Coinciding with the Egyptian government’s announcement, at the beginning of last July, of measures that expand the powers of non-Egyptians to own real estate, as part of what it describes as a “real estate export” strategy, information circulated about a proposal submitted by the Ministry of Housing to allocate about 49,000 feddans behind the city of New Alamein, on the north-western coast, for a huge real estate project which, it was said, might exceed in area the “Ras El-Hekma” project that the government concluded with Emirati companies two years ago.
The government has not yet announced any official details about this circulating proposal, which has not yet been confirmed, but the coincidence of this news with decisions facilitating foreigners’ ownership of real estate has revived the debate over the state’s trend towards relying increasingly on the real estate sector as one of the most important sources for attracting foreign currency.
But a source inside the Ministry of Housing who spoke to us, preferring not to be named, explained that the proposal is still under study, and that the committee assigned to oversee it has not yet settled on the sale plan, the mechanism or the timeframe, noting that coastal land represents a strong attraction for Egyptian and foreign investors, which is why the government continually seeks to develop the real estate investment system and to provide distinctive opportunities for the foreign investor in order to secure foreign currency.
The source considers that the government is betting on the “real estate export” policy as one of the tools capable of boosting foreign currency inflows, by attracting buyers and investors from abroad, which would contribute to increasing foreign currency proceeds, supporting foreign direct investment in the real estate sector, and stimulating economic sectors linked to it, such as construction, building materials and tourism services.
He also points out that the government regards this policy as complementary to other sources of foreign currency, not a substitute for them, especially in light of the challenges facing the Egyptian economy and the need to diversify sources of hard currency.
Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly had delegated to the Minister of Justice some of his powers set out in Law No. 230 of 1996 regulating non-Egyptians’ ownership of built real estate and vacant land, with the aim of speeding up decisions on ownership applications and simplifying administrative procedures, in a step the government said falls within the “real estate export” strategy aimed at attracting more foreign investors.
The decision is an extension of a series of measures the government has taken in recent years to facilitate foreigners’ ownership of real estate, including amending the rules for granting Egyptian citizenship to investors and lowering the minimum value of property qualifying for citizenship to USD 300,000, alongside work on establishing an electronic platform under the name “Real Estate Export”, aimed at marketing Egyptian real estate units abroad and connecting foreign investors with real estate developers inside Egypt.
Although the government sees this policy as a means of increasing dollar inflows and stimulating investment, it raises, on the other hand, concerns among a number of economists about the lack of transparency in managing this type of project, especially when it comes to allocating large areas of land, as well as its potential impact on property prices and on citizens’ ability to obtain housing.
The term “real estate export” is defined as the sale of local real estate units to foreign investors or buyers in exchange for foreign currencies, providing an additional source of foreign currency. It is a model applied by several countries, but its success depends on numerous factors, including economic stability, market transparency and ease of investment procedures.
These moves come amid mounting economic pressures facing the Egyptian government, as a result of the rising burden of external debt, increasing debt service interest and the continuing general budget deficit, alongside the ongoing need to secure foreign currency to cover imports and meet external obligations, which has pushed the government in recent years to adopt policies based on maximising foreign direct investment and selling some state-owned assets and land.
In February 2024, the government signed the agreement to develop the Ras El-Hekma area with a consortium led by the Emirati company “ADQ”, in the largest foreign direct investment deal in the country’s history, worth USD 35 billion, to develop an area extending over about 170 million square metres, equivalent to nearly 40,000 feddans. The government said at the time that the proceeds of the deal would be used to support monetary reserves, reduce the burden of external debt and strengthen economic stability.
Last July, the Emirati group “Modon Holding”, in cooperation with “Nammos Hotels and Resorts”, announced the launch of the “Nammos Ras El-Hekma” project, which comprises 72 residential units and 79 hotel rooms within the “Wadi Yemm” district, the first district of the city being developed under a plan that includes 17 urban districts.
Real Estate Deals as an Alternative Source of Foreign Currency
Economists believe that the government’s increasing reliance on selling land and real estate projects as a means of securing foreign currency is not the optimal choice, given the persistence of the structural challenges the economy suffers from, including high public debt, the decline in the pound’s purchasing power and continuing inflationary pressures, as well as the exchange rate being affected by regional and international tensions.
Economic reports warn that expanding the sale of real estate to foreigners may lead to increased speculation within the property market and higher prices for land and housing units, widening the gap between citizens’ incomes and housing prices, especially as a large part of current demand relies on buying property as a store of value against inflation, not to meet actual housing needs.
For his part, Dr Karim El-Omda, professor of political economy, believes that major real estate deals, such as the Ras El-Hekma project and other similar projects, cannot be a substitute for economic reforms based on production and increasing exports, even if they succeed in providing dollar liquidity in the short term.
He tells Zawia3 that these deals are distinguished by their ability to provide rapid cash flows, because the investors interested in them already exist, which makes completing them faster compared with industrial or productive projects, which need years before they begin to achieve an economic return and generate foreign currency proceeds.
He adds that the state needed urgent dollar resources during the past period to confront economic pressures, which explains its move towards concluding major investment deals in the real estate sector, especially given fears linked to regional tensions and the possible impact on some traditional sources of foreign currency, such as tourism, Suez Canal revenues and remittances from Egyptians working abroad.
He points out that the largest share of Egyptians’ remittances comes from the Gulf states, which makes them vulnerable to any regional developments, prompting the government to seek to secure monetary reserves by attracting foreign direct investment, including major real estate projects.
But he stresses that these deals, however large, cannot achieve sustainable economic development on their own, explaining that the Egyptian economy needs to localise industry, increase production and strengthen export capacity, as the basic pillars for generating continuous dollar resources. He says: “Even if the state concluded dozens of real estate deals, they would not substitute for building a productive economy capable of meeting the needs of more than a hundred million citizens.”
For his part, urban researcher Ibrahim Ezz El-Din believes that the state no longer treats the housing file as a social policy aimed at guaranteeing the right to housing, so much as it has come to play the role of a real estate investor seeking a return.
He says this shift began to take clear shape over the past decade, citing the changing roles of a number of government bodies. He explains that the Urban Development Fund, formerly known as the Informal Settlements Development Fund, moved from focusing on developing unsafe areas to offering land for real estate projects targeting high-income groups, while the New Urban Communities Authority has turned into a real estate developer focusing increasingly on upper-middle and luxury housing.
He adds that this trend coincided with a relative decline in attention to social housing and a rise in its prices, making it harder to obtain for the groups for which the programme was designed, and considers that government policies have gradually moved from the logic of guaranteeing adequate housing to the logic of maximising returns from real estate investment.
Ezz El-Din warns that directing a large share of investment towards the real estate sector may achieve financial returns for investors, including the state, but does not necessarily achieve sustainable economic development.
He points out that productive sectors, such as agriculture and industry, provide long-term added value and contribute to strengthening food security, creating jobs and increasing exports, while real estate activity relies essentially on developing and selling units, without requiring a continuous cycle of production and operation after the project is completed.
The urban researcher stresses that the Egyptian market is indeed witnessing real demand for housing, given the large population concentration within the Greater Cairo region and the Delta governorates, but the real estate product currently on offer does not respond sufficiently to these needs, as the bulk of new projects is concentrated in luxury or upper-middle housing and targets groups able to invest or to preserve the value of their savings amid inflation and the decline in the currency’s value, more than it targets families looking for suitable housing.
He believes that addressing the housing crisis requires giving priority to producing social housing units at prices commensurate with the incomes of the target groups, instead of focusing on projects that achieve the highest investment return.
The “Real Estate Export” Policy
Karim El-Omda rules out direct economic risks from directing foreign investment into the real estate sector in itself, but believes that the sector’s attractiveness for the government lies in the speed of its return and its liquidity, given the government’s urgent need for foreign currency, compared with investment in industry, agriculture or technology, which require larger investments and longer periods before they begin to produce economic results.
Ezz El-Din takes a more reserved position towards the concept of “real estate export”, as he believes that housing is a fundamental human right and should not turn into a commodity managed by the logic of profit alone. He stresses that priority should go to guaranteeing the right of all citizens to adequate and safe housing, with mechanisms that ensure ease of access to it and protect the right of ownership, before expanding the use of the real estate sector as a tool to attract foreign investment or generate revenue.
He affirms that the success of any real estate policy should be measured first by its ability to meet citizens’ housing needs, and only then by its ability to attract investment and achieve economic returns, not the other way round.
The Egyptian real estate sector has seen major growth in recent years, driven by rising prices and the expansion of new cities, as the largest real estate development companies recorded record sales worth hundreds of billions of pounds during 2024 and 2025, but experts believe that this boom reflects, to a large extent, the continuous rise in prices more than a real increase in final demand for housing.
Supporters of the “real estate export” policy promote the experiences of countries such as the UAE, which succeeded in attracting extensive foreign investment into its property market, but experts point out that the success of the Emirati experience was linked to factors that are hard to compare with the Egyptian market, most notably a stable currency, ease of transferring funds, long-term residency and a tax environment attractive to investment.
By contrast, European countries that had adopted similar programmes moved to scale them back or abolish them: Portugal stopped granting the “golden visa” in exchange for buying real estate, while Spain announced the ending of the same programme, after mounting criticism linking these policies to rising housing prices and the difficulty citizens face in obtaining suitable housing.
Although the Egyptian government has announced multiple facilities to attract foreign buyers, foremost among them granting citizenship in exchange for real estate investment, official data are still absent on the number of beneficiaries of these programmes or the volume of foreign inflows they have actually succeeded in attracting, in addition to a lack of transparency about the nationalities with the greatest demand for Egyptian real estate.
The Debt Crisis and the Search for Dollars
The government’s moves to expand real estate investment and attract foreign buyers come at a time when the Egyptian economy faces mounting pressures linked to the rising debt burden and the ongoing need to secure dollar resources to cover external obligations.
According to Central Bank of Egypt data, the external debt stock stood at about USD 163.7 billion at the end of September 2025, compared with about USD 161.2 billion at the end of June of the same year, an increase of nearly USD 2.5 billion in three months.
The bulk of the external debt is distributed among various government bodies: general budget agencies account for the largest share at about USD 81.8 billion, while the debt owed by the Central Bank stands at nearly USD 37 billion, alongside about USD 23 billion owed by banks and around USD 22 billion by other sectors.
The pressures lie not only in the size of the existing debt, but in the repayment schedule for the coming period. According to debt burden schedules published by the World Bank, Egypt faces external obligations approaching USD 50.8 billion until September 2026, including instalments and interest due on external debts.
A large proportion of these obligations is concentrated during the first half of 2026, as the data indicate maturities of nearly USD 28.2 billion during the first quarter of the year and about USD 12.7 billion during the second quarter, before falling to about USD 9.8 billion during the third quarter.
If the payments made during the last quarter of 2025 are added, total external obligations during the period from October 2025 to September 2026 approach USD 66 billion, which explains the government’s continued focus on attracting new foreign currency inflows, whether through foreign direct investment, selling assets or expanding real estate development projects.
As for public debt, both domestic and external, total government debt rose to about EGP 14.95 trillion at the end of June 2025, with domestic debt accounting for the largest share at nearly EGP 11.1 trillion.
Although the ratio of public debt to GDP fell from about 89.4% in fiscal year 2023/2024 to nearly 85.6% in fiscal year 2024/2025, according to Ministry of Finance data, the government still faces the challenge of reducing the cost of borrowing and debt service, as Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly announced a target of reducing the ratio to about 78% of GDP by June 2027.
Debt interest is one of the biggest pressures on the general budget, as interest payments have risen recently by nearly 45%, which has contributed to increasing the overall budget deficit.
Economic estimates indicate that total debt service burdens during fiscal year 2025/2026, including instalments and interest, may approach EGP 4.4 trillion, against expected public revenues of around EGP 3.1 trillion, which reflects the size of the gap between the state’s financing needs and the resources available.
The Impact of Foreign Ownership on Property Prices
Regarding the expansion of permission for foreigners to own real estate, Karim El-Omda believes that the expected impact on housing prices for citizens may be limited, because most of the units targeted by this policy fall in the luxury housing segment within the new cities, such as the New Administrative Capital, New Alamein, New Sheikh Zayed and New Cairo, units whose prices exceed the purchasing power of most Egyptians.
He points out that these projects primarily target investors, foreigners residing in Egypt, or those seeking units of an investment or tourism nature, more than they target local demand for housing.
He adds that the market already contains a large supply of luxury units, while citizens’ real demand is concentrated on middle-income and low-income housing, which makes the impact of increased foreign ownership on the prices of the units most Egyptians seek less severe than the concerns that may be raised about it.
With continuing pressures linked to debt service and the decline of some sources of foreign currency, the “real estate export” policy appears to the government to be one of the options on the table for shoring up monetary reserves. However, its success, according to experts, will remain contingent on its ability to be part of a more comprehensive economic vision based on boosting production, industry and exports, rather than turning into a substitute for them.
