Metro, Trains and Fuel: Egyptians Pay for Three Price Rises in One Month

Egypt’s Transport Ministry has announced another increase in rail and Cairo Metro fares, reaching 25% in affected categories, less than two weeks after fuel-price increases that the report puts at up to 30%, amid the escalating war involving the United States, Israel and Iran.

The decision has prompted widespread discontent as higher energy prices compound economic pressure on Egyptians. The government describes it as gradual repricing of public transport in response to rising operating costs, especially fuel and electricity.

In its official statement, the ministry increased Metro fares for journeys of up to nine stations from EGP 8 to EGP 10, a 25% rise, and up to 16 stations from EGP 10 to EGP 12, a 20% rise. Fares remained EGP 15 for up to 23 stations and EGP 20 for longer journeys. Transport Ministry statement.

Rail fares rose by 12.5% on long-distance routes and 25% on shorter routes. The report describes greater increases affecting air-conditioned trains and higher classes, with more limited rises for third-class trains used by many passengers across the governorates.

Transport Minister Kamel El Wazir added to the controversy by ruling out fare cuts if fuel prices fell. In television remarks, he said sectors already unable to cover operating needs would not reduce fares, though further scheduled increases might be postponed.

Press reports cited by the article put the targeted additional revenue at EGP 3 billion. They describe around EGP 2 billion from rail, with revenue reaching EGP 12 billion against EGP 9.5 billion in the preceding year; another EGP 1 billion was anticipated for the National Authority for Tunnels, with revenue reaching EGP 6.5 billion against EGP 5.8 billion. Sleeping-car revenue was put at around EGP 1.8 billion. These rounded targets do not reconcile exactly with the reported baselines. The Arabic article labels the current fiscal year 2026/27, although its April 1, 2026 publication falls within 2025/26; the figures are retained as reported targets rather than silently assigned to that later year. revenue targets.

Anger in parliament

MP Maha Abdel Nasser, of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, submitted an urgent parliamentary statement on March 27 about the new rail and Metro fares. She argued that the increases came at a difficult economic moment and followed substantial cumulative Metro fare rises since 2014. MP’s urgent statement.

The Metro is a primary means of transport for millions, she said, so any fare increase directly raises daily living costs. While acknowledging economic challenges and globally rising operating costs, she questioned why citizens continue to bear the greatest burden without sufficient protection.

Abdel Nasser criticised repeated price increases without clear social-protection policies. Season tickets alone are not enough, she argued, calling for a balance between economic reform and households’ ability to pay.

MP Freddy El Bayady, deputy leader of the same party, agrees. He sees the latest increases as part of an ongoing policy of gradually removing subsidies, rather than merely a response to global energy prices.

“The state does not shoulder part of the burden; it passes the entire cost to citizens,” El Bayady tells Zawia3. He identifies a lack of clear information about fuel stocks and actual operating costs as a central problem. MPs have requested detailed public-transport budgets and costs, especially amid regional developments, but received no response, he says.

Social-protection programmes do not match successive price increases, El Bayady argues. He says the policies erode the middle class and intensify pressure on poorer households without adequate compensation for high inflation.

MPs have repeatedly demanded feasibility studies for road and transport projects, he adds. Some recent loans were opposed because there was insufficient information about their economic and social returns.

In television comments cited in the report, El Wazir put loans obtained for national transport projects by March 2026 at around $18 billion. He said loans would go only to rail and Metro authorities, and that the ministry’s final borrowing would be for high-speed rail and the sixth Metro line.

MP Sanaa El Saeed likewise attributes fare increases to the gradual removal of energy subsidies rather than directly to regional tensions. Fixed salaries alongside steadily rising prices place families under increasing pressure, she says, squeezing the middle class and worsening poverty.

“Prices are rising across essential services, including public transport, electricity, water and cooking-gas cylinders,” she tells Zawia3. “These increases exhaust citizens without a clear approach to balancing their effect on purchasing power.” She calls for a full assessment of households’ economic circumstances before repricing, alongside stable prices or wages that keep pace with costs.

El Saeed expects transport increases to intensify inflation and weaken household purchasing power. State support should focus on those most in need, she argues, rather than leave ordinary people carrying the consequences of conflicting government plans.

A long history of fare increases

When the Metro opened on September 27, 1987, it charged a nominal flat fare of ten piastres. Prices rose gradually over the following two decades: the article cites 25–75 piastres in 2002 and one pound in 2006, regardless of the number of stations on the first two lines. The fare doubled to two pounds in March 2017. Cairo Metro history.

In 2018, the ministry introduced distance-based zones, with fares of EGP 3 for up to nine stations, EGP 5 for up to 16, and EGP 7 for longer journeys. The Arabic paragraph reverses the wording around the final two bands; the English version follows its stated zone structure.

When the third Metro line began the service expansion described in June 2019, its fares were EGP 5 for nine stations, EGP 7 for 16 and EGP 10 beyond that, while the first two lines’ fares remained unchanged at that stage.

The report describes the National Authority for Tunnels as becoming an economic authority with an independent budget in 2020, able to pursue activities and investment to cover expenditure and maintenance. Subsequent fare changes differed by line and distance; the article cites EGP 3–7 and EGP 5–10 bands, with increases of 40–67%.

In March 2022, the authority acquired 51% of the Egyptian Company for Metro Management and Operation. The ministry raised fares twice in 2024: January’s range was EGP 6–15, and August’s EGP 8–20. The article describes the same EGP 8, 10, 15 and 20 bands in 2025, rather than demonstrating a separate increase in every band.

On March 27, 2026, the first two bands rose to EGP 10 and EGP 12, while the longer-distance bands remained unchanged.

Fare increases also affected the railways. Over the past decade, long-distance routes and services in the Nile Delta have seen repeated rises, particularly in first-class air-conditioned and premium trains.

In July 2015, full-route air-conditioned fares increased by EGP 20 in first class and EGP 10 in second. In April 2016, the report cites increases of around 100%, including an Aswan–Cairo ticket rising from EGP 67 to EGP 135. August 2024 brought increases of 12.5–25%, followed by the latest 12.5% long-distance and 25% short-distance increases.

For Cairo–Aswan journeys, the report traces some Spanish-train fares from approximately EGP 80 in 2016 to EGP 200 in 2024. It separately cites a first-class category rising from EGP 145 to EGP 335 and then EGP 430 after the March 2026 increase. Train type and class must remain distinct when comparing these figures.

Russian trains entered service in July 2020 with relatively lower fares, initially EGP 25–50 on medium-distance journeys. The article cites a subsequent Aswan fare of EGP 130 and air-conditioned increases ranging from 25% to 83%.

The report again cites EGP 335 for a first-class category in 2024 and approximately EGP 200 for a regular Spanish service, followed by Cairo–Aswan fares of EGP 430 in first class and EGP 280 in second. One Arabic paragraph dates the later increase to March 2027, conflicting with the report’s April 2026 publication and repeated references to March 2026. That future date is not treated here as an event that had already occurred.

For Talgo services between Cairo and Alexandria, the article cites launch-period fares of approximately EGP 150–200 in 2022. Its January 2026 paragraph gives EGP 350 instead of EGP 275 for first class, but also assigns EGP 750 instead of EGP 550 to second class. This conflicts with the same route’s later figures and appears to mix routes or classes; those January values cannot form a consistent price sequence.

The article’s March figures are EGP 400 for Cairo–Alexandria first class and EGP 275 for second, and EGP 1,000 and EGP 750 respectively for Cairo–Aswan. Its claim of Cairo–Aswan Talgo fares in 2016 predates the 2022 launch it gives elsewhere, so it is not presented as a valid Talgo comparison.

Compounding household pressure

Rail and Metro increases followed changes to public and private transport fares across the governorates earlier in March. Cairo adjusted several shared-transport routes on March 10, with increases of EGP 1–3 by route and distance. Ordinary minibus fares rose from EGP 18 to EGP 19, and air-conditioned minibuses from EGP 22 to EGP 25.

Some larger-bus routes also saw increases, particularly links between Cairo and neighbouring governorates. Local authorities in Gharbia, Menoufia and Suez posted new fare schedules, with average increases described as 10–20%.

Private shared vehicles and taxis saw varying increases of 15–20%, depending on route and distance. Some Cairo shared-vehicle trips rose by EGP 2–5. White taxis’ starting meter charge increased from EGP 11 to EGP 13, and the per-kilometre rate from EGP 5 to EGP 6, according to the report.

These transport changes followed the government’s March 10 increase in petroleum-product and vehicle-gas prices, the third increase within a year. fuel-price announcement.

Dr Mohamed Saad El Din, an energy specialist and deputy chair of the Petroleum and Mining Chamber, says the effect of a fuel-price increase on transport costs is not equal to the announced fuel increase. Fuel is only one component of operating costs alongside maintenance, depreciation and wages. Fare adjustments should reflect its share of total cost, he argues; some actual increases exceed that logic.

“Separating transport operating costs from fluctuations in energy prices is possible if the state intervenes through subsidies, bearing part of the increase instead of passing it entirely to consumers,” he tells Zawia3.

El Din considers the current fuel increases temporary and linked to exceptional conditions: geopolitical tensions, higher global oil prices, exchange rates, shipping and insurance. He also points to a historical gap between domestic selling prices and production costs after decades of subsidy, making gradual repricing difficult and, in his view, explaining repeated recent rises.

Shehab Abu Zeid, policy adviser and programme director at Nada for Safer Egyptian Roads, sees the fuel and transport increases as part of a broader restructuring that reduces public spending and maximises revenue. Linking them solely to regional tensions misses the objective of aligning fuel prices with international prices, he argues, pointing to similar absolute increases across different products.

“This direction may be understandable from the perspective of the state seeking fiscal balance, but it raises a fundamental question about how the burden is distributed,” Abu Zeid tells Zawia3. Lower-income groups, who form much of public transport’s ridership, are most exposed. Reform must be accompanied by effective social protection.

Abu Zeid calls for transparency, accountability and detailed information on transport authorities’ reported losses and their causes. Such information would help assess decision-making and operational efficiency. Decisions are often presented as final measures—fare increases or a larger private-sector role—without sufficient debate on alternatives or underlying problems, he says.

A model based on market pricing and profit-oriented utility management may be an option, Abu Zeid says, but it requires a strong safety net to protect most citizens under current economic conditions.

The report cites National Authority for Tunnels revenue of around EGP 3.166 billion in 2021/22 and activity costs of EGP 651 million: EGP 193 million in wages and EGP 458.2 million in fuel, materials and spare parts. It reports a surplus or profit of approximately EGP 2.515 billion, then net profits of EGP 3.536 billion in 2022/23, nearly EGP 3 billion in 2023/24 and EGP 4.350 billion in 2024/25.

Elsewhere, the report cites authority chair Tarek Goweily describing losses of EGP 1.3 billion in 2021/22 and EGP 1.896 billion the following year. Media reports put long-term liabilities and supplier dues at EGP 105.5 billion by 2023/24, EGP 31.2 billion above the previous year. The profit and loss figures are not reconciled in the source and may concern different entities, operations or accounting measures; they cannot be treated as equivalent results for the same activity.

Cairo’s Public Transport Authority had a reported EGP 6.423 billion budget for 2025/26. Costs and expenses were approximately EGP 4.068 billion, including EGP 2.378 billion in wages and EGP 1.690 billion in other expenditure. Revenue was EGP 3.585 billion, including EGP 1.881 billion in subsidies, leaving a reported loss of EGP 482.7 million.

More pressure on inflation

Dr Khaled El Shafie, an economist and head of the Capital Centre for Economic Studies and Research, attributes the fare increases to the overlap between higher international fuel prices and government subsidy restructuring.

He forecasts an inflationary effect of at least 5–10%, as stated in the Arabic report, but does not specify whether this means percentage points or a proportional increase in the inflation rate. It is an expert projection, not a measured outcome. With incomes fixed, he expects purchasing power to weaken and living pressures to rise, especially among poorer and middle-class households not fully covered by social protection or announced wage increases.

“Weak oversight of private transport leads to uncontrolled price increases,” El Shafie tells Zawia3. Public transport prices remain based on government estimates of a fair price, despite questions about their relationship to actual operating costs.

He questions continued reported rail and Metro losses and calls for examination of their financial and administrative data. Losses at services used by millions may reflect poor management or insufficient revenue development, rather than operating costs alone, he argues.

El Shafie advocates a broader economic approach: stronger domestic production, greater exports, local industrial capacity and less reliance on imports. This would help reduce fiscal and trade deficits and deliver growth that improves living standards, rather than rely chiefly on price increases.

Economist Zohdy El Shamy, deputy leader of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, is not surprised by the fare decisions. He says the government had long intended them. Cumulative public-transport increases over the last decade have exceeded citizens’ purchasing capacity, he argues, describing an approach to revenue collection that does not adequately consider people’s circumstances or adjust salaries and pensions.

El Shamy warns of effects on inflation and on goods and services. Households are squeezed between rising prices, fixed wages and the pound’s falling value, he tells Zawia3.

Annual urban inflation reached 13.4% in February 2026, against 11.9% in January, while monthly headline inflation was 2.8%, according to the report. Its separate statement of approximately 3% core inflation concerns a different measure and should not be read as the annual headline rate. Central Bank inflation data.

Mohamed Ramadan, a researcher in the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights’ Economic and Social Justice Unit, says transport is a core household expense, especially where people commute far from home. Higher fares force families to redistribute budgets by cutting other essentials, including food.

Ramadan sees a wider approach that transmits external shocks, such as oil-price rises, directly into domestic markets without sufficient mechanisms to absorb them. This can keep inflation high for longer—sticky inflation—and intensify pressure on the economy and families.

“Those most affected include workers in the informal economy, who do not benefit from official wage increases, and a broad section of the middle class on fixed incomes,” he says. Transport takes a larger budget share at the expense of education, health and other needs.

Public transport, particularly the Metro, is essential to millions each day, Ramadan says. Affordable access should be a priority because it supports work and production. Social-protection programmes cannot close the growing gap between wages and living costs after inflation and exchange-rate changes have reduced real pay.

He criticises a narrow fiscal response centred on reducing public spending. Passing the cost of limited utility subsidies to citizens may have wider consequences: higher commuting and production costs and weaker economic activity.

The data and interviews trace rising pressure associated with subsidy removal and energy-price liberalisation. Whether justified by operating costs or international crises, repeated increases leave citizens carrying much of the burden without a matching expansion of social protection.