Since Egypt introduced safeguard duties on imported billets and sheet steel in September 2025, small and medium-sized rolling mills have faced an additional cost for a material on which they depend. These mills buy steel billets from domestic producers or import them, then roll them into reinforcing bars. Integrated producers, by contrast, manufacture the billets they need themselves. The dispute over protecting domestic producers while keeping their industrial customers operating extends to jobs, construction materials, household appliances and cars.
The measures began with Investment and Foreign Trade Ministry Decision 398 of 2025, which imposed a provisional billet duty of 16.2% of cost, insurance and freight value (CIF), subject to a minimum of EGP 4,613 per tonne, for 200 days from 14 September 2025. Decision 121 of 2026 subsequently introduced definitive duties that decline over time: 13.12%, with a minimum of USD 70 per tonne, from 2 April to 13 September 2026; 12%, with a minimum of USD 64, from 14 September 2026 to 13 September 2027; and 11%, with a minimum of USD 59, for the following year, ending 13 September 2028. The rate therefore changed after the interviews for this report were prepared in August. The initial rate does not remain fixed throughout the three-year period.
The ministry attributes the measures to a sharp, unexpected rise in imports that harmed domestic industry. Rolling mills, however, complain of higher production costs and difficulty buying locally produced billets in the quantities they need at suitable prices. Field reporting in March 2026 described operations falling to 10% or 15% of capacity in some cases, idle production lines and thousands of jobs at risk. Estimates of the number of affected mills differ between sources. The operating rate of one factory, or a group of factories, cannot be treated as representative of the entire industry.
According to Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) figures reported by Al-Ahram, the value of Egypt’s imports of iron and steel ores and raw materials fell 16.4% in 2025 to about USD 5.7 billion. For the first five months of 2026, Asharq Bloomberg cited CAPMAS data showing a 2.9% decline to USD 2.345 billion, against USD 2.416 billion in the same period of 2025. This included a 14.4% fall in iron ore and concentrate imports, to USD 596.9 million from USD 697.2 million. These import categories are broader than billets alone. They do not, by themselves, measure billet imports or the shortage of material available to rolling mills.
Major billet producers in Egypt include Ezz, Beshay, Egyptian Steel, Suez Steel and El Marakby. Estimates of factory numbers and capacity vary with the definition of a factory and the production stage being counted. In August 2026, the Industrial Development Authority offered eight billet production licences covering a planned combined capacity of 2.8 million tonnes a year: four licences for 500,000 tonnes each and four for 200,000 tonnes each. The announcement set 9 September as the deadline for bids. It announced a licensing tender, not proof that eight factories had been awarded licences and started producing in August.
Opponents of the duties argue that large integrated producers, including Ezz, Suez Steel and Egyptian Steel, benefit when imported billets become more expensive because they manufacture the material domestically and have less need to import it. They warn that the measures could strengthen market concentration and weaken competition. These are concerns and assessments put forward by industry participants; they do not establish that any particular company has committed an antitrust violation.
On 27 August 2026, Al Borsa newspaper reported manufacturers’ estimates placing annual billet production capacity at 13.7 million tonnes. Nameplate capacity, however, is not necessarily the same as actual output or the quantity offered for sale to other mills: companies consume some of their production in their own facilities. Material prices also depend on exchange rates, energy, freight, international markets and selling terms. A commercial webpage that is continually updated cannot establish a single historical price for every factory. Price comparisons in this report are therefore attributed to the people making them and to the period they describe.
The Arab Iron and Steel Union’s bulletin dated 29 August 2026 provides a contemporaneous international price reference. Russian billets were quoted at USD 460 to USD 465 per tonne free on board (FOB), while billets from Commonwealth of Independent States countries delivered to Turkey were quoted at USD 500 to USD 505 per tonne on a cost-and-freight (CFR) basis. Neither is the cost of delivering the material to an Egyptian factory: delivery terms, insurance, duties and inland transport differ. Egypt’s billet duty at that time was 13.12%, subject to a minimum of USD 70 per tonne.
Rolling mills struggle to secure inputs
Sameh Attia, marketing and sales director at Arabian Steel and Elco Steel, says rolling mills that rely on imported billets bear a direct increase in the cost of a crucial input for reinforcing steel because of the safeguard duties. This, he argues, weakens their ability to compete.
He estimates that roughly 23 or 24 rolling mills operate in the market alongside a limited number of large integrated producers. Duties on billets, which he estimated at around 13% to 14% at the time of the interview, combined with constraints on sources of supply, have made it difficult for rolling mills to obtain the quantities they require, he says.
“Factories that need large quantities of billets may be unable to obtain all their requirements from the large domestic producers,” he tells Zawia3. “This pushes some to look for alternative sources, including unlicensed factories that produce billets informally, opening the way to legal violations and an informal market for the material.”
Attia argues that protecting domestic billet production should not come at the expense of rolling mills. He uses the term “dumping” when calling for a clear justification for the duties, saying that a lack of sufficient domestic supply at competitive prices turns them from an instrument of industrial protection into an added production cost. Legally, however, the measure examined here is a safeguard against increased imports causing serious injury. It differs from anti-dumping measures, which address sales below normal value.
“Domestic billets that are unavailable in the required quantities, or at competitive prices, force factories to bear a higher cost,” he adds. “That may ultimately affect the prices of reinforcing steel and finished products. The repercussions could reach the point of stopping some production lines at private factories. What is happening in the market now is that some factories have stopped one of their two lines, and the situation could worsen amid the slowdown and shortage of liquidity.”
He describes a slowdown in Egypt’s iron and steel market, alongside weak liquidity and lower demand from customers buying reinforcing bars. Purchasing behaviour can also be driven by price expectations, he says: demand may fall when prices are low, then increase when buyers expect a rise.
Attia calls for a balance between protecting domestic industry, preserving competition and making raw materials available at fair prices. He wants sufficient domestic billet production or alternative sources at competitive prices, alongside tighter oversight of unlicensed producers. He warns that a continuing informal market could circulate material that fails to meet specifications for chemical composition, carbon, manganese and other elements. Such producers, he says, are not subject to the necessary checks on production processes, inputs, quality and safety, and consequently do not obtain certification.
Different factories, the same safeguards
An industry overview on the Chamber of Metallurgical Industries’ website distinguishes three production models that help explain the dispute: integrated companies that begin at earlier iron- and steelmaking stages; semi-integrated companies that melt scrap or sponge iron to make billets and then roll them; and rolling mills that buy ready-made billets. The overview’s company lists and capacity figures are old, however. They include Egyptian Iron and Steel, whose liquidation was approved on 11 January 2021. They cannot be treated as a census of factories operating in 2026.
The historical overview lists Egyptian Iron and Steel, Ezz Dekheila, the Egyptian American Steel company in Sadat City, Ezz Suez Flat Steel and Suez Steel in the integrated category, with combined annual capacity of around eight million tonnes. It also distinguishes the Egyptian company’s use of domestic ores from other companies’ reliance on higher-specification imported inputs. This describes a classification and production structure at the time the page was prepared, not an updated assessment of what those companies produce today.
In the semi-integrated category, the same overview names Delta Steel, Misr Steel, El Marakby and Egyptian Steel, with available capacity of roughly 2.5 million tonnes a year. It also describes Abu Zaabal Engineering Industries as producing 60,000 tonnes of billets annually without rolling facilities. The classification helps explain differences between production stages and their costs. Its historical figures should not be added to newer estimates as though they formed a single dataset.
Rolling mills occupy the final stage: they buy domestic or imported billets and turn them into reinforcing steel. The chamber’s historical overview lists around 28 companies with approximately five million tonnes of available annual capacity, compared with Attia’s estimate of 23 or 24 mills operating at the time of his interview. Existing capacity may be used only partially for economic or financing reasons. A count of companies or licensed capacity therefore differs from the number of operating factories and their actual output.
The industry chamber defends protection
Mohamed Hanafy, director of the Chamber of Metallurgical Industries at the Federation of Egyptian Industries, offers a different assessment. Higher input costs can affect the selling price of rolled steel, he says. Yet mills importing billets can still sell their products for less than large integrated manufacturers that make steel from earlier-stage inputs, despite the safeguard duties increasing their material costs.
“The duties were imposed after studies and discussions that lasted two or three years,” he tells Zawia3. “The aim was to achieve greater balance in the steel market and narrow the price gap between factories importing billets and those producing them domestically.”
Some factories sold a tonne of steel for about EGP 34,000 while integrated producers charged approximately EGP 39,000, Hanafy says. The roughly EGP 5,000 difference was not necessarily a profit margin: he attributes it to some factories’ lower imported-input costs compared with domestic production costs.
He links lower billet prices in certain foreign markets to their integrated production resources, including iron ore, coal, steelmaking plants and equipment. These factors reduce production costs and allow producers to sell more cheaply, he argues, potentially harming Egyptian factories if the market is left without safeguards.
In his assessment, the duties seek to narrow the price gap between billet importers and integrated producers, creating a more balanced basis for competition. Protecting domestic industry is the main purpose of the safeguard duties, he says.
Hanafy estimates that Egypt has about five billet-producing factories with annual capacity of roughly 12 million tonnes, while total reinforcing-steel output is around nine million tonnes a year. Domestic billet capacity could cover the market’s entire requirements, he says, but producing it costs more than obtaining it from some foreign markets, encouraging certain factories to import instead.
Asked about the effect on reinforcing-steel prices, he says prices did not rise substantially during the period he was describing. The price per tonne had remained broadly stable for about six months from the start of 2026, according to his assessment at the time of the interview. A gap nevertheless remained between billet-importing mills and integrated producers: some of the former sold for roughly EGP 34,000 or EGP 35,000 per tonne, compared with around EGP 39,000 at companies such as Suez Steel and Ezz.
Hanafy attributes the fall in Egyptian steel exports to duties imposed by the United States and European Union on Egyptian products. He also argues that factories relying on imported billets face particular difficulties exporting to those markets, where buyers do not readily accept products made from billets sourced from multiple suppliers and favour integrated production whose manufacturing stages can be traced and tested from raw material to finished product. This is his explanation of market-access obstacles; it does not mean every factory using imported billets is legally barred from exporting to those destinations.
Contemporary press coverage, meanwhile, recorded price movements during the same broader period. Reports described an earlier EGP 2,000-per-tonne increase at El Marakby and El Garhy to EGP 37,500 after the provisional safeguards. In January 2026, reporting put Ezz’s increase at approximately EGP 34,200 to EGP 37,000 per tonne, Suez’s at EGP 33,700 to EGP 36,500, and El Marakby’s at EGP 34,000 to EGP 36,000. Increases ranged from EGP 2,000 to EGP 3,000, with some consumer prices reaching EGP 38,000 or EGP 38,500. These quotations concern different dates and stages of sale, not a single current market price. Nor does an increase occurring after a duty establish that the duty was its only cause.
On 12 May 2026, Al-Shorouk reported, citing a document it had seen, that the value of Egyptian steel exports fell 13% in the first quarter to USD 404 million, from USD 463 million in the corresponding period of 2025. This compares export value in dollars, not necessarily an equivalent change in tonnage. On its own, it cannot separate the effect of domestic duties from changes in demand, prices and external restrictions.
From factory inputs to appliance and car prices
The impact extends beyond reinforcing steel. Sheet steel is used to manufacture refrigerators, washing machines, cookers, water heaters and other appliances. Definitive Decision 120 of 2026 distinguishes cold-rolled, galvanized and pre-painted sheet: the rates initially applied from 2 April 2026 were 13.7%, 14% and 14.5%, respectively. From 14 September 2026, they declined to 13%, 13.5% and 14%, with separate minimum dollar amounts per tonne. The use of sheet steel in an appliance does not mean it represents an identical share of the number of components, weight or cost. These are different measures.
Ashraf Helal, head of the Cairo Chamber of Commerce’s household and electrical appliances division, says safeguard duties on the sheet steel used by the sector directly affected its material costs. Sheet steel is used in numerous appliances, he explains, noting that the measures were initially set for 200 days before being replaced by a three-year framework.
Helal says some domestic sheet producers raised their prices directly after the decision, increasing the cost of manufacturing appliances that depend on sheet steel, including cookers, air conditioners, refrigerators, fans and washing machines. He estimates that some appliance prices rose by as much as approximately 5% because of higher material costs.
“Any rise in goods prices has a negative effect on buying and selling because it reduces the rate of capital turnover,” he tells Zawia3. “That causes losses for traders and factories, weakens consumers’ purchasing power and affects inflation in the economy, as increases in production costs and final prices are ultimately passed on to the consumer.”
The effects were not confined to household and electrical appliance manufacturers, Helal says. They also reached some downstream steel factories that relied on imported sheet. Those factories, he adds, were harmed by the safeguard duties on sheet steel as well.
Osama Abu El Magd, head of Egypt’s automobile dealers’ association and deputy head of the chamber of commerce’s automotive division, says iron and steel are used across many industries and are particularly important to car manufacturing. Higher costs, whether arising from safeguard duties or other factors such as anticompetitive practices, exchange-rate movements or a shortage of foreign currency for billet importers, eventually feed into finished-product costs, he argues.
Because steel is a central component of car manufacturing, movements in its price affect vehicle prices, Abu El Magd says. He points to several increases in car prices between March and the time of the interview.
“Part of Egypt’s steel industry depends on importing billets and then carrying out manufacturing processes in local factories,” he tells Zawia3. “The dollar’s exchange rate is one of the principal factors affecting production costs and steel prices, especially given the consequences of the wars and tensions the region and the world have experienced.”
A car contains more than 22,000 parts, he says, estimating that 50% to 70% of automotive components are imported. While the stated local-content figure is approximately 45%, he argues that the actual level does not exceed 20%. Egypt does not fully manufacture several major components, he says, including gearboxes, engines, alternators and air-conditioning compressors, illustrating the industry’s continuing reliance on imports. These are Abu El Magd’s estimates. The interview does not provide a common basis for measuring local content by number of parts or by value, so the percentages should not be added together or presented as components of a single chart.
Abu El Magd connects industry’s dependence on imported inputs with import costs, foreign-currency availability and exchange rates. Technically, however, billets used mainly for long products such as reinforcing bars must be distinguished from slabs, which are generally rolled into flat products and sheet. Discussing steel’s role in car manufacturing does not mean billets and sheet are the same material, or that all their production lines follow the same process.
He argues that the impact of safeguard duties on different industries should be assessed within the full picture of production costs. Changes in steel or finished-product prices should not be reduced to the effect of a single decision when several factors are involved, particularly exchange rates and dependence on imported inputs.
Protecting industry or weakening competition?
Senator Ashraf Abdel Ghani, secretary of the Senate’s economic committee and chairman of the Egyptian Tax Experts Association, argues that factories which do not produce billets domestically and instead import them may be the hardest hit by the safeguard duties. Large companies producing their own billets do not face the same impact as factories that import the input, he says.
Abdel Ghani opposes the duties, arguing that they may restrict fair competition between domestic and imported products, with consequences for consumers. Preventing the entry of a lower-priced import, or giving domestic producers a price advantage by taxing it, could leave those producers with a more dominant market position and scope to raise prices, he says.
“Fair competition means products competing under equal conditions,” he tells Zawia3. “If an imported product is available at a lower price, it is better to benefit from it, or work to manufacture the domestic product at the same quality and at a similar or lower price, strengthening local industry’s ability to compete and export.”
Using lower-cost products and inputs can help Egyptian factories produce competitively priced goods, export them and bring foreign currency into the country, he argues. He contrasts that approach with limiting competition by preventing or restricting imports, stressing the importance of preserving fair competition in consumers’ interests and allowing them access to efficient, lower-priced products.
Between the objective of protecting domestic production and the warnings from rolling mills and sheet-steel users, the interviews reveal a dispute over what sufficient supply means and what it should cost. Supporters of the measures point to harm from increased imports and higher domestic production costs. Opponents describe difficulties securing competitively priced materials and burdens passing along the production chain to consumers. Nameplate capacity alone cannot resolve that disagreement without information on the output available for sale, its prices and its selling terms.
With new billet production licences being offered, the test is whether announced capacity becomes available output, and whether it supplies competitively priced material without harming rolling mills or forcing them to cut operations. The Investment Ministry has said prices and material availability will be monitored monthly and the measures reviewed every three months. The effects of that commitment can be assessed across the different parts of the industry.
The effectiveness of the duties ultimately depends on the state’s ability to regulate the market, increase supply and address anticompetitive practices and informal production while balancing domestic protection with competition and access to inputs. Protecting one production stage is insufficient if it forces others to contract. Nor should consumers alone bear the cost of industrial safeguards.
