Tel Aviv and Addis Ababa, warning that any tripartite alliance between Israel, Ethiopia and Somaliland represents a direct threat to Egyptian and Arab interests and to Arab national security, and may lead to a serious imbalance in the region’s balances and push Cairo to take countermeasures, which would complicate the fragile scene in East Africa. But he stresses at the same time that Tel Aviv’s ability to bring about radical change or impose decisive pressure on Egypt remains limited, especially as the United States is not in agreement with it.
Drawing the Maps of the Region
In a related context, Dr Ali El-Aawar, an expert in Israeli affairs, believes that Israel’s Mossad is extending its circles of regional influence at an accelerating pace, and that Tel Aviv’s current moves aim to control the Bab el-Mandeb area through the establishment of a military-intelligence-security base in Somaliland, considering that talking about Somaliland means talking about an area of extreme strategic importance in security and military terms, because of the capacity it provides to protect the vital maritime outlet that connects Israel to the outside world via Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, all the way to India, South-East Asia and the Gulf of Aden.
He points out that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recognition of “Somaliland” cannot be separated from the broader context of the war on the Gaza Strip, considering that the step reflects Netanyahu’s quest to impose himself as the sole player in drawing the maps of the region, in clear defiance of the international community, at a time when the war continues, along with what El-Aawar describes as crimes of genocide against the Palestinians in Gaza.
He tells Zawia3: “Netanyahu recognises the legitimacy of states according to the interests and the security and strategic objectives of his government, and I fear that he will apply this to statelets that may emerge in the Middle East. He is dealing a strong blow to Arab national security by establishing a military, security and intelligence base in Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, and thereby controlling global trade, and as a result a number of Arab countries lose their economic and security strength in the Red Sea.”
El-Aawar explains that control of the Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden area allows Israel to come into direct proximity with Yemen, and perhaps to monitor or disrupt the routes of ships believed to be transporting weapons to the Houthis, in addition to securing Israeli trade lines, as about 99% of Israeli foreign trade passes via India, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal, all the way to Israeli ports on the Mediterranean, such as Ashdod and Haifa.
He adds: “Israel is defying international legitimacy and the United Nations, and is also defying the countries of the Horn of Africa and the countries of the Middle East, foremost among them Egypt and Yemen, in addition to the Houthi group in Yemen and Iran. This step represents, from the Israeli government’s point of view, a military, intelligence and security achievement that Tel Aviv seeks to market globally,” noting that Netanyahu is trying to entrench a discourse according to which Israel is capable of creating the “new Middle East”, not only through military force, but through intelligence expansion.
In contrast, Ibrahim El-Darawy, an expert in Palestinian and Israeli affairs, believes that the unilateral Israeli recognition of “Somaliland” carries no real political or legal value, in the absence of any international or UN recognition of “Somaliland”. Nevertheless, Cairo led, in coordination with a number of Arab countries, a clear diplomatic move to respond to it, which resulted in a state of international dissatisfaction with what is currently happening in Somalia, including the US position, which reflects an important shift in the relationship between the United States and Israel.
He tells Zawia3: “Israel is not moving out of interest in Somalia, but as part of its quest to find alternatives for the plans to displace Palestinians, after some parties expressed a theoretical readiness to receive residents of the Gaza Strip, which was met with categorical Palestinian rejection. This behaviour falls within the framework of ‘spiteful’ political pressure attempts, after Egypt clearly foiled the plans for the voluntary and forced displacement of Palestinians.”
He adds that the Abraham Accords, which Trump sought to expand, did not mature or succeed because of the continuation of the occupation and the absence of a sovereign Palestinian state, noting that the American vision has today become closer to the Egyptian vision on this file, in light of implicit understandings between Presidents El-Sisi and Trump whose features emerged after the Sharm El-Sheikh meeting.
El-Darawy considers that Israel’s promotion of justifications such as confronting the Houthis or seeking a foothold in Africa and the Red Sea is nothing more than the illusions of the Israeli far right, which still puts forward the ideas of “Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates”, affirming that these proposals no longer find acceptance in the international community, which has become more aware of the nature of Israeli policies as extremist religious policies that aim to exclude Palestinians and Arabs and seek to impose displacement as a solution.
Ultimately, the unilateral Israeli recognition of “Somaliland” reveals the transition of the conflict in the region from the sphere of diplomatic statements to a stage of testing geopolitical balances in one of the most sensitive maritime corridors in the world. Between broad Arab and African rejection, and Israeli moves seeking to impose new realities on the ground, the files of maritime security, the unity of states, regional influence and the threat to the vital interests of countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia intersect, in a scene that does not appear isolated from the conflicts of Gaza, Sudan, Yemen and the Renaissance Dam.
Experts agree that the danger of this step lies not so much in its limited legal value as in its being part of a cumulative path of re-engineering influence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa through unrecognised entities and cross-border alliances. While the possibilities of direct military escalation remain limited in the near term, the continuation of this path places the region at a crossroads: either collective regional action that fortifies the unity of states and the security of maritime corridors, or leaving the vacuum open to further interventions that may reproduce crises of disintegration and proxy wars in one of the most fragile regions of the world and one of the most influential on regional and international security.
Editorial correction: The first version of the report stated that “Somaliland” declared its independence in 1990, and in another place in 2000; the correct date is that it declared it unilaterally in May 1991.
