As the next Journalists Syndicate election approaches, attention is turning to the end of Khaled El-Balshy’s second term as president. He was re-elected on 2 May 2025 with 3,346 votes, ahead of former syndicate president and former Al-Ahram board chair Abdel-Mohsen Salama, who received 2,562—a margin of 784—in an election described as having the highest turnout in the syndicate’s history.
That victory built on his surprise first win on 17 March 2023. El-Balshy, known for his left-wing background and defence of press freedom, received 2,450 votes against 2,211 for Khaled Miri, then editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar. The result ended six years of leadership by candidates backed by state institutions. Journalists and analysts saw it as the beginning of a shift in the balance of power, with the rise of a current advocating union independence and press freedoms.
Although the next midterm election has not formally begun and the candidates and alliances remain unclear, early preparations for the presidency are already being discussed in journalistic circles. Journalists and professional leaders interviewed by Zawia3 say the contest will test the balance of forces produced by the 2023 and 2025 elections, rather than simply select a new president.
They believe El-Balshy’s second term has differed from his first, with growing controversy over syndicate issues. These include delays in payment of the training and technology allowance last July—although delays around the start of the fiscal year have recurred in recent years—and debate over a proposed journalistic code of ethics, particularly provisions relating to gender.
These interviewees argue that the issues have been used to inflame polarisation and reshape opinion before the election, strengthening the prospects of a candidate associated with the state-owned press or supported by state institutions. Others reject that interpretation and regard developments as ordinary electoral competition ahead of a syndicate vote.
A harder and more competitive contest
Journalist and prominent trade unionist Hisham Fouad expects the next election to differ from the previous two, with greater polarisation and competition for both the presidency and council seats.
He tells Zawia3 that several indicators inform his assessment: what he describes as the retreat of the openness that accompanied the launch of the National Dialogue, the continued imprisonment of journalists and referral of some to trial over publishing offences, and what he sees as harsher treatment of union activity in professional syndicates.
He cites the arrest of four Dental Syndicate members following action to demand government placements for the class of 2023, and the arrest of Educational Professions Syndicate leader Mohamed Zahran after he called for implementation of a court ruling concerning syndicate elections. Fouad considers these incidents evidence of increasing restrictions on union work.
He expects these developments to affect the election, arguing that state institutions will make greater efforts to regain the presidency and a council majority, given the political and symbolic importance of the Journalists Syndicate as a “syndicate of opinion.” He connects this expectation to continuing debate over the training and technology allowance, suggesting that the timing of any increase could have electoral significance.
Nevertheless, Fouad stresses that the result remains open. Success will depend on candidates’ performance, the independence current’s cohesion and the general assembly’s mood. “The outcome is not predetermined, but the next election will be one of the most difficult and competitive syndicate battles.”
In recent days, several names have been discussed as possible presidential candidates, based on accounts of meetings, consultations and early electoral activity in recent weeks, or on speculation among journalists. None had officially announced their candidacy at the time of this report.
Among the names is Diaa Rashwan, currently minister of state for information and a former syndicate president who served two consecutive terms. Some journalists associate his tenure with the renovation of the syndicate building’s façade, known as the “shrouding of the syndicate,” because it remained covered for years during the work. They called that period the “years of shrouding.”
Sources tell Zawia3 that others have begun preliminary consultations, including discussion of electoral lists and potential support. They include Khaled Miri, former deputy president who lost to El-Balshy in 2023; Abdel-Mohsen Salama, who lost in 2025; Abdel-Raouf Khalifa, an Al-Ahram managing editor and board member who also sits on the syndicate council; and Refaat Rashad, an Al-Akhbar board member who lost to Rashwan in 2019 and 2021.
The name of current secretary-general Gamal Abdel-Rahim has also circulated. His council membership ends at the coming election, but he has not decided whether to run. Other sources mention council member Mohamed Saad Abdel-Hafiz, although he has two years left in his term and has made no announcement. The list remains open, with no formal candidacy declarations.
An election with significance beyond the presidency
Journalist and former syndicate president Yehia Qallash disagrees with the view that intense polarisation will determine the outcome. Successive elections in professional syndicates, he says, show the limited influence of polarisation on voters. Direct intervention can even backfire, as illustrated by recent Engineers Syndicate and Judges Club elections.
He tells Zawia3 that Journalists Syndicate elections have a distinctive character. Despite relatively small membership, their results attract attention beyond union affairs and are read as an indicator of opinion within an influential group in society. Historically, political and diplomatic circles have followed these elections.
For Qallash, the contest concerns the symbolism of the office more than the individual who wins. A syndicate president is “not merely the head of a professional union, but a symbol of the profession’s standing and influence in public life.” At the same time, he says the state–syndicate relationship has not historically been one of constant confrontation, but a “policy of containment.” Every president has dealt with the state through institutional arrangements, regardless of political affiliation.
He challenges the common distinction between a “services president” and an “independence president,” arguing that experience does not support it. He cites independence figures such as Galal Aref and Kamel Zoheiry, who secured substantial service and legislative gains, including addressing the syndicate’s financial crisis, launching an emergency fund, establishing the Journalists City housing project and defending legal guarantees of press freedom.
Qallash says sharp polarisation between “state” and “independence” candidates was not the dominant feature of the syndicate’s history. It emerged clearly in the 1981 election amid the exceptional political circumstances following Camp David and disputes with President Anwar Sadat. Since then, a binary has become entrenched that does not necessarily reflect union work: the independence current does not mean belonging to the opposition, but defending the syndicate’s autonomous decisions and journalists’ rights, regardless of members’ political or party backgrounds.
Preparing for a “bridge-building president”?
Journalist Karem Mahmoud, a media faculty professor and former syndicate secretary-general, says the state’s effort to regain the presidency is nothing new. It is a recurring pattern, to varying degrees, in professional syndicate elections, especially those with public influence, foremost the Journalists Syndicate.
He tells Zawia3 that the office’s importance comes from the syndicate’s role as a “syndicate of opinion,” rather than its membership numbers. The results therefore attract political interest beyond the profession. In each cycle, he says, the state seeks a candidate close to it or trusted by it, to ensure leadership that avoids confrontation.
The coming contest has not officially begun, but meetings and consultations among possible candidates are already taking place behind the scenes, alongside early efforts to form lists and coordinate positions.
Mahmoud discusses the longstanding idea of a “bridge-building president,” prominent since the 1980s: a leader close to those in power is supposedly better able to obtain services and financial benefits for journalists through connections with state institutions.
The idea has endured in electoral rhetoric for decades and become part of the syndicate’s electoral culture. Experience, however, shows the relationship is less straightforward: proximity to power does not necessarily yield greater gains for members.
He cites former president Galal Aref, elected as an independence candidate, who secured financial and service benefits while preserving the syndicate’s autonomy. This was largely repeated during El-Balshy’s first term, which saw cooperation with state institutions on several issues without surrendering independence.
Conversely, some presidents known for closeness to power did not deliver the promised improvement in services. Some tenures, he says, were bleak, with neither meaningful services nor genuine union activity. That raises questions about equating government connections with the ability to improve journalists’ lives.
Mahmoud stresses that the crisis is now structural, affecting the profession’s future: press organisations face economic difficulties, journalists’ living standards have deteriorated and jobs are scarce. Electing someone close to or distant from power will not alone resolve these issues. They require a broader vision of journalism’s future and state media policy.
He concludes that electoral success should be measured by a candidate’s ability to defend independence, secure members’ interests and maintain dialogue with state institutions without drifting into either dependency or confrontation.
The next election cannot be separated from the troubled professional conditions revealed by the syndicate’s first member survey in twenty years. Conducted in preparation for its sixth conference in December 2024, it involved 1,568 journalists.
The results showed that 72% earned less than the minimum wage and 79% were dissatisfied with their incomes. For 48.6%, the training and technology allowance was a principal source of livelihood; only 17.2% used it for its intended purpose. Some 65.5% took additional work to compensate for low pay, 27.4% had experienced arbitrary dismissal, and about 70% of those dismissed said their cases remained unresolved.
The indicators extended beyond living conditions: 57.3% believed journalism no longer fulfilled its role in society, 88.4% were dissatisfied with how editorial leaders were selected, and 67.5% expected journalism’s role to decline as social media platforms gained influence.
The findings reveal entrenched problems accumulated over years and worsened during the past decade amid economic difficulties, a crisis in the press industry and the deterioration of media institutions. That period saw several presidents, including Abdel-Mohsen Salama (2017–2019) and Diaa Rashwan (2019–2023), both associated with the state-owned press and proximity to decision-makers. Yet most problems—pay, job security, social protection and the profession’s future—persisted and grew more complicated after the 2016 police raid on the syndicate. This raises doubts about any president’s capacity, whatever their relationship with the state, to resolve a crisis rooted in the industry’s structure and regulatory policies.
Regaining the presidency through indirect influence
Journalist and trade unionist Viola Fahmy expects efforts to regain the presidency, but indirectly. “The state, or some of its agencies, will try to recover the seat—not by interfering with the ballot box, because syndicate elections still largely preserve the general assembly’s will, but by influencing voters’ choices,” she tells Zawia3.
In her assessment, that influence operates through the continuing obstruction of issues affecting everyday life: temporary workers in state-owned press institutions, wages, increases in the training and technology allowance, and arbitrary dismissals. Failure to resolve them, she says, “pushes some journalists to believe a president closer to the government can end these crises and secure gains.”
This overlooks the fact that the president cannot decide these matters alone. “People sometimes imagine the president has a magic wand. But these are chronic problems accumulated over years, and some parties do not want certain issues resolved, so they remain unresolved.” She says El-Balshy “has tried to manage these matters with considerable balance, but ultimately he is not the decision-maker.”
On the independence current’s readiness, Fahmy cites El-Balshy’s own experience: he lost three consecutive council elections before winning the presidency in 2023. “The independence current has not run dry and continues to produce new leaders. But the decisive factor is the general atmosphere within the assembly, not names alone.”
She relates the office’s importance to the syndicate’s distinctive position. It is “not simply a professional union, but connected to press freedom and the circulation of information—among the most important indicators of freedom in any country.” Journalists, she adds, help shape public awareness alongside educational and religious institutions.
Between efforts to regain the presidency through candidates perceived as close to power and journalists’ commitment to independence, the general assembly retains the final say. But the survey and interviews show that the real crisis goes beyond candidate names: low pay, insecure employment, restrictions on journalism and a declining professional environment are structural problems accumulated over years. The next president’s identity matters, but it will not suffice without a genuine willingness to address those roots and restore the professional role of both the syndicate and journalism.
